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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This is a study of the formation of the international regime for controlling the dumping of 
radioactive wastes from ships and aircraft into the oceans, the so-called London Dumping 
Convention, from 1972 \  This international regime prohibits the disposal of high-level 
radioactive wastes in the world's oceans and strictly regulates ocean disposal of low-level 
radioactive wastes, a practice that had been in use since 1946 2. Radwaste disposal, the 
phrase I will use for ocean dumping of low-level radioactive waste, was subsequently 
banned in 1983. This significant policy development is also examined in this study.
Prior to the formation of the international dumping regime, ocean disposal of 
radioactive wastes was subject only to national control. In contrast, in the period since the 
agreement, international control has prevailed. The shift from national to international 
control is my primary concern: what accounts for the adoption of an international dumping 
regime? To answer this question, I have examined the roles played by environmentalists,
1. Definitions of international regimes abound. I use the term in a way similar to Robert O. Keohane 
and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1977). Their definition was, as it has been put by prominent international relations scholar 
Susan Strange, 'something quite narrow -  explicit or implicit internationally agreed arrangements, usually 
executed with the help of an international organization1. Susan Strange ’Cave! hie dragones: A Critique 
of Regime Analysis', in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 343. Keohane has similarly defined international regimes as 'complexes of rules and organizations, 
the core elements of which have been negotiated and explicitly agreed upon by states'. 'International 
Institutions: Two Approaches' International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988), 384.
2. For the convention text, see Appendix A. The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. Signed in London on 13th November 1972, entered into force on 
30th August 1975. International Legal Materials 11 (November 1972), 1291-1314. Dumping is defined 
as any deliberate disposal at sea of material and substances of any kind, form or description from vessels, 
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures, as well as the disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or 
other man-made structures themselves. The disposal of wastes or other matter derived from the normal 
operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structure (operational discharges) is excluded 
from this definition. See also IMO document 'The Provisions of the London Dumping Convention, 1972 
and Decisions made by the Consultative Meetings of the Contracting Parties'. LCD/INF.2. 28 May 1985, 
11-12. Ninth Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. 23-27 September 1985.
ocean scientists, politicians, and international organizations during the late 1960s and early 
1970s. To understand the decision to ban radwaste disposal, I have also examined the roles 
those actors played in the 1980s.
My perspective is not that of an ocean scientist or an environmentalist. As a student 
of international relations and international politics, I will view the adoption of this 
international regime as a case of international cooperation 3. I will, therefore, ignore many 
technical and regulatory aspects of radioactive waste regulation and I will not attempt to 
compare policies across countries 4. There are three theories that attempt to explain how 
such cooperation is accomplished: the Realist model of international cooperation; the 
epistemic community model; and the complex interdependence model. Realism, which 
currently dominates the study of international relations, is relevant because the United States 
acted, as my research will show, as an international leader in the regime-building process. 
Realism assumes that states make their choices independently in order to maximize their own 
returns, and that international cooperation is based on self-interest. The prominent role that 
scientific information occasionally plays in international politics has led to the notion that 
networks of experts, 'epistemic communities', influence policy outcomes at the international 
level in ways that do not necessarily reflect the national identities of the scientists. Some 
scholars have, in their explanations of the international dumping regime and radwaste
3
3. Robert O. Keohane defines cooperation as follows: 'Cooperation occuis when actors adjust their 
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination'. 
'After Hegemony' (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 51-52. See similar definitions by 
Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions', in Kenneth A. Oye 'Cooperation Under Anarchy' (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 
1986), 226; and Keohane International Institutions: Two Approaches', 380-381.
4. Among the existing -  several are comparative -  studies of nuclear waste disposal I will refer to the 
following: E. William Colgalzier, Jr., ed., The Politics o f Nuclear Waste (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1982); Gene I. Rochlin, Plutonium, Power, and Politics. International Arrangements for the Disposition 
of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Charles A. Walker, Leroy 
C. Gould, and Edward J. Woodhouse, eds., Too Hot to Handle? Social and Policy Issues in the 
Management o f Radioactive Wastes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983); Andrew Blowers 
and David Pepper, eds., Nuclear Power in Crisis. Politics and Planning for the Nuclear State (London: 
Croom Helm, 1987); Luther J. Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust. Dealing with Radioactive 
Waste (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1987); Frans Berkhout, Radioactive Waste: Politics 
and Technology (London: Routledge, 1991); Andrew Blowers, David Lowry, and Barry D. Solomon, The 
International Politics o f Nuclear Waste (London: Macmillan Press, 1991).
disposed, pointed to the special influence of scientists 5. Complex interdependence theorists 
presume that some form of international cooperation is needed in situations of 'ecological 
interdependence'. Power politics have to give way to bargaining, compromise and 
cooperation.
This study will demonstrate that none of these theories adequately explain the 
formation of the international dumping regime. Nor do they properly account for the change 
of international policy on radwaste disposal in 1983. I suggest, instead, a transnational 
coalition model. My primary unit of analysis is a transnational coalition rather than states 
or scientists. The formation of the international dumping regime can be understood as the 
goal of a transnational coalition with the aim of significantly reducing, if not halting, ocean 
dumping of wastes, particularly radioactive wastes. The moratorium on radwaste disposal 
imposed in 1983 by the international dumping regime similarly represents a victory by a 
transnational coalition.
Based on this case study, I have developed a number of propositions that may help 
increase our understanding of international cooperation on environmental protection. Thus, 
this case offers a window on the global politics of the environment and international regime- 
building.
History of efforts to control ocean disposal of low-level radioactive waste 
Radioactive wastes -  the source of the problem
Many forms of radioactive waste exist and all must ultimately be disposed of 6. Here we
5. Edward L. Miles, Science, Politics, and International Ocean Management: The Uses of Scientific 
Knowledge in International Negotiations (Berkeley, California: University of California, 1987). Dolores 
Maria Wesson, Science and Policy in International Ocean Regimes: MARPOL 73/78, Annexes II and III, 
and the London Dumping Convention. Unpublished master's thesis. University of Washington, 1990.
6. Alan Preston writes: 'Storage is expensive, and it may not in the long run offer any better chance than 
does prompt disposal in optimizing the choice between cost of protection from radiation and the value 
of the radiation detriment thus avoided. Storage is thus, except in a very few cases, no substitute for
5are primarily concerned with ocean disposal of low-level radioactive wastes. Low-level 
radioactive wastes, which also can be disposed of on land, are the only form of radioactive 
wastes which have been dumped in the oceans 7. Most of these wastes have been packaged 
in 55-gallon drums filled with concrete to ensure that the drums would sink to the ocean 
bottom. These packages were not designed to remain intact for long periods after descent 
to the sea bottom, and it was assumed that all contents would be released relatively 
quickly 8. Fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests and nuclear bombs, which also 
have reached the oceans, is controlled by the Limited Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 9. Fallout 
from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (on April 26, 1986), 
and operational discharges from the British nuclear reprocessing plant Sellafield have been 
by far the greatest contributor to the radioactivity of the marine environment 10.
disposal, and disposal should be the preferred management option as soon as it offers a reasonable chance 
of optimizing with respect to the resulting radiation detriment'. Deep-Sea Disposal of Radioactive Wastes' 
in P.Kilho Park, Dana R. Kester, Iver W. Duedall and Bostwick H. Ketchum, eds., Radioactive Wastes 
and the Ocean. Wastes in the Ocean. Volume 3 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), 108. It should 
be noted that disposal signifies the final fate' of the waste, while storage means a temporary, not 
permanent, scheme. For a discussion of the distinction between storage and disposal, see Gene I.Rochlin, 
Plutonium, Power, and Politics, 95. Furthermore, the disposal concept often does not imply continuous 
monitoring. See Nuclear Science and Technology. Risks, Regulation Responsibilities and Costs in 
Nuclear Waste Management: A Preliminary Survey in the European Community. Report of the
Commission of the European Communities, 1980, 4.
7. At least three submarines, the U.S. submarines the Thresher and the Scorpion and one Soviet nuclear- 
powered submarine, have been lost at sea. See 'Nuclear Waste Management and the Use of the Sea: A 
Special Report to the President and the Congress' (Washington, D.C.: National Advisory Committee on 
Oceans and Atmosphere, 1984), 5.
8. William L. Templeton Dumping Packaged Low Level Wastes in the Deep Ocean'. Nuclear 
Engineering International, February 1982, 39.
9. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 
August 5, 1963, is commonly known as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty. It was signed by more than 100 
states including all major powers except China and France. Over 1200 nuclear tests have been conducted 
throughout the world. The United States conducted 18 tests in 1982, 8 tests in 1990. See Tor A Nuclear 
Safer World', Economist, April 18, 1992. In April 1992, however, France announced that it would 
suspend nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific until the end of same year. Alan Riding Trance 
Bans Atom Tests in Nod to Greens', International Herald Tribune, April 9, 1992.
10. According J. Mike Bewers and Chris J.R. Garrett: The total amount of radioactivity dumped in the 
ocean, some 6 x 104 TBq, is much less that the approximately 2 x 10* TBq that were added to the oceans 
as a result of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons between 1954 and 1962. This, in turn, is only 1%
There are many definitions of radioactive wastes, ranging from those of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which assists the international dumping regime 
with definitions of radioactive wastes, to those of individual laboratories. The most 
important waste forms eue high-level waste, low-level waste, transuranic waste and mill 
tailings. These categories of waste are not simply a function of the nature of the wastes. 
Scientists and regulators have developed subjective distinctions 11.
There are basically two sources of high-level waste. One is unreprocessed spent fuel 
assemblies from nuclear power plants. The other is the highly radioactive waste from 
reprocessing plants. This waste contains the fission products and actinides (heavy elements) 
separated from the dissolved fuel. The highly toxic nature of high-level waste, as well as 
the extremely long half-lives of the nuclides contained in such wastes, require that the waste 
be isolated from the biosphere for several thousand years. In the United States, high-level 
waste is currently kept in pools at reactor sites while a site for a mined geological repository 
is sought. Emplacement of high-level waste into the seabed was debated and rejected at the 
1983 annual meeting of the signatories to the ocean dumping convention.
Transuranic wastes, which result primarily from spent-fuel reprocessing and nuclear 
weapons production, are those which contain transuranic elements (that is, elements having 
a greater atomic number than uranium), for example, plutonium, americium, and neptunium 
in concentrations of greater than ten nanocuries per gram n. The risks from transuranic
6
of the 2 x 1010 TBq that exists naturally in the ocean. However, the mix of radioisotopes involved is 
different in each case and radioisotopes vary widely in the extent to which they can affect marine 
organisms and man, so that the total radioactivity is only a very rough guide to the risk. It must also be 
staled that the dumping cannot be considered safe just because the releases of radionuclides are small 
compared to the natural incidence of radionuclides in the environment'. 'Analysis of the Issues Related 
to Sea Dumping of Radioactive Wastes'. Marine Policy, April 1987, 106. For a definition of 
terabecquerel (TBq) see footnote 12 below.
11. A good example is the so-called de minimis risk approach below which a material will not be 
regarded as radioactive and therefore is 'below regulatory concern'. For a discussion, see C.G. Whipple 
Dealing With Uncertainty About Risk in Risk Management', in National Academy Press, Hazards: 
Technology and Fairness (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986), 44—60.
12. Harold P. Green and L. Marc Zell 'Federal-State Conflict in Nuclear Waste Management: The Legal 
Bases', in E. William Colglazier, Jr., ed., The Politics of Nuclear Waste, 115. The curie (Ci) is a unit 
frequently used as a measure of the amount of radioactive material. It is defined as the amount of
wastes arc not a function of the actual concentration of radioactive contaminant but rather 
lie in the fact that these elements decay so slowly.
Mill tailings are, for the most part, produced at uranium mills. For every ton of 
uranium ore that is milled in the United States, not more than about 5 pounds of uranium 
is extracted, leaving the rest to be discharged as finely ground, sandy tailings. Mill tailings 
contain very low concentrations of naturally occurring radioactive materials. From the mill 
the tailings go as a slurry into a tailings pond, but in drying they form a large spreading 
delta. Huge tailings piles have been created at numerous sites. Typically, tailings are left 
near uranium mills. Today, regulators see the accumulation of huge tailings piles as an 
unacceptable waste disposal practice. The best solution is to require burial of the tailings 
well below grade, or below the surface of the adjacent terrain 13. So far, mill tailings have 
not been the subject of long and severe public protests.
In the United States low-level waste is defined by law. Low-level waste is defined 
as 'radioactive waste not classified as high-level radioactive waste, transuranic waste, spent 
nuclear fuel', or uranium or thorium tailings and wastes M. Low-level waste can take 
solid, liquid, or gaseous forms. Typical wastes include protective clothing, filters, solidified 
liquids, scintillation wastes, animal carcasses, laboratory trash, contaminated soil, activated
radioactive materia] that will produce 37 billion disintegrations (3.7 x lo10) per second. This is 
approximately the number of disintegrations per second in 1 g of radium. A more up-to-date unit is the 
Becquerel (Bq), which is the amount of radioactive material that produces one atomic disintegration per 
second. Since one terabecquerel or TBq is equal to one trillion Becquerel, one TBq is approximately 
equal to 27 G  (37 x 27 -> 1000) . A measure of minute radiation is the nanocuries which is one-billionth 
of a Ci (10~9 curies).
13. See Luther J. Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 11-14. According to Carter, for a 
properly regulated industry, containment of tailings need not be a major problem. However, others 
disagree. See R.L Goble Time Scales and the Problem of Radioactive Waste', in R.E. Kasperson, ed., 
Equity Issues in Radioactive Waste Management (Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1983), 170-171. Policy 
suggestions for management of uranium mill tailings can be found in R.E. Kasperson, P. Derr, and R.W. 
Kates 'Confronting Equity in Radioactive Waste Management: Modest Proposals for a Socially Just and 
Acceptable Program', ibid., 331-368.
14. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, P.L. 96-573, December 22, 1980. Quoted from F.L. 
Parker 'Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal', in Michael E  Burns, ed., Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Regulation: Science, Politics, and Fear (Lewis Publishers, 1988), 85.
metals, and failed equipment 15. Low-level radioactive wastes can be generated by 
industries such as hospitals; medical, educational or research institutions; private or 
government laboratories; or facilities forming part of the nuclear fuel cycle (e.g. nuclear 
power plants, fuel fabrication plants) 16. The United States was producing three million 
cubic feet of low-level waste annually in the early 1980s. Due to dramatically rising costs, 
which have resulted in better packaging of the wastes and therefore volume reduction, this 
figure has since been reduced by two-thirds 17.
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International ocean disposal practices before 1973
Beginning as early as 1946 and extending into 1972, ocean disposal of low-level radioactive 
wastes was practiced by several countries without any international control. Disposal 
operations were carried out under the direction of the relevant national authorities. The 
United Kingdom was the principal dumping country between 1949 and 1970. Isolated 
instances of ocean disposal were carried out by Belgium in 1960, 1962, and 1963. Table 
1 lists the dominant countries that conducted ocean disposal operations along with the 
number of packages and associated radioactivity I8.
15. Quoted from Don M. Berkovitz 'Waste Wais: Did CongTess 'Nuke' State Sovereignty in the Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, in Harvard Environmental Law Review 11 
(1987), 440.
16. F.L. Parker 'Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal', 92.
17. James L. Franklin 'Are 15 Waste Sites Too Much of A Good Thing?' The Boston Globe, February
11, 1991.
18. W.F. Holcomb 'A History of Ocean Disposal of Packaged Low-level Radioactive Waste'. Nuclear
Safety 23 (March-April 1982), 184. Note, the more accurate data on U.S. packages and approximate
radioactivity (4,3 x 1015 Bq), but not weight, are from Amelia A. Hagen History of Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Sea', in P.Kilho Park, Dana R. Kester, Ivcr W. Duedall and Bostwick 
H. Ketchum, eds., Radioactive Wastes and the Ocean. Wastes in the Ocean, vol. 3, 49. See also P. Kilo 
Park, Dana R. Kester, Iver W. Duedall and Botstwick H. Ketchum 'Radioactive Wastes and the Ocean: 
An Overview', ibid., 5. Information on the number of containers dumped and their radionuclide content 
is incomplete. A later evaluation of all available data for past United States dumping resulted in an 
increase in the estimate of the quantity of radioactivity dumped of about 25% from earlier estimates. See
Tahlg 1 ro w tr if^  RmyageH im f W . i  lum ping nf R»il»n»rrtv> W itte I jallaterfllly
Approximate Approximate
9
weight, Namber of radioactivity*
TMMtry Period û t t i f t 1 pflfjflffT Ci
United States 1946-1967 Pacific/Atlantic 25000 107000 116100
United Kingdom 1949-1966 Atlantic 47664 117544 143200
1968,1970
Netherlands 1965-1972 Atlantic 935 2365 62
Japan 1955-1969 Pacific 656 1661 452
Rep. of Korea 1968-1972 Sea of Japan 115 Not available
Total 74255 228685 259814
• Radioactivity at the time of dumping.
International efforts to control dumping of radioactive materials date back to the 1958 
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS) which adopted a resolution stating 
that 'Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from dumping of 
radioactive waste, taking into account any standards and regulations which may be 
formulated by the competent international organizations' 19. This resolution was a 
compromise between those states engaged in such practices, who actively lobbied for its 
deletion, and other states (especially the Soviet Union) who favored a complete prohibition 
of nuclear waste dumping, and it had no great effect20. Although states pledged to 
cooperate and take relevant 'measures', neither the precise nature of these measures nor any
IMO Document 'Report o f Intersessiortal Activities Relating to the Disposal o f Radioactive Wastes at Sea, 
Including the Final Report o f the Scientific Review Report of the Expanded Panel Meeting'. LDC 9/4.
24 June 1985. Annex 2, 12.
19. UN Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, Article 25, para. 1. Signed by, among others, Japan, the 
Soviet Union, the USA and United Kingdom. The article goes on to say: 'All States shall co-operate with 
the competent international organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas 
or air space above, resulting form any activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents'. 
Quoted from L.F.E. Goldie International Maritime Environmental Law Today -  An Appraisal', in J.L. 
Hargrove, ed., Who Protects the Ocean? (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1975), 76.
20. Myres S. McDougaJ and William T. Burke, The Public Order o f the Oceans (New Haven-London: 
Yale University Press, 1962), 864-67.
minimum standards were specified 21. 'In essence, the Conference produced no community 
policy at all' 22.
The conference resolution, which did not have the force of a treaty, further 
recommended that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an organization of the 
United Nations which promotes the peaceful use of nuclear power, undertake studies of the 
technical and scientific problems connected with radioactive waste disposal in the sea. An 
IAEA panel established for this purpose concluded in 1961 that, while there was no hazard 
at that time associated with ocean dumping of radioactive wastes, such hazards might 
become significant in the future. Further, the report concluded that ocean disposal of high- 
level wastes could not be recommended and that low-level wastes should be dumped only 
under controlled conditions. The panel proposed an international accord to prevent 
radioactive hazards accumulating to unacceptable levels. This proposal, however, was never 
embodied in an international convention 23.
Starting in 1967, a voluntary mechanism set up by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) 
of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) provided 
guidelines and undertook supervisory responsibility for disposal of low-level wastes by NEA 
member countries 2A. That same year the first NEA-supervised international nuclear waste 
dumping operation was carried out at a depth of 5000 meters in the eastern Atlantic Ocean.
10
21. M.S. Schenker 'Saving the Dying Sea? The London Dumping Convention on Ocean Dumping', in 
Cornell International Law Journal 7 (1973), 37. See also 'International Conventions Relating to 
Radioactive Marine Pollution', in Nuclear Law Bulletin 14 (April 1974), 41-42.
22. Alton Frye, The Hazards o f Atomic Wastes: Perspectives and Proposals on Oceanic Disposal 
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962), 29. See also Daniel P. Finn 'International Law and 
Scientific Consultation on Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Ocean', in P. Kilo Park, Dana R. Kester, Iver 
W. Duedall and Bostwick H. Ketchum, eds., Radioactive Wastes and the Ocean. Wastes in the Ocean. 
voL 3, 71. This interpretation is supported by, among others, Lindsay Grant (acting deputy assistant 
secretary of state for environmental and population affairs). See the statement before 'Radiological 
Contamination of the Oceans'. Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and the 
Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. House of Representatives. 1976, 94th 
Congress. Second Session, 11.
23. L.F.E. Goldie International Maritime Environmental Law Today -  An Appraisal', 94-95. See also 
Daniel P. Finn, ibid., 71-72.
24. W.F. Holcomb 'A History of Ocean Disposal of Packaged Low-level Radioactive Waste', 184.
The primary objectives of OECD/NEA were 'to develop, at the international level, a safe and 
economic method for ocean disposal and to demonstrate this by a joint experimental disposal 
operation involving several member countries' 25. Belgium, France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Netherlands, and Britain supplied some 35,000 containers of wastes weighing 
nearly 11,000 t and containing approximately 8,000 Ci of radioactivity. The primary 
dumpers were Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Britain and they participated in 
a series of coordinated dumping operations which took place in 1967, 1969 and each year 
from 1971 to 1982. France, Italy, Sweden, and the Federal Republic of Germany only 
participated in the first two dumping operations. The regionally coordinated dumpings called 
for agreement on dumpsite selection, package design for the waste material, facilities 
available on the dumping vessel, and duties of escorting officers The waste came 
mostly from national research centers, though in later years low-level wastes from nuclear 
power plants were included 27. Table 2 lists the mass of the material dumped from 1967 
to 1982 as well as the estimated alpha and beta/gamma activity of the wastes at the time of 
packaging 2S.
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25. 'Radioactive Waste Disposal Operation Into the Atlantic -  1967. European Nuclear Energy Agency. 
Organization for Cooperation and Development. 1968. Quoted from Robert S. Dyer 'Sea Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste: A Brief History', in Thomas C. Jackson, ed., Nuclear Waste Management: The Ocean 
Alternative' (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 12.
26. Alan Preston Deep-Sea Disposal of Radioactive Wastes', 115.
27. The principal sources were wastes from nuclear power plant operations, other nuclear fuel cycle 
operations, including fuel fabrication and reprocessing, radionuclides used in medicine, research and 
industry and from the decontamination and dismantling of redundant plant and equipment. IMO 
Document. 'Report of Intersessional Activities Relating to the Disposal o f Radioactive Wastes at Sea, 
Including the Final Report of the Scientific Review Report of the Expanded Panel Meeting', Annex 2, 73.
28. IMO document 'Report o f Intersessional Activities Relating to the Disposal o f Radioactive Wastes 
at Sea, Including the Final Report o f the Scientific Review Report of the Expanded Panel Meeting’, Annex 
2, 104.
Alpha, beta, and gamma rays are collectively called ionizing radiation. Radioactivity is a nuclear 
phenomenon and it does not depend in any way on chemical or physical changes that an atom may 
undergo. When an alpha, beta, or gamma ray enters a piece of matter, energy is transferred to the 
material through collisions with the atoms in the matter. If the material is sufficiently thin or if the 
radiation has a high energy, the particle can pass completely through the material, losing only a portion 
of its original energy; otherwise, the particle will be absorbed within the materia] and will lose all its 
energy through ionization. Ionization gives rise to chemical reactions and to a genera] healing of the
12
Table 2 Radioactive Waste Dumped into the North Atlantic Ocean wider the Supervision of OECD-NEA, 1967-1982
Annrnïim ate radinartivitv Ci
Gross
Weight Beta/
Year i Alpha r^mma Tritium
1967 10895 253 7636*
1969 9178 485 22066*
1971 3968 627 11148*
1972 4131 681 21626*
1973 4350 740 12660*
1974 2265 416 100356*
1975 4454 767 57374 29690
1976 6772 878 53518 20703
1977 5605 958 76451 31886
1978 8046 1101 79628 36613
1979 5416 1414 83166 42240
1980 8319 1855 181227 98135
1981 9434 2177 153566 74372
1982 11693 1428 126988 77449
1983 No dumping
1984 No dumping
Total 94526 13780 987410 411088
• Includes tritium (*H).
From 1946 through 1970 the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
allowed disposal of low-level radioactive wastes in the ocean at AEC-Iicensed sites. 
Approximately 107,000 canisters (116,100 Ci) were disposed of 29. The wastes from all 
sources consisted of contaminated laboratory glassware, bench tops, floor coverings, tools, 
chemicals, and animal carcasses. The wastes were mainly disposed of in three sites in the
material.
Alpha particles are only capable of traveling a few inches in air and are stopped by a sheet of paper or 
intact skin. On the other hand, if alpha-emitting elements are taken internally, they are highly toxic. 
Alpha particles produce more deleterious biological effects than the lightly ionizing radiation associated 
with beta, gamma, or X-radiation. Although beta particles have a range greater than alpha particles, they 
can be stopped by relatively thin layers of water, glass, or metal. The range of beta particles in tissue is 
great enough, however, to cause bums when the skin is exposed. Beta-active isotopes that may become 
fixed in the body are highly toxic. Gamma rays penetrate a relatively great thickness of matter before 
being absorbed. Because of the penetrating nature of gamma radiation, overexposure of the body to it 
results in deep-seated organic damage. Of the three types of radiation from radioactive substances, 
gamma radiation is by far the most serious external hazard and is the one that requires heavy shielding 
and remotely controlled operations.
29. Amelia A. Hagen estimates the radioactivity to 4.3 x 1015 Bq in History of Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Disposal in the Sea', 49. Information on the number of containers dumped and their radionuclide 
content is incomplete. See footnote (18) above.
Atlantic, off New Jersey and Massachusetts, and one site in the Pacific, off San Francisco. 
More than ninety percent of all the radioactive waste packages and ninety-five percent of 
the estimated radioactivity dumped were received by these four sites.
The largest quantity of radioactive wastes was dumped from 1946 through 1962. In 
1960, because of strong and increasing public opposition to ocean disposal, the AEC 
imposed a moratorium on the issuance of new licenses for dumping 30. The AEC turned 
instead to land-burial, which also entailed relatively lower costs compared to ocean 
disposal 31. By 1963 most ocean dumping activities had been phased out. About 350 
containers (with an estimated activity of 230 Ci) were dumped in the ocean during 1963 and 
1970 when all dumping of radioactive wastes was terminated 32.
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International ocean disposal practices after 1973
Representatives from ninety-two nations, meeting in a highly publicized United Nations- 
sponsored conference held in London from October 30 to November 13, 1972, agreed for 
the first time to establish an international dumping regime controlling the disposal of wastes 
in the oceans, radioactive wastes included. All Western European maritime states
30. George T. Mazuzan and J. Samuel Walker, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear 
Regulation 1946-62 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 304-345. In 1971, an official of 
the Atomic Energy Agency explained: TVo new licenses authorizing radioactive waste disposal at sea have 
been issued in the past 10 years. Only one commercial organization (which has never conducted any sea 
disposal), two Government agencies, and one university are still authorized to dispose of radioactive 
wastes in the ocean. The major contractors of the AEC have not disposed of any wastes at sea since 
1962'. James T. Ramey 'Ocean Dumping o f Waste Materials'. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. House of Representatives. Ninety-Second Congress, April 5,6, 7,1971, 
231.
31. Contributing to the high costs were containers, transportation to the dock, and transportation to 
disposal point in the ocean. See Conrad P. Straub, Low-Level Radioactive Wastes. Their Handling, 
Treatment, and Disposal (United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1964), 326.
32. W.F. Holcomb 'A History of Ocean Disposal of Packaged Low-level Radioactive Waste’, 189. 
Amelia A. Hagen, who also assesses that 350 containers were dumped, estimates the activity to be 8.5 
x 10“  Bq. Hagen 'History of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Sea', 51.
participated together with the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand. A large number of developing countries were also represented 33. This 
truly international regime prohibits ocean dumping of high-level radioactive waste while 
medium-wastes and low-level radioactive wastes may be dumped when done in essentially 
a 'controlled way’.
The international dumping regime prohibits dumping without a permit. Governments 
are responsible for issuing permits to dumpers under their jurisdiction and for determining 
that any required conditions are fulfilled. Members must report the quantity and nature of 
the material dumped to a secretariat, which then reports this information to the other 
members of the regime. However, it is the international dumping regime that determines the 
criteria for issuing radwaste dumping permits -  in essence the regime's regulatory policy on 
radioactive waste disposals -  and dumping criteria are regularly reviewed by the members. 
This takes place at the London headquarters of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), an agency of the United Nations which facilitates international cooperation on 
technical matters affecting international shipping, and which serves as regime secretariat. 
The IAEA determines what radioactive materials arc unsuitable for ocean dumping and 
makes recommendations on the disposal of other radioactive wastes. The IAEA also makes 
recommendations with regard to selection of a dumping site, packaging for dumping, 
approval of the ship and its equipment, escorting officers and record keeping. In setting 
radiation protection standards, the IAEA relies on the recommendations of the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), an international nongovernmental scientific 
organization of professional radiologists.
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33. Eighty countries participated: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, The Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, The Ivory Coast, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Nepal, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, 
Portugal, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somali Democratic Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, 
United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, the Soviet Union, Venezuela, People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen, and Zambia. Twelve governments had send observers.
Since 1971, only Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Britain have been 
conducting radwaste disposal. In 1974, France, Italy, West Germany and Sweden withdrew 
from the operation of the NEA/OECD arrangement, opting for land storage for waste 
products.
In 1979 both Japan and the United States announced their intention to initiate new 
programs of radioactive waste dumping into the ocean. Japan became a member of the 
international dumping regime in 1980 most probably in order to legitimize its plans to dump 
one to two million drums containing about 100,000 curies per year of low-level waste into 
a Pacific Ocean site 34. The United States considered a plan to scuttle ageing nuclcar 
submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As many as 100 submarines were to be 
involved in this dumping program, each representing 50,000 curies of radioactive waste. The 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) formulated new regulations that would permit 
resumption of ocean dumping of radioactive wastes, including decommissioned nuclear 
submarines3S. These plans were, however, soon defeated by Congress and 
environmentalists and the radioactive engine compartments of the submarines were instead 
buried at two government land facilities as an 'interim move’ 36.
In 1983, in response to the planned dumpings by Japan and the United States and the 
annual European dumping operation against which protest was raising, a transnational 
coalition composed of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), principally Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth, developing countries, led by South Pacific island nations, and the 
Nordic countries in alliance with Spain, succeeded in imposing a moratorium on radwaste
15
34. See J.M. Van Dyke 'Ocean Disposal of Nuclear Wastes'. Marine Policy, April 1988, 86. According 
to Daniel P. Finn, up to a million drums would be disposed of over the decade with an annual radioactive 
input of approximately 10s Ci during the operational phase. See 'Nuclear Waste Management Activities 
in the Pacific Basin and Regional Cooperation on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle'. Ocean Development and 
International Law Journal 13 (1983), 215. Japan has contended that the London Dumping Convention 
justifies their planned low-level dumping. See Jon Van Dyke, Kirk R. Smith and Suliana Siwatibau 
■Nuclear Activities and the Pacific Islanders', Energy 9 (1984), 743. See also James B. Branch The Waste 
Bin: Nuclear Waste Dumping and Storage in the Pacific' AMBIO 13 (1984), 327.
35. Colin Norman U.S. Considers Ocean Dumping of Radwastes' Science 215 (5 March, 1982), 1217-19.
36. Philip Trapp 'Nuclear Subs to Settle on Dry Land', Oceans 17 (July 1984), 34-35.
dumping within the international dumping regime. Although the moratorium, which was 
renewed for an indefinite period in 1985, technically speaking did not outlaw dumping, the 
previous practices were no longer tolerated internationally. The moratorium was strongly 
opposed by Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United States, and Britain. 
The British government threatened to renounce its membership of the international dumping 
regime with a view to further dumping, and the Swiss government announced that it would 
continue dumping low-level wastes in spite of the moratorium. France, who had last 
dumped in 1969, and Holland both seemed interested in further dumping 37. But the 
planned dumpings by Britain were boycotted by leading British transport unions and the 
government shelved its plans to dump. Responding to protests from its Pacific neighbors, 
the Japanese government decided in December 1984 to discontinue radwaste dumping 3B.
In the late 1980s, the U.K. Ministry of Defence considered the option of disposing 
of obsolete nuclear submarines at sea, in possible breach of both the informally agreed upon 
Law of the Sea and the international dumping regime 39. Since the mid-1980s discharges 
of radioactivity from the British nuclear reprocessing plant Sellafield (previously known as 
Windscale) into the Irish Sea have also caused concern within the international dumping 
regime 40. In the spirit of the international dumping regime, and a regional dumping 
regime signed by countries bordering the North Sea -  the so-called Oslo Convention -  the
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37. 'United Kingdom: Ocean Disposal Operations to Continue', Nuclear News, July 1983, 50.
38. 'Ocean Disposal: Japan Calls a Halt', Nuclear News, February 1985, 118.
39. David Fairhall 'MoD Favours Scuttling Old Nuclear Subs', The Guardian, April 13, 1989. John 
Pienaar 'Nuclear Subs May Be Scuttled', The Independent, April 13, 1989. Peter Jones 'Plans to Dump 
Nuclear Subs at Sea', Marine Pollution Bulletin 20 (June 1989), 251. See also W. Jackson Davis and Jon 
M. Van Dyke Dumping of Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines at Sea', Marine Policy, November 1990, 
467-476.
40. For recent concern, see Tim Deere-Jones 'Back to the Land: The Sea-to-Land Transfer of
Radioactive Pollution'. The Ecologist 21 (January/February 1991), 18-23. For a rare balanced and well-
documented disraissinn, see M.F. Perutz 'Is Britain 'Befouled’?' in The New York Review o f Books,
November 23, 1989, 51 ff.
Sellafield discharges arc no longer a domestic British matter only involving Ireland 41. 
Political parties and Greenpeace Denmark have put pressure on the Danish government, 
which also is concerned about its fishing interests, to protest against the Sellafield 
discharges 42.
Beginning in the 1980s American, British, and Japanese attempts to find permanent 
land-based disposal facilities for radioactive waste have increasingly met with public 
opposition and politically acceptable solutions seem out of reach 43. Radwaste disposal 
is, to this day, constantly being reexamined by some governments. United States EPA 
officials have, for example, been reconsidering radioactive waste disposal in the oceans, but 
dumping has not been resumed M.
The members of the international dumping regime have in the period following the 
moratorium tried without success to reach agreement on the environmental effects of 
radwaste disposal. A small group of nations, consisting of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Japan, occasionally supported by France, have regularly opposed the waste 
management policy advocated by the majority of nations and have refused to incorporate
17
41. Convention for the Protection of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (‘Oslo 
Convention'). Entered into force 1974. International Legal Materials, 11, 262-266.
42. Persona] communication. National Agency of Environmental Protection, Denmark, October 1988.
43. For Great Britain, see Duncan Campbell and Patrick Forbes '£100 Million to be made as Nuclear 
Waste Dumpers Scramble to Get Rich Quick', New Statesman, 18 October 1985, 5; Simon Hadlington UK 
Nuclear Waste Strategists Still Facing Public Suspicion', Nature 333 (2 June 1988), 388; Christine 
McGourty UK Public says 740, Thanks' to Nuclear Waste', Nature 336 (I December 1988) 415. Recently, 
public protests in Japan against radioactive waste disposal and planned nuclear reprocessing plants have 
intensified. See Michael Cross 'Japan's Nuclear Industry Tries to Rescue Its Image'. New Scientist, 24/31 
December 1988, 8; Charles Smith 'Electoral Fallout. Row over Reprocessing Nuclear Waste Widens', Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 26 October, 1989, 12-13; 'Japan's Green Tinge'. The Economist, February 2, 
1991; 'Japan. Plutonium Politics', The Economist, October 5, 1991; David E. Sanger Tokyo Cautioned 
on Nuclear Storage', International Herald Tribune, April 14, 1992. For the United States 'Nuclear 
Gridlock', The Economist, January 18, 1992, 42-43.
44. See Alan B. Sielen 'Sea Changes? Ocean Dumping and International Regulation'. Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 1 (Spring 1988), 1-32. Sielen is presently Director, Multilateral 
Staff, Office of Internationa] Activities, U.S. EPA.
international policy on this issue into their national policies 4S. A political deadlock may 
be inevitable. However, the members of the international dumping regime have continued 
to meet and have avoided undermining the regime's authority despite severe conflicts. 
Despite the conflicts surrounding seabed emplacement of high-level radioactive waste, for 
example, the 1984 annual meeting nonetheless agreed that the international dumping regime 
was 'the appropriate international forum' to examine this issue *6. In a similar manner, the 
group of international experts which met in 1985 within the context of the international 
dumping regime to examine whether radwaste disposal was advisable on technical and 
scientific grounds wrote in their report that 'present and any future dumping can only take 
place within the still-developing framework of international regulations' 4?. In short, the 
London Dumping Convention has established a robust international regime for regulation of 
ocean disposal of radioactive waste 48.
18
45. In October 1987, for example, the Japanese delegation to that year's meeting of the international 
dumping regime stated that 'although it is not presently dumping radioactive wastes at sea, it regards sea 
dumping as an important option for the future'. Jon M. Van Dyke 'Ocean Disposal of Nuclear Wastes', 
82.
46. Full text of this consensus decision is: '.1. The Consultative Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the 
London Dumping Convention is the appropriate international forum to address the question of the disposal 
of high-level radioactive wastes and matter into the sea-bed, including the question of the compatibility 
of this type of disposal with the provisions of the London Dumping Convention. 2. No such disposal 
should take place unless and until it is proved to be technically feasible and environmentally acceptable, 
including a determination that such wastes and matter can be effectively isolated from the marine 
environment, and a regulatory mechanism is elaborated under the London Dumping Convention to govern 
the disposal into the sea-bed of such radioactive wastes and matter'. IMO Document 1Report of the 
Eighth Consultative M e e tin g LDC 8/10, 8 March 1984, 31.
47. IMO Document 'Report of Intersessional Activities Relating to the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes 
at Sea, including the Final Report of the Scientific Review Report of the Expanded Panel Meeting\ Annex
2, 71.
48. The international dumping regime is 'robust' or in 'institutional equilibrium’ in the sense defined by 
Kenneth A. Shepsle. He regards 'an institution as 'essentially' in equilibrium if changes transpired 
according to an ex ante plan (and hence part of the original institution) for institutional change'. Shepsle 
’Studying Institutions. Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 
1 (1989), 143. See also Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of institutions for 
Collective Action (Cambridge, New York: University Press, 1990), 58, This definition of robustness 
comes close to how Erast B. Haas defines regime stability: 'Regime stability implies several things. The 
norms, rules, and procedures that make up the regime will not be challenged by the members so as to 
throw the existence of the regime into doubt. The rights of the parties will be generally respected and
I will demonstrate that transnational actors have supplied crucial leadership in the 
regime-building phase and when international policy on radwaste disposed changed in 1983. 
In the early 1970s, elite United Nations officials galvanized international expectations in the 
regime-building phase and turned a United States proposal into an internationally acceptable 
dumping regime. In the 1980s, international environmental pressure groups constructed and 
focused international public opinion on pro-dumping nations. Transnational actors and a 
coalition of small states have thus successfully created international norms and regulatory 
machinery for ocean protection that constrain pro-dumping governments.
My conclusions will challenge basic assumptions in the examined literature on global 
cooperation on environmental protection. First, powerful governments build international 
cooperative agreements but, once established, might cooperate against their own will. 
Second, public opinion, national and international, has a significant impact on international 
cooperation. Third, international cooperation is heavily conditioned by domestic politics. 
FouTth, international organizations and NGOs occasionally play important roles in 
international cooperation.
Summary
In 1972, states reached for the first time agreement on an international dumping regime 
prohibiting the dumping of high-level radioactive wastes into the world's oceans and 
regulating ocean disposal of low-level radioactive wastes. This international regime has 
functioned as intended. It has been an active international forum for policy coordination, and 
a significant policy shift, the 1983 moratorium on radwaste disposal, has been adopted. 
Hence, the international dumping regime is a rare example of international cooperation on 
environmental protection. While international environmental agreements and conventions 
often fall short of expectations, international policy coordination has taken place although
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obligations will be carried out. Challenges will take the form of conduct specified by the regime's 
procedures'. "Why Collaborate? Issue-Lmkagc and International Regimes'. World Politics 32 (April 
1980), 386.
the international dumping regime obviously is a hard case of international cooperation on 
environmental protection 49.
Another important fact is that membership in the international dumping regime has 
been rising since international agreement was reached in 1972 50. Governments involved 
in radwaste disposal as well as governments opposing this practice have become members 
of the international dumping regime. It thus represents a significant departure from 
individual nations' uncontrolled dumping activities in the past. Today the international 
dumping regime is the forum where governments debate their dumping policies and attempt 
to reach agreement on international controls. Thus, the international dumping regime has 
been hailed as 'a milestone of international cooperation on ocean pollution control' S1.
I will attempt to explain the forces that converged to produce the international 
dumping regime, as well as the forces that later converged to produce the ban on radwaste 
disposal. I will also use this case to test dominant theories of international cooperation and, 
finally, to propose a new model to explain global cooperation on environmental protection. 
In a world searching for policy responses to global environmental problems such as C02
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49. According to Oran R. Young, participants in international institutions can have strong incentives to 
disregard or change institutional requirements. The following factors seem likely to produce such 
incentives: one or more of the prominent members of the subject group are predisposed to dislike the 
outcomes they expect a regime to produce; it is comparatively easy to violate the rules of the regime 
either without detection or in such a way that incontrovertible evidence of the violation is difficult to 
obtain; and, ongoing changes in the character of international society raise doubts about the sociopolitical 
or intellectual underpinnings of the regime. The more of these conditions present at the same time, the 
harder the case as far as the effectiveness of institutional arrangements is concerned. See discussion in 
The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables', 5, to have been 
included in James N. Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order 
and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Kenneth N. 
Waltz gives the following definition: 'hard cases -  situations, for example, in which parties have strong 
reasons to behave contrary to the predictions of one's theory’. Theory of International Politics in Robert 
O. Keohane, ed., Realism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 123.
50. As of 17 May 1985, 56 governments had become member to the international dumping regime. IMO 
document 'The Provisions of the London Dumping Convention, 1972 and Decisions Made by the 
Consultative Meetings of the Contracting Parties', Annex 1. LCD/INF.2.
51. P. Kilho Park and Thomas P. O'Connor 'Ocean Dumping Research: Historical and Internationa] 
Development', in Bostwick H. Ketchum, Dana R. Kester and P. Kilho Park, eds., Ocean Dumping of 
Industrial Wastes (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), 6.
emissions and ozone depletion, the international dumping regime -  the first international 
institution to address global problems of marine pollution -  presents a significant case 52. 
Our knowledge about international cooperation on environmental protection is limited and 
studies in building of international regimes for environmental protection are almost 
nonexistent. This study of the formation of the international dumping regime can, therefore, 
offer theoretical as well as practical insight into global cooperation on environmental 
protection.
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52. On the significance of the international dumping regime, one U.S. EPA official writes: 'Although in 
the past decade the London Convention has been supplemented by several regional marine protection 
agreements to address the particular needs of such areas as the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the 
South Pacific, it is still generally recognized as the standard against which all disposal operations must 
be measured'. Alan B. Sielen 'Sea Changes? Ocean Dumping and International Regulation', 4-5. The 
London Dumping Convention is not the first international convention for protection of the marine 
environment against radiation. But, as it has been noted, 'a basic characteristic of this period [the period 
from 1954 to 1971] is that environmental concern was limited to oil pollution. Conventions on nuclear 
ships and nuclear damage treated the matter as a dangerous activity rather than as an environmental 
problem'. Gr.J. Timagenis, International Control of Marine Pollution (New York: Oceana Publications, 
1980), Vol.l, 5. Equally important, the global dumping convention regulates intentional, as opposed to 
accidental and unintentional, disposal of waste into the ocean. Put differently, unlike the earlier oil 
pollution conventions this regime considers ocean dumping 'a conscious decision to alter a given 
environmental medium for perceived social benefits'. Allen L. Springer, The International Law of 
Pollution: Protecting the Global Environment in a World of Sovereign States (Westport, Connecticut: 
Quorom Books, 1983), 7.
There is no single global regime for marine pollution control. Many marine pollution control 
arrangements exist, but are mostly either regional or bilateral. See Peter Hayward 'Environmental 
Protection: Regional Approaches', Marine Policy, April 1984, 106-19; Dominique Alheritiere 'Marine 
Pollution Control Regulation: Regional Approaches', Marine Policy, July 1982, 162-73; Sonja A.
Boehmer-Christiansen 'Marine Pollution Control in Europe: Regional Approaches, 1972-80', Marine 
Policy, January 1984, 44-55. Ocean dumping contributes only 10 percent of wastes entering the oceans. 
The remaining 90 percent of wastes originate from sources on land, the so-called land-based sources. 
While no global regime presently covers land-based sources of marine pollution, some regional 
arrangements do. The members of the international dumping regime are currently considering the 
expansion of the regime to cover such sources. For a proposal, see W. Jackson Davis 'Global Aspects 
of Marine Pollution Policy: The Need for a New International Convention', Marine Policy, May 1990, 
191-97.
CHAPTER 2
THE INTERNATIONAL DUMPING REGIME AND REALISM, THE EPISTEMIC 
COMMUNITY MODEL, AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE
In this chapter, I examine how three models of international cooperation predict how the 
international dumping regime would be constructed and, once constructed, how it would 
change. Several questions are posed: Under what conditions are global regimes for 
environmental protection likely to be created? Who builds global regimes for environmental 
protection and exactly how do they do it? What are the constraints on global cooperation 
on environmental protection and how can they be overcome? Once in place, what would 
change a global regime on environmental protection? In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 ,1 will test the 
ability of each of these three models to explain the formation of the international dumping 
regime.
I will examine the following models of international cooperation: the Realist, the 
epistemic community, and the complex interdependence models. Most students of 
international politics subscribe to a Realist point of view. Realist scholars, who especially 
dominate American thinking about international politics, point to Thucydides' History of the 
Peloponnesian War, Machiavelli's The Prince, and Hobbes' Leviathan as their theoretical 
ancestors They share the view that states fundamentally struggle for physical survival and
1 Students of international politics are often categorized as either Realists or Reflectionists (liberals). 
See Robert O. Keohane 'International Institutions: Two Approaches'. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., however, uses 
the labels neorealism and neoliberalism. See 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism' World Politics 40 (January
1988), 235-51. Realists emphasize anarchy, states as the principal actors, and pursuit of power as the 
primary objective of states. Major realist works include: E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: 
An Introduction to the Study o f International Relations (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964); Hans J. 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, Knopf, 1973); 
Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and Annette 
Baker Fox (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical 
Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954); Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). Realists often use results from economists' studies to understand 
international cooperation, especially how and when public goods might be provided. At the same time, 
it is widely held by economists that pollution control, within as well as among states, is a typical public 
good problem. The arguments developed by a diverse group of scholars of the environment and natural
political independence 2. Realists have contributed substantially to our understanding of 
international regimes, international cooperation and international leadership, three distinct but 
related phenomena in international politics. They as well as many other scholars view the 
prospects for international cooperation on environmental protection with pessimism ?. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will show that Realism correctly predicts that the United States played an 
important role in the regime-building process. It will also become clear, however, that 
Realism ignores crucial aspects of this process.
Peter Haas's recent book Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics o f International 
Environmental Protection, a study of the Mediterranean Action Plan to protect against 
marine pollution in the Mediterranean basin, has drawn attention to the way an epistemic 
community, 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
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resources are therefore often repeated in Realist studies. The most important contribution by natural 
resource economists is H. Scott Gordon The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The 
Fishery' Journal o f Political Economy 62 (April 1954). For externalities, see EJ. Mishan The Postwar 
Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay' Journal of Economic Literature 17 (March 1971), 1-
28. For the economics studies of international pollution problems, see Ingo Walter, ed., Studies in 
International Environmental Economics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976); Ingo Walter, 
International Economics o f Pollution (London: Macmillan, 1975); Charles S. Pearson, International 
Marine Environmental Policy: The Economic Dimension (The John Hopkins University Press, 1975); C. 
Pearson 'Environmental Policy and the Ocean', in Perspectives on Ocean Policy. Conference on Conflict 
and Order in Ocean Relations (The John Hopkins University, 1975), 207-19; Richard N. Cooper 'An 
Economists' View of the Ocean', in Perspectives on Ocean Policy. Conference on Conflict and Order in 
Ocean Relations, 143-65. For the most widely quoted work on collective action problems, see Mancur 
Olson, The Logic o f Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory o f Groups (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1965). For a recent analysis of collective action, see Elinor Ostrom, Governing 
the Commons. For collective action problems and international cooperation on environmental protection 
and natural resource uses, see Per Magnus Wijkman 'Managing the Global Commons' International 
Organization 36 (Summer 1982), 513-36. See also Bruno S. Frey, International Political Economy 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 122-42.
2 For a critical European review of Realism, see Pierre de Senarclens The 'Realist' Paradigm and 
International Conflict' International Social Science Review, February 1991, 5-19.
3 Other scholars who do not represent the international politics schools examined here are also 
pessimistic about the prospects for international cooperation on environmental protection. In fact, 
pessimism is widespread among commentators. See, for example, William Ophuls The International 
State of Nature and the Politics of Scarcity', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., The 
Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives (New York: Random House, 1983), 367-89.
domain or issue-area', might induce states to cooperate 4. The epistemic community 
research program, which is still in the process of defining its method as well as its object 
of study, has initially focused on compliance with international regimes rather than regime 
creation 5. Haas's conclusion, that the Mediterranean Action Plan essentially was instituted 
and advanced by an epistemic community, radically challenges Realism. The epistemic 
community concept originates from the reflective literature which asserts that international 
cooperation basically varies with evolution and change in governments' perception of 
international cooperation 6. Epistemic community theorists generally focus on the impact
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4 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination1. 
International Organization 46 (Winter 1992), 3. Saving the Mediterranean. The Politics of International 
Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
5 Peter M. Haas Do Regimes Matter? The Mediterranean Action Plan and Evolving Policies to 
Control Mediterranean Pollution’. Manuscript, 1988. Peter M. Haas Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic 
Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control' international Organization 43 (Summer 1989), 377- 
403. Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas 'Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the 
Creation of a Reflective Research Program' international Organization 46 (Winter 1992), 367-90.
6 For an introduction to the so-called Reflective approach, the alternative to the Realist and 
Rationalistic Realist approach, see Robert O. Keohane ’International Institutions: Two Approaches'. 
Modem Reflective or liberal theory, like its predecessors 'functionalism' and 'neofunctionalism’, stresses 
the impact of domestic society on international society, interdependence, and international institutions. 
Major liberal works include: Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area 
(Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting Of Europe (Stanford University Press, 
1956). For the classic outline of functionalistic international theory, see David Mitrany, A Working Peace 
System (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966). Ernst B. Haas has repeatedly examined the cognitive and 
philosophical foundation of international cooperation. See -  all by Haas -  'Why Collaborate? Issue- 
Linkage and International Regimes'; Words Can Hurt You: Or, Who Said What to Whom About 
Regimes', in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimesy 23-59; When Knowledge is Power: Three 
Models o f Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). For 
empirical work in this tradition, see Ernst B. Haas, Mary Pat Williamson, and Don Babai, Scientists and 
World Order: The Use of Technical Information in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977); Edward L. Miles, Science, Politics, and International Ocean Management 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1987); Peter M. Haas Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities 
and Mediterranean Pollution Control'. See also Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean and 'Obtaining 
International Environmental Protection Through Epistemic Consensus’ Millennium 19 (Winter 1990), 347- 
64. Although not representative of the reflective ’school’, the importance of science and knowledge within 
certain issue-areas has also been stressed by James N. Rosenau 'Capabilities and Control in an 
Interdependent World' International Security 1 (Fall 1976), 32-49. See also Rosenau 'New Non-Land 
Resources as Global Issues', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., The Global Agenda. 
Issues and Perspectives', 390-97. The importance of understanding how perception guides international 
actors is stressed by, among others, Christer Jonsson 'A Cognitive Approach to International Negotiation',
of science and knowledge on international politics. The role of scientists should be 
examined in other cases of international cooperation on environmental protection. Epistemic 
community analysts view the prospects of international cooperation on environmental 
protection with moderate optimism 7. This case study, however, questions the usefulness 
of the concept of epistemic community.
The complex interdependence model, as far as it is one model, is the major challenger 
to Realism. Complex interdependence theorists claim that a historically unprecedented 
expansion of trade, advances in technology, military technology included, and increased 
communication, have drastically changed how states today define their interests and pursue 
foreign policy objectives 8. The complex interdependence research program on international
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European Journal of Political Research 11 (1983), 139-50. Jonsson has later given up the cognitive 
approach* as a separate research program. See International Aviation and the Politics o f Regime Change 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1987), 24. The literature on the environment as a new international policy area 
often implicitly subscribes to a reflective view. See, among others, Lynton Keith Caldwell, International 
Environmental Policy. Emergence and Dimensions (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1984). See 
also by Caldwell, Between Two Worlds: Science, The Environmental Movement and Policy Choice 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
7 See Peter M. Haas, 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus',
348.
1 On interdependence theory, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Transnational Relations 
and World Politics', in Leland M. Goodrich and David A. Kay, eds., International Organization (Madison, 
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 427-54; Keohane and Nye, Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition; Keohane and Nye Power and Interdependence revisited', 
International Organization 41 (1987), 725-53. For critical discussion of the notion of interdependence, 
but little about complex interdependence, see RJ. Barry Jones and Peter Willetts, eds., Interdependence 
on Trial (London: Francis Pinter, 1984). For Oran Young, The Politics of International Regime 
Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment' International Organization 43 (Summer
1989), 349-75; International Cooperation. Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); 'Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development 
of Institutions in International Society' International Organization 45 (Summer 1991), 281-308. Many 
of the core arguments of interdependence theory are masterly applied to issues like protection of the 
global commons and others in James N. Rosenau 'Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World'. 
An important contribution, which however disagrees with Keohane and Nye's 'Power and 
Interdependence1, is James N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence. Essays on the 
Transnationalization o f World Affairs (London: Francis Pinter, 1980). Rosenau presumably finds that 
ocean pollution is a typical interdependence issue. See James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics. 
A Theory o f Change and Stability (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 106. Studies 
on international dimensions of regulation uses concepts from the complex interdependence literature. See 
Ronald Brickman, Sheila Jasanoff, and Thomas Ugen, Controlling Chemicals: The Politics o f Regulation
cooperation, which is less well-specified than Realism's, includes the role of international 
organizations and transnational coalitions, as well as international negotiation. Realism has 
contributed little to our understanding of international organizations and non-state or non­
governmental organizations as it finds they have no significant or independent influence on 
international politics. The complex interdependence model is, therefore, a rival candidate 
to Realism because officials and agencies of the United Nations participated in the 
construction of the international dumping regime. As mentioned, the IMO provides the 
regime with its secretariat. Complex interdependence theorists view the prospects of 
international cooperation on environmental protection with some optimism.
The international dumping regime and realism
Realist analysts primarily study military power and to a lesser extent international political 
economy. They have so far paid little attention to global cooperation on environmental 
protection. Nonetheless, it is obvious that Realists see the structure of the international 
system as a severe obstacle to such cooperation.
According to prominent Realist scholar Kenneth Waltz: 'In the 1970s, with the rapid 
growth of population, poverty, and pollution, some concluded, as one political scientist put 
it, that 'states must meet the needs of the political ecosystem in its global dimensions or 
court annihilation1. The international interest must be served; and if that means anything at 
all, it means that national interests are subordinate to it. The problems are found at the 
global level. Solutions to the problems continue to depend on national policies. What are 
the conditions that would make nations more or less willing to obey the injunctions that are 
so often laid on them? How can they resolve the tension between pursuing their own 
interests and acting for the sake of the system? No one has shown how that can be done, 
although many wring their hands and plead for rational behavior. The very problem,
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in Europe and the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), chapter 11. See also Sheila 
Jasanoff, Risk Management and Political Culture (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986), 75-77.
however, is that rational behavior, given structural constraints, does not lead to the wanted 
results. With each country constrained to take care of itself, no one can take care of the 
system'9. Thus, states are seemingly trapped in a static situation out of which only a major 
change of the international system can bring them: 'States facing global problems are like 
individual consumers trapped by the 'tyranny of small decisions'. States, like consumers, can 
get out of the trap only by changing the structure of their field of activity. The message 
bears repeating: The only remedy for a strong structural effect is a structural change' 10.
Realists assert that the anarchic structure of international politics, a result of absence 
of a government, a police force and a judicial power, makes nations constantly worry about 
their survival n . The international system is, as Waltz puts it, a self-help system that 
severely constrains governments' ability to cooperate ,2. According to Waltz, two principal 
obstacles to all international cooperation follow: 'A state worries about a division of possible 
gains that may favor others more than itself. A state also worries lest it become dependent 
on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services' l3.
In the Realist view, states cooperate within the international dumping regime only to 
the extent that they improve, or at least maintain, their position relative to other states. 
Realists expect that especially developing countries are reluctant to participate in the
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics', reprinted in Robert O. Keohane, Realism and 
Its Critics, 106. Waltz then simply concludes in a footnote that 'states (in such situations) face a 
'prisoners' dilemma'. If each of two parties follow his own interest, both end up worse off than if each 
acted to achieve joint interests'. Ibid., 129.
10 Ibid., 108. By 'tyranny of small decisions', a phrase coined by the American economist and top 
regulator Alfred E. Kahn, Waltz refers to collectively unwanted consequences of individuals' behavior. 
One example of that would be the tragedy of the commons'. For discussion of the tragedy of the 
commons, see Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 2-3. Thomas C. Schelling has given numerous 
examples of bow society, and other 'groups', may dislike the aggregate results of behavior which on the 
level of the individual seems rational. Sec Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: Norton, 1978).
u According to WaJtz: "Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared 
to do so -  or live at the mercy of their military more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of 
nature is a state of war. Among men, as among state, anarchy, or the absence of government, is 
associated with the occurrence of violence'. Theory o f International Politics, 98.
u Ibid., 101-04.
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13 Ibid., 102-3.
international dumping regime. Because of developing countries' poor economic conditions, 
they are not expected to spend scarce economic resources on pollution control technologies. 
For similar reasons, it is very unlikely that developing countries through stringent 
environmental legislation would retard their much needed industrial and economic 
development.
For Realists, the primary concern of states is neither to maximize power nor to realize 
economic gains. Instead, states' primary concern is to maintain their positions in the 
international state system. Also for that reason, Realists doubt that developing countries 
would join the international dumping regime 14. Moreover, it follows from the first Realist 
assumption that considerations of security subordinate economic and all other gain to 
political interest 15. Due to the security and energy concerns intimately associated with 
regulation of radioactive waste, Realists would therefore predict that nuclear nations would 
strongly resist other states' interference in these matters 16. Nuclear nations are most likely 
to attempt to exclude regulation of nuclear waste from the scope of the international dumping 
regime 17. Similarly, as long as environmental problems do not seem to threaten their 
national security, developing countries remain very reluctant about joining and participating
28
14 Ibid., 127. See also Waltz 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My 
Critics' in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Realism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 
334. Joseph M. Grieco has recently emphasized that states are primarily concerned with their physical 
survival and political independence. See Cooperation among Nations. Europe, America, and Non-Tariff 
Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1990), 10. The realist claim that states worry about 
how well they fare compared to other states (relative gains), and not simply how well they fare 
themselves (absolute gains), which has severe consequences for international cooperation, has most 
recently been challenged in Duncan Snidal 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation' 
American Political Science Review, 85 (September 1991), 701-26. See also footnote 25 below.
15 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 104.
16 For example, in April 1977, the Carter Administration decided to defer commercial reprocessing 
of nuclear waste indefinitely because of the feared risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. See Paul F. 
Power The Carter Anti-Plutonium Policy' Energy Policy 7 (September 1979), 215-31. See also E. 
William Colglazier, Jr., The Politics of Nuclear Waste.
17 Scope refers to the range of issues the regime covers. Strength refers to the degree of compliance 
with regime injunctions. See discussion in Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons Theories of 
International Regimes' International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), 496-98.
in the international dumping regime 18.
Realists assert that global cooperation generally occurs only at the wish of strong 
states. 'Great tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability. This is why 
states, and especially the major ones, are callcd on to do what is necessary for the world's 
survival' 19. They further postulate that international cooperation and 'order* generally can 
be established only by a leader that possesses a 'preponderance of material resources', in 
contemporary parlance a hegemon 70. Put simply, the supporters of the hegemonic 
leadership theory credit British leadership for the relatively stable world economy from 1850 
to 1914, while the United States provided the leadership after World War II until the early 
1970s. International crisis and disorder, on the other hand, are caused by a lack of 
hegemonic leadership 21.
Realists will suspect that the United States constructed the 1972 international 
dumping regime. The United States acted on pure self-interest and followed a mixed 
strategy of material rewards, threats, and perhaps exclusion of recalcitrant governments 22.
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11 Attempts have been made to redefine environmental deterioration as a national security concern. 
See Richard K. Ullman 'Redefining Security' International Security 8 (Summer 1983), 130-53; Lester R. 
Brown 'Redefining National Security', reprinted C.W. Kegley, Jr. and E.R. Wittkopf, eds.. The Global 
Agenda: Issues and Perspectives, 340-46; and Jessica Tuchman Mathews 'Redefining Security' Foreign 
Affairs 68 (Spring 1989), 162-77.
19 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 107.
20 The quotation is from Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, 32.
21 See Robert O. Keohane The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in Internationa] Economic 
Regimes, 1967-1977', in Ole. R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander L. George, eds., Change 
in the International System (Boulder, Col: Westview, 1980), 131-62. Charles P. Kindleberger, who first 
used the term hegemon in his studies of international political economy, writes: 'My conclusion stated that 
the 1929 Depression was so wide, so deep, and so long because no leading country was able and willing 
to discharge the role of a stabilizer'. 'Hierarchy Versus Inertial Cooperation'. International Organization
40 (Autumn 1986), 841-47. Supporters of the hegemonic leadership theory disagree on Ihe definitions 
of the key terms hegemon, leader, and stabilizer. For a discussion see Susan Strange The Persistent Myth 
of Lost Hegemony1 International Organization 41 (1987), 551-74. For a recent critical discussion, see 
Isabella Grunberg 'Exploring the 'Myth' of Hegemonic Stability' International Organization 44 (Autumn
1990), 431-77.
22 According to Realists, the hegemon creates regimes for the following reason: 'Hegemons provide 
these goods [the collective goods that are needed for regimes to function effectively'] not because they 
are interested in the well-being of the system as a whole, but because regimes enhance their own national
Thus, the United States made use of its material and military supremacy 23. Through 
provision of side-payments, described as 'bribery' by Realist economic historian 
Kindleberger, or by other forms of reward, the United States built the necessary support 24. 
Some Realists suggest that in case the United States gained more than others it might have 
spent part of its revenue on building support25.
Realists generally assert that changes in the underlying relative power capabilities
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values'. Stephen D. Krasner ’Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables'* in Krasner, ed., international Regimes, 15.
23 However, as Haggard and Simmons observe: 'Hegemonic interpretations of regimes are not always 
clear about what hegemons actually do to promulgate and maintain a given set of rules'. Theories of 
International Regimes', 502. (Emphasis in the original). Oran Young puts it more emphatically: 
'Confusion abounds when we turn to the actual processes through which institutions emerge'. See 
'International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions', in World Politics 39 (October 1986), 110. 
Young has recently made some insightful suggestions on this issue in his discussion of 'structural 
leadership'. However, he repeats his doubts about hegemons as a necessary condition for the formation 
of regimes. See 'Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in 
International Society', 286-93. Scholars generally pay little attention to the processes of regime building. 
See, for instance, Charles Pentland 'Building Global Institutions', in Gain Boyd and Charles Pentland, eds., 
Issues in Global Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1981), 326-366. Scholars using the term 
international regime seldom ask the question how, and by who, these are created. For security studies, 
sec Seong W. Cheon, Andrew F. Cooper, and Niall M. Fraser ’Partial Security Regimes and Verification 
of Compliance' International Interactions 16 (1989), 117-36. For international trade studies, see Richard 
Thomas Cupitt 'Compliance with International Trade Regime Norms and the Effects of Regime Change' 
International Interactions 14 (1988), 373-83.
24 Instead of multilateral cooperation of some sort, future international environmental policy scenarios 
in which the United States, the Soviet Union or the United Kingdom employ military means to protect 
the Brazil's tropica] forests and the ozone layer, as well as prevent drift-net fishing have recently been 
envisaged. See Roger Martin, former British career diplomat-tumed-environmentalist, in Toward a 
'Green' Defense Policy', The Boston Globe, August 6, 1990.
25 Oran R. Young writes that a party with more to gain than others can exercise bargaining leverage 
by offering side-payments or promising to reward others for their support. 'Political Leadership and 
Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society', 289. Joseph M. Grieco 
has recently emphasized the Waltzian view on cooperation claiming that such bargains will not take place. 
Grieco writes: 'a relative-gains problem for cooperation [exists]: a state will decline to join, will leave, 
or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise 
mutually positive gains favor partners'. Cooperation Among Nations, 10. For further discussion, see 
Duncan Snidal 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', and Robert Powell 'Absolute 
and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political Science Review 85 (December
1991), 1303-1320. For a recent critical discussion of Grieco's view, see Helen Milner 'International 
Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,' World Politics 44 (April 1992), 
466-96.
result in regime change 26. A decline of American leadership would therefore weaken the 
international dumping regime. Fragmentation of hegemonic power eventually means regime 
collapse. In the absence of a hegemon, disputes are more likely and rule violations more 
frequent within the international dumping regime.
For Realists, states are 'the only agents capable of solving global problems' 27. 
International organizations, ocean scientists, NGOs and prominent individual personalities 
therefore play an insignificant role in the process of building the international dumping 
regime 28. Moreover, Realists implicitly state that the influence of non-state actors 
diminishes as the number of cooperating states rises.
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The international dumping regime and rationalistic realism
Rationalistic Realists share Realists' view on the international system. However, they find 
that international rules and institutions facilitating international cooperation are more 
widespread than what is suggested by Realists 29. Whereas the latter group of scholars see 
the world as always in danger of slipping back into a state of war (theorizing is therefore
26 Keohane The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 
1967-1977', 132. See also Stephen Krasner 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As 
Intervening Variables', 14-16.
27 Waltz, Theory of Internationa] Politics, 108.
3 Realists maintain that states are the only significant actors at the level of the international system. 
Graham T. Allison claims in Essence o f Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1971) that his three models all explain major aspects of international politics. Waltz has 
responded that only one of the three models is relevant for understanding international politics, while the 
two other models arc in fact concerned with foreign policy making, i.e. domestic level events. See Waltz 
ibid., 122. See also Robert G. Gilpin's critique of Allison in The Richness of the Tradition of Political 
Realism' in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Realism and Its Critics, 316-18.
29 The term rationalistic theory is suggested by Keohane in International Institutions: Two 
Approaches'. For an important collection of studies by Rationalistic Realists, see Kenneth A. Oye, ed., 
Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1986). Referred to as Neoliberal 
Institutionalism, the Rationalistic Realist school of thought has recently been challenged by Realists. See 
Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations.
oriented toward explaining how the state of war might be avoided, for example balance-of- 
power theory) the former group sees the world as consisting of states with a potential for 
cooperation (theorizing is therefore oriented toward explaining the obstacles to cooperation 
and how they might be overcome). Rationalistic Realists emphasize the existence of 
collective goods, collective action problems, mixed interests, mutual gains, and plus-sum 
conflicts in international politics 30. In the Rationalistic Realist view, the international- 
political system is divided up into issue-areas, and states are not quite the rational, unitary 
decision-makers Realists would have them to be 31. To explain cooperation, Rationalistic 
Realists focus on international regimes 32. According to Stephen D. Krasner's well-known 
definition, which is broader than the one used in this study, 'regimes can be defined as sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' 33. While 
Rationalistic Realists in principle agree with Krasner that 'actors are rarely constrained by 
international principles, norms, rules, or decision-making procedures', i.e. regimes really do
32
30 ReaJist Stephen D. Krasner has repeatedly emphasized that zero-sum conflicts do not provide a 
basis for regimes nor any reason to coordinate policies precisely because one actor's loss is another's gain. 
Sec Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985), 60; see also 'Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier', 
World Politics 43 (April 1991), 336-66. Robert O. Keohane uses Thomas Schelling's term 'mixed- 
motives' games to describe international situations or structures which could benefit from cooperation. 
See After Hegemony, 67. For the definition of mixed-motive games, see Thomas C. Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1980), 89.
31 See, for example, Keohane's discussion of bounded rationality and incomplete and partially 
available information in ibid., 85-132.
32 For an important collection of contributions to this literature, which also demonstrates major 
differences of opinion, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed. International Regimes.
33 Stephen D. Krasner 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables', 2. Important criticism of the definition of regimes has been put forward in Susan Strange 
'Cave! hie dragones: a critique of regime analysis', and Oran R. Young, International Cooperation. 
Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, 194-198. For a good overview, see 
Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons Theories of International Regimes', 491-517. For the definition 
used in this study, see Chap. 1, footnote 1. I do not count Krasner in the Rationalistic Realists' group. 
Krasner has recently criticized this group of scholars for emphasizing 'political market failures' as well 
as monitoring and information, rather than power. See 'Global Communications and National Power', 
361-62.
not matter much on their own, they nonetheless find that regimes can perform important 
functions 34.
Rationalistic Realists thus claim that international regimes help governments to 
overcome collective action problems, especially the problems of supplying and maintaining 
collective goods, for example pollution-free oceans 35. The Prisoners' Dilemma, the most 
popular model of collective action problems, illustrates that governments behaving as rational 
egoists might fail to cooperate; while non-cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma is the best 
strategy for each government, the governments lose collectively compared to if they had 
cooperated 36. Also, future cooperation is discouraged 37.
Rationalistic Realists find that international regimes can improve on this socially 
undesirable situation. To show how, insights from rational-choice theory and micro­
economics have been incorporated into regime theory. Thus, Rationalistic Realists claim that 
as improving communication between the prisoners increases cooperation in the Prisoners' 
Dilemma (where the prisoners are held incommunicado), so improving communication 
among governments will aid cooperation. Communication is thus crucial in coordinating the
33
34 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict, 60.
35 It is well-known that public goods are defined by the two characteristics 'jointness of supply' and 
'non-cxcludability‘. The first characteristic points out that the consumption of pure public goods is 
jointly, non-rival and simultaneously occurring, i.e. once the good is made available to one individual 
(state) it can be easily and freely supplied to otheis (states) as well. Everyone with access to it is able 
to consume it without detracting from the amount available to others. Non-excludability means that once 
the good is provided it cannot feasibly be withheld from others in the group. See Mancur Olson, The 
Logic o f Collective Action, 14.
36 Helen Milner writes: Indeed, prisoners' dilemma (PD) has proliferated as the key metaphor of 
international politics'. International Theories of Cooperation Among States,' 467. By 197S, more than 
2,000 papers had been devoted to the Prisoners' Dilemma game. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the 
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 5.
37 The Prisoners' Dilemma is some variation on the following situation: Two prisoners are accused 
of the same crime. If both confess, both will be convicted. If neither confesses, neither will be convicted. 
If one refuses while the other confesses, the confessor will be acquitted and will furthermore receive a 
gift while the refuser will be punished more severely than he would have been if both confessed. Both 
prisoners' best individual strategy is therefore to confess (no cooperation) as each then avoids the most 
severe punishment and might, if the other refuses, furthermore receive a gift. If neither confesses 
(cooperation), however, both will be acquitted.
preferences of governments. Rationalistic Realists argue that international regimes also can 
facilitate monitoring and enforcement by providing information on the behavior of states. 
International regimes will thus help in establishing the credibility of governments, especially 
their reputation for cooperation 38. By stressing reciprocity among states, regimes 
delegitimize defection, which makes this strategy more costly 39. For Rationalistic Realists, 
international regimes thus serve a major function as information gatherers and distributors.
It has been demonstrated experimentally that cooperation is more likely when the 
Prisoners' Dilemma is played several times instead of just once because short-term gains 
obtained by non-cooperation are outweighed by the potential benefits of cooperation in the 
long run 40. Rationalistic Realists similarly maintain that examples from international 
political economy support their claim that cooperation becomes more likely when 
governments expect that their relationships will continue indefinitely ('the shadow of the 
future') and retaliation is possible 41. Regularizing inter-govemmental relations is thus 
another major function of international regimes. In sum, international regimes help 
cooperation through providing reliable information to members; monitoring governments; 
raising the costs of non-compliance (as issues might be linked within regimes); and pushing 
states to reexamine their short-term interests in the light of long-term interests.
Rationalistic Realists also stress that transactions and information costs rise as the
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3> Robert Kcohanc and Robert Axelrod write: 'Regimes provide information about actors' compliance; 
they facilitate the development and maintenance of reputations; they can be incorporated into actors' rules 
of thumb for responding to others' actions; and they may even apportion responsibility for decentralized 
enforcement of rules'. 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', 237.
39 Ibid., 250.
*° Keohane, After Hegemony, 75-76. For discussion of the games Prisoners' Dilemma, Stag Hunt, 
and Chicken, see Kenneth A. Oye 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategics', 
in Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy, 13-14. See also Axelrod and Keohane 'Cooperation Under 
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', 232. For a more detailed discussion, see Kenneth W. Abbott 
'Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers', Yale Journal of 
International Law 14 (1989), 354-75.
41 Axelrod and Keohane 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', 232. 
However, realists doubt that the 'shadow of the future' necessarily makes cooperation more likely. See 
Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, 227.
number of states increases. They agree that very high transactions costs and information 
costs in some cases might preclude cooperation. Another threat to cooperation within groups 
involving large numbers of states stems from difficulties in anticipating the behavior of other 
states. In addition, the feasibility of sanctioning defectors is diminished in large groups, 
which encourages free-riding 42.
To improve on such situations, Rationalistic Realists point to the beneficial effect of 
transforming groups involving large numbers of states into collections of more manageable 
two-persons games 43. In their understanding, this is achieved by powerful states forcing 
less powerful ones to accept terms favored by the powerful ones 44. For such reasons, 
Rationalistic Realists expect that groups of rather homogeneous states would establish 
regional dumping regimes. Reaching agreement on an international dumping regime, 
necessarily including a much higher number of very uneven and heterogenous states, would 
be infeasible and is therefore not likely.
For Rationalistic Realists, finally, constructing linkages between issues within regimes 
might increase cooperation. International regimes with many issues on their agenda, high 
issue density, are therefore more successful in promoting cooperation than regimes with low 
issue density 45.
Although Rationalistic Realists have paid little attention to the question, there appears
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42 Kenneth A. Oye 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies’, 19-20.
43 For a discussion of N-person games, see Duncan SnidaJ The Game Theory of International 
Politics', in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy, 52-55.
44 Axelrod and Keohane write: the role of institutions in transforming N-person games into 
collections of two-person games'; and 'institutions...may enable N-person games to be broken down into 
games with smaller number of actors'; also, 'powerful actors structure relationships so that countries 
committed to a given order can deal effectively with those that have lower levels of commitment'. 
'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', 238-9 and 248. Axelrod and 
Keohane mention big banks (they discuss a study of banking) and great powers as examples of 'powerful 
actors' structuring relationships. Keohane has given other examples of how powerful states structure less 
powerful states' policy choices. See After Hegemony, 72-73. It should be kept in mind that institutions, 
as the two first quotes could imply, are not actors. James N. Rosenau has criticized Keohane for referring 
to international regimes as if they were actors. See 'Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes and Habit- 
Driven Actors in World Politics' International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), 881-82.
41 For discussion of issue density, see Keohane, After Hegemony, 79-80.
to be agreement that international regimes are created by selfish hegemons supplying 
international public goods Rationalistic Realists therefore suspect that the United States 
would 'throw its weight' behind the creation of the international dumping regime.
Important implications for how international cooperation develops follow from 
Rationalistic Realists1 emphasis on international public goods. Thus, similar to Realists, they 
predict that the hegemon will support the regime as long as benefits exceed costs to the 
hegemon. But it might happen, however, that other states to some extent follow their own 
interests and perhaps do not contribute their fair share to the provision of the good 47. For 
Rationalistic Realists, the scope and the strength of the international dumping regime will 
therefore not be dictated entirely by American interests. Other states might be able to pursue 
their own interests to a limited extent.
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46 Robert O. Keohane writes: The dominance of a single power may contribute to order in world 
politics, in particular circumstances, but it is not a sufficient condition and there is JittJe reason to believe 
that it is necessary'. However: 'Cooperation may be fostered by hegemony, and hegemons require 
cooperation to make and enforce rules’. See After Hegemony, 46. Keohane has not developed an 
alternative to the hegemonic stability theory's explanation of international regime formation. Keohane's 
functional theory of international regimes (Chap. 6 in After Hegemony) explains regimes as means at the 
disposal of states wanting to cooperate. Using a functional explanation, the question of how regimes are 
constructed is not addressed by Keohane. For a good discussion of functional explanations, see Jon 
Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 49-69. For a good discussion of hegemons and international regime formation, 
see Oran R. Young The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and 
the Environment', 350-55. Sec also Young ’Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the 
Development of Institutions in International Society', 285-88. Those who stress that hegemons act on 
selfish reasons when they provide public goods repeat Mancur Olson's argument about 'privileged groups': 
'(Groups where) each of the members, or at least one of them, will find that his personal gain from having 
the collective good exceeds the total cost of providing some amount of that collective good: there are 
members who would be better off if the collective good were provided, even if they had to pay the entire 
cost of providing it themselves, than they would be if it were not provided’. Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action, 34.
47 Especially the United States government as well as American academicians have seen such 
"exploitation1 of the great by the small', first described by Olson, as a threat to international cooperation 
within NATO. This discussion runs parallel to the one of international burden-sharing. For discussion 
of international cooperation and public goods, see Bruce M. Russett and John D. Sullivan 'Collective 
Goods and International Organization' International Organization 25 (1971), 853—54. See also Mancur 
Olson 'Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation' International Organization 25 (1971), 870.
Summary; The international dumping regime, realism and rationalistic realism
Realists claim that global cooperation on environmental protection necessarily is severely 
constrained by the structure of international politics. International rules, institutions and 
patterns of cooperation might develop, but will achieve very little 48.
Because of anarchy, the lack of common government to enforce rules, states 
cooperate only when it is in their interest. States cannot be forced to act against their self- 
interests. Domestic politics, international organizations and NGOs are insignificant in the 
Realist and the Rationalistic Realists' models of international politics 49. International 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures guiding behavior within particular 
issue-areas are non-mandatory and volatile. Moreover, they change with redistribution in 
the underlying relative power capabilities. Information distribution and monitoring are 
occasionally well developed within international regimes, but centralized enforcement is as 
a rule lacking x .
Realists and Rationalistic Realists both suspect that the United States would have 
constructed the international dumping regime. As a hegemon, the United States would be 
motivated purely by self-interest. Concern for the welfare of other states, much less for the 
world's oceans, would not enter into its policy 'calculus'. The regime would closely mirror 
environmental interests of the United States, or achieve broader American foreign policy 
objectives.
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41 Realism does not ruJe out the existence of international rules. See Waltz, Theory o f International 
Politics, 89. Waltz writes 'Rules, institutions, and patterns of cooperation, when they develop in self-help 
systems, are all limited in extent and modified from what they might otherwise be'. Waltz 'Reflections 
on Theory o f International Politics-. A Response to My Critics', 336. Same point is made in James N. 
Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 245-46.
49 Waltz writes: The theoretical separation of domestic and international politics need not bother us 
unduly...Students of international politics will do well to concentrate on separate theories of internal and 
external politics until someone figures out a way to unite them’. 'Reflections on Theory o f International 
Politics: A Response to My Critics', 340.
50 Axelrod and Keohane write: 'Of course, compliance is difficult to assure; and international regimes 
almost never have the power to enforce rules'. 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions', 2S0.
For Realists and Rationalistic Realists, the international dumping regime would be 
critically dependent on continued support from the United States. Declining American 
leadership would eventually lead to regime collapse because states would follow their own 
individual interests.
Realists and Rationalistic Realists both suspect that dumper nations would fiercely 
resist other states' attempts to circumscribe their regulatory autonomy with respect to disposal 
of radioactive waste in the oceans. Because regulation of radwaste disposal also raises 
security and energy independence concerns, nuclear nations would try to exclude regulation 
of radwaste disposal from the scope of the regime. Similar to the negotiations on the 1958 
U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, mentioned in Chapter 1, anti-dumping nations would have 
no powerful leverage to use against dumping nations, an exclusive group of economic and 
military superpowers (the Soviet Union excluded).
A study of the international dumping regime and radwaste disposal -  successful 
global environmental cooperation, in particular in the case of radwaste disposal -  tests 
Realism in circumstances that arc very unfavorable to the theory. From the Realist 
viewpoint, it is unlikely that a global arrangement for ocean dumping control would be 
established, and termination of disposal of radioactive waste is even more unlikely. In short, 
the international dumping regime is a hard case for Realist scholars.
The international dumping regime, reflectivism and the ecological epistemic community 
model
Reflective literature stresses that international cooperation cannot be fully understood without 
reference to ideology, the knowledge available to actors, and the values of actors. 
Cooperation is affected by ideas, provision of information and capacity to process it, 
perception and misperception, and learning 51. Ernst Haas, a leading Reflective scholar,
51 The literature on how perception and misperception, taken in the more narrow sense, influence 
foreign policy-making, is not included in the Reflective group. For this literature, see R. Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
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emphasizes the role science plays in policy-making within international organizations and 
international cooperation: 'Science, in short, influences the way politics is done. Science 
becomes a component of politics because the scientific way of grasping reality is used to 
define the interests that political actors articulate and defend. The doings of actors can then 
be described by observers as an exercise of defining and realizing interests informed by 
changing scientific knowledge about man and nature' 52. Thus, Reflective analysts mostly 
pay attention to how decisions and policies are made within national and international 
bureaucracies. Whereas Realists and Rationalistic Realists analyse at the level of the 
international system, Reflective scholars analyse at the level of the so-called units of the 
international system.
Ernst Haas links regime creation to perception of costs of non-cooperation: 'The need 
for collaboration arises from the recognition that the costs of national self-reliance are 
usually excessive’ 53. However, knowledge needs to be rather consensual in order to guide 
regime creation 54. If not, regimes are hard to construct. Since knowledge varies over time 
Reflective analysts question if certain forms of international collaboration by definition are 
collective goods ss. Internationally, then, the sharing of a fund of knowledge among 
governments otherwise in opposition to each other is, in Ernst Haas's words, a form of
39
For another approach, focussing on uncertainty and decision making, see by John D. Steinbruner, The 
Cybernetic Theory o f Decision (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).
52 Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, 11.
33 Ernst B. Haas 'Why Collaborate? issue-Linkage and Internationa] Regimes', 357.
54 Ernst B. Haas, ibid., 364-67. Recently, Haas has written: 'When knowledge becomes consensual, 
we ought to expect politicians to use it in helping them define their interests; we should not suppose that 
knowledge is opposed to interests'. When Knowledge is Power, 12.
55 Ernst Haas writes: 'If the emphasis is on how actors perceive the need for collaboration, certain 
activities or places cannot by definition be regarded as a 'collective good'. Whether they are so regarded 
depends on the mixture of perceptions and the modes of reasoning employed by those who fashion 
regimes'. 'Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and Internationa] Regimes', 360. For an example of how 
thinking about 'a place' has changed, the example is oceans as the heritage of mankind', see Ernst B. Haas 
'Words Can Hurt You; Or, Who Said What to Whom About Regimes', 24.
'cognitive convergence'56.
Reflective scholars generally do not consider hegemonic power a sufficient condition 
for regime creation and maintenance57. They find it unlikely that the hegemon will supply 
the necessary power in cases where it does not see the need for creating collaborative 
arrangements 58. This might happen when those involved at the domestic level do not 
support cooperation, are unable to reach agreement among themselves, or possibly 
miscalculate the outcomes and benefits of cooperation 59. On the other hand, cooperation 
is helped to the extent governments are guided by embedded norms stressing the existence 
of a commonly shared problem and the appropriate solutions ®.
When do regimes change, then? Reflective scholars agree that changes of regimes 
are mainly a result of change of knowledge: 'If we adopt this perceptual notion of the 
national interest, we must discard the idea of 'structurally necessary' regimes; nothing is 
absolutely necessary. Necessity is a function of perception, of knowledge; it is time-bound. 
What wets considered necessary in one epistemological perspective becomes obsolete in 
another' 61.
To understand evolution and change in governments' perception of international 
cooperation, Reflective scholars especially focus on how scientists and policy experts 
influence policy. Reflective scholars stress that professional groups of for instance scientists 
and experts by way of academic training and professional experiences might acquire a 
common outlook on the world and even share political values. Other scholars have observed 
that experts from public administration, industry and private interest groups might as
56 Haas Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes', 368.
57 Ibid., 359.
51 Ibid., 365.
59 For an example, see John S. Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas 
as Sources o f Change (Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 358.
60 See, for example, John G. Ruggie 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', in SD. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, 195-231.
61 Haas m y  Collaborate?', 392.
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informal groups affect policy because their professional training and knowledge of policy 
realities lead them to advocate some policies and oppose others 62. Reflective scholars, in 
contrast, argue that policy experts, government advisors, and bureaucrats who constitute an 
epistemic community choose to advocate policies when these conform to political beliefs and 
values which academic training and professional experience have instilled in them. 
Epistemic communities are actively influencing and perhaps even formulating policy; they 
are not just government advisors, policy specialists, or experts 63.
To illustrate his thesis, Emst Haas has often referred to ocean affairs. He writes, for 
example, that: The ocean matters to governments because their citizens use it to fish, sail 
ships, extract oil, fight wars and conduct research; they also now recognize that the oceans 
help determine the weather and that it may not be a good idea to use them as the world's 
garbage dump' 64. But Ernst Haas does not explain how the health of the oceans and how 
competing uses of the oceans -  both issues signify a change in perception which gained 
political momentum only in the beginning of the 1970s -  became political issues. The 
Reflective approach has often an evolutionary and rather harmonious flavor and, as this study 
will show, despite its intentions to the opposite, may downplay important ideological 
conflicts and rivalries among competing perceptions. Furthermore, knowledge is apparently 
transformed into policy through a piecemeal, gradual process. As Emst Haas writes: 
'Knowledge becomes salient to regime construction only after it has seeped into the
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62 The terms issue network, advocacy coalition, and policy community have been used to describe 
such informal networks of policy specialists active in setting agendas and formulating policies. For issue 
networks, see Hugh Heclo Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment', in Anthony King, ed., The 
New American Political System (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 87-124. For 
advocacy coalitions, see Paul A. Sabatier 'An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the 
Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein', Policy Sciences 21 (1988). For policy community, see John 
W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Policy Alternatives (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 123, and 
Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 161.
63 According to Ernst B. Haas: 7401 only molecular biologists and meteorologists but also 
psychoanalysts, astrologers, and sociologists may constitute epistemic communities (or they may not)'. 
When Knowledge is Power, 41.
64 Emst B. Haas 'Why Collaborate?', 365.
consciousness of policy-makers and other influential groups and individuals' But 
because it is difficult to pin down exactly when knowledge is consensual enough for policy­
making it also becomes difficult for the Reflective scholar to predict at what point new 
knowledge will give rise to international regimes Nonetheless, Ernst Haas finds that 
issue-specific negotiations usually deal with topics on which there is an accepted body of 
knowledge 67. It is therefore to be expected that the international dumping regime will 
reflect rather consensual knowledge 68.
For Reflective scholars, international organizations may play a major role as 
producers and distributors of new scientific knowledge. But regimes arise and change 
through interactions among governments, which leaves little influence to other actors. 
Downplaying the role of hegemons, Ernst Haas generalizes: 'Regimes are constructed by 
states through the medium of multilateral negotiation' 69.
The international dumping regime and the ecological epistemic community model
In a recent study Peter Haas concludes that an ecological epistemic community has been 
essential in promoting the arrangement for protecting the Mediterranean Sea against pollution 
(the so-called Med Plan). He summarizes: 'Controlling marine pollution and supporting the 
Med Plan has been basically an elite-driven process. Domestically, issues of marine quality
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“  Ibid., 369.
66 See also discussion in Haggard and Simmons Theories of Internationa] Regimes', 509-13. 
Reflective scholars admit that they have difficulties predicting when cooperation will occur. See, for 
example, John S. Dryzek, Margaret L. Clark, and Garry McKenzie 'Subject and System in International 
Interaction' International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), 498.
67 Ernst B.Haas "Why Collaborate?', 370.
68 For riisc»s<i™i of some of the conceptual problems of consensual knowledge and cooperation, see 
Peter M. Haas 'Epistemic Communities and Internationa] Policy Coordination', Manuscript January 1991, 
32-34.
69 m y  Collaborate?', 370.
were not highly politicized, following their initial popularity, and remained the purview of 
a small group of elites and technocrats'TO. This group constituted an ecological epistemic 
community; i.e. an epistemic community sharing views on 'the kinds of substances to be 
controlled, the methods to be used and the values to be employed in order to direct policy 
towards desired ends' 71.
Peter Haas finds that an ecological epistemic community defined the scope and 
influenced the strength of this regional pollution control arrangement72. Based on a shared 
broad understanding of the environmental problems and their solutions, an ecological 
epistemic community pressured decision-makers to construct a regional arrangement the 
community itself had defined. The strength of the arrangement varied in relation to the 
ecological epistemic community's influence on domestic policy-making. Countries with 
strong representation of the ecological epistemic community, i.e. access to national decision­
makers, were the most active supporters of international commitments and the most 
successful in national compliance along the lines of the epistemic community's shared view. 
Countries with weak representation of the ecological epistemic community were less 
supportive of international commitments and adopted weaker domestic pollution controls. 
Governments would thus be persuaded to establish environmental protection policies when 
members of the ecological epistemic community presented their advice in a forceful and 
consistent way to national decision-makers, and the influence of the opposition was at the 
same time minimized 73. Similar to the case of the Med Plan, Peter Haas finds that recent
10 Saving the Mediterranean, 163.
71 Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection Through Epistemic Consensus',
350. Haas adds the following to the definition: 'Every member of this group of specialists (epistemic 
community in environmental issues) shares a number of beliefs: principled values regarding the 
enhancement of collective welfare, the validity of cause-and-effect relationships, truth tests (while most 
ecological epistemic communities share an acceptance of the scientific method, truth tests may in principle 
be based on other techniques) and a common policy enterprise'. Ibid., 350.
72 For scope and strength of international regimes, see footnote (17) above.
73 Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection Through Epistemic Consensus',
351. Ernst Haas writes: The success of an epistemic community thus depends on two features: (1) the 
claim to truth being advanced must be more persuasive to the dominant political decision makers than 
some other claim, and (2) a successful alliance must be made with the dominant political coalition. We
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international efforts to protect the ozone layer largely have been driven by an ecological 
epistemic community which 'identified the broad scope of international policy, 
and...pressured governments to comply with international standards' 74.
Epistemic community theorists argue that the political influence of an epistemic 
community grows with its control over bureaucratic power. In countries in which it gains 
significant bureaucratic control it will institute environmental protection policies. At the 
national level, members of an epistemic community might be present in budgetary finance, 
staffing and enforcement authorities 75. At the international level, an epistemic community 
might supply international officials who will influence agenda-setting, policy debates, and 
draw attention to international problems and their possible solutions. Thus, an epistemic 
community might as a transnational network influence policy-making in several countries.
The epistemic community analyst will expect that the international dumping regime 
was basically created by an ecological epistemic community. The ecological epistemic 
community would persuade domestic decision-makers of the need for protection of the 
marine environment against ocean dumping 76. Reflecting the ecological epistemic 
community's perception of the scope of the ocean dumping problem, the epistemic 
community would press for a global arrangement. Those countries in which the epistemic
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can say that epistemic communities seek to monopolize access to strategic decision-making positions, 
though few of them succeed in holding such a position for a long period'. When Knowledge is Power, 42.
74 Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining Internationa] Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', 361. 
Haas writes that members of the epistemic community 'urged compliance with the Med Plan and pushed 
their governments to adopt and enforce more comprehensive pollution control policies'. Saving the 
Mediterranean, 79. See also 132 as well as 249-50.
75 Haas 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', 351.
76 Peter Haas variously talks of pressure, persuasion and learning when explaining the influence of 
ecological epistemic communities. But he does not make clear analytical distinctions among pressure, 
persuasion and learning. Persuasion and learning are the two most important explanations. For instance, 
he observes: 'I jjiming seems to have occurred by persuasion, as marine scientists and members of the 
ecological epistemic community informed foreign ministry officials of the need to control specific 
pollutants'. See Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control', 397. 
Elsewhere, however, he stresses that very little learning occurred by persuasion. Other government 
officials did not come to accept a more integrative and conceptual vision of environmental problems (an 
environmental consciousness) as a result of their accepting the correctness of the ecological epistemic 
community's consensual knowledge'. Saving the Mediterranean, 227.
community had access to domestic decision-makers would be the strongest supporters of 
stringent controls on ocean dumping. Those countries in which the epistemic community 
did not have access to domestic decision-makers would be the weakest supporters of 
stringent controls on ocean dumping.
As previously mentioned, Reflective scholars doubt that hegemonic power is a 
sufficient condition for international regime formation. Pointing to, among others, 
international regulation of oil tanker pollution and treaties for preservation of endangered 
species, Haas similarly claims that 'these environmental treaties were concluded without any 
single state -  not even the United States -  assuming a leadership role' 71. Haas asserts, 
instead, that: 'international environmental cooperation is generated by the influence wielded 
by specialists with common beliefs, contrary to the conventional approaches which stress the 
role of interstate power'78.
The epistemic community model tends to focus on compliance with international 
regimes rather than regime creation. While Haas points to the role of knowledge and new 
information when explaining why Mediterranean states complied with and expanded the 
Mediterranean Action Plan, he actually points to enoneous beliefs instead of scientific 
knowledge when explaining the regime-building process. In Haas's account, therefore, 
persuasion by an ecological epistemic community was not essential in bringing decision­
makers to begin controlling regional pollution: 'Many [national] officials thought that 
pollution was a commons problem, and thus required coordinated action throughout the 
region. They assumed that currents transferred the pollutants fairly freely among countries. 
UNEP officials were well aware that currents were not sufficiently strong to transmit 
pollutants across the Mediterranean Basin...but they hoped to complete an agreement, so they 
just smiled and nodded when others characterized Mediterranean pollution as a commons 
problem. Only later did studies reveal to marine scientists that currents were too weak to 
fully exchange the wastes between the northern and southern shores; regional pollution was 
not a true collective good, and could be managed bilaterally or subregionally, although this
77 Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', 349.
71 Saving the Mediterranean, xxii.
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fact was never fully appreciated by foreign ministry officials, who continue to accept 
pollution as a regionally shared problem. This false perception actually facilitated the 
resolution of the problem’ 79. Elsewhere, Haas briefly mentions that 'Jacques Cousteau was 
active in attracting publicity* to Mediterranean pollution and 'gloom-and-doom prophesies' 
led to concern about the Mediterranean in the early 1970s ® Although such popular 
science accounts of Mediterranean pollution together with prominent scientists and ecologists 
thus identified the need for regulation, they are not given any more systematic significance 
by the ecological epistemic community model81.
To create the international dumping regime, the epistemic community analyst will 
expect that international leadership would be supplied by an ecological epistemic community. 
Domestic decision-makers will be uncertain about the nature and scope of the ocean 
dumping problem, as well as the costs of specific control strategies, and will consult the 
ecological epistemic community for advice. By providing the authoritative and legitimate 
scientific understanding of the ocean dumping problem, the ecological epistemic community 
will shape policy as well as institutional and organizational arrangements 82. The epistemic 
community will develop a coherent view and common understanding of the ocean dumping 
problem through international scientific conferences as well as other forms of exchange and
46
79 Saving the Mediterranean, 70-71. For a discussion of Haas’s explanation, see also Helen Milner 
'International Theories of Cooperation among Nations,1 478-79.
80 Ibid., 83 and 104. Haas occasionally juxtaposes the influence of popular science and *hard' science 
in his explanation: Taring evidence of environmental degradation, fearing the impending 'death' of the 
Mediterranean, and pressured by the UNGHE preparations, governments established environmental 
ministries to alleviate the uncertainty surrounding the causes and effects of Mediterranean pollution and 
to develop measures to control it'. Ibid., 156.
B1 Haas's summary version of the emergence of the Med Plan reads: 'An ecological epistemic 
community was consulted by governments in order to dispel uncertainty about the extent of environmental 
pollution. Such concern was precipitated by a crisis; the alarm that the Mediterranean was in danger of 
dying. This epistemic community significantly influenced the form and duration of environmental 
cooperation. The epistemic community made itself felt internationally and nationally'. Ibid. 224.
121 use the words organizations and institutions in the sense they have been defined by Oran Young: 
'Institutions arc practices composed of recognized roles coupled with sets of rules or conventions 
governing relations among the occupants of these roles. Organizations are physical entities possessing 
offices, personnel, equipment, budgets, and so forth'. Oran R. Young 'International Regimes: Toward a 
New Theory of Institutions', 108.
communication of scientific understanding and knowledge. Common understanding among 
the members of the ecological epistemic community will guarantee that its members in 
various countries will give consistent, uniform scientific advice to decision-makers. 
Reflecting the beliefs of the ecological epistemic community, domestic decision-makers will 
then design and implement a global policy to protect the oceans against dumping.
Epistemic community analysts maintain that the ecological epistemic community's 
political influence remains unabated as long as it can advise policy-makeis in a consistent 
and persuasive way, and as long as its claim to expertise remains unchallenged. Its political 
influence might end, however, should new Torrey Canyon-size oil spills, ozone holes over 
the Antarctica, Chernobyl nuclear accidents, or shifts in scientific understanding, reject the 
'paradigm' advanced by the epistemic community 83. In the absence of ecological or 
environmental crises, or erosion of the ecological epistemic community's authoritative claim 
to policy relevant knowledge, the epistemic community analysts therefore suspect that the 
international dumping regime through advice and pressure will develop consistently with the 
interests of an ecological epistemic community.
Summary; The international dumping regime, reflectivism and the ecological epistemic 
community model
According to Reflective scholars, scientists play a key role in international environmental 
policy-making as well as in cooperation oh technical and scientific issues M. Scientists
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43 Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining Internationa] Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', 353. 
See also Saving the Mediterranean', 249. For the international political impact of the 1967 Torrey 
Canyon oil spill (121,200 tonnes) between France and Britain, see R.MichaeI M'Gonigle and Mark W. 
Zacher, Pollution, Politics, and International Law. Tankers at Sea (Berkeley, Calif.: University of 
California Press, 1979). For the impact of the discovery of a seasonally depleted ozone layer over the 
Antarctica, see Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy. New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 110-11.
M According to Ernst Haas, environmental protection and public health is particularly prone to be 
guided by scientists and their models: 'Scientific models show up more directly in those fields of public 
policy in which scientific participation is continuous alongside the work of nonscientific decision makers,
participate because of a need for expertise, and the high uncertainties which often surround 
global environmental issues reinforce the need for policy advice by scientists, which 
probably increases their influence 85.
Epistemic community theorists will predict that the international dumping regime will 
be masterminded and spearheaded by an ecological epistemic community, the legitimate 
scientific authority with claim to policy relevant knowledge. Staffing international 
organizations as well as national environmental administrations involved in ocean dumping, 
an ecological epistemic community will persuade and pressure decision-makers to establish 
and enforce stringent ocean dumping controls reflecting the epistemic community's view of 
this problem and its appropriate solutions.
Epistemic community theorists will also predict that the strength of the international 
dumping regime will vary with the ecological epistemic community's influence on domestic 
policy-making. Countries with strong representation of the ecological epistemic community, 
i.e. broad access to national decision-makers, will be the most active supporters of 
international commitments and the most successful in national compliance. Countries with 
weak representation of the ecological epistemic community will be less supportive of 
international commitments and will adopt weaker domestic ocean dumping controls.
It should be noted that Reflective scholars and epistemic community theorists neglect 
environmental groups and public opinion in their understanding of international cooperation 
on environmental protection. While Ernst Haas only briefly remarks on these matters, Peter 
Haas finds little supporting evidence that public opinion and environmental groups influence
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such as public health, environmental protection, transportation, telecommunications, and defense 
production. Here the models used by scientists seriously guide the way problems are defined and 
solutions devised; economic, political and legal information that constrains the use of scientific models 
at the margin, however, also enters the process'. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, 22.
15 The reason why epistemic communities come into power is the growing reliance on technical 
expertise to manage highly complex international policy matters'. Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining Internationa] 
Environmental Protection Through Epistemic Consensus', 347. He also claims that 'if perceived 
uncertainty by politicians is high and public pressure is severe, then epistemic communities may be 
effectively able to promote policies that are further from the political 'norm' than if uncertainty was less'. 
Ibid., 353.
international policy development He therefore concludes that 'environmental policy is 
usually elite driven' and 'despite the recent emergence of Green Parties throughout Europe, 
actual governmental policies for environmental protection and international co-operation 
preceded this mass mobilization of public opinion' 87. In fact, few, if any, contributors to 
international regimes theory ascribe any importance to environmental groups and public 
opinion in understanding international cooperation on environmental protection 88.
A study of the international dumping regime -  science-intensive, fairly inexpensive 
environmental cooperation -  tests ecological epistemic community theory in circumstances 
that favor the theory 89. Epistemic community theorists will strongly suspect that an
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*6 According to Ernst B. Haas: '...other instances of regional rather than national space as foci for 
governance are confined to such unspectacular matters as fisheries conservation and pollution control, 
which are not likely to arouse the emotional involvement of the citizenry’. When Knowledge is Power, 
185.
17 Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', 353. 
Peter Haas asserts that public opinion has been ignoring the issue of marine pollution and has been 
without effective influence on the initiation of environmental protection policies for the Mediterranean 
Basin. See Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control’, 399-400. 
See also Saving (he Mediterranean, 163.
88 Discussing this issue, James N. Rosenau has concluded: The politics of new resource issues is 
unlikely to be sustained by the hue and cry of mass publics or burdened or facilitated by their 
mobilization and intervention'; instead, the onset of problems derived from new non-land resources ['the 
new non-land resources associated with outer space, the seabed, environmental pollution, radio 
frequencies, and weather climate as issue-areas'] is likely to be detected only by specialists whose salience 
and clout in the political arena are quite limited’. 'New Non-Land Resources as Global Issues', 394. See 
also Rosenau 'Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World', 43-49. Oran R. Young has paid no 
attention to mobilization of international public pressure and deliberate construction of public opinion in 
order to build, and change, international regimes for environmental protection. See Young, 'International 
Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions, 104-22; Young, The Politics of International Regime 
Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment; Young, International Cooperation: 
Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment; Young, 'Global Environmental Change and 
Internationa] Governance'. None of the three leadership types recently discussed by Young -  structural, 
entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership -  owe their influence to skillful use of public opinion, or 
attempt to mobilize international public opinion. See Young, 'Political Leadership and Regime Formation: 
On the Development of Institutions in International Society’.
19 As two epistemic community theorists write: 'In the area of global environmental policy an obvious
place to look for an epistemic community is climate change, although it would also be instructive to study
deforestation, the Law of the Sea, and maritime pollution'. Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas Epistemic
Communities, International Cooperation, and World Order: Creating A Reflective Research Program'.
Manuscript, January 1991, 41. Epistemic community theorists seem to believe that high costs are likely
ecological epistcmic community has been essential in building the international dumping 
regime, as well as in halting radwaste disposal. For epistemic community theorists, the 
international dumping regime is a soft case of international cooperation on environmental 
protection 90.
The international dumping regime and complex interdependence theory
During the 1970s, several criticisms of Realism were raised by international relations 
scholars. Most important were the following points: the existence of a multitude of 
international organizations and multinational corporations, as well as various kinds of 
regional organizations, such as the European Community (EC) and NATO, had dramatically 
changed international politics; technology and science played a major role in transforming 
international politics and international organizations 91; it increasingly seemed misleading 
and artificial to separate domestic politics and international politics; bureaucratic politics as 
well as organizational routines and malfunctions prevented states from behaving as unitary, 
rational actors n ; and issues other than war and peace had appeared on the international 
agenda.
Moreover, states competed within issue areas, instead of within international politics
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to reduce an ecological epistemic community's influence on international environmental policy. See, for 
example, the comparison between the efforts to protect the ozone layer and the efforts to deal with global 
warming in Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining Internationa] Environmental Protection through Epistemic 
Consensus', 354-361.
90 For hard cases, see Chap. 1, footnote 49.
91 See Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The International Imperatives of Technology. Technological 
Development and the International Political System (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Institute 
of International Studies Research Series, no. 16,1972). See also Skolnikoff The International Functional 
Implications of Future Technology', reprinted in Thomas J. Kuehn and Alan L. Porter, eds., Science, 
Technology, and National Policy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981), 226—46.
92 For the seminal argument, sec Graham T. Allison 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis', 
American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969), 689-718. See also Allison, Essence of Decision.
at large. The metaphor chessboards was used to describe the presumed new realities of 
international politics: The competition between states takes place on several chessboards in 
addition to the traditional military and diplomatic ones: for instance, the chessboards of 
world trade, of world finance, of aid and technical assistance, of space research and 
exploration, of military technology, and the chessboard of what has been called 'informal 
penetration'. These chessboards do not entail the resort to force'93. Scholars conclude that 
states were less powerful than earlier, that transnationalization had reduced the power states 
used to exercise, and that the costs of unilateral action had dramatically increased 94.
Such observations made scholars search for an alternative to the notion that states are 
the most significant actors and that states as unitary, rational units struggle for power and 
peace in an anarchic and violent world politics arena. Realism seemed in addition unable 
to explain the processes of international politics. A representative view among skeptics of 
Realism was that 'the state-centric view often fails to forecast outcomes correctly, and state- 
centric theories are not very good at explaining such outcomes even when the forecasts are 
correct'95.
Complex interdependence
In an important analysis Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons have concluded that domestic 
politics and transnational coalitions should be included in theories of international regimes. 
They suggest: 'a research program that focuses greater attention on issues raised by theorists 
of complex interdependence; these issues have been neglected in the revival of game theory,
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93 Stanley Hoffman Internationa] Organization and the Internationa] System', quoted in Nye and 
Keohane Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion', 434.
94 James Rosenau has summarized, with sarcasm: Yes, the power of states has eroded and yes, the 
world is still smaller and more interdependent than ever, but the state is still the predominant actor in 
world politics and the state system is still the main foundation for the course of events. That has been 
the litany in the literature of the field for several decades'. Turbulence in World Politics, 97.
95 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion', 430.
and include the erasure of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy, the 
importance of transnational coalitions, and, above all, the way in which domestic forces 
determine patterns of international cooperation1 96. International regime analysis has also 
been criticized by others, most notably by Susan Strange, for overlooking domestic politics
97
The complex interdependence model, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane coined the 
term, takes into account several of the criticisms of Realism. Complex interdependence 
describes situations which exhibit three main characteristics: multiple channels connecting 
countries reduce the foreign office’s control of a governments' foreign policies; absence of 
hierarchy among issues; and military force as an largely irrelevant or inapplicable means for 
overcoming conflicts in the international system The model primarily focuses on 
transnational and transgovemmental as well as interstate relations Domestic politics is
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96 Haggard and Simmons Theories of International Regimes', 492.
97 Susan Strange has suggested instead: 'In trying to draw a map of interlocking, overlapping bargains 
the researcher will often be drawn far beyond the conventional limits of international politics and 
international economics. Most likely, the map will have to include bargaining situations and their 
outcome within national political economies...Drawing bargaining maps will therefore reveal the domestic 
roots of international arrangements, and tell us more about what is likely to be permanent and what will 
probably prove ephemeral about them'. Susan Strange 1Cave! hie dragones: a critique of regime analysis', 
353. More generally, James Rosenau has recently emphasized the analytic need to break free ’of the 
presumption that the domain of 'domestic' politics is separate from the domain of 'international' politics 
and, instead, viewing the two as woven together around and through the historical and legal boundaries 
that allegedly separate them'. Turbulence in World Politics, 42.
98 Robert O. Keohane has later emphasized that 'the most important feature of complex 
interdependence -  almost its only important feature -  is the ineffectiveness of military force and the 
constraints that this implies on fungibility of power across issue-areas'. Keohane Theory of World 
Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond', in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, 197.
99 Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane coined the term in Power and Interdependence. See Keohane and 
Nye's own discussion in Power and Interdependence revisited', 732. According to Keohane and Nye: 
Transnational interactions necessarily involve nongovernmental actors, whereas interstate interactions take 
place exclusively between states acting as units. Transgovemmental interactions, however, are defined 
as interactions between governmental subunits across state boundaries. The broad term transnational 
relations includes both Xxdiisnational and iimsgovernmental interactions -  all of world politics that is not 
taken into account by the state-centric paradigm1, 439.
not a significant part of it 10°.
The complex interdependence school has not put forward explicit propositions about 
creation and change of international regimes for environmental protection 101. But the 
three conditions of complex interdependence 'are fairly well approximated on some global 
issues of economic and ecological interdependence' 102 and 'the explanatory power of 
overall structure theories of regime change would be lower under conditions of complex 
interdependence than under realist conditions' m . Because international regimes for 
environmental protection arise under conditions of complex interdependence -  while instead 
military' security 'regimes' arise under Realist conditions -  complex interdependence theorists 
have indicated possible avenues for formation and change of the international dumping 
regime.
To cope with ecological interdependence, Keohane and Nye claim, leadership should 
make sure that behavior focuses on joint gains rather than the zero-sum aspects of 
interdependence 104. But hegemonic leadership is hardly viable under conditions of 
complex interdependence. A combination of unilateral initiative -  'going first and setting 
an example' -  and action to induce other states to help stabilize an international regime is 
instead needed. The first form of leadership will be carried out primarily by a large 
powerful state while cooperation among large states is needed for the second form of 
leadership.
Complex interdependence theorists will predict that the United States will take the 
initiative to construct the international dumping regime because of domestic concern over
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100 For their own recent comments on this, see Keohane and Nye 'Power and Interdependence 
revisited', 739-40.
101 International regimes are defined as follows: 'Relationships of interdependence often occur within, 
and may be affected by, networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control 
its effects. We refer to the sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence 
as international regimes'. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 19. (Emphasis in the original).
102 Ibid., 25.
103 'Power and Interdependence revisited', 733.
,0* Power and Interdependence, 229.
pollution caused by dumping in U.S waters. Ocean dumping will attract policy attention 
which results in legislation to protect U.S. waters. In addition, the United States will take 
the initiative to act internationally against ocean dumping. Complex interdependence 
theorists will therefore suspect that the international dumping regime will be constructed in 
response to a U.S. initiative. In short, the United States will go first and thereby set an 
example ,05.
For complex interdependence theorists, the United States will be able to use only 
limited economic pressure, but no military means, to achieve agreement on the international 
dumping regime. According to Keohane and Nye: 'Power resources specific to issue areas 
will be most relevant. Manipulation of interdependence, international organizations, and 
transnational actors will be major instruments' I06.
For complex interdependence theorists, the international dumping regime's survival 
depends on its legitimacy: 'If non-hegemonic leadership is to be effective, furthermore, all 
major parties must believe that the regime being created or maintained is indeed in their 
interests' 107. Legitimacy is crucial in reducing free-riding or cheating because the 
coercive element is diminished under conditions of complex interdependence. Keohane and 
Nye do not, however, explain how and by who the legitimacy of the international regimes 
will be created. It is assumed, furthermore, that it will be more difficult to create legitimacy 
among a large number of uneven actors than among a small number of like-minded 
countries 108.
Complex interdependence theorists assert that international organizations will not
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105 To define unilateral initiatives to create international regimes Keohane and Nye quote Susan 
Strange. I have then generalized and applied this form of leadership to ocean dumping. Susan Strange 
writes: The rule made by the United States -  made in response for the most part to domestic political 
pressures and domestic economic and social needs — are almost always much the most important set of 
national rules affecting operators in international markets'. Susan Strange 'What is Economic Power and 
Who Has It?', International Journal 30 (Spring 1975), 220, in Keohane and Nye, Power and 
Interdependence, 230.
106 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 37.
107 Ibid., 231.
101 Ibid., 234.
supply leadership. International organizations may however help cooperation by serving as 
forums bringing officials together face-to-face and as facilitators of transnational and 
transgovemmental coalition-formation. International organizations can also influence the 
international agenda 109.
To understand change of regimes, Keohane and Nye have suggested an 'international 
organization model' no: 'Regimes are established in accordance with distributions of 
capabilities, but subsequently the relevant networks, norms, and institutions will themselves 
influence actors' abilities to use these capabilities. As time progresses, the underlying 
capabilities of states will become increasingly poor predictions of the characteristics of 
international regimes. Power over outcome will be conferred by organizationally dependent 
capabilities, such as voting power, ability to form coalitions, and control of elite networks: 
that is, by capabilities that are affected by the norms, networks, and institutions associated 
with international organization' U1. Because oceans affairs is a 'low politics' area 
compared to the 'high politics' of national defence, complex interdependence theorists expect 
that their international organization model would better than the Realist model capture the 
politics of the international dumping regime n2.
Complex interdependence theorists see a possibility for the international dumping 
regime developing contrary to the interests of its most powerful members. This might
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109 Ibid., 35-37. See also 240.
110 The 'international organization model' is not an international organization but a type of world 
political structure'. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 54. It basically states that: first, the 
breakdown or weakening of a regime is explained by changes in the nonns and organizational processes 
of world politics'; second, 'a regime may be altered by political bargaining processes that diminish the 
position of the states with underlying power that gave rise to the regime'; third, the development of 
networks of political interaction, often centered on international organizations, may facilitate agreement 
on new principles for an international regime'. Keohane and Nye's 'international organization model1 has 
not occupied scholars much. For a discussion of the model, see John S. Odell, U.S. International 
Monetary Policy, 37. For a discussion of its use for international regime theory, see Christer Jonsson, 
International Aviation and the Politics o f Regime Change, 57-61.
111 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 55. (Emphasis in the original).
112 Keohane and Nye have recently discussed, and confirmed, the usefulness of the international 
organization model for understanding oceans politics. See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence 
revisited, 738-39.
happen when less powerful states join forces to vote against the interests of more powerful 
states. Also, coalitions between developing and developed countries may arise within the 
international dumping regime. Moreover, less powerful states might control the scientific 
work within the international dumping regime.
According to complex interdependence theorists, the dumping regime might at some 
point be too adverse to the interests of powerful governments. In that case, powerful 
governments will abandon the international dumping regime. Keohane and Nye explain: 
’The factors on which the international organization model depends are also more temporary 
and reversible than those of the basic structural models. If powerful governments decide to 
destroy the existing regimes, and have the determination as well as the ability to do so, the 
regimes and their associated organizations will no longer have lives of their own’ 113.
Powerful governments might choose, however, not to abandon the international 
dumping regime if the costs of creating another, more attractive regime are prohibitively 
high. According to Keohane and Nye: 'The international organization model postulates that 
the costs of destroying a regime will be high when well-integrated elite networks exist on 
many levels among countries. Nevertheless, the costs of an adverse regime could become 
so great that some states would resolve to destroy it even though that meant disrupting those 
networks. At this point the basic structural models would become more relevant than the 
international organization model' n4. Powerful states will therefore abandon the 
international dumping regime when they consider it too adverse to their interests but might, 
in some cases, choose not do so when the costs of destroying its elite networks are too high.
Summary; The international dumping regime and complex interdependence theory
Complex interdependence theorists protest when Realists interpret the international political 
system as one where states as unitary, rational actors compete for peace and power under
56
113 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 57. (Emphasis in the original). 
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conditions of anarchy. In their view, ecological interdependence and other interdependence 
issues are causing states to be increasingly dependent on one another for attainment of 
human well-being and social welfare. The nature of interdependence issues requires that 
states cooperate within international regimes. International regimes, then, will often allow 
international organizations as well as transnational and transgovemmental coalitions to play 
a considerable role.
Complex interdependence theorists will suspect that the United States will propose 
to create the international dumping regime. Responding to domestic political pressures, the 
United States government will at the same time probably be establishing legislation to 
protect U.S. waters against pollution from dumping. The United States' initiative to create 
the international dumping regime will therefore be motivated by concern for national 
interests.
Once constructed, the international dumping regime will mostly be dependent on its 
continued legitimacy. Powerful states will have no means for forcing regime decisions upon 
other states. Through transnational coalition-formation and control of elite networks, less 
powerful states even might use the international dumping regime to their advantage. In case 
the regime becomes too adverse to the interests of major powerful states, however, they will 
destroy the regime.
A study of the international dumping regime and radwaste disposal -  an ecological 
interdependence issue institutionalized within the framework of the United Nations system -  
tests complex interdependence theory in circumstances that are favorable to the theory. 
Complex interdependence theorists will suspect that the conditions for reaching viable 
compromises are favorable, but will doubt that less powerful states will be able to use the 
regime to halt radwaste disposal.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined how three models of international cooperation predict the 
international dumping regime will be built. Each model explains the construction of
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international regimes, as well as their strength and scope, differently. At the level of the 
international system, their preferred level of analysis, Realists find little potential for global 
cooperation on environmental protection. They doubt if the international dumping regime 
will be anything more than a foreign policy instrument of the hegemon, the United States. 
The epistemic community theory model focuses on change in governments' perception of 
cooperation. The model predicts that successful global cooperation can be attributed to an 
ecological epistemic community exerting influence over policy-makers. Ecological 
epistemic communities are groups composed of experts, national and international officials 
agreeing on the kinds of substances to be controlled, the methods to be used, and the values 
to be employed in order to direct policy towards desired ends. The complex interdependence 
model postulates that the nature of ecological interdependence issues compels states to 
cooperate within international regimes. Power politics have to give way to bargaining, 
compromise and cooperation. By using political resources specific to the particular issue- 
area, less powerful states may be able to exert considerable control. Powerful states may, 
however, ultimately destroy the international dumping regime if they wish so.
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THE INTERNATIONAL DUMPING REGIME AND THE EPISTEMIC 
COMMUNITY MODEL
The international dumping regime is a global regime. Epistemic community theorists would 
thus assume that in 1972 states generally perceived ocean dumping as a global commons 
problem. They would likewise suspect that negotiations on the regime would proceed as a 
collective, cooperative process. This was not the case, however, as Russell Train, head of 
the U.S. delegation to the negotiations on the international dumping regime explained before 
the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the spring of 1972: 'Perhaps 
naively, I had thought everybody would be in favor of doing something effective about 
stopping dumping in the ocean, but we have found that many of the LDCs are very leery 
of getting into this. They would rather not have a convention'
The proposal to establish an international dumping regime was made by the United 
States. Perhaps epistemic community theorists would suspect that an ecological epistemic 
community had persuaded American decision-makers to propose that other states work 
together in controlling ocean dumping. This group of theorists would assume that decision­
makers, who would be uncertain about the nature of the ocean dumping problem, its possible 
solutions, and costs of possible control strategies, would take advice from marine biologists, 
ecologists and other scientists serving as policy experts. Further, such experts would 
constitute an ecological epistemic community and would provide decision-makers with non­
conflicting scientific advice. Epistemic community theorists also predict that decision­
makers would then transform expert advice into stringent control of ocean dumping.
Epistemic community theorists also assume that international expert advice and 
pressure could have influenced United States ocean dumping policy in 1972. One possible
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1 Russell Train before U.N. Conference on Human Environment: Preparations and Prospects, 17. 
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate. 92nd Congress. May 3, 4, 
and 5, 1972, 17.
source of influence would be international scientific conferences, another the many United 
Nations organizations which had been active in the marine pollution field since the mid- 
1960s.
To test the epistemic community model, this chapter focuses on scientific advice 
given to the U.S. Congress, the administration's involvement in ocean dumping control, and 
the international scientific response to ocean dumping. This chapter will show that ocean 
dumping regulation in the United States was not established by policy-makers responding 
to persuasion or pressure by an ecological epistemic community. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
supply further evidence of the inability of the epistemic community model to explain crucial 
aspects of the construction of the international dumping regime.
The United States response to ocean dumping
In the late 1960s, asbestos, DDT, smog, and a few other names of supposedly deadly 
chemicals and environments became household words in the United States 2. Together with 
nuclear fear, which had a longer history of raised emotions, these were the subject of the 
most frequent protests in the 'pollution battle'3. They each could serve as a guide to the 
surge of environmental policies which in 1969 started to sweep the United States 4.
The late 1960s were a time of dramatic and rapid changes of beliefs and values in 
the United States. In January 1970, Newsweek reported in an article titled 'The Politicians 
Know an Issue’, that 'Old Washington hands have been sensing for some time that
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2 For a brief account of the asbestos case, see Haivey M. Sapolsky The Politics of Risk', Dadalus 
119 (Fall 1990) Risk (Special Issue), 83-96.
3 See Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1988).
4 This period witnessed the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), the creation of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (1970), and the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(1970), the Clean Air Act of 1970 (1970), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (1972), 
and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (1972). President Nixon also established the 
CEQ.
environment may well be the key issue of the 70s, for the nation and for their political 
futures. They freely concede that no other cause has moved so swiftly from the grass roots 
into the arena of public policy-making. As early as 1968, environment had surpassed law 
and order and in 1969 was gaining on Vietnam in total linage in the Congressional Record. 
And by now, nearly everyone on Capitol Hill seems to be actively against pollution, causing 
a veritable stampede for stage center in the crusade to save America's land, air and water' 
5. In 1973, the environment had clearly established itself as an issue: 'A few year ago, 
'ecology' and 'environmental protection' did not exist in American public discourse; they were 
non-issues to most citizens and public officials. Now we are in the midst of a new 
'environmental decade’ 6.
Faced with unprecedented demands for political action to protect the environment, 
President Nixon was under pressure to act. There is no doubt', Newsweek wrote, 'that the 
President has been a Johnny-come-lately on the environmental bandwagon' 7. While 
especially Democrat Edmund S. Muskie had made anti-pollution a central part of his 
political program, Nixon's position on environmental control was unclear in early 1970. 
"What the issue needs,' said one liberal Democrat, 'is a man like Bob Kennedy who went to 
the Indian reservations. Some young guy has to get into a bathing suit and jump into Lake 
Eric. If he survives, he's on top of the issue'8.
Pollution of Lake Erie had thus emerged as one of the major environmental issues 
in the United States. Lake Erie often symbolized, as above, the political crisis of the 
environment. According to the most widely quoted environmentalists in the United States, 
Lake Erie 'died' already in the mid-1960s as a result of a greatly accelerated eutrophication
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5 The Politicians Know and Issue', Newsweek, 33, January 26, 1970.
6 Walter A. Rosenbaum, The Politics o f Environmental Concern (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1973), 51.
7 The Politicians Know and Issue', Newsweek, 33, January 26, 1970.
* 'And How Are the Democrats Doing?', Newsweek, 15. January 12, 1970.
process caused by industrial pollution 9. Many saw the condition of the lake as at least 
gloomy, at worst it was doomed 10. Newsweek wrote in January 1970: ’A few years ago — 
nobody was paying close enough attention to tell exactly when -  Lake Erie died: acidic 
wastes from the surrounding factories have strained its water of virtually every form of life 
except a mutant of the carp that has adjusted to living off poison’ n. As a conspicuous 
symbol of industrial destruction of ecosystems of large bodies of water, Lake Erie served as 
a catalyst for the realization of U.S. dumping policy for both the Great Lakes as well as 
coastal waters 12.
President Nixon did respond on the issue in a series of speeches which laid out a 
philosophy and policy for protection of the environment. In his State of the Union message 
in late January, 1970, President Nixon, interrupted 28 times with applause by the audience 
at the Capital, declared: The great question of the seventies is, shall we surrender to our
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9 For an early article on the pollution of Lake Erie, see Charles F. Powers and Andrew Robertson The 
Aging Great Lakes', Scientific American, November 1966, reprinted in Man and the Ecosphere. Readings 
from Scientific American. 1971. Arthur D. Hasler and Bruce Ingersoll wrote in 1968 ?It took the visual 
(and olfactory) impact of a huge body of water, Lake Erie, suffocating as a sump for industrial waste, 
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Some now pronounce Lake Erie 'dead’.’ See 'Dwindling Lakes' reprinted in Cecil E. Johnson, ed., Eco- 
Crisis (New York: Wiley, 1970), 152-52.
10 Ecologist Barry Commoner devoted a chapter of The Closing Circle (1971) to the subject. For a 
rejection of Commoner's view, see John Maddox (British scientist, author and former editor of Nature) 
The Doomsday Syndrome (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 19-20. For denials of the poor condition 
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Jr. The Disaster Lobby. Prophets of Ecological Doom and Other Absurdities (Chicago: Follett, 1973), 
62-87. Since 1972 the state of the Great Lakes seemed to be improving. See The Great Lakes are 
Scarcely Great but Getting Better', New York Times, June 9, 1974. R. Tunley Tresh Start for the Great 
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11 'Special Report: The Ravaged Environment', Newsweek, January 26, 1970, 31.
12 Interview with Charles Lettow, former member of the CEQ, Washington, D.C., (September 24, 
1991). Lake Erie is one of the examples of environmental disasters from the late 1960s and early 1970s -  
headline events that had the effect of catalyzing environmental fears’ -  which are discussed in John 
McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise: The Global Environmental Movement (Bloomington; Indiana 
University Press, 1989), 59. See also Dixy Lee Ray with Lou Guzzo, Trashing the Planet ( Washington. 
D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1990), 164. Charles W. Howe writes: ’Lake Eric's 'death' in the 1960s, caused 
by the inflow of sewage and industrial wastes, spurred the passage of the Water Quality Act of 1965'. ’An 
Evaluation of U.S. Air and Water Policies', Environment, September 1991, 15.
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surroundings, or shall wc make our peace with nature and begin to make reparations for the 
damage we have done to our air, to our land and to our water?' 13. The special 'Message 
on the Environment' in February 10, 1970, which was the most comprehensive statement 
ever made by an American president on the subject, established a permanent three-member 
White House Council of Environmental Quality (CEO) 14. Although President Nixon had 
opposed the proposal at first, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was also 
established 15. In the President's message to the Congress of April 15, 1970, on the subject 
of Great Lakes and other dumping, the President directed the CEQ to make a study and 
report on ocean disposal of solid wastes 16.
In October 1970, the CEQ announced a national policy to prevent pollution of the 
oceans in the future. The CEQ also recommended that the United States should take the 
initiative to establish international cooperation on ocean dumping, and that such proposals 
should be presented in 'international forums such as the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human 
Environment' 11. Such proposals should be made along the lines of national policy.
13 For President Nixon's State of the Union message, see Text of President Nixon's State of the Union 
Message', the Congressional Quarterly. Weekly Report, January 23, 1970, 245-48. See aJso 'Nixon's 
Spirit of 76', Newsweek, February 2, 1970, 20-23, and Pollution: The Battle Plan', Newsweek, February
23, 1970, 23-24. The State of the Union message tells what the President consider important at the given 
moment. Steven Kelman sees it as an agenda-setting mechanism for Congress. See Making Public 
Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 71-72. The message is, in John W. Kingdon's words, 'a classic 
garbage can'. See Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 197.
14 Democrat Senator Henry M. Jackson had proposed a permanent three-member White House 
Council on Environmental Quality. It was established by a law which originated in legislation introduced 
by Congressman John D. Dingell (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation). 
Environmentalism among American presidents is briefly discussed in Philip Nobile and John Deedy, eds., 
The Complete Ecology Fact Book (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1972), xiii-xvii.
13 President Nixon personally saw the environment issue as 'a phony one'. Mark H. Moore What Sort 
of Ideas Become Public Ideas', in Robert B. Reich, ed., The Power o f Public Ideas (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), 67. See also Alfred Marcus 'Environmental Protection Agency', in James 
Q. Wilson, ed., The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 287.
16 For President Nixon's message to Congress on pollution of the Great Lakes, see 'Great Lakes 
Pollution', the Congressional Quarterly. Weekly Report, April 17, 1970, 1050-51.
17 Ocean Dumping: A National Policy. A Report to the President prepared by the Council on 
Environmental Quality. October 1970, 37. For the history of this report, see H. Crane Miller 'Ocean 
Dumping -  Prelude and Fugue' Journal o f Maritime Law and Commerce 5 (October 1973), 58. See also
President Nixon welcomed the council's recommendations and its 'approach of acting rather 
than reacting to prevent pollution',8. Senator and 'antipolluter' Gaylord Nelson, Democrat 
of Wisconsin and leading Senate authority on ocean pollution, declared: 'We have the 
opportunity now to prevent the sea from becoming the same kind of mess we now see in our 
rivers' 19. A New York Times editorial, titled To Save the Seas', cautioned: 'If the nations 
continue to use the seas as a dump, scientists warned last summer, the world's oceans will 
become as 'dead' as Lake Erie by the end of this century' 20.
In its report entitled 'Ocean Dumping. A National Policy', the CEO urged that strict 
limits set on the wastes that were dumped indiscriminately into the Great Lakes and the 
oceans. On radioactive waste, the report said: The current policy of prohibiting ocean 
dumping of high-level radioactive wastes should be continued. Low-level liquid discharges 
to the ocean from vessels and land-based nuclear facilities are, and should continue to be, 
controlled by Federal regulations and international standards. The adequacy of such 
standards should be continually reviewed. Ocean dumping of other radioactive wastes 
should be prohibited. In very few cases, there may be no alternative offering less harm to 
man or the environment. In these cases ocean disposal should be allowed only when the 
lack of alternatives has been demonstrated. Planning of activities which will result in 
production of nuclear wastes should include provisions to avoid ocean disposal'21.
The CEQ's decision was based on the anticipated environmental and economic
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Ocean Waste Disposal. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Committee 
on Commerce. Senate. 92nd Congress. March 2, 3; April 15, 21, 22, and 28, 1971, 205-18.
11 Robert M. Smith 'Panel Urges Curbs on Ocean Dumping; Nixon Hails Report', New York Times, 
October 8, 1970.
19 Don't Go Near the Water', Newsweek, October 19, 1970, 76. According 1o the Newsweek, 
America's ten 'filthiest' rivers were the Ohio, the Houston Ship Channel, the Cuyahoga, the Rouge River, 
the Buffalo, the Passaic and the Arthur Kill, the Merrimack, the Androscoggin and the Escambia. ’From 
Sea to Shining Sea' Newsweek, January 26, 1970, 37.
20 To Save the Seas', New York Times, October 13, 1970.
21 Ocean Dumping: A National Policy, vi-vii.
consequences of future dumping 22. As a member of CEQ explained before a Senate 
hearing: 'We think it is a serious problem today. It is a potentially very critical problem for 
the future. And let's stop; let's control the problem. Prevention, I think, in this case will be 
far more economical than tTying to cure it after it becomes critical'23.
In 1968, more than 48 million tons of waste were dumped at 246 sites in the Gulf 
of Mexico and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The amount of ocean dumping was expected 
to increase drastically as a result of a future increase in the U.S. coastal population. The 
CEQ report stressed the need for preventive rather than remedial action. Knowledge of 
economic costs and environmental impact of ocean dumping was scanty, however, and 
comparisons made with disposal alternatives disregarded political and social hindrances and 
hoped for technological advances and new methods of recycling. At subsequent hearings 
waste managers pointed to possible future scarcity of suitable landfills and lack of treatment 
technologies for certain toxic and other hazardous materials 24. The report listed as 'interim 
alternatives' hauling waste to suitable dumping sites by rail and reclaiming strip mines and 
other land for dumping. Permanent alternatives to ocean dumping, which neither the CEQ 
nor legislators gave much attention to later, would be sought through research authorized as 
part of legislation and development of environmentally acceptable and feasible land-based 
alternatives 2S. President Nixon practically quoted the CEQ's findings and policy 
recommendations in his statement to the Congress: 'In most cases, feasible economic, and 
more beneficial methods of disposal are available...Legislation is needed to assure that our 
oceans do no suffer the fate of so many of our inland waters, and to provide the authority 
needed to protect our coastal waters, beaches, and estuaries'26.
22 Ibid., v.
25 Dr. Gordon J.F. MacDonald before Ocean Waste Disposal, 153.
24 Ibid., 124.
23 For the brief mention in the Senate, see the Congressional Record, September 8, 1971, 30863.
26 'International Aspects of the 1971 Environmental Program: Message from President Nixon to the 
Congress', Department o f State Bulletin, March 1, 1971, 254. Compare with Findings and 
Recommendations', Ocean Dumping. A National Policy, v.
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Although the draft bill of the national regulation was prepared and cleared through 
the office of Management and Budget in October 1970, it was held and announced in the 
President's environmental message to the Congress on February 8, 1971, providing the first 
annual report on the state of the Nation's environment 27. In the 'Message on the 
Environment', President Nixon recommended legislation to implement 'a national policy 
banning unregulated ocean dumping of all materials and placing strict limits on ocean 
disposal of any materials harmful to the environment' 28. In order to complete national 
legislation, U.S. should work toward getting other nations to adopt and enforce similar 
measures 29. The final act similarly said that the Secretary of State and the administration 
should pursue international action and cooperation to protect the marine environment and 
'may for this purpose, formulate, present, or support specific proposals in the United Nations 
and other competent international organizations for the development of appropriate 
international rules and regulations in support of the policy of this A ct'30.
Two days later, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus submitted to the Senate 
a draft of a bill for national legislation 31. The bill was part of a comprehensive and wide- 
ranging action program which built upon the twenty-three legislative proposals and fourteen 
acts to clean up air and water submitted to the Congress the year before. 'Upon introduction 
in the Congress it was clear', wrote one of the staff members to the hearings, 'that the issues 
would be primarily jurisdictional, not substantive: a political demand for the legislation was
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27 H. Crane Miller 'Ocean Dumping -  Prelude and Fugue', 58. See also Melvin J. Grayson and 
Thomas R. Shepard, Jr., The Disaster Lobby, 67.
28 'International Aspects of the 1971 Environmental Program: Message from President Nixon to the 
Congress', 254.
29 Ibid., 255. The Council of Environmental Quality's recommendation with respect to international 
cooperation said: finally, this report recogmzcs the international character of ocean dumping. Unilateral 
action by the United States can deal with only a part -  although an important part — of the problem. 
Effective international action will be necessary if damage to the marine environment from ocean dumping 
is to be averted'. Ocean Dumping. A National Policy, v.
30 'Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972', Section 109. Quoted from Senate 
Report no. 92-451, November 12, 1971, sec 108.
31 The President: The Ecologist', Newsweek, February 22, 1971, 23-24.
evident; the regulatory techniques chosen were acceptable without objection'32.
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The scientific basis of ocean dumping regulation
In the early 1970s, knowledge of environmental effects of ocean dumping was at best 
rudimentary. Dr. R. B. Clark, British scientist and editor of Marine Pollution Bulletin, 
described in 1971 the state-of-the-art in marine pollution research as follows: 'Most 
knowledge of the biological consequences of marine pollution is derived from studies in 
temperate waters. Information about these environments is woefully inadequate, but it is 
encyclopedic compared with what we know about even the basic ecology of Arctic and 
tropical waters, let alone the consequences of effluent disposal and accidental pollution in 
them' 33. Two years later, it was obvious that there still was 'a great gap in scientific 
knowledge about pollution of the seas. A gush of research following oil spills of the 1960s 
barely has begun to lay the groundwork for decades of study needed before people can know 
just what pollutants are in the sea, how much there is of them, where they go once there and 
what effect they eventually will have on life in the oceans and on land'34. This lack of 
knowledge did not, however, dampen regulatory policy-making.
The question whether available knowledge of water and marine pollution could guide,
32 H. Crane Miller 'Ocean Dumping -  Prelude and Fugue', 59.
33 Michael Harwood "We Are Killing the Sea Around Us', The New York Times Magazine, October
24. 1971.
34 Barry Newman The Sea: Pollution of Oceans is Enormous Threat, but Few People Care', The Wall
Street Journal, October 2, 1973. For a marine pollution expert's view, see John A. Knauss 'Ocean 
Pollution: Status and Prognostication', in John King Gamble, Jr. and Guilio Pontecorvo, eds., Law of the 
Sea: The Emerging Regime of the Oceans (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1973), 313-28. For a lawyer’s 
account of the state-of-the-art in ocean dumping research, see Eckart Böhme The Use of the Seabed as 
a Dumping Site Viewed from the Outcome of the FAO Technical Conference on Marine Pollution, Rome 
1970', in Eckart Böhme and Max Ivers Kehden, eds., From the Law o f the Sea towards an Ocean Space 
Regime: Practical and Legal Implications o f the Marine Revolution (Hamburg: Werkhefte der
Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, 1972), 
93-121.
and should guide, policy-making actually had already been raised before the CEO issued its 
report on ocean dumping. The scientific basis of a proposal to control waterways, included 
in the above 37-point program presented at the first 'Message on the Environment’ in 
February 1970, had been received with skepticism. Under this plan, rivers and lakes were 
assumed to have a capacity to absorb waste without becoming polluted, technically known 
as the assimilative capacity 35, and through fair allocation of this capacity among all 
industrial and municipal sources precise limits on the amount of waste dumped into a river 
or lake would be assigned 36. But the Nixon administration’s proposal, which allowed 
waste discharges but would avoid pollution 37, did not have the full consent of the Congress 
38. ’We just don’t know enough about a river’s assimilative capacity,' objected one Senate
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35 The terms assimilative capacity, environmental capacity, accommodative capacity, and absorptive 
capacity have all been used to identify the capacity of the oceans to receive wastes safely. See footnote 
(37) below.
36 President Nixon said in his 'Message on the Environment': 'I propose that State-Federal water 
quality standards be amended to impose precise effluent requirements on all industrial and municipal 
sources. These should be imposed on an expeditious timetable, with the limit for each based on a fair 
allocation of the total capacity of the waterway to absorb the user's particular kind of waste without 
becoming polluted'. 'President Nixon’s Message on the Environment', Congressional Quarterly. Weekly 
Report, February 13, 1970, 436.
37 Ocean scientists presume the existence of a certain identifiable assimilative capacity of the oceans. 
This concept relies on the capacity of the oceans to absorb and neutralize pollutants. It follows that as 
long as this assimilative capacity is not exceeded, the marine environment will clean itself. Consequently, 
pollution occurs when a certain marine capacity is exposed to pollutants which exceed the upper level or 
capacity of assimilation of contamination. In this definition room is given to a certain legitimate use of 
the waste disposal capacity of the oceans, as long as the regeneration of the ocean resources is not 
prevented. In 1979 a group of ocean scientists reached agreement on a consensus definition, which later 
has been more widely accepted, which defines this capacity as the amount of materials that could be 
contained within a body of seawater without producing unacceptable biological impacts'. It is therefore 
necessary to consider specific conditions like the mixing capacity, length of turnover time (it takes, for 
example, 50 years for the water in the Baltic Sea to be renewed), stratification of water, temperatures and 
the level of biological activity when defining the assimilative capacity of a certain region. For above 
definition of assimilative capacity, see Edward D. Goldberg, ed., Assimilative Capacity of US. Coastal 
Waters for Pollutants. Workshop at Crystal Mountain' (1979). Used by professionals the word 
contamination signifies what is less than clean but not quite polluted.
38 EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus told congressman John Dingell that EPA's policy disagreed 
with, in Dingell's words, some of the industrial and municipal folks who have ideas we should utilize the 
streams and lakes and oceans up to their assimilative capacity'. Ocean Dumping of Waste Materials. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Subcommittee on
water expert. The best route is no dumping at ail, but that's is not what Nixon seemed to 
say' 39.
The CEO report on ocean dumping actually acknowledged that existing knowledge 
of ocean pollution was either rudimentary or, in fact, did not exist 40. It had, in addition, 
been impossible to separate the effects of ocean dumping from the broader issue of ocean 
pollution 41. The CEQ nonetheless concluded that there was 'reason for significant concern' 
4‘. It was, in addition, clear to U.S. government officials with experience in control of oil 
pollution from tankers that international control of ocean dumping was needed 43.
Contrary to the predictions of the epistemic community model, Congressional 
hearings held in spring 1971 demonstrated that experts disagreed whether significant 
pollution had occurred in the ocean, whether an ocean capacity to safely absorb some wastes 
existed, and whether regulation reducing ocean dumping at all was justified 44. The view 
of the administration and a group of congressmen backing ocean dumping legislation and the 
view of representatives from the waste management field were strongly at odds. Professional 
witnesses from the waste management field did not find that waste disposal necessarily was 
a danger to the health of the oceans. They stressed that the oceans were robust, had an 
enormous capacity to receive waste safely, and should be considered in any rational waste 
management strategy. Indeed, they did not support stringent ocean dumping control and
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Oceanography of the Commitlee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. House of Representatives. 92nd 
Congress. April 5, 6, 7, 1971, 454. It has been suggested that any indication that the EPA in any way 
supported 'pollution', and more specifically, effluent charges and intended to 'sell licenses to pollute' 
■would have dealt a serious blow to the EPA's need to find some political breathing room' in the 
precarious early months of its existence. James Q. Wilson The Politics of Regulation' in James Q. 
Wilson, ed. 'The Politics of Regulation', 376.
39 Pollution: The Battle Plan', Newsweek, February 23, 1970, 24.
40 Ruckelshaus concurred with this view. See Ocean Dumping o f Waste Materials, 451.
41 Ocean Dumping. A National Policy, 18.
42 Ibid., 18.
43 Interview with Charles Lettow.
44 See the two Congressional hearings Ocean Waste Disposal and Ocean Dumping o f Waste Materials.
many strongly disagreed that ocean dumping should be advised against in all cases. But 
another group of witnesses, mainly ecologists and marine scientists, disagreed. They 
advocated stringent control of ocean dumping on the grounds that irreversible damage 
otherwise would be inflicted on the oceans. In their view, the assimilative capacity of the 
oceans was limited and should be protected by legislation. The lack of any form of dumping 
regulation resulted in lack of incentives to reduce the amount of waste disposed of 4S.
Contradicting another essential claim of the epistemic community model, public 
opinion was far from indifferent on the issue of ocean pollution. Further illustration of the 
wide divergence of views among the acknowledged experts and, at the same time, 
considerable public concern over the health of the oceans, is found in the testimony given 
by a marine geologist who had produced a study that was the basis of the CEQ ocean 
dumping report. While he advised against any bill which ignored the assimilative capacity 
of the oceans he realized that the examination of the pros and cons of ocean dumping was 
met with public disbelief. Thus, public opinion was in favor of significantly reducing, if not 
banning, ocean dumping: 'We are faced with a matter of attitude in the United States today. 
It seems clear that in the general public's mind the idea prevails that disposal of any waste 
materials in the ocean is inherently bad, and therefore should be stopped, or at least severely 
curtailed...I am opposed to this, and I will explain why. I am convinced, and I believe if you 
will talk to various professionals in the waste management field you will find general 
agreement, that ocean dumping of selected types of waste -  and I emphasize selected -  is 
not only permissible but is in fact quite desirable...I fully recognize that this approach, as in 
my statement here, favors ocean disposal of all of certain types of wastes may seem contrary 
to everything you have heard or read regarding waste disposal at sea. I recognize also that 
in the present era of aroused public interest in the environment, in which ecology has 
become virtually a 'motherhood issue', there are certain significant hazards, both politically 
and professionally, in what at first may seem to favor what others might term 
pollution...There is a need to recognize in the bill that will be reported out by this committee
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45 For a discussion of these scientists' values, which however downplays the values of politicians and 
public opinion, see Judith Spiller and Alison Rieser 'Scientific Fact and Value in U.S. Ocean Dumping 
Policy', Policy Studies Review 6 (November 1986), 389-98.
that the waste assimilative capacity of the sea is enormous. I can hardly overstate or 
overemphasize that there has been a general failure to recognize this. We hear a lot of what 
I term vastly oversimplified and commonly ill-founded statements that any discharge of 
waste to the sea is pollution. This is just not true. If you will talk to qualified sanitary 
engineers, qualified biologists who are concerned with waste management, I think you will 
find general agreement with this1 46. Parts of this witness' statement were reprinted in the 
Senate report which, however, ignored it and instead urged strict control on ocean dumping
47
Despite a lack of knowledge about the environmental effects of ocean dumping, 
Congress passed a law on ocean dumping regulation the following year -  the Marine 
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 48. It was hoped that research would 
uncover the many unknowns of ocean pollution. Obviously motivation to solve the problem 
was far ahead of understanding.
Also contradicting the epistemic community model, Chapter 4 will demonstrate that 
a group of congressmen seeking to minimize all ocean dumping mobilized public and 
political support for U.S. domestic legislation. To supplement domestic regulation, they also 
advocated the establishment of an international regime. To influence and move public 
opinion and political leaders, both national and international, a series of Congressional 
hearings spread the simple, powerful idea that 'the oceans are dying'. Although clearly 
disregarding the many scientific unknowns of ocean dumping, this idea was used to focus 
public opinion and legislative attention on this issue.
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46 Dr. David D. Smith before Ocean Waste Disposal, 206-207. For the lack of knowledge of effects 
of wastes on the ocean environment, and the possible benefits of waste disposal, see also testimonies on 
122-134 and 134-142.
47 Senate Report no. 92-451, November 12, 1971, 4239-40.
41 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 33 U.S.C §§ 1401 a seq.
The pre—Stockholm international response to ocean dumping
As epistemic community as well as other theorists predict, international officials saw in 
ocean dumping and ocean protection generally a possibility to expand their sphere of 
competence and influence in the early 1970s 49. Several United Nations specialized 
agencies -  IMCO, FAO, UNESCO, and WMO -  had since the 1960s been involved in 
various aspects of ocean pollution x . In the words of a U.S. State Department official: 'A 
number of international organizations -  in fact, I dare say almost every one of them -  all 
simultaneously discovered the environment. All decided that they in tum wanted to be the 
sole organization or the principal organization dealing with i t '51. A pronounced tendency 
among international public officials to make ocean pollution, as well as the environmental 
'crisis', a serious international issue was also obvious 52. But none of these international 
agencies had success in getting governments involved in ocean dumping control. Neither 
did they play an essential role in the construction of the international dumping regime.
The UNESCO so-called Biosphere Conference held in Paris in September 1968 
marked the beginning of the new era of international environmental concern of the late 1960s
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Pollution: Problem and Response', Ocean Development and International Law, 10 (1982), 315-56. For 
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R. Michael M'Gonigle and Mark W. Zacher, Pollution, Politics, and International Law. Tankers at Sea, 
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50 Richard N. Gardner The Role of the United Nations in Environmental Problems', International 
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51 Christian A. Herter, Jr., special assistant to the Secretary of State for Environmental Affairs, at 
International Environmental Science. Joint Colloquium before the Committee on Commerce, United 
States Senate, and the Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives. 92nd 
Congress. 1st Session. May 25 and 26, 1971, 27.
52 In 1974, an internal memo written by a high-level UNEP official said: 'I continue to support FAO's 
tactic of stressing the effect on fisheries as a way to stimulate action on pollution in the Mediterranean, 
but suspect that the tourist angle is also one which should be played, particularly in relation to oil on 
beaches, but also in relation to sewerage'. Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean, 256.
s3. The conference was organized in cooperation with other U.N. organizations and, among 
several nongovernmental agencies, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources (IUCN), an organization aimed at furthering the ecological point of 
view 54. Prior conferences on environmental issues, often United Nations-sponsored, had 
tended toward a technical rather than an ecological orientation and had been single events 
5S. The Biosphere Conference concentrated on the scientific aspects of the conservation of 
the biosphere and marked the first appearance on the international environmental agenda of 
the biosphere approach to man-environment relationships 56. The conference was well- 
attended; representatives from sixty-two nations and a number of international organizations 
were present. As at the later United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
1972, the so-called Stockholm Conference, prominent and vocal ecologists, mostly 
American, attended the conference and contributed to conference reports.
The 'Final Report' of the Biosphere Conference recommended: 'In the place of single­
purpose actions in disregard of their associated consequences, both public and private, there 
is need to substitute planned programs for the management of resources if past degradation 
of the environment and deterioration of ecosystems are to be corrected, if the biosphere's 
productivity is to be maintained and even enhanced, and if aesthetic appreciation is given 
opportunity to flower1 57. But because economic, social and political dimensions of the
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Basis for the Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere. For the new era of 
international environmental concern, see John McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise, 47-105.
54 For the preparations for the conference, see M. Taghi Farvar and John P. Milton, eds., The Careless 
Technology. Ecology and International Development (Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press,
1972), 974-75.
55 See Lynton K. Caldwell 'Government and Environmental Quality', 198-204 in Huey D. Johnson, 
ed. No Deposit -  No Return (Reading, Mass.: Addison -  Wesley, 1970), 198-204. Also by Caldwell, 
see 'Cooperation and Conflict: Internationa] Response to Environmental Issues' Environment 27 
(January/February 1985), 974-75.
56 Alien L. Springer, The International Law o f Pollution, 4-5. See also R. M'Gonigle and Mark W. 
Zacher, Pollution, Politics and International Law, 5.
57 UNESCO, Final Report of the Intergovernmental Conference o f Experts on the Scientific Basis for 
the Rational Use and Conservation o f the Resources o f the Biosphere, Paris, 4-13 September 1968, 34.
problems of the biosphere were outside the purview of the Biosphere Conference -  
UNESCO is concerned primarily with science issues and scientific aspects of policy-making
-  the Final Report made only vague recommendations for future legal and institutional 
changes. It concluded that 'it has become clear...that earnest and bold departures from the 
past will have to be taken nationally and internationally if significant progress is to be made', 
but the more precise nature of those 'departures' was not mentioned. The 1972 Stockholm 
Conference, instead, focused on the economic, political and social dimensions of protection 
of the global environment.
'Man and His Environment: A View Toward Survival' was the telling title of the 13th 
National Conference of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO dealing with the 
environment. The conference took place in November 1969 at Stanford University and was 
attended by representatives of more than two hundred organizations 58. Prominent 
environmentalists such as Paul R. Ehrlich, Barry Commoner and distinguished anthropologist 
Margaret Mead contributed background papers or participated in panel discussions, or both. 
Considerable attention was paid to ocean pollution as well as control of population growth, 
reduction of atmospheric pollution, and preservation of ecological diversity.
One scientist warned that 'the end of the ocean came late in the summer of 1979 and 
it came even more rapidly than the biologists had expected' s9. Another contribution 
entitled The Sea: Should We Now Write It Off As a Future Garbage Pit?', by a specialist 
in the effects of pollutants on marine birds, was headlined in the conference publication as: 
’For those who don't as yet believe that the sea is dying, this is ample proof. For those who 
do, it is further documentation' “ . It was concluded that 'Scientific, practical, economic,
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Johnson, ed., No Deposit -  No Return, 121-136.
moral, and esthetic reasons require that the sea not be used as a garbage dump'61.
Similar to the Biosphere Conference, it was concluded that international machinery 
was needed because radioactivity released by atomic explosions, DDT, and polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), potentially travelled long distances. The conference proposed that 'the 
leaders of all nations through the United Nations General Assembly declare that a state of 
environmental emergency exists on the planet Earth' a . Among the proposals for future 
action were the establishment of national, regional and worldwide commissions on 
environmental deterioration and rehabilitation a . More precise indications were not given.
The beginning of the United Nations' interest in international control of marine 
pollution is signaled by a General Assembly request from 1969 that the Secretary General 
conduct a survey among member states on desires for international arrangements for 
regulation and reduction of ocean pollution M. The responses from 44 countries showed 
a general concern of increasing threat of pollution to the ocean environment, and a need for 
international prevention and control of ocean pollution. It was reported that no existing 
international agreement effectively controlled marine pollution. Existing agreements were 
too broad and without proper enforcement of many of the concepts agreed to. Other 
agreements were narrow and did not cover the existing range of pollution problems 63.
61 Ibid., 122.
62 'Interdependency Resolution'. Ibid., 337. See also Connie Flateboe The UNESCO Manifesto', in 
Ecotaciics. The Sierra Club Handbook for Environment Activist (New York: Pocket Books, 1970), 179- 
82. Barry Commoner also recommended that action should be taken through the United Nations when 
his background paper The Ecological Facts of Life' was reprinted as part of the conference proceedings. 
Earlier version published in Robert Disch, ed., The Ecological Conscience. Values for Survival (A 
Spectrum Book, 1970).
“  Ibid., 337
64 Already in 1966 did the Subcommittee on Marine Science and Its Application -  formed by the 
Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) of the United Nations -  and IMCO a survey among 
all the U.N. members on ocean pollution. Out of 67 replies, 13 governments declared that pollution of 
the seas was no problem; of the 47 stating that pollution was a problem, on the other hand, 36 indicated 
harm to living resources, 20 referred to threats to human health, 12 to hindrance of marine activities and
19 to reduction of amenities. Veiimir Pravdic, GESAMP. The First Dozen Years (UNEP, 1981), 3-4.
65 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General The Sea: Prevention and Control o f Marine 
Pollution, 51 U.N. ECOSOC, Annex 2, at 6, UN.DOC E/5003, 1971.
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The more specialized agencies within the sphere of the United Nations also involved 
themselves in ocean dumping. In 1969, the then Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IMCO) conducted a survey among its member countries on the kind and 
amount of materials which were disposed of from ships and barges in the ocean 66. The 
general picture showed that some control of dumping existed within territorial waters, while 
there existed almost no control of ocean dumping on the high seas 67.
In December 1970, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) organized 'the first 
attempt to make a worldwide scientific approach to marine pollution and its effects on the 
living resources of the oceans' 6S. Invitations had been sent to all FAO member nations and 
associate members, United Nations agencies, intergovernmental organizations and 
nongovernmental bodies with an interest in ocean pollution. Almost 400 participants 
attended the conference, mostly scientists and experts in the various fields of marine 
pollution, but also industry and governments, coming from over 65 countries. In addition 
to its scientific objectives, the conference intended to focus attention on pollution problems 
where international cooperation and coordination were required.
Experimental and review papers were mostly concerned with pollution by rivers and 
atmospheric fall-out. Ocean dumping had received little attention. In the discussion it was 
pointed out, however, that the future impact of marine pollution on a large scale would 
derive from ocean dumping. Serious concern should therefore be given to the future 
development of disposal of waste by ocean dumping. Harmful substances were reaching the 
ocean from coasts, through rivers and the atmosphere, but the substances disposed of by
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46 IMCO Document OPSfCirc.15, 13 May 1969. Exists also as appendix to GESAMP report no. 22,
10 February 1970.
67 Eckart Bohme The Use of the Seabed as a Dumping Site Viewed from the Outcome of the FAO 
Technical Conference on Marine Pollution, Rome 1970', 105.
“  Official conference title was the Technical Conference on Marine Pollution and its Effects on 
Living Resources and Fishing, held in Rome December 9-18, 1970. See ibid., 93—121. Scientists from 
the Woods Hole Institute in Massachusetts, a leading international oceanographic institute, described that 
a number of scientists at this conference had reached the conclusion that oil pollution of the ocean was 
'an increasingly serious global problem'. Max Blumer, Howard L. Sanders, J. Fred Grassle, and George 
R. Hampson 'A Small Oil Spill', Environment 13 (March 1971).
ocean dumping -  radioactive materials, chemical warfare weapons, and ammunition -  were 
particularly toxic and persistent. The participants concluded therefore that 'in future there 
is all the more an urgent need to improve the knowledge and information about the aspects 
of pollution by ocean dumping before any future control of ocean dumping can work 
efficiently* 69. The recommendations said that FAO in cooperation with other bodies 
should: 'review the widespread practice of dumping wastes, especially toxic or persistent 
substances in the world oceans and encourage international studies of selected dumping sites 
to make a scientific evaluation of both the short and long-term effects of such practices, and 
bring about cessation of the practice of dumping containers of waste and other obstacles in 
present and potential fishing grounds, and establish a system of registration to cover the 
dumping of all persistent and or highly toxic pollutants into the sea' 10. FAO was not 
involved in the preparations already under way to establish an arrangement for protection of 
the North Sea against ocean dumping, but it did get involved, though only indirectly, in the 
preparations for the global dumping regime initiated only a few months after the marine 
pollution conference.
Conclusion
Contrary to the predictions of the epistemic community model, the Nixon administration 
proposed ocean dumping regulation although scientific evidence of damage to the oceans was 
nonexistent in the early 1970s. Despite lack of knowledge, the administration considered 
ocean dumping a domestic environmental problem of some importance and urgency. 
Because of ocean dumping's international character, the administration also suggested that 
international regulation be established. Contrary to the predictions of epistemic community 
theorists, the hegemon, the United States, thus took the initiative to establish the international 
dumping regime.
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49 Ibid., 96. 
70 Ibid., 95.
Nor were politicians influenced by scientific knowledge as epistemic community 
theorists suggest. Congressional hearings demonstrated that scientists radically disagreed on 
the question whether ocean dumping had damaged the ocean environment and whether the 
ocean had a capacity to safely absorb some substances. Scientists also disagreed on the 
question whether knowledge about the effects of ocean dumping was sufficient to guide 
regulation. In short, policy experts were divided. Stringent ocean dumping legislation was, 
therefore, not given unanimous support by marine scientists. Politicians, however, largely 
ignored this.
Beginning in the late 1960s, international organizations, scientists, and international 
'anti-pollution' conferences advocated control of ocean dumping. Ecologists and 
environmentalists participated in conferences, for example the Biosphere Conference, 
organized by international organizations; ecologists and environmentalists also participated 
in international 'anti-pollution' conferences; and FAO convened several hundred scientists 
to establish a global scientific approach to marine pollution. But the public as well as 
governments paid little attention to such initiatives. Chapter 4 will show that politicians 
together with prominent environmentalists and ecologists -  instead of scientists and 
international organizations -  spearheaded United States' initiative to construct an 
international dumping regime.
Perhaps epistemic community theorists would object to this conclusion. They would 
correctly point out that the international dumping regime of 1972 was constructed at a time 
when only few governments had established environmental protection agencies. An 
ecological epistemic community would, therefore, be without the organizational platform 
necessary to exert its influence. Nonetheless, this case contradicts the claim that the 
existence of an ecological epistemic community is a necessary condition, and maybe even 
a sufficient condition, for the construction of international regimes for environmental 
protection. Chapters 4 and 5 will add supporting evidence to this conclusion.
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THE INTERNATIONAL DUMPING REGIME, REALISM AND RATIONALISTIC 
REALISM
Realists and Rationalistic Realists both would argue that the United States would constmct 
the international dumping regime. The United States would use the regime to realize its 
environmental objectives, if necessary at the expense of other states. The regime would 
closely mirror American environmental interests. It might, alternatively, satisfy American 
foreign policy objectives, for example improving the U.S. bargaining position in international 
trade or strengthening an international organization facilitating cooperation, which would not 
be intrinsically related to the solution of environmental problems *. This group of theorists 
assumes that the United States would dictate the terms of the regime to other states through 
some combination of coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of incentives 2.
In order to assess the Realist and Rationalistic Realist models of international regime 
formation, which seem identical, this chapter examines U.S. domestic policy formulation, key 
politicians' perception of the ocean dumping problem, Congress' support of legislation, and 
the economic implications of U.S. ocean dumping regulation. Contrary to the predictions 
of these models, ocean dumping was perceived as an international, if not global, problem 
both by Congress and the administration in the early 1970s. Through a series of hearings
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1 A 1970 U.S. administration study report suggested several reasons of this kind: 'International 
cooperation on the environment may be deliberately undertaken and encouraged for the purpose of 
strengthening an international organization that serves US interests, revitalizing it, and/or to increase its 
capability to bring nations together. Sometimes the primary aim is a more specific political objective such 
as enhancing the US image abroad or improving our bargaining position in international trade. In these 
cases, the improvement of environmental quality is a secondary consideration even though the desirability 
of that end is acknowledged and the need for joint action to control pollution is recognized'. Committee 
On International Environmental Affairs: Task Force III, US Priority Interests in the Environmental 
Activities o f International Organizations, December 1970, 23.
2 Oran R.Young 'Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes', in Stephen D. 
Kiasncr, ed, International Regimes, 100.
intended to attract public attention and legislative action congressmen 'trying to clean up the 
oceans' -  as they put it -  established domestic regulation 3. To influence and move public 
opinion and political leaders, nationally and internationally, Congressional hearings spread 
the simple, powerful idea that 'the oceans are dying1. To supplement domestic regulation, 
the United States should also work toward agreement on an international dumping regime. 
Supporting the claim made by Realists and Rationalistic Realists, introduction of ocean 
dumping regulation domestically created significant pressure in the United States for some 
sort of global regulation able to harmonize the economic costs of environmental protection 
in other countries. But their prediction that the United States primarily would be motivated 
by self-interest and a need to protect the national interest does not conform well with this 
case.
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US Congressional hearings on ocean dumping
The United States Department of the Army's disposal of some 65 tons of nerve gas in the 
Atlantic Ocean off Florida in the summer 1969 focused national as well as international 
attention on the problem of unregulated ocean dumping of supposedly extremely dangerous 
materials 4. In the words of one congressman: The nerve gas dumping incident reverberated 
around the world and focused public opinion on the need for legislation'5. In August 1970,
3 See footnote 14, below.
4 Stuart Weinstein-Bacal mentions the nerve gas dumpings in The Ocean Dumping Dilemma', Lawyer 
of the Americas 10 (1978), 892. Some have claimed that the international dumping regime was created 
in direct response to these dumpings. See R.P. Barston and P.W. Birnie The Marine Environment', in 
R.P Barston and Patricia Birnie, eds., The Maritime Dimension (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 
113. For international reactions, see Joachim Joesten, Wem gehört der Ozean? Politiker, Wirtschaftler 
und moderne Piraten greifen nach den Weltmeeren (München: Südwest Verlag, 1969), 152. See also 
Eckart Böhme The Use of the Seabed as a Dumping Site Viewed from the Outcome of the FAO 
Technical Conference on Marine Pollution', 98.
5 The Congressional Record. September 8, 1971, 30854. One Congressman said during the debate 
in the House on the ocean dumping bill: That emergency situation demonstrated that we had virtually no 
national policy or means of control for ocean dumping, and we had to stand by and watch the Army dump
despite national and international protests, the Army disposed of surplus nerve gas rockets 
embedded in concrete vaults on the ocean floor deep under international waters 6. 'A major 
incident’, wrote the New York Times 7. Scientists -  concerned over plans for oil drillings 
and discharges of domestic wastes, chemicals, minerals and 'other byproducts of our 
technology by proposed giant outflows into the deep sea' -  gave testimony before 
Congressional hearings describing possible catastrophic implications in the deep sea and were 
quoted by the press 8. A 1969 study by the US National Academy of Sciences talked of 
catastrophic dangers for fish 9. When the Council on Environmental Quality in October 
1970 announced its ocean dumping report the Army’s dumpings again were brought up. 
'Such practices could -  and should -  be controlled by executive order to conform to the new 
guidelines', said the New York Times 10.
Public and political attention to ocean dumping was sustained through several
81
nerve gas into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Florida'» The Congressional Record, September 9, 
1971, 31154. See also the Congressional Record, October 16, 1973, 34298.
6 For the Army dumpings, see Robert L. Fricdhcim ’Ocean Ecology and the World Political System', 
in John L. Hargrove, ed., Who Protects the Ocean ? Environment and the Development o f the Law of the 
Sea (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975), 172-73. The U.N. Seabed Committee made an 'appeal 
to all governments to refrain from using the seabed and ocean Door as a dumping ground for toxic, 
radioactive and other noxious material which might cause serious damage to the marine environment'. 
See David A. Deese, Nuclear Power and Radioactive Waste. A Sub-Seabed Disposal Option? 
(Lexington, Mass.; Lexington Books, 1978), 45-47. See also David Deese 'Seabed Emplacement and 
Political Reality,' Oceanus 20 (1977), 51. For the international legal consequences of the dumpings, see 
Oscar Schächter and Daniel Serwer 'Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies', The American Journal of 
International Law 65 (1971), 107-08.
7 Robert M. Smith 'Panel Urges Curbs on Ocean Dumping; Nixon Hails Report', New York Times, 
October 8, 1970.
1 Statement by Dr. Howard Sanders, from Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, Massachusetts, before 
the Subcommittee on Oceanography, is quoted from Senate Report no. 92-451, November 12, 1971, 
4238. Robert M. Smith 'Panel Urges Curbs on Ocean Dumping; Nixon Hails Report’, New York Times, 
October 8, 1970.
9 The study is mentioned in Joachim Joesten, Wem gehört der Ozean?, 152.
10 To Save the Seas’, New York Times, October 13, 1970.
Congressional hearings held in 1971 ll. One group of congressmen and senators concerned 
over ocean dumping, some with ties to the U.S. marine scientific community 12, was 
organizing an attack on the image of the oceans as pristine and indestructible and was 
effectively formulating new norms for ocean protection 13. While ocean pollution 
commanded the attention of the President and the administration, this group saw the 
opportunity to minimize, and maybe even end, all ocean dumping, and initiate a new oceans 
program 14. Heightened public and political concern for the health of the oceans furnished
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11 As one Congressman later said: 'Our colleague John Dingell, who chairs the Subcommittee on Fish 
and Wildlife Conservation, was instrumental in bringing public attention and focus on the problem through 
the important hearings which he conducted'. The Congressional Record, September 9, 1971, 31154.
12 From the point of view of the marine scientific community the past decade had been dominated by 
'ocean rhetoric'. The then newly established U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) was welcomed as an opportunity to 'get going*. See Administrator-Designate of NOAA Dr. 
Robert M. White's speech to the American Oceanic Organization. Reprinted in the Congressional Record, 
February 4, 1971, 1670-72.
13 Senator Alton Lennon, John D. Dingell (the chairmen of the Joint Subcommittee on Fisheries and 
Wildlife Conservation and the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries), and Senator Ernest F. Hollings (chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on oceans and 
atmosphere) were clearly the driving forces behind the ocean dumping convention. For Hollings' interest 
in marine science and technology, see Robert Gillette 'Politics of the Ocean: View from the Inside', 
Science 178 (November 1972), 729. Lennon and DingelJ had for several years prior to 1971 been 
concerned with the degradation of the marine environment and were responsible for the development of 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the establishment of the CEQ. See the Congressional 
Record, September 8, 1971, 30854.
14 Senator Hollings said during the Senate debate on the ocean dumping bill: \..the actual goal of 
trying within 5 years to set a policy against dumping the committee will welcome and gladly go along 
with'. The Congressional Record, November 24, 1971, 43068. See also discussion in Joseph A. 
Lumsdaine 'Ocean Dumping Regulation: An Overview' Ecology Law Quarterly 5 (1976), 771-772 and, 
more briefly, Allan Bakalian ’Regulation and Control of United States Dumping: A Decade of Progress, 
An Appraisal for the Future* Harvard Environmental Law Review 8 (1984), 213.
This group's continued interest in minimizing all ocean dumping is evident from an exchange between 
Senator Hollings and Mr. Rhett, spokesman for EPA, at the 1975 Oversight Hearing for the dumping act: 
’Sen. Hollings. If you had to make the choice from your vantage point, would you ever choose 
the ocean over a land site? I mean, I have been listening to this testimony about all the progress in 
phasing dumping out, and we're starting here and there, and now you act like you re going to start up 
something that never was.
Mr. Rhett. Let's say you have no heavy metal contaminants or anything of this nature and no 
land available for disposal. I'm not sure. Maybe it is better to burn it and pollute the air, but I think that 
we should evaluate all methods. I am not saying that it should be in the ocean, but, I am saying that I
them with this opportunity. In order to mobilize public and political support for regulation, 
prominent environmentalists and experts were invited to Congressional hearings where they 
described ecological threats to and even crises in the marine environment caused by 
pollution. Prominent ecologists and scientists attacked in particular the view that the oceans 
have a capacity to absorb unlimited waste without harm to them.
This group of politicians saw the problem of ocean dumping as being 'global in 
scope' 1S. National efforts alone would be futile. 'We are faced not with a national 
problem', one politician declared, *but an international one. Unless the nations concerned 
combine to put an end to ocean abuse, the abuse will write finis to us all' 16. A Senate 
hearing highlighting the international character of ocean dumping was held in the fall of 
1971. The goal of this hearing -  named 'International Conference on Ocean Pollution' -  was 
to focus national and international public and political attention on ocean dumping in 
particular and demonstrate the need for international cooperation. The idea to convene an 
international conference was put forward by a congressman who questioned the usefulness 
of the course of action suggested by the Council on Environmental Quality. In a letter to 
President Nixon he wrote: 'I believe the ocean dumping problem is of such momentous 
importance as to warrant an international conference at which it could receive maximum
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think all methods of disposal should be considered.
Sen. Hollings. We looked at all methods of disposal and we looked at oceans...We made that
determination. We are not looking around to find places to dump...
Sen. Hollings. You guys had better stay in that one direction because we'll amend the law to 
make sure you do.
Mr. Rhett. I think we are, but I do not believe that the act, as such, precludes ocean dumping. 
It says *regulate'.
Sen. Hollings. Well, We'll look at that and make sure because we want to go in one direction
on this one. We are trying to clean up the oceans. Go right ahead'. Quoted in Joseph A. Lumsdaine,
772.
15 Senator Randolph quoted in the Congressional Record April 1,1971, 9184. See also Senator Roth 
Congressional Record, April 1, 1971, 9209. See also statement of congressman Dante B. Fascell, in 
Ocean Dumping o f Waste Materials, 137-41. See also the Congressional Record, May 12,1971, 14667.
16 International Conference on Ocean Pollution. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oceans and
Atmosphere of the Committee on Commerce. Ninety-Second Congress. United States Senate. October
18 and November 8, 1971, 40.
attention. It seems to me that the exclusive attention which such an international conference 
could afford would be more productive of positive results than would be the case if we relied 
on a general conference such as the United Nation's Conference on the Human Environment 
scheduled for 1972’ n . Agreement reached at an international conference would, at the 
same time, be part of United States' preparations for the Stockholm Conference where, as 
one Congressman put it, 'the United States must be prepared to offer for consideration an 
international policy governing ocean disposal of materials'18.
Representatives of the international diplomatic community attended the 'International 
Conference on Ocean Pollution' ,9. Science aspects of ocean pollution were covered by 
Thor Heyerdahl, Jacques-Yves Cousteau, and Barry Commoner, all vocal international 
environmentalists and respected scientists. None of the marine scientists from earlier 
hearings participated 20. Congress had been informed that Cousteau in 1960 led a 
successful campaign to prevent the French Atomic Energy Commission's dumping of 
radioactive wastes into the Mediterranean 21. Thor Heyerdahl, the Norwegian explorer, had
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17 Senator William V. Roth's, Jr. letter to President Nixon of October 13, 1970 reprinted in the
Congressional Record, April 1, 1971, 9209.
18 Senator Randolph, the Congressional Record, April 1, 1971, 9184. Senator Randolph and others 
doubted the value of routine diplomatic channels with respect to reaching an international agreement on 
dumping. He suggested, instead, to reach an agreement through the international conference on ocean 
pollution and the Stockholm Conference. The reasons why United States tabled a draft convention on 
ocean dumping at the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine Pollution has been 
briefly discussed. See Lawson A.W.Hunter, The Question of an Ocean Dumping Convention 
(Washington, D.C.: Studies in Transnational Legal Policy no. 2., The American Society of International 
Law, 1972), 9-10. See also Gr. J. Timagenis, International Control of Marine Pollution, 181-82.
19 In addition to a number of unidentified representatives of foreign governments, the ambassador of 
Spain, the ambassador of South Africa, the ambassador of Honduras, and the ambassador of Portugal were 
present. International Conference on Ocean Pollution, 1.
20 The following individuals participated in The International Conference on Ocean Pollution': Scott
Carpenter, former NASA astronaut; Jacques Cousteau; Christian A. Herter, special assistant to the
Secretary of State for Environmental Affairs; Mark Morton, vice president and group executive, General 
Electric Co.; Barry Commoner; Hugh Downs; and, Thor Heyerdahl. See ibid.
21 Ocean Dumping of Waste Materials, 163. For the planned French dumping in the Mediterranean, 
see 'Atomic Disposal Alarms Riviera', New York Times, October 11, 1960; Riviera Resorts Threaten 
Strike', New York Tunes, October 12, 1960; France to Delay Atomic Disposal', New York Times, October 
13, 1960. For Cousteau's involvement in the French anti—nuclear movement, see Dorothy Nelkin and
during trips crossing the Atlantic in a reed boat in 1970 collected samples of oil pollution 
which later were on deposit at the United Nations in New York. Reports on oil pollution 
by Heyerdahl were also included in the United Nations group of marine pollution scientists's 
(GESAMP) documents as well as in background documents for the Intergovernmental 
Working Group on Marine Pollution (IWGMP), the negotiating and drafting group on the 
dumping convention 22.
Senator Hollings, in chairing The International Conference on Ocean Pollution', 
explained the goal of focusing public and political attention on ocean pollution in his 
opening remarks. This...Conference is dedicated to putting people on the alert... Everyone 
talks a lot about ecology...But we lack a sense of environment priorities...we need much 
more a full-scale assault on the heart of the problem. A second oceans program will 
provide just that' 23. Barry Commoner’s left-wing political views later almost
overshadowed his scientific statement, and were met with strong objections by one Senator. 
At that point, Senator Hollings defined the crucial role of vocal ecologists and 
environmentalists in giving the ocean pollution issue the needed national and international 
visibility 24. 'Specifically we all know', he said, 'that the oceans program is dragging its 
feet. It dragged its feet under President Kennedy. It dragged its feet under President 
Johnson. It was due to this Congress that we got the Stratton Commission and President 
Nixon instituted NOAA. We had a conference last week on how we could get the 
Administration going again in giving attention to the oceans, giving attention to the pollution 
problem, as the President gave in his Reorganization Plan No. 4 setting up the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. So we are trying to move it along, and you have 
helped us in a magnificent way' 25. When closing the international conference on ocean
Michael Poliak, The Atom Besieged. Antinuclear Movements in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The MIT Press, 1981), 91.
22 See Oscar Schachter and David Serwer 'Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies', 90.
23 International Conference on Ocean Pollution, 40.
24 For Barry Commoner, see Rae Goodell, The Visible Scientists (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 60-69.
21 International Conference on Ocean Pollution, 71.
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dumping, Hollings further emphasized the importance of the participation of Commoner, 
Heyerdahl and Hugh Downs, a television personality: 'So the only way I know -  I could say 
these things over and over again -  but the only way we are ever going to get this message 
through is with people with the brilliance and dynamism of you three here this morning 
getting the attention of the American public and in turn of our colleagues here in the 
Congress to move in the right direction’ 26.
Evidently the international conference's goal of focusing public and media attention 
on the issue of ocean pollution was achieved. Heyerdahl's statement was reprinted in the 
Congressional Record 27. Cousteau's statement, however, reached a much broader audience. 
It was reprinted, in an even more apocalyptic version, in the New York Times under the 
heading 'Our Oceans Are Dying' a , which often since has been quoted in popular science 
publications and ecology literature 29. At this occasion, and others, Cousteau significantly 
influenced public opinion with his message that 'the seas are dying'30.
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26 Ibid., 126.
27 Sec the Congressional Record, November 9, 1971, 40233-40235. For Heyerdahl's speech in 
Stockholm, see the Congressional Record, October 13, 1972, 35753-35756. Many statements given by 
Heyerdahl at U.S. hearings and the Stockholm Conference were reprinted in the Congressional Record.
28 Jacques Cousteau 'Our Occans Are Dying', New York Times, November 14,1971. New York Times 
followed clearly an apocalyptic editorial line. The New York Times Magazine had explored the same 
theme a few weeks earlier in an article by Michael Harwood entitled 'We Are Killing The Sea Around 
Us'. The article's daunting conclusions were characteristic of the time: "Lake Ene may, or may not be 
restored within 50 years', Dr. Max Blumer of Woods Hole wrote last December, "but a polluted ocean will 
remain irreversibly damaged for many generations'. And who would care to argue that a dead ocean 
would not mean a dead planet?'. For criticism of the lack of scientific evidence and the dialectical 
convolutions worthy of a Cicero* in this article, see Melvin J. Trayson and Thomas R. Shepard, Jr., The 
Disaster Lobby, 65-66.
29 See, for example, Reo M. Christenson, Challenge and Decision. Political Issues of Our Time (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1976), 2.
30 Interview with Robert J. McManus, Washington, D C., August, 29, 1991. Former Director, Oceans 
Division, Office of International Activities, U.S. EPA, and former General Council, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration. See also Robert J. McManus 'Legal Aspects of Land-Based Sources of 
Marine Pollution', in J.I. Chamey, ed., The New Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces (Totowa, 
NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, 1982), 90. See also R.B. Clark The Mediterranean, the Media, and the Public 
Interest’, in Marine Pollution Bulletin 20 (1989), 369-72. In a 1978 fund-raising letter, in which no 
numbers were given, Cousteau repeated the frightening possibility of the death of the oceans: I beg you
House and Senate reports on ocean dumping and the view of Congress
The House committee released its report upon the hearings in spring of 1971. On the 
question whether the oceans should be used for waste disposal, it said: 'Considering this end 
and the many other issues raised in the course of the hearings, it seems fair to say that the 
Committee wished to emphasize its answer to that question as a very large ’No" 31. The 
House committee report did not reflect the wide divergence of views among the scientists 
who had testified. Using carefully worded language, it summarized 'almost complete current 
unanimity of concern for the protection of the ocean's from man's depredations. In the 
hearings before this Committee, the witnesses were unanimous in their support for the 
purpose of this legislation. No argument was raised by any witness as to the desirability of 
creating a system of protection for unregulated dumping of waste material into the oceans' 
3~. As described in Chapter 3, there had been considerable disagreements among scientists 
and professional witnesses from the waste management field. But the Committee chose to 
ignore the view of the latter group. To explain the need for ocean dumping regulation, it 
instead extensively quoted prominent environmentalists Paul and Anna Ehrlich, Jacques 
Cousteau and Thor Heyerdahl although only Heyerdahl had testified in the spring hearings
33
A quotation from Paul and Anna Ehrlich stressed nations' responsibilities toward each 
other: 'No one knows how long we can continue to pollute the seas with chlorinated 
hydrocarbon insecticides, polychlorinated biphenyls, and hundreds of thousands of other
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not to dismiss this possibility (of death of the oceans) as science fiction. The ocean can die, these horrors 
could happen. And there would be no place to hide'. Quoted in Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, 
Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection o f Technological and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982), 170. (Their emphasis)
31 House report no. 92-361, July 17, 1971, 14.
32 Ibid., 12.
33 For the Ehrlichs, see Rae Goo dell, The Visible Scientists. See also Edith Efron, The Apocalyptics: 
How Environmental Politics Control What We Know About Cancer (New York: Touchstone, 1984), 33- 
35.
pollutants without bringing on a world—wide ecological disaster. Subtle changes may already 
have started a chain-reaction in that direction. The true costs of our environmental 
destruction have never been subjected to proper accounting. The credits are localized and 
easily demonstrated by the beneficiaries, but the debits are widely dispersed and are borne 
by the entire population through the disintegration of physical and mental health, and, even 
more importantly, by the potentially lethal destruction of ecological systems. Despite social, 
economic, and political barriers to proper ecological accounting, it is urgent and imperative 
for human society to get the books in order134.
At the spring hearings, discussed in Chapter 3, one congressman had submitted a 
letter from Jacques Cousteau who, in the words of the congressman, was 'the person most 
expert on the oceans of the world', and whose 'testimony is the best available to alert us to 
the damages we have done to our oceans and to the dangers we face if we do not act quickly 
and constructively' 3S. The House report quoted one portion of this letter 'Because 96 
percent of the water on earth is in the ocean, we have deluded ourselves into thinking of the 
seas as enormous and indestructible. We have not considered that earth is a closed system. 
Once destroyed, the oceans can never be replaced. We are obliged now to face the fact that 
by using it as a universal sewer, we are severely over-taxing the ocean's powers of self­
purification. The sea is the source of all life. If the sea did not exist, man would not exist. 
The sea is fragile and in danger. We must love and protect it if we hope to continue to exist 
ourselves' 37. The report also underscored the global scope of the ocean dumping problem. 
It explained that Thor Heyerdahl 'had found evidence of pollution and dumping of materials 
throughout his trip from Africa to the West Indies'38. The House report summarized that
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34 House report no. 92-361, July 17, 1971, 11-12. From Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich The 
Food-from-the-Sea Myth', Saturday Review, April 4, 1970. For House debate on the Committee report, 
see the Congressional Record, September 8, 1971, 30862.
15 Ocean Dumping of Waste Materials, 161.
36 For full letter, see ibid., 161-162.
J7 House report no. 92-361, July 17, 1971, 12.
'these issues formed the focus and background for the hearings on the Administration's ocean 
dumping legislation'39.
The administration's proposal to ban the dumping of chemical and biological warfare 
agents and high-level radioactive wastes had the full support of the committee. The 
committee considered high-level wastes, referred to as 'hot' radioactive wastes, so hazardous 
that it recommended an absolute ban on disposal at sea. An AEC spokesman had assured 
the committee that AEC did not consider resuming ocean dumping of low-level wastes 
which, as described in Chapter 1, had been almost completely phased out since 1963 in the 
United States 40. Hearing reports advocated that an international agreement on radioactive 
waste dumping at sea be established. They included papers, provided by conservation 
groups, advocating 'restraint and careful planning in nuclear exploitation of the oceans', and 
stressing an urgent need for 'worldwide agreements limiting radioactive pollution'41.
The more detailed Senate report covered both the views for and against dumping. 
The report nonetheless was unmistakably precautionary and prohibitory in tone. It quoted 
extensively from Cousteau's statement at the 'International Conference on Ocean Pollution', 
held after the House report was issued, and frequently used images, arguments and passages 
from his statement. A portion of the Senate report said: 'We have treated the oceans as 
enormous and indestructible -145 million square miles of surface -  the universal sewer of 
mankind. Previously we thought that the legendary immensity of the ocean was such that 
man could do nothing against such a gigantic force. But the real volume of the ocean is 
very small when compared to the volume of the earth and to the volume of toxic wastes that 
man can produce with his technological capability. Hie water reserve on our spaceship is 
very small. And again, as Captain Cousteau has said: The cycle of life is intricately tied 
with the cycle of water. Anything done against the water is a crime against life. The water
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system has to remain alive if we are to remain alive on this earth142. Parts of this passage, 
stressing norms and ethical concerns but little scientific evidence, was later repeatedly quoted 
in the Senate debate on the dumping bill 43.
Instead of reasoning as Realism's rational egoists exclusively concerned with the 
protection of American national interests, key United States politicians thus perceived ocean 
dumping as a fundamentally global problem concerning all mankind. The House Committee 
report said: 'The Committee wishes to emphasize its awareness that the types of problems 
with which [the ocean dumping bill] deals are global in nature. We are not so blind as to 
assume that in dealing with the problems created by our own ocean dumping activities, we 
are thereby assuring the protection of the world's oceans for all mankind. Other nations, 
already moving to grapple with these troublesome issues, also will and must play vital roles 
in this regard' M. A sense of guilt for past polluting activity further suggested that the 
United States took the initiative to begin controlling ocean dumping globally: 'At the same 
time, however, the committee recognizes that the United States has been heavily involved 
in ocean dumping activities and that the kinds of materials that our highly industrialized, 
commercial nation may be forced to dispose of may be particularly hazardous to the health 
of the oceans’ 45. Furthermore, in terms more commonly used by complex interdependence 
theorists, rather than Realists or Rationalistic Realists, the Committee report urged the United 
States to play a key leadership role: 'Even more importantly, we believe strongly that 
someone must take the first steps’ 46.
In Congress, Cousteau's statement, originally appearing in the Washington Post and 
reprinted in the Congressional Record, that The oceans are in danger of dying. The
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43 The Congressional Record, October 13, 1972, 36044.
44 House Report no. 92-361, July 17, 1971, 14.
45 Ibid., 14.
46 Ibid., 14. The need for U.S. leadership had also been stressed during hearings. See statement of 
congressman Lawrence Coughlin in Ocean Dumping of Waste Materials, 161.
pollution is general' was repeated frequently, as was his and Heyerdahl's descriptions of 
pollution encountered in isolated and previously unspoiled parts of the oceans 47. 
Cousteau's support for the administration bill given earlier was also repeated 4S. The 
soundness of the two explorers' statements and policy advocacy was not questioned. 
Debatable knowledge was not debated. Moreover, the abundant scientific uncertainties 
which surrounded ocean dumping necessitated immediate action instead of restraint. Senator 
Hollings declared: The seas are dying according to Jacques Cousteau, but we have not done 
much to find out whether he is right or not. And if we wait much longer, we may not have 
the luxury of time to find out. Because if the oceans die, we d ie '49. Some proposed even 
more stringent regulation 50.
It was, as would be expected, congressmen especially from states contiguous to the 
Great Lakes and from the coastal states who most actively supported control of ocean 
dumping. Undoubtedly, politicians also felt under pressure to demonstrate willingness to 
protect the environmentS1. But the high number of votes with which the bill passed both 
in the House and Senate reflected genuine concern over the environment among the public
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hearings on ocean dumping. See, for instance, Ocean Dumping of Waste Materials, 139. According to 
a three-paragraph article: "Oceans Are Dying,' Cousteau says'. The oceans are dying. The pollution is 
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a  'Men of all nations must join together in an effort to save our seas. I am sure that by such measures 
as are called for in H.R. 805 (the Administration's proposal) we will succeed'. The Congressional Record, 
October 13, 1972, 36044.
49 Senator Hollings. The Congressional Record, November 24, 1971, 43074.
50 The Congressional Record, September 9, 1971, 31129-31160.
51 One congressman said: The general public feeling is that government is unresponsive and that the 
individual is powerless to affect his environment. That is not the case when legislation such as this is 
enacted'. The Congressional Record, September 9, 1971, 31155. Another congressman said during the 
House debate on the dumping bill: 'We can afford to wait no longer. We must pass this bill. We must 
demonstrate to the American people that Congress is ready, willing -  and, yes, able -  to act in this area 
of critical need. Let us not delay'. The Congressional Record, September 8, 1971, 30859-60.
as well as political and administrative leaders 52. One Republican Senator saw the United 
States ocean dumping regulation as 'the result of our relatively sudden realization that the 
sea is not a bottomless septic tank, but a delicately balanced ecosystem dependent upon the 
good sense of man for its continued existence' 5\  Similarly, on Congress' motives for 
overwhelmingly supporting an amendment to a water pollution bill to study limitations on 
DDT, the Congressional Quarterly wrote in spring of 1970: To a certain extent, members 
were rushing to get on the bandwagon. 1970 is an election year, and public concern over 
the fate of the environment has never been higher. But evidence indicated that much of the 
new concern in Congress is sincere -  and may continue after the current frenzy of activity 
slows down' 5A. Several conservation and wildlife preservation groups supported ocean 
dumping regulation, but were not actively involved in the political process 3S. Leadership 
by key politicians and ecologists thus was crucial as public concern over ocean dumping and 
marine pollution generally was only moderate despite attempts to focus attention on this 
particular issue 56.
Economic costs of United States ocean dumping regulation
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The economic costs of United States ocean dumping regulation gave raise to concern. Like
H The House passed the ocean dumping bill by a vote of 304 to 3. The Senate passed the ocean 
dumping bill by a vote of 73 to 0.
53 Dumping of Waste Materials', the Congressional Quarterly. Weekly Report, December 11, 1971, 
2548-49.
54 'Pollution: Everyone Wants a Piece of the Action', the Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report, 
April 24, 1970, 1135.
55 For House debate, see letters from the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and others in the 
Congressional Record, September 8, 1971, 30853 and 30857. See also the Congressional Record, 
September 9, 1971, 31151-52. For Senate debate, see the Congressional Record, November 24, 1971, 
43060.
56 Interview with Charles Lettow. See also Barry Newman The Sea: Pollution of Oceans Is Enormous 
Threat, But Few People Care', The Wall Street Journal, October 2, 1973.
other pieces of regulation to protect the environment, domestic regulation would impose 
economic costs on United States industry which, in the absence of global regulation, would 
benefit foreign industry. In the case of ocean dumping U.S. government representatives and 
industrialists were concerned over the possible economic implications regarding especially 
European and, to a lesser extent, Japanese industries, and great importance was attached to 
finding an international forum where those problems also could be tackled 57. Thus the 
importance of institutional choice in a new era of policy-making was evident. Because 
Japan was not a participant in NATO, the U.S. Administration disapproved of using NATO 
as the primary forum for negotiating an international agreement on ocean pollution from oil 
discharges from ships 58. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), an organization of developed countries where the problems were to a greater degree 
in common than they would be in Stockholm, was favored by the United States for dealing 
with international trade implications of environmental regulation S9. In the case of an 
international ocean dumping convention and other problems of the marine environment, 
however, the United States preferred to work through the United Nations system, and thus 
the Stockholm Conference, as it included nations with substantial oceanographic capabilities
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57 The Senate ocean dumping report reads: 'Most of the subjects...are important not only 
environmentally but economically as well. Since much of current economic concern stems from the 
relative competitive position of different nations in world markets, it is important to get as many nations 
as possible to impose like environmental restraints upon themselves...the U.S. domestic legislation can 
promote international agreement by treating the subject of ocean dumping in international waters 
separately. [In order to avoid law of the sea issues, the proposal for U.S. dumping regulation was based 
on the right to regulate transportation from U.S. ports and by U.S. registered ships]. By taking this route, 
the U.S. can tend to equalize out competitive position relative to European industry. Under the proposed 
U.S. draft convention these practices would have to change, resulting in a considerable economic impact'. 
Senate report no. 92-451, November 12, 1971, 4242-4243. The issue of disadvantage to U.S economic 
interests was also raised by a representative from private industry at the International Conference on 
Ocean Pollution, 27.
51 See the Congressional Record, April 1, 1971, 9209.
59 The reasons for the choice of OECD were explained before the Congressional hearing U.N. 
Conference on Human Environment: Preparations and Prospects. Hearings before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations. United States Senate. 92nd Congress. May 3, 4, and 5, 1972.
(e.g. the Soviet Union, Japan) and large maritime fleets (e.g. Liberia, Panama) 60.
While the economic implications of ocean dumping regulation were modest, but 
anyway gave rise to concern, the potential economic costs of international environmental 
regulation that might be agreed on in Stockholm gave rise to serious concern in the United 
States. The economic consequences of differing national standards jeopardized international 
trade. Furthermore, international trade war seemed a real threat as there was considerable 
pressure within the U.S. Congress and the administration to impose countervailing duties 
where other countries did not maintain standards comparable to U.S. standards 61. Such a 
trade war would probably escalate as the environment increasingly became an issue also in 
Europe; the environment was already an issue in Japan. The U.S. State Department thus 
intended to use the Stockholm Conference for reaching agreement on international 
regulations and standards in order to protect national economic interests and avoid trade
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of Ocean Politics (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 65. Other U.S. considerations, 
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organization. See U.N Conference on the Human Environment: Preparations and Prospects, 63.
61 United States Assistant Secretary of Commerce Harold C. Passer warned of the possibility of a trade 
war in a speech on October 6, 1970, when he said: 'In those cases where prices increase (to meet pollution 
control costs), U.S. goods would be at a competitive disadvantage in world trade. In order to avoid a 
major deterioration of our balance of payments position, remedial action would be necessary. Perhaps 
the most desirable action would be the setting of international pollution standards. An international 
convention of the world's countries could be convened for the purpose of reaching agreement on pollution 
standards. If an international agreement on pollution standards cannot be reached, the U.S. may find it 
necessary to levy border taxes on imports and rebates on exports to reflect the added production costs of 
pollution standards. This is obviously a less desirable solution, because it might violate existing GATT 
rules and because it would be difficult to determine the extent to which the imposition of pollution 
standards adds to production costs'. Quoted in U N Conference on Human Environment: Preparations 
and Prospects, 68.
disruptions fa. Similarly, to protect U.S. economic interests, members of the Senate wanted 
U.S. delegates to the Stockholm Conference to 'advocate and support multilateral accords to 
achieve standards and regulations of environmental protection enforceable by the United 
Nations or multilateral economic sanctions'
Also in the case of ocean dumping would international agreement offer an 
international solution to the economic costs imposed by domestic regulation. As a U.S. 
official participating in the negotiations explained: 'One reason the United States strongly 
supported an ocean dumping treaty in the first place was its hope that other nations -  
especially industrialized ones -  will establish environmentally protective regulations similar 
to our own. To the extent they do not, foreign industry may gain a competitive edge, since 
the price of its products will not reflect the costs of pollution abatement. And so, once 
enactment of domestic ocean dumping legislation was foreseen, the United States became 
enthusiastically instrumental in establishing an international control mechanism reflecting our 
domestic law' 6*. In short, agreement on international regulation would imply that also 
foreign industry should reflect the costs of pollution control in its products.
Thus, on the economic side, soon-to-be realized domestic regulation created 
incentives to establish an international regime and prompted United States international 
leadership in ocean dumping regulation. To protect national economic interests, the United
95
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States was in strong support of international regulation as this could provide an acceptable 
solution to the economic costs of domestic regulation. The Stockholm Conference was the 
best forum for reaching agreement on international regulation, both from the economic and 
the environmental perspective. Hence, the United States tabled a proposal for a global 
dumping convention at the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine 
Pollution (IWGMP), a negotiation group established by the Preparatory Committee of the 
Stockholm Conference.
Conclusion
In the late 1960s, several spectacular mishaps and incidents of pollution had attracted 
American attention to pollution of rivers, lakes and harbors. Attention to pollution of the 
ocean from dumping, however, was provoked by the problem of dumping of dredged spoils 
into the Great Lakes, which provoked concerns for dumping in the ocean, and the Army's 
dumping of nerve gas off the coast of Florida. Although no severe damage had been 
inflicted on the ocean environment, ocean dumping was singled out for regulation. This 
approach, in President Nixon's words, of 'acting rather that reacting' to prevent marine 
pollution from dumping also made political sense to politicians under pressure to 
demonstrate a willingness to act
Public concern about the health of the oceans was new in the late 1960s. It was a 
fortunate combination of focusing events, a new influential public idea and a group of 
determined congressmen which resulted in regulation of ocean dumping in the United States. 
It was this combination of elements which had been mentioned in the opening remarks at 
one of the Congressional hearings on ocean dumping in 1971: 'It seems that no one knows 
the volume -  and I think that is really an understatement -  of wastes that have been dumped 
in the oceans in the past years. In fact, until recently, the question was scarcely asked and
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then only by an obscure group of scientists, known as ecologists. Fortunately, however, in 
the last few years the entire question of ocean disposal of waste material has been thrust into 
prominence, and I think appropriately so, by the recently disclosed dumping of nerve gas and 
oil wastes off the coast of Florida, by the dumping of sewage and other municipal wastes 
off New York Harbor, and a number of other and similar instances' 66. In the wake of a 
series of spectacular environmental accidents in the ocean and examples of dumping causing 
'death' in Lake Erie and other large water bodies the idea of pollution of the ocean from 
dumping, which had started among an insignificant group of scientists at an earlier date, was 
used by a group of congressmen to effectively set new norms for ocean protection. To 
attract public and political attention to the need for regulation, prominent ecologists and 
environmentalists spread the simple, powerful idea that the 'oceans are dying'.
Contradicting the claim made by Realists and Rationalistic Realists, ocean dumping 
was seen as an international problem involving all states. Protection of the national interest 
thus necessitated that potentially all states would work together in controlling ocean 
dumping. But an international policy would be realized only if states could agree on a 
definition of the problem. This could not be achieved by coercion by instead some form of 
international persuasion and education.
97
66 Senator Alton Lennon Ocean Dumping o f Waste Materials', 1.
CHAPTER 5
98
THE INTERNATIONAL DUMPING REGIME AND COMPLEX 
INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY
For complex interdependence theorists, ecological issues cause states to depend on each 
another for attainment of human well-being and protection of the environment. The nature 
of interdependence issues compels states to cooperate within international regimes.
According to this body of theory, military force is not an available means to influence 
international policy under conditions of complex interdependence. These theorists would 
predict that the United States, or another powerful state, would create the international 
dumping regime by demonstrating to other states the advantages of cooperation. However, 
international organizations would play an insignificant role in the regime-building process. 
According to Keohane and Nye: ’Leadership will not come from international organizations, 
nor will effective power'
As regards the international dumping regime, the regime-building process was far 
from a 'governments only' affair. It was intimately interwoven with the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, the Stockholm Conference, where 
organizers attempted to secure the environment a permanent place on the global agenda. The 
Stockholm secretariat organized the negotiations on the international dumping regime so that 
a treaty could be ready for signature by governments at the conference. Agreement on this 
regime would prove governments' willingness to start protecting the environment. An 
agreement was reached within a few months after the conference.
Popular ecology themes from the Biosphere Conference in September 1968, discussed 
in Chapter 3, dominated the view on nature-society relationships in Stockholm. But the 
large number of participating states from North and South and the attendance of 550 non­
governmental organizations and many individuals representing mass movements or special
1 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 240.
interest groups distinguished this conference from previous United Nations-sponsored 
environment conferences2. Furthermore, conference resolutions and recommendations urged 
that concrete international machinery for environmental protection be established. The 
Stockholm Conference thus was a political conference with 'the full rigor of diplomatic 
protocol'3.
Contrary to the predictions of complex interdependence theorists, the Stockholm 
secretariat played an important catalytic role in the regime-building process. High-level 
United Nations officials significantly influenced both pre-negotiation and negotiation 4. 
Tensions between developed and developing countries, major differences in governments' 
commitment to protecting the environment, scientific uncertainties concerning environmental 
impact of substances, and lack of global attention to ocean dumping jeopardized the 
construction of the international dumping regime. However, due to the Stockholm secretariat 
these obstacles were overcome. Equally important, the secretariat effectively mobilized 
international public opinion and pressure during the preparations for the conference. 
International pressure was a significant element in reaching agreement on the international 
dumping regime.
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The Stockholm Conference and ocean pollution from dumping
The idea to convene a high-level United Nations conference in order to focus the attention 
of the international community on the need for international action on the environment 
originated with Sverker Astrom, head of Sweden's mission at the United Nations, New York. 
A member of the Swedish delegation made the formal proposal at a meeting of U.N.'s 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOQ in July 1968. The council's resolution calling for 
the conference was then debated by the U.N. General Assembly. The assembly adopted the 
draft document without alteration in December 1968. Under the resolution the coming 
United Nations conference should 'provide a framework for comprehensive consideration 
within the U.N. of the problems of the human environment in order to focus the attention 
of governments and public opinion on the importance and urgency of this question and also 
to identify those aspects of it that can only or best be solved through international 
cooperation and agreement'3.
Michel Batisse, the organizer of the UNESCO Biosphere Conference in 1968, 
appointed a Swiss scientist, Jean Mussard, as Secretary-General of the coming conference. 
Mussard planned to organize an international meeting which would focus on scientific 
aspects of the environment. Political and economic aspects of environmental protection were 
ignored. At that point, it seemed more likely that the coming conference would produce 
scientific reports and books, and probably financial support to UNESCO, rather than 
concerted governmental action.
FAO and WHO (World Health Organization), both bypassed in the early planning 
phase, did not share UNESCO's intentions for the coming conference. Sverker Astrom, who 
in his published recollections wrote 'from the very beginning we emphasized the need for 
rapid action', realized that the preparations did not develop as he intended 6. Together with 
a few high-level United Nations officials Astrom persuaded U Thant, the then Secretary-
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6 Quoted from Wade Rowland, The Plot to Save the World: The Life and Times of the Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1973), 34.
General of the United Nations, to replace Jean Mussard. In December 1969, a U.N. 
resolution shifted the direction of the coming conference 'to serve as a practical means to 
encourage and to provide guidelines for action by governments and international 
organizations'7. Maurice Strong, a former Canadian businessman who had recently been 
appointed as head of the Canadian International Development Agency, replaced in the Fall 
1970 Mussard as Secretary-General of the conference 8. From then on, an international 
policy conference started to take shape. The official title of the conference was changed and, 
as both FAO and WHO hoped, emphasized now the 'human aspects' of the environment 9 
. This shift in emphasis implied that political and economic aspects, as well as the proper 
role of science and technology in environmental protection, should move to the fore. An 
action-oriented approach to the preparations for the conference as well as for the conference 
itself was also developed by the Stockholm secretariat.
The secretariat, some twenty people, was aware that one single United Nations 
conference on the environment could not suddenly bring governments to massively cooperate 
on environmental protection. Many developing countries suspected that environmental 
protection was simply another way for developed countries to slow down their industrial 
development. At the same time, protection of their economies and sovereignty made 
developed countries oppose any bold attempts at international cooperation on these matters. 
The secretariat nonetheless hoped for the beginning of environmental protection on a global 
scale.
The secretariat established a Preparatory Committee, a group consisting of 27 
governments, with strong representation from the third world, which at its first two meetings
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preparations at that point and had met with the Preparatory Committee.
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Remarks by Maurice F. Strong, Secretary-General Designate, United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment, at Informal Meeting of Preparatory Committee for the Conference'. U.N. Centre for 
Economic and Social Information, GESI Note/13, 10 November 1970.
looked for particular areas for future international cooperation on pollution control. The U.N 
General Assembly resolution -  'to identify those aspects of it that can only or best be solved 
through international cooperation' -  led the Preparatory Committee in their search for parts 
of environmental problems that were joint 10. The Committee focused on areas outside 
national authority and areas under national authority of concern to most governments.
The secretariat tried to convince governments that at least a number of pollutants and 
ways in which pollution occurred due to their nature only, or best, could be solved through 
international cooperation. Among these pollutants of 'broad international significance', as 
they were called in 'basic papers' produced by specialized agencies of the United Nations and 
presented during the preparatory process, three types were identified: those whose effects 
were felt beyond the national jurisdictions in which the pollutants were released to the 
environment; those who affected international trade; and those that occurred in many states 
n. Global aspects of marine pollution were emphasized in separate basic papers n. The 
Secretariat hoped to demonstrate that there were particular pollutants which from a global 
perspective should be controlled.
The oceans, the stratosphere and Antarctic seemed strong candidates for the first 
category, while maintenance and restoration of soils and conservation seemed strong 
candidates for the third category. However, protection of the marine environment did by far 
attract the most attention as a particular area in which it was hoped action could be 
undertaken in Stockholm. The secretariat then took the initiative to convene an international 
working group on marine pollution, officially named the Intergovernmental Working Group 
on Marine Pollution (IWGMP), to prepare action in this particular field.
Far from all governments saw ocean dumping as a global environmental problem.
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11 For the 'basic paper', which was commissioned by the secretariat and produced at the United 
Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), see Daniel Serwer International Co-Operation 
for Pollution Control', in John Lawrence Hargrove, ed., Law, institutions, and the Global Environment 
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12 For the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) report concerned with marine 
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Most governments were in fact not concerned over ocean dumping. Only in those countries 
where environmentalism had gained a foothold, namely developed countries and especially 
the United States, did ocean dumping cause concern. Thus, it was in the United States, 
where prophecies of environmental catastrophes were a peculiar characteristic of the ecology 
debate as well as a favorite theme of the ecology elite, that the idea that the oceans were 
dying first gained political importance and ocean dumping was seen as a global problem 13. 
As a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations later noted caustically: 'We have become 
great producers and distributors of crisis. The world environmental crisis, the world 
population crisis, the world food crisis, are in the main American discoveries -  or inventions
-  opinions differ' 14.
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Secretary of the Interior, or the scholarly Raymond Fosberg of the Smithsonian Institution should share 
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Especially in the eyes of China, Brazil, and India, the affluent Western societies, who 
were facing severe self-inflicted environmental problems, intended through the Stockholm 
Conference to impose new environmental regulations on developing countries which would 
cause industrial and economic stagnation. Some developing countries even saw global 
environmental standards as a deliberate strategy of the developed countries aimed at halting 
the development of poor countries 15. In Stockholm, developing countries thus launched 
an attack on the developed countries, especially the United States, and demanded 
compensation and assistance in development16.
Developing countries' rejection of globed environmental standards did not come as a 
surprise to the Stockholm secretariat. Representatives of developing countries had at 
meetings arranged by the secretariat made it clear that they were opposed to such standards 
and that they saw pollution with global effects as a by-product of the intensity of industrial 
activity in the highly developed countries 11. However, Maurice Strong assured in his 
'round-the-world-lobbying to organize the conference' that land use, drastic erosion, 
spreading deserts, and loss of wetlands and watersheds, all topics most relevant to developing 
countries, would be on the Stockholm agenda 18. In addition, conference organizers kept
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15 At a meeting prior to Stockholm delegates from developing countries warned that they saw banning 
of DDT as genocide. 'And global environmental standards, they said, were merely a means of 
perpetuating underdevelopment by inhibiting industrialization and economic growth in the Third World'. 
Nigel Hawkes Human Environment Conference: Search for a Modus Vivendi' Science 175 (18 February 
1972), 737. See also The Big Cleanup’ Newsweek, June 12, 1972, 36-43.
“  'An unexpected theme of the two-week conference, now at its half-way point, has been the 
insistence that because the advanced nations are responsible for the largest amount of environmental 
pollution to date, they owe the developing countries both reparations and assistance in development'. 
Gladwin Hill 'China Denounces U.S. on Pollution: Reparations to Poor Nations Demanded in Stockholm' 
New York Ttmes, June 11, 1972. See also Gladwin Hill 'Sense of Accomplishment Buoys Delegates 
Leaving Ecology Talks' New York Tunes, June 18, 1972.
17 See Founex Report on Development and Environment' International Conciliation (January 1972), 
7-37. For a good Hisreissinn, see Lawrence Juda 'International Environmental Concern: Perspectives of 
and Implications for Developing Countries', in David W. On and Marvin S. Soroos, eds., The Global 
Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1979), 90-107.
11 The Big Cleanup', Newsweek, June 12, 1972, 40. See also Allen L. Springer United Slates 
Environmental Policy and International Law: Stockholm Principle 21 Revisited', 50.
family planning, a politically very sensitive issue, off the agenda in Stockholm in the hope 
not to alienate developing countries w. This was part of the price paid for persuading 
underdeveloped countries to come to a conference they have no heart for' 70.
As regards ocean dumping, the view of the group of developed countries and that of 
the group of developing countries differed dramatically. Developing countries generally did 
not see themselves as polluters of any significance and did not consider ocean pollution their 
problem. Nor did scientists from developing countries pay much attention to ocean 
pollution. As a spokesman of the scientific community from the developing countries 
explained before a United States Congressional hearing: 'Ocean and higher atmosphere 
pollution, that is to say the two phenomena with the greatest global effects, have almost not 
been considered [by Third World scientists]. I would dare to interpret this fact as the feeling 
that the less developed countries are judging themselves only in a very small measure 
responsible for the occurrence of these pollutions and that therefore the solutions should also 
be undertaken by the industrialized countries' 21. In his comments on the Stockholm 
secretariat's proposal to identify pollutants of broad international significance, the Brazilian 
delegate to the Stockholm Conference wrote: The examination of this list of major pollutants 
of international significance shows clearly that (with only marginal exceptions) the great 
polluters are the highly industrialized countries. Starting from radionuclides (practically 100 
per cent of whose production and dissemination is imputable to a few highly developed 
countries) and going right on down the list of all the other major pollutants, the 
overwhelming discharge of effluents is the consequence of the developed countries' recent
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19 A columnist from Nigeria's Lagos Daily Times offered his view as: The idea of family planning 
as peddled by the Euro-American world is an anempt to keep Africa weak'. Quoted in The Big Cleanup', 
Newsweek, June 12, 1972, 43. A U.N. conference on population was instead planned for 1974. See 
Wade Rowland, The Plot to Save the World, 126-127.
20 Nigel Hawkes Human Environment Conference: Search for a Modus Vivendi' Science 175 (18 
February 1972), 737.
21 Statement by Dr. Francesco Di Castri, the Vice President of the Scientific Committee on Problems 
of the Environment, International Council of Scientific Unions, before the 1971 US Senate hearing 
International Environmental Science. Joint Colloquium before the Committee on Commerce, United 
States Senate, and the Committee on Science and Atmosphere, House of Representatives. May 25 and 
26, 1971. 92nd Congress, 37.
technologies and of their high level of industrial as well as primary production (particularly 
in over-fertilized, over-herbicided, and synthetically controlled agriculture). The 
contribution to this type of pollution by developing countries is, in absolute terms, extremely 
small and in relative terms practically nil' 22. A report from the Indian National Science 
Academy likewise did not count ocean pollution among existing global environmental 
problems 23.
Negotiating the international dumping regime
Within one year, the IWGMP met four times. At the fifth session held in London from 
October 30 to November 13, 1972, a global dumping convention was signed. This group 
was established by the Stockholm secretariat as part of the preparations for the Stockholm 
Conference and was intended to produce an action program for future international control 
of marine pollution to be presented at the conference.
The first session of the IWGMP took place from 14 to 18 June 1971 at IMCO 
headquarters, London, under the sponsorship of the British government. Thirty-three 
governments had sent representatives 24. Representatives of the Stockholm secretariat, 
GESAMP, IOC, FAO, IAEA, WMO, and UNESCO also attended, together with 
representatives of IMCO. An observer from the United Nations Group of Experts on Long- 
Term Scientific Policy and Planning was also present.
From the outset, the participants agreed that many forms of action were needed, due
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22 Miguel Ozorio de Almeida The Confrontation between Problems of Development and Environment, 
International Conciliation (January 1972), 48.
23 International Environmental Science, 223-24. See also India, Summary of the Indian National 
Report in The Human Environment, voL2: Summaries of National Reports, Environment Series 201 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Internationa] Center for Scholars, 1972), 35-40.
24 Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, France, 
Ghana, Iceland, Iran, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States of 
America, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.
to the variety of human activity on land and at sea, in order to prevent marine pollution. Yet 
in addition to drawing up a comprehensive plan for preservation of the marine environment 
it was decided to single out particular aspects of marine pollution where it might be possible 
to conclude a treaty at the Stockholm Conference 25. A United States draft convention, 
titled 'Regulation of Transportation for Ocean Dumping Convention', and regional 
arrangements to protect seas or groups of seas were the main instances mentioned in this 
connection. While discussions on regional anangements had to wait until the next session, 
since detailed proposals did not exist, widespread support for a global arrangement for 
dumping control was expressed 26.
Under the United States draft convention, the convention should apply to dumping 
by all means of transportation while other marine pollution sources, for instance land-based 
sources like pipelining from the coast, would be excluded from the convention. The 
transportation of all materials from land for the purpose of dumping at sea would be 
prohibited unless a permit was issued by relevant state authorities. For that purpose, each 
state should establish criteria for the issue of dumping permits. These criteria, which gave 
rise to debate, generally should be designed to 'avoid degrading or endangering human 
health, jeopardizing marine life, and economic uses of the ocean' 27. States should then 
notify an international registry as to the kinds and amounts disposed of, the location of 
disposal site, and other relevant data.
The question of the prohibitory and restrictive stance, or lack of same, of the United 
States draft convention stirred debate. A number of states thought that the convention should
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25 'Report o f the First Session of the Inter-Governmental Working Group on Marine Pollution, 
London 14-18 June 1971\ UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.I/5. 21 June, 1971, 5.
26 According to Christian A. Herter, Jr, Special Assistant of the Secretary of State for Environmental 
Affairs: It was not felt in London that at this point it was possible to deal with what you might call 
coastal and estuarine pollution because there are enormously complicated problems involving jurisdictional 
boundaries and all sorts of things, and as you are fully aware, the so-called law of the sea conference is 
designed to deal with these problems of territorial jurisdiction...It was felt if we can get anything done 
at Stockholm at all, let's keep it fairly simple, it may not be the world's most meaningful thing, but at least 
it is a start'. International Conference on Ocean Pollution, 35.
27 UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.I/5, 6.
primarily prohibit ocean dumping and only consider for disposal those materials 'whose 
harmless effects could be demonstrated in the light of existing knowledge and experience' 
28• Referring to the work done by GESAMP, it was suggested that a distinction should be 
made between substances; whereas some substances might be prohibited, in other instances 
dumping might be allowed, subject to a license being obtained 29. Other countries found 
the suggestions of the United States draft more acceptable. The United States draft did not 
distinguish between permitting and prohibiting ocean dumping 30. Sweden, which in 
January 1972 passed a law prohibiting ocean dumping altogether, found the U.S. proposal 
too lax 31. Moreover, the criteria for issuance of dumping permits left too much discretion 
to individual states. In support of deletion, Canada suggested that elements of the GESAMP 
definition of marine pollution should be incorporated in the United States proposal. Since 
the draft convention did not specify what criteria should be followed to distinguish between 
general permit and special permit, it was also inquired what the limits of the general permit 
would be. Speaking in reply, the United States agreed, to some extent, with the views 
expressed and declared that the draft would be revised to take into account the points raised 
with respect to dumping criteria and the need for international principles and guidelines to 
harmonize among national regulatory approaches. In general, the draft was only intended 
to be the first step toward an international regulatory arrangement.
With respect to pollutants to be regulated by the convention, it was agreed to focus 
on a number of pollutants: urban effluents, oil, toxic and persistent substances (e.g. 
organochlorine pesticides and other persistent chlorinated hydrocarbons), metals which 
caused accumulation processes in the food chain (e.g. mercury and other heavy metals), and
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2,1 Ibid., 6.
29 The Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) was 
established by several specialized agencies of the United Nations in 1969.
*  The US draft read: No party shall issue peimils for the transportation of such material for dumping 
if the dumping thereof in the ocean would unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare or 
amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, or existing or future economic use of the ocean’. 
Article 3 (b). UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.I/5, Annex 5, 4.
31 See International Legal Materials (ILM), vol. 11, no. 5. September 1972, 1115-16.
industrially derived organic wastes (e.g. pulp and paper mill wastes and organic wastes from 
refineries) 32. The list was not intended to be definitive, and could be revised to take into 
account scientific advice given by advisory bodies such as GESAMP. In fact, the listed 
pollutants were identified on the basis of advice given by GESAMP 33. Importantly, 
radioactive substances were not among the listed pollutants. Pointing out that existing 
arrangements already were in place, see Chapter 1, the United States and Britain did not 
intend to include radioactive wastes in the list of pollutants.
As the first meeting came to the end, a general optimism prevailed as to the 
possibility of reconciling the different approaches to regulation of ocean dumping. However, 
the question as to whether the emphasis should primarily be put on prohibiting ocean 
dumping remained. Canada, among others, favored a strong anti-dumping policy while the 
United States draft convention, as mentioned, made no mention of prohibition of dumping 
3\  As one observer put it, the United States draft proposed little more than a straight 
'licence to dump' regime 35. However, the IWGMP decided to continue negotiating a global 
dumping convention. A feel of urgency was unmistakable here. In the unusually forthright 
and impelling words of the meeting report's summary of conclusions: '...there are specific 
actions which should be prepared for completion at the time of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment...certain particular actions were identified which, if 
taken in the near future, could materially improve the situation and serve as evidence of the
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12 UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.I/5, 8.
“  The recommendations of GESAMP in Annex IV of the GESAMP Report of the Third Session.
34 'General Principles on Ocean Disposal', submitted by Canada. 'A. There should be general 
prohibition on use of the international areas of the oceans for the disposal of materials' B. The only 
materials that should be considered for disposal in such areas are those whose deleterious effects can be 
assessed with confidence taking into account factors such as assimilation by the food chain and 
distribution by physical processes such as ocean currents. Genera] Considerations. A. There should be no 
assumption that the oceans have an excess assimilative capacity. B. The localization of the disposal of 
materials into waters not within the international area of the oceans would permit a more ready assessment 
of the effects. C. Materials of long persistence and toxicity should not be disposed of into any area of the 
sea'. UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.I/5, Annex 6.
15 Rodney N. Duncan The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes at Sea', Journal o f Maritime Law and Commerce 5 (January 1974), 30.
utility of international co-operation to protect the oceans. Proposals with regard to the 
control of ocean dumping are a specific step for which preparation should go forward with 
urgency'36. The option of a global dumping convention appeared to be within reach in the 
immediate future.
The second session of the IWGMP took place in Ottawa from 8 to 12 November
1971. The session was attended by representatives from forty-two governments and 
representatives from the Stockholm secretariat, GESAMP, FAO, UNESCO and its IOC, 
WHO, UNlTk, WMO, IMCO, and IAEA 31. In general discussion, the working group 
'reaffirmed the importance of urgent and effective action against marine pollution, especially 
by dumping'38.
Although recent progress toward regional institution-building was welcomed by the 
IWGMP -  the so-called Oslo Convention on the Control of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
from Ships and Aircraft had been drafted October 22,1971 -  many states were in agreement 
that action also at a global level was necessary in order to link together and complement 
regional arrangements 39. Several developing countries thought that the Oslo Convention 
should not serve as model for the global dumping convention. Instead, it was crucial that 
a convention not have loopholes allowing developed countries to dump substances which 
under no circumstances should be dumped. This point was repeated during the final 
negotiations at the London Conference 40. But a global convention should, on the other 
hand, not hinder the industrialization of developing countries. Brazil had made this clear
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36 UN doc. A/CONF.48/TWGMP.I/5, 13.
17 Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, 
Kenya, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Republic of Tanzania, United Kingdom, United States of 
America, the Soviet Union, and Zambia.
“  'Report of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine Pollution on its Second Session', UN 
Doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.II/5, 22 November 1971, 7.
39 UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.U/5, November 22, 1971, 8.
40 Archival material (R.I.j.no.82.B.89) December 6, 1972, 3.
already at the first session 4\  In addition, smaller Western European countries, like the 
Netherlands and Finland, pointed to the risk of too vague rules of exemption from the lists 
of substances banned by a global convention 42.
To that end, a drafting group set up on an open-ended basis produced a number of 
provisional articles. Several draft articles took a firmer prohibitory and restrictive stance 
compared to the first United States draft convention 43. Moreover, although as yet 
unspecified, a distinction between ‘general permits' and 'special permits' was made In 
addition, the dumping of a number of substances was directly prohibited by the provisions 
of the draft. Importantly, disagreement with respect to whether radioactive waste should be 
regulated by the convention now had emerged. Draft articles put radioactive waste in 
'brackets1, indicating that the issue was unresolved 45.
I l l
41 At the first session, Brazil pointed out that *to jeopardize the development of countries and the 
corresponding growth of industries and transportation, in spite of negative factors involved, is not 
something to envisage with a realistic eye1. Further, Brazil proposed that developing countries planned 
anti-pollution measures according to their economic possibilities, and also suggested assistance to the 
developing countries in controlling their marine economic resources. UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.I/5, 
Annex 13, 1-2.
42 Archival materia] (R.l. j.no. 82.B.89.) December 6, 1972, 3.
43 The first article read: The contracting parties pledge themselves to take all possible steps to prevent 
the pollution of the sea by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, harm living 
resources and marine life, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea'. UN doc. 
A/CONF.48/IWGMP.II/5, 9. General criteria for issue of permits took also a firmer prohibitory and 
restrictive stance. Article 7 read: *No party shall grant permits for dumping if the dumping of matter or 
the continued dumping thereof would [materially] endanger human health, welfare or amenities, the 
marine environment, living and other marine resources, ecological systems, or other legitimate uses of the 
sea*. Ibid., 10.
44 Article 2. Ibid., 9.
45 Article 3 said: It is forbidden to dump at sea toxic mercury, cadmium, organohalogen [and 
organosilicon] compounds, [and oil and derivative hydrocarbons], other than those which are rapidly 
converted in the sea into substances which are biologically harmless, except as noted in article IV. [The 
dumping of biological and chemical warfare agents and [high level] radioactive waste is also prohibited]. 
The dumping of other matter which has a deleterious effect on the marine environment equivalent to the 
properties of the matter referred to above is also prohibited'. Ibid., 9-10. Similarly, Article 8, which 
referred to ’special permit' still without a more precise definition, stated: For such substances as 
[radioactive wastes], arsenic, lead, copper and zinc, and their compounds, cyanides and fluorides, and 
pesticides, a special permit for each dumping shall be required(...)'. Ibid., 11. However, because the 
question of regulatory authority over radioactive waste was unresolved, a distinct reference to IAEA still
North-South conflicts did not significantly influence the Ottawa session. Anticipating 
the coming conflict, Spain recognized, among several identified duties of international 
cooperation, the need for assistance from 'states at higher levels of technological and 
scientific development' to those states which would request i t 46. However, time did not 
permit discussion of this principle.
The Ottawa session had decided that the IWGMP should meet again and draft, if 
possible, a convention on ocean dumping before the Stockholm Conference 47. In the 
words of the meeting report, the session in Reykjavik from 10 to 15 April, 1972, was 
convened 'in the hope that agreement on concrete global action might be reached before the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment'48. As initiation of cooperation at 
regional levels appeared unlikely given the complicated problems involved and the short time 
available for negotiation, the meeting was convened under the more indicative working title 
'Intergovernmental Meeting on Ocean Dumping'. It was attended by representatives from 
29 states and observers from FAO, IMCO and IAEA 49.
The meeting established a drafting group. The group was presented with a 
negotiation text consisting of the draft convention proposed by the United States, together 
with draft articles produced at the previous meeting, the Oslo convention, and draft articles 
proposed by Canada. To prevent pollution of the sea, the United States suggested that 'The 
Parties pledge themselves to take all feasible steps'; the Oslo Convention and the text from 
the previous meeting agreed that The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to take all
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appeared in the text: Nothing in this convention supplants any recommendations designed to regulate the
disposal of any material adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency'. See Article 12, ibid., 12.
46 UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.II/5, Annex 4, paragraph 11.
47 Archival material (R.I. j.no. 82.B.89, May 1, 1972), 1.
** 'Report of the Intergovernmental Meeting on Ocean Dumping', UN doc. IMOD/4, 15 April 1972, 
2. For this decision see also UN doc. A/CONF.48/TWGMP.II/5, 12.
49 Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, 
France, Ghana, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, United Kingdom, and United States of 
America.
possible steps'; and finally, Canada proposed that 'States Parties pledge themselves' so. 
After considering the various drafts and the proposal of the drafting group the meeting 
reached agreement on a formulation saying: 'Each Party pledges itself to use its best 
endeavors to prevent the pollution of the sea by matter that is liable to cause harm to the 
marine environment and its living resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine 
activities including fishing, impairment of quality for use of sea water, or reduction of 
amenities'51.
The phrase 'to use its best endeavors' was obviously less binding than any phrase 
examined by the drafting group. The phrase occurred because developing countries were 
opposed to draft general provisions which they found would impose unacceptable constraints 
on their economies. While developing countries supported that annexes and dumping permit 
criteria were as stringent as possible they opposed that general provisions proclaimed an 
overall restrictive and prohibitory dumping policy. Essentially, while developing countries 
were in favor of stringent standards they wished to avoid obligations which could hinder 
their industrialization. Negotiators expected this conflict to resume at Stockholm 52.
The question of which substances would be totally prohibited to dump, the so-called 
blacklisted substances, and which substances might be dumped under certain conditions, the 
so-called greylisted substances, was from the beginning seen as being of fundamental 
importance for the convention. Because of the technical nature of such decisions a working 
group on the annexes, composed of specialists mainly representing the industrialized 
countries, was established. The deliberations of the working group were later debated in the 
general meeting. High-level radioactive wastes were allocated to the black list, officially 
Annex I. This meant a total prohibition on dumping. Other forms of radioactive wastes,
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*  See 'Composite Articles on Dumping from Vessels at Sea'. Produced by the Canadian delegation. 
Ottawa, Canada, April 7, 1972.
51 Text of Draft Articles of a Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping'. UN 
doc. IMOD/2, 3.
12 Archival material (R.I., j.no. 82.B.89) May 1, 1972, 7.
medium-level and low-level forms, were not mentioned 53. The inclusion of high-level 
radioactive wastes, and 'agents of biological and chemical warfare' in the black list was 
fiercely contested.
The revised United States draft convention was silent with respect to radioactive 
waste dumpings. Yet the position of the United States was that such activity should not be 
regulated by the future global dumping convention but should instead remain under the 
IAEA 54. In contrast, the draft article proposed by Canada listed high-level radioactive 
wastes in the group of substances which were prohibited.
Canada attempted in the subsequent debate, massively supported by all developing 
countries, to include high-level radioactive waste in the black list. The United States and 
Britain opposed this and argued that the measures to protect against radioactive 
contamination, it was said, were best taken through IAEA 5S. They proposed that 
radioactive waste only should be referred to in general terms. In their view, an article 
similar to article 14 of the Oslo Convention, the only mention of radioactive waste in this 
convention, should be drafted 56.
To settle the issue it took a long debate during which the developing countries were 
supported by Spain and Portugal, while other Western European states chose not to comment 
on this controversial matter. In the end, a Canadian compromise which put high-level
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53 Text of Draft Articles of a Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping'. Annex 
IJ1 and III. UN doc. IMOD/2.
54 The draft convention said: 'Nothing in this Convention shall affect the Regulation of the disposal 
of any matter which is or may be the subject of recommendations of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’. Article 6, United States Draft Convention (from U.S. Department of State Telegram POL-3, UN, 
March 23, 1972) in 'Composite Articles on Dumping from Vessels at Sea'.
55 Archival material (R.I., j.no. 82.B.89,) May 1, 1972, 3.
*  The Oslo article 14 reads: The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to promote, within the 
competent specialized agencies and other international bodies, measures concerning the protection of the 
marine environment against pollution caused by oil and oily wastes, other noxious or hazardous cargoes, 
and radioactive materials'. See text in ILM, vol.11, no.2, March 1972, 262—266. The parties to the Oslo 
Convention had agreed that this convention should not cover oil and radioactive materials. The 
formulation of article 14 indicated also that the member states bad agreed to cooperate within the relevant 
fora. Archive material R.I.82. B.83, December 13, 1971.
radioactive wastes in square brackets, indicating that the issue still was outstanding, in 
addition copied article 14 of the Oslo Convention, implying that regulation of radioactive 
waste should be done through the IAEA, was adopted. In this way, the draft would make 
a general commitment to take measures against pollution from radioactive waste. However, 
radioactive waste would not be covered by the operative part of the convention. This 
diplomatic compromise did not even mention IAEA 51. In the end, the Ottawa session 
issued a Text of a Draft Articles of A Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution', 
instead of a Text of Draft Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution'. In brief, the 
session failed to resolve the disagreements 58.
In summary, the question of whether to regulate dumping of radioactive waste under 
the convention was still unsettled. As the United States thought that regulation of 
radioactive waste as well as bacteriological and chemical weapons in an inappropriate and 
unreasonable way introduced a disarmament aspect into the dumping convention, this 
decision was without doubt one of the most contentious issues for the coming Stockholm 
Conference 5S. Many reservations on the part of the developing countries, Canada and to 
a lesser extent Spain and Portugal also promised severe obstacles to attainment of agreement 
at Stockholm. Negotiators expected that developing countries would fiercely support 
stringent standards and at the same time oppose any hindrances to their own industrialization 
*°. It furthermore seemed doubtful if the Stockholm Conference, with a considerably larger 
number of developing countries and Eastern European states, would be able to reach 
agreement.
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57 Article 11 read: The parties pledge themselves to promote, within the competent specialized 
agencies and other international bodies, measures concerning the protection of the marine environment 
against pollution caused by oil and oily wastes, other noxious or hazardous cargoes, radioactive materials 
and agents of biological and chemical warfare'. Text of Draft Articles of a Convention for the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution by Dumping', UN doc. IMOD/2, 6.
51 Archival material (R.I., j.no. 82.B.89,) August 11, 1972, 2.
59 Archival material (R.I.j.no. 82.B.89.) May 1, 1972, 6 and (RJ.j.no. 82.B.89,) December 6, 1972,
19.
60 Archival material (R.I.j.no.82.B.89) May 1, 1972, 7.
As the Stockholm Conference was approaching, time became scarce. Once again a 
session of the IWGMP was called for the purpose of resolving outstanding issues. This 
session took place in London on 30 and 31 May 1972. The sole working document was the 
text drawn up at Reykjavik in April. Seventeen nations sent delegates, Canada being 
represented by an observer 61. No representatives from United Nations or other 
international organizations were present.
The outstanding disagreements were not resolved. However, an agreement on a 
proposed new text of the black list which listed high-level wastes was reached. In addition, 
the precise definition of these wastes would be prepared by IAEA The Stockholm 
Conference was less than two weeks away and many states wished to postpone the 
conditions of the proposed convention until after Stockholm. A number of states stressed 
the importance of awaiting the conclusions of the forthcoming conference before any further 
meetings were set. Britain then announced a plenipotentiary meeting to sign the convention 
in the late summer of 1972 63.
The issue of marine pollution control attracted considerable attention when the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment met in Stockholm from 5 June to 12 June 
1972. Nature wrote that this issue was 'every delegation's favorite cause', and the chief 
delegates of Britain and the United States urged action on ocean dumping M. Both the draft 
convention and marine pollution principles were dealt with by Committee III (pollution and 
organizational matters). But the draft convention on ocean dumping was not subject to any 
substantial negotiations. It was evident that several countries wanted more time to study the 
draft and that no international agreement would be signed into international law.
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61 Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Gennany, France, Iceland, India, Ivoiy 
Coast, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America.
“  The text said: 'High-level radioactive wastes as specified by the IAEA, in co-operation with other 
international bodies, as unsuitable for dumping at sea'. Intergovernmental Meeting on Occan Dumping. 
London, 30 and 31 May, 1972’. UN doc. A/CONF.48/C.3/CRP.19/, Annex C, June 6, 1972.
63 Ibid., 2.
M 'Politics, Bureaucracy and the Environment’, Nature 237 (1972), 363-64.
But marine pollution was addressed on a more general level. One principle of the 
Human Environment Declaration from the conference and eight detailed recommendations 
of the Stockholm Action Plan dealt specifically with marine pollution. The recommendation 
on ocean dumping urged immediate action: 'Refer the draft articles and annexes contained 
in the report of the inter-governmental meetings at Reykjavik, Iceland, in April 1972 and 
in London in May 1972...to a conference of Governments to be convened by the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in consultation with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations before November 1972 for further consideration, 
with a view to opening the proposed convention for signature at a place to be decided by 
that Conference, preferably before the end of 1972' 65. Governments clearly felt under 
pressure to demonstrate willingness to act. 'For all their differences', the New York Times 
wrote, '114 countries felt it necessary to show concern for the environment. They agreed on 
a large number of recommendations, such as an end to whaling and the regulation of ocean 
dumping, that are useful if not binding. They began the creation of new international 
machinery' 66. Substantial negotiations would take place at the London Conference. While 
there were only few concrete comments on the draft convention when the U.N. Seabed 
Committee soon thereafter met in Geneva, developing countries repeated that they were 
vehemently opposed to global pollution control standards 6?.
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65 Recommendation 86 (d) of the Stockholm Conference Action Plan as approved by the United 
Nations General Assembly. Reprinted in Wade Rowland, The Plot to Save the World, 174.
66 Anthony Lewis 'One Confused Earth', New York Times, June 17,1972. It was evident that an ocean 
dumping convention was at the top of the list of concrete accomplishments at the Stockholm Conference. 
To take the positive things fust: the conference resolved to establish an international convention on 
marine dumping, the details to be worked out at a London meeting in October this year and the 
convention to be open for signature by the end of 1972'. Nigel Hawkes 'Stockholm: Politicking, 
Confusion, but Some Agreements Reached', Science 176 (June 1972), 1308.
67 Commenting on the draft convention on ocean dumping, developing countries insisted that the 
Articles failed to distinguish between developed and developing countries in terms of their relative 
capacity to pollute the oceans. It was feared thereby that an unfair burden would be imposed on 
developing countries in the event of such a convention coming into force. It was pointed out that an 
international law to control dumping must, in the first place, avoid authorizing present practices of 
dumping by industrialized countries, a possibility which has been protested by a large majority of States 
already'. Quoted from Robert L. Friedheim 'Ocean Ecology and the World Political System', 179.
Ninety-two nations met in the London Conference from October 30 to November 13,
1972. The Stockholm Conference had contributed significantly to generate interest in the 
conference and socialist and developing countries were better represented than at earlier 
meetings The British Secretary of the State for the Environment, in opening The Inter­
governmental Conference on the Convention on Dumping of Wastes at Sea', urged the 
negotiators to reach agreement on the convention which, if it was agreed, would be 'the first 
tangible fruit of Stockholm' 69.
The final version of article 1 said: 'Contracting Parties shall individually and 
collectively promote the effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine 
environment, and pledge themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the 
pollution of the sea by dumping of waste and other matter that is liable to create hazards to 
human life, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere 
with other legitimate uses of the sea'70. The content of this article should be seen in the 
light of article 2: 'Contracting Parties shall, as provided for in the following Articles, take 
effective measures individually, according to their scientific, technical and economic 
capabilities, and collectively, to prevent marine pollution caused by dumping and shall 
harmonize their policies in this regard'71 .
Beginning in Reykjavik, the general provisions thus took an even less prohibitory and 
restrictive stance: states should 'promote the effective control', a less binding verbal phrasing, 
'of all sources of pollution of the marine environment', leaving 'all practicable steps’ to 
tackling pollution of the sea by dumping. In short, concrete measures should only be taken 
with respect to ocean dumping. Furthermore, the phrase 'practicable steps', an elaboration
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“  As Charles F. Lcttow wrote: The Stockholm Conference did much to generate interest in the 
London Conference and producc the large and representative gathering of nations there'. The Control of 
Marine Pollution', in Erica L. Dolgin and Thomas G. P. Guilbert, eds.. Federal Environmental Law (St. 
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1974), 665.
69 'Conference Meets on Dumping of Wastes at Sea' Nature 240 (November 3 1972), 4.
10 See Appendix A.
71 Ibid.
of the phrase 'according to their capability' from Reykjavik, implied that regulatory efforts 
of states would be based upon individual technical possibilities, as the phrase 'possible steps' 
indicates, and other factors, especially economic capabilities 72. Article 2, which also had 
been redrafted several times during the negotiations, had similarly a new modifier saying 
'according to their scientific, technical and economic capabilities'. Developing countries had 
proposed and strongly supported the phrases to take all practicable steps' and 'according to 
their scientific, technical and economic capabilities'. Obviously, instead of uniform global 
pollution standards their intention was to lessen the burden of dumping reduction on 
developing countries 73.
The evaluation of the black and grey lists took place in a group of experts with 
delegates from Canada, France, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Spain, Tunisia, Britain, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union. The group was informed that it should not debate 
whether radioactive waste and bacteriological and chemical weapon should remain on the 
black list 74. The group examined both the draft article from Reykjavik, which had put 
high-level radioactive wastes in square brackets, and the alternative formulations from 
London. The group proposed an amended version of the latter and agreed that states should
119
72 Archival materia] (R.1, j.no. 82. B.89) December 6,1972, 5. See also GrJ.Timagenis, International 
Control o f Marine Pollution, 183. For the Reykjavik text, see article 2 in Text of Draft Articles of a 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping'. IMOD/2, 3.
73 It is here relevant to remind of the content of principle 23 of the Stockholm Declaration. It reads: 
■Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the international community, or to standards 
which will have to be determined nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of 
values prevailing in each country and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for the 
most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the 
developing countries'. See Wade Rowland' The Plot to Save the World, 143. For the so-called 'double 
standards', see GrJ.Timagenis, ibid., 77-79, 178, and 193-95. See also Allen L.Springer United States 
Environmental Policy and International Law: Stockholm Principle 21 Revisited', 50.
74 In the terms of reference given to the technical working group: To explore the scientific and 
technical aspects only of [ ] passages (i.e. high-level radioactive wastes and agents of biological and 
chemical warfare) in the Annexes'. 'Report of Technical Working Party', UN doc. DWS(T)7 1st Revise. 
Archival material (R.I.j.no. 82.B.89,) December 6 1972, 2.
take into account international standards and regulations 75. IAEA was not mentioned, 
however, although the group agreed on the amendment after it had 'fully considered' an 
IAEA report on the subject 76. Significantly, the technical working group now listed 
radioactive wastes which were not included on the black list, i.e. medium and low-level 
radioactive wastes, in the grey list. Thus, the group proposed that these wastes might be 
dumped when a special permit was issued and the recommendations of the competent 
international body in this field were followed. Again, the group did not designate the 
competent international body 7?.
It was subsequently agreed by the IWGMP that radioactive waste which IAEA found 
unsuitable for dumping, because of health, biological, or other reasons, were prohibited from 
being dumped. Apart from the strengthened role of IAEA, the final convention text of the 
black list and the proposed amendment from London were quite similar 7B. Similarly, the 
grey list now included a new clause stating that radioactive waste, which wets not subject to 
regulation by Annex I, might be dumped when a special permit was issued and IAEA 
guidelines and recommendations were followed 19, In retrospect, the issue of regulation of 
radioactive waste had been more of a hindrance to completion of the convention at an earlier 
stage of the negotiations. The final agreement, which clearly was a necessary solution to a 
very contentious issue, and was also perceived in this way, meant that important regulatory 
decisions remained with IAEA ®°.
Heightened international expectations were essential for the successful completion of
75 The following version of the article was agreed to: High-level radioactive wastes defined as 
unsuitable including the ecological viewpoint for dumping at sea, by the competent international body in 
this field'. Ibid., 2.
74 Ibid., 3.
77 Annex II, D said. ’Radioactive wastes not included in Annex 1. In the granting of permits for the 
dumping of these wastes, the States' Parties should follow the recommendations of the competent 
international body in this field'. Ibid., 5.
78 See Appendix A, annex I, 6.
79 Appendix A, annex II, D.
"  Archival material (j.no. 82.B.89,) December 6, 1972, 19.
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the negotiations. Negotiators felt that high international expectations put on their shoulders 
by the Stockholm Conference pressured them to solve outstanding jurisdictional issues from 
earlier meetings. One U.S. negotiator explained that the fact that 'everyone was anxious to 
complete an effective Convention' resulted in a clause -  the clause itself was a strong reason 
why governments were willing to conclude the negotiations -  which stated that the 
convention would not prejudice the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) beginning in 1973 81. A second U.S. negotiator pointed out that keen 
attention by mass media had a decisive influence on the final outcome: 'Ultimately, the text 
of an agreement was initialed by representatives of 61 nations, but only after the newspapers 
had reported, accurately enough, that negotiations were on the verge of bitter collapse, and 
only after the conference was extended for three days’82. The Danish delegation report also 
emphasized the weight of international expectations and newly emerging international norms 
for environmental protection: That the negotiations -  in spite of all difficulties -  were 
concluded with a signed draft of convention is, no doubt, due to the fact that all participants
-  also the Soviet Union -  felt committed by the recommendations and declarations of the 
Stockholm Conference, whose first concrete result now has manifested itself B3.
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11 Terry L. Lehzell The Ocean Dumping Convention -  A Hopeful Beginning,' San Diego Law Review
10 (1973), 512. Law of the sea issues such as width of the coastal zone and enforcement rules on the 
high seas were a serious threat to agreement at the London Conference. As Nature correctly wrote: 
'Agreement was not easy to achieve -  the conference overran by three days and at one point almost broke 
down -  partly because of fears that the convention might prejudice the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conference planned for next year. As a result there is a clause specifically stating that the convention 
does not prejudice that conference'. 'Agreement Reached on Dumping at Sea', Nature 240 (November 
1972), 120. See Appendix A, article 13.
12 Robert J. McManus The New Law on Ocean Dumping. Statute and Treaty, 29.
D Archival material (j.no 82, B.89. December 6, 1972), 23. Because of the unsettled German issue 
and the refusal to the GDR of diplomatic recognition the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries, 
with the exception of Rumania, were absent from the Stockholm Conference.
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As the complex interdependence model would predict, the United States took the initiative 
to cooperate globally on ocean dumping control. To key political leaders in the United 
States, international leadership implied the willingness, as quoted in Chapter 4, to ’take the 
first steps' to deal with the problem w. But this chapter has also shown that the 
construction of the international dumping regime does not fully confirm the predictions of 
the complex interdependence model since the Stockholm secretariat played a very catalytic 
role in the regime-building process.
While there was concern about ocean dumping in the United States and parts of 
Western Europe, this problem did not in itself result in international cooperation. Developing 
countries thought that developed countries were responsible for the problem since they had 
created it. Furthermore, developing countries opposed the economic costs of pollution 
control. The existence of an 'ecological interdependence' issue thus did not prompt 
international cooperation as complex interdependence theorists tend to think.
Chapter 6 will show that the Stockholm secretariat was involved in resolving 
important issues such as scientific uncertainties concerning environmental impact of 
substances and major differences in governments' commitment to protect the environment 
which potentially could jeopardize the negotiations. This chapter demonstrated that 
international pressure was an essential element in reaching agreement on the international 
dumping regime. Chapter 6 will also show that, contrary to the predictions of all three 
models tested in this study, the Stockholm secretariat mobilized international public opinion 
and pressure during the preparations for the Stockholm Conference.
14 House Report no. 92-361, 14.
CHAPTER 6
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EXPLAINING REGIME FORMATION: LESSONS FROM OCEAN DUMPING
The three previous chapters examined the construction of the international dumping regime 
from the perspectives of three dominant theoretical explanations of international cooperation: 
the epistemic community, the Realist and Rationalistic Realist, and the complex 
interdependence models. Each chapter focused on different steps and aspects of the regime- 
building process. Those particular aspects and phases of international regime-building to 
which the models pay most attention were examined. This seems the best way to adequately 
test models.
The epistemic community model raises the issue of whether a group of ecology- 
oriented scientists persuaded and pressured decision-makers to regulate ocean dumping, the 
Realist model addresses the question of which motives and reasons prompted the United 
States to provide international leadership in the regime-building process, and the complex 
interdependence model addresses the question of how international agreement to cooperate 
was reached. Since these models are rivals, they disagree about which steps and aspects are 
the most essential in the construction of international regimes. The examined models could 
suggest explanations of all three questions but would emphasize the aspects and steps that 
each model considers the most significant. But they might supplement each other exactly 
because they emphasize different steps and aspects of international regime-building. To 
draw the theoretical conclusions, this chapter examines how well the three models account 
for the steps and aspects of regime-building they consider to be the most important. This 
discussion is also useful as the basis for the model proposed in Chapter 9 for the formation 
of global regimes for environmental protection based on this case study.
The epistemic community model
Reflectionists primarily focus on cognition and perception. In the case of the international 
dumping regime, Reflectionists correctly predict that a change in perception of the health of 
the oceans preceded regulation. To be sure, regulation would not have been established had 
a change in perception not occurred. As regards epistemic communities, Peter Haas points 
out that they 'are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments 
as well as from country to country' *. While this claim certainly is justified, this study 
shows that there exist other channels for communication of ideas and scientific knowledge 
and that epistemic communities compete, deliberately or not, with those channels. Chapter
3 showed that congressmen were faced with conflicting scientific advice in the early 1970s. 
Two groups of experts offered profoundly conflicting advice. While the epistemic 
community model does not rule out this possibility, the presumption that only one epistemic 
community advises decision-makers is taken for granted. Put differently, this model 
assumes one epistemic community per policy. Consequently, it is unclear what the existence 
of more than one group of scientists means in terms of scientists’ influence on policy. The 
epistemic community model docs not give an answer to this question 2.
This study suggests that a group of scientists was unable to significantly influence 
policy development because it did not effectively communicate its advice and ideas to the 
public and decision-makers. The coherence, attractiveness, persuasiveness and other 
qualities that make ideas successful and influential do not explain why those ideas failed to
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1 Peter M. Haas 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination' 
International Organization 46 (Winter 1992), 27.
2 Note the following conclusion from a study of Mediterranean pollution. 'Most important, however, 
the disagreement among scientists on pollutant sources, pathways, fates, and effects serves to maintain 
a political momentum that keeps the issue alive. Governments, international agencies, and publics have 
somehow come to accept the problem of Mediterranean pollution as a continuing challenge'. Baruch 
Boxer The Mediterranean Sea: Preparing and Implementing a Regional Action Plan' in David A. Kay and 
Harold K. Jacobson, eds., Environmental Protection: The International Dimension (Totowa, NJ.: 
Allanheld, Osmun, 1983), 274.
influence policy 3. A testimony given before a Congressional hearing in 1972, quoted in 
Chapter 3, illustrates the point. Before explaining his view of the ocean dumping problem 
to the Congressional committee, a marine geologist who was opposed to a complete ban on 
ocean dumping said: 'I fully recognize that this approach, as in my statement here, favors 
ocean disposal of all of certain types of wastes may seem contrary to everything you have 
heard or read regarding waste disposal at sea1 4. This shows that more than one source of 
ideas with potential policy implications existed. It also strongly indicates that a community 
of professional waste managers and its supporters had been unsuccessful in effectively 
contradicting claims made by more visible and vocal scientists and ecologists3. As a result, 
this study shows, the anti-dumping idea became the dominant one and was even looked 
upon as being morally superior to all other views 6. As the marine geologist himself was 
aware: 'I recognize also that in the present era of aroused public interest in the environment, 
in which ecology has become virtually a 'motherhood issue', there are certain significant 
hazards, both politically and professionally, in what at first may seem to favor what others 
might term pollution'7. Sociologists' studies of how policy issues are defined have similarly 
concluded: The public arena is not a field on which all can play on equal terms; some have
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} With respect to the influence on Keynesian ideas on policy-making it has similarly been noted that 
'if it is to influence policy, an idea must come to the attention to those who make policy'. Peter A. Hall 
'Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas' in Peter A. Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic 
Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 370.
4 Dr. David D. Smith in Ocean Waste Disposal, 206.
s For a study of American environmental leaders enjoying intense mass media coverage in the 1960s 
and 1970s, see Rae Goodell, The Visible Scientists.
6 Mark H. Moore has made similar observations in his study of the impact of ideas on policy-making. 
He writes: '...ideas seem to guide public action...Tbe ideas define the conventional wisdom in the area, 
set out the questions for which evidence is necessary, suggest the alternative policies that are plausibly 
effective, and (most important), keep alternative formulations of the problem off the public 
agenda....Perhaps Iceeping ideas off the agenda' is too strong a formulation. But dominant ideas have 
certainly relegated competing definitions of the problem to relative obscurity. Those who advance these 
alternative conceptions...often felt they were not only risking their reputation for knowledge in the area, 
but also trying the patience and tolerance of their audience'. Mark Moore 'What Makes Public Ideas 
Powerful', 72-73.
7 Dr. David D. Smith in Ocean Waste Disposal, 206.
greater access than others and greater power and ability to shape the definition of public 
issues...At any specific moment, all possible parties to the issue do not have equal abilities 
to influence the public; they do not possess the same degree or kind of authority to be 
legitimate sources of definition of the reality of the problem, or to assume legitimate power 
to regulate, control, and innovate solutions'8. Thus, networks of scientists and experts are 
not the only 'channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as 
well as from country to country' and such networks might unsuccessfully communicate 
policy relevant ideas and knowledge to the public and decision-makers compared to other 
policy advocates and might for that reason be unable to influence policy.
It is also important to note that a group of congressmen was determined to 'clean up 
the oceans' despite conflicting expert advice. As described in Chapter 4, this group was not 
pressured and persuaded as the ecological epistemic community model predicts. These 
politicians allied themselves with prominent scientists and leaders of the environmental 
movement in order to influence and mobilize public opinion and political leaders and to 
establish ocean dumping regulation. This group combined Congressional hearings, mass 
media and environmental leaders in order to communicate new ideas. 'Pollution ideas are', 
as it has been pointed out, 'an instrument of control' 9. Chapter 4 quoted from Senator 
Hollings' closing remarks at the 'International Conference on Ocean Pollution': 'So the only 
way I know -  I could say these things over and over again -  but the only way we are ever 
going to get this message through is with people with the brilliance and dynamism of you 
three [Commoner, Heyerdahl, and Hugh Downs] here this morning getting the attention of 
the American public and in tum of our colleagues here in the Congress to move in the right 
direction' 10. This flatly contradicts the predictions of the epistemic community model
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(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 8.
9 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, 47.
10 Senator Hollings International Conference on Ocean Pollution, 126. For policy makers using the 
mass media, instead of technical reporls and briefing papers, to focus the attention of other policy makers 
on problems, see John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 63. See also Martin 
Linsky The Media and Public Deliberation', in Robert B. Reich, ed., The Power of Public Ideas, 206.
which is only concerned with decision-making as it takes place within national and 
international bureaucracies and, in addition, ascribes little influence to public opinion. While 
Peter Haas downplays the influence of Jacques Cousteau in the case of the Med Plan, this 
case shows that congressmen were keenly aware that Cousteau and other articulate science 
celebrities and prominent, vocal scientists and ecologists could play an important role when 
the need for regulation was to be identified and new norms for ocean protection were to be 
established. This further illustrates that politicians are hardly the passive consumers of ideas 
that epistemic community theorists assume them to be. Politicians themselves might be 
actively involved in spreading policy-relevant ideas and it then becomes difficult to 
distinguish in a meaningful way between producers, consumers, and communicators of ideas 
n. It is also evident from this study that ideas do not have to be true in an absolute sense 
in order to have a significant impact on policy development 12. Policy advocates, 
sometimes called policy entrepreneurs, deliberately push a simplistic understanding of the 
problem in order to mobilize support 13. The idea that ’the oceans are dying' or 'the sea is 
dead' clearly illustrates this. Therefore, understanding policy development requires 
examination of how successfully networks of scientists influence decision-makers and, as 
repeatedly stressed in this study, influence public opinion compared to other policy 
advocates.
How mass media influence national and international public policy issues by 
communicating scientific information and values is ignored in the epistemic community 
literature. This study shows that it is important to examine the role mass media play when 
policy relevant ideas and policy proposals concerning environmental protection are
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published in Reader's Digest, February 1971, and reprinted in the Congressional Record, February 8, 
1971, 2035-36. Senator Nelson was the first to propose U.S. ocean dumping regulation in Congress in 
February 1970. See the Congressional Record, February 19, 1970, 4088-94.
12 For other examples and discussion, see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets o f Regulation (Cambridge, 
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13 For a discussion of policy entrepreneurs, see John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public 
Policies, 129-30, 188-93, and 214-15. Sec also James Q. Wilson The Politics of Regulation', 370-71.
communicated to politicians and the public. Other studies have similarly observed that 
politicians may use mass media to communicate ideas and focus attention on particular 
issues and that policy-makers often use the mass media, instead of technical reports and 
briefing papers, to focus the attention of other policy-makers on policy problems ,4.
An idea reaches the public slowly and policy based on the idea happens only long 
after its birth because channels of communication are ineffective and its intended audience 
is not sufficiently receptive. It is difficult to say in a meaningful way that advocacy of an 
idea by an epistemic community had significant implications for policy development in cases 
where several years pass between an ideas' birth till its adoption into policy. Chapter 1 
mentions that public concern about radwaste disposal had emerged in some coastal states in 
the United States already in the late 1950s. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 4, 
Cousteau led a successful campaign to prevent the French Atomic Energy Commission's 
dumping of radioactive wastes into the Mediterranean in 1960. Rachel Carson, who later 
wrote Silent Spring, the book that warned America about the dangers from DDT and other 
supposedly extremely toxic pesticides and chemicals, also condemned American ocean 
dumping of radioactive waste ,s. In the revised 1961 edition of Carson's science bestseller 
The Sea Around Us, she called dumping of nuclear waste an 'ominous problem' and made 
it clear, without actually saying so, that dumping should be stopped: The problem, then, is 
far more complex and far more hazardous than has been admitted. Even in the 
comparatively short time since disposal began, research has shown that some of the 
assumptions on which it was based were dangerously inaccurate. The truth is that disposal 
has proceeded far more rapidly than our knowledge justifies. To dispose first and investigate 
later is an invitation to disaster, for once radioactive elements have been deposited at sea 
they are irretrievable. The mistakes that are made now are made for all time' 16. While
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u Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1962).
16 Rachel Carson, The Sea Around Us (New York: New American Library, 1961), x-xii. The original 
book version, first published in 1951, was silent on radwaste disposal. The is also true of the 1957 
edition. See The Sea Around Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).
only indirect evidence exists, it seems clear that Carson's warning was forgotten in early 
1971, and that it probably never reached many people ,7. The important point here is that 
the idea that radwaste disposal was a threat to all oceans emerged more than a decade before 
the same idea was adopted into regulation in the United States in 1972, and that it apparently 
had faded away in the intervening period. Thus, the case of radwaste disposal regulation is 
anomalous for those epistemic community theorists who are concerned with the way new 
ideas are being adopted into policy. Nonetheless, it raises the question whether significant 
insight into policy development is gained by pointing to those who initially produced an idea 
which only later was adopted into policy. In the conclusion of an important study of the 
relationship between ideas and policy development: Thus the key to understanding policy 
change is not where the idea came from but what made it take hold and grow' 1S.
While the epistemic community model is primarily concerned with international 
policy change, epistemic community theorists conclude that shared, or at least non-rival, 
perceptions of the environmental problem among developing and developed countries 
facilitated international regime-building in the Mediterranean. Thus, the model would 
predict that the international dumping regime would not be built in a situation where a few 
developed countries saw ocean dumping as an international problem, while developing 
countries generally thought that developed countries, since they had created the problem, 
should solve it 19. The three previous chapters showed that the international dumping
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17 Senator Gaylord Nelson, the leading Senate authority on ocean pollution, wrote that 'even Rachel 
Carson, in her 1951 book The Sea Around Us, saw the oceans as one last haven, safe forever...Yet some 
marine biologists now say grimly that, unless we act, the current accelerating pace of ocean pollution will 
put an end to significant live in the sea in 50 years or less'. 'Stop Killing Our Oceans', reprinted in the 
Congressional Record, February 8, 1971, 2035. (Italics added). None of those interviewed during this 
study were aware that Rachel Carson had commented on radwaste disposal.
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19 Peter Haas has briefly commented on the formation of the international dumping regime. His 
account emphasizes the role played by the Stockholm secretariat: 'As early as February 1971, Dan Serwer, 
a consultant to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and Peter Thacher 
(seconded to Maurice Strong's staff for the preparation of UNCHE from the U.S. State Department, later 
to be director of the Geneva Regional Office supervising the Regional Seas Programme, and ultimately 
deputy executive director of UNEP) identified marine dumping and land-based sources as key areas that 
were not covered by international legislation. With Strong, they realized that regulating land-based
regime was not constructed by governments pressured and persuaded by an ecological 
epistemic community. Furthermore, as shown below, it was clear to negotiators that 
knowledge about environmental effects of ocean dumping was incomplete.
Finally, Ernst Haas has suggested that the leadership style of Maurice Strong might 
be based on a 'privileged body of knowledge' used to persuade governments 20. It is 
concluded below that Maurice Strong and his staff preparing the Stockholm Conference 
indeed did perform crucial leadership in the formation of the international dumping regime 
as well as in the Stockholm Conference. But again, persuasion through use of scientific 
documentation of environmental damage was only one aspect, and most likely a rather 
insignificant one, of the leadership style of Strong and the Stockholm secretariat.
Realism and rationalistic realism
Realists and Rationalistic Realists assume that states are self-interested egoists concerned 
with protecting their political independence and maintaining economic growth in an anarchic 
world. They would correctly stress that the international dumping regime was an expansion 
of United States domestic regulation onto the international level. This group of scholars 
would further point out that since the regime would harmonize costs of pollution control 
across countries, which would neutralize economic costs imposed on U.S. industry by 
domestic regulation, a strong economic incentive existed to act as a leader in the regime-
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sources was an unrealistic goal at that time because of the cost of regulation and its contentious nature, 
but hoped to control them later. At UNCHE they encouraged delegates to recommend the prompt 
adoption of a dumping treaty: whal became the London dumping convention'. Saving the Mediterranean, 
78. Peter Haas occasionally uses the word 'problem' in a way that ignores that while developing countries 
agreed that international environmental problems existed they at the same time resisted any responsibility 
for the occurrence of such problems. See Saving the Mediterranean, 209. Chapter 5 gives several 
examples of how developing countries wanted 'disownersbip' of international environmental problems. 
For a discussion of disownersbip of public problems, see Joseph R. Gusfield, The Culture o f Public 
Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order, 12-13.
20 When Knowledge is Power, 226. Haas attributes the same leadership style to Mostafa Tolba 
(presently director of UNEP). But as Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 will show, characterizing Tolba's 
leadership in this way is problematic.
building phase. In short, Realists could claim that the regime was created by a hegemon, 
the United States, acting in self-interest. Apparently, this case would add no new insight 
into international regimes since, in Stephen Krasner's formulation, 'the prevailing explanation 
for the existence of international regimes is egoistic self-interest. By egoistic self-interest 
I refer to the desire to maximize one's own utility function where that function does not 
include the utility of another party. The egoist is concerned with the behavior of others only 
insofar as that behavior can affect the egoist's utility’ 21. Furthermore, egoistic self-interest 
would also explain that developing countries were opposed to international regulation 
entailing economic costs for their economies, and that large nuclear nations would protect, 
although they failed to do so, their regulatory autonomy with regard to radwaste disposal by 
resisting the regulation of these dumpings under the international dumping regime.
But governments did not reach agreement out of concern for the national interest as 
understood by Realists and Rationalistic Realists. Brazil refused to sign the dumping 
convention in London because it did not go far enough in terms of ocean dumping reduction. 
The head of the Brazilian delegation told the press that the convention 'defends the interests 
of the developed countries, polluters every one' 22. Sweden followed a policy of strict 
control of dumping at home as well as abroad. Britain had already joined a regional 
agreement protecting its waters against ocean dumping, i.e. the Oslo convention, and 
President Nixon had signed American ocean dumping legislation to protect the Atlantic 
Ocean six weeks before governments met in the London Conference. Britain's decision to 
join the international dumping regime thus cannot be understood as only motivated by 
concern for its own waters. As the evidently proud British Under-Secretary of State for the 
Environment declared at a press conference after the agreement was reached in London in 
November 1972: ’It is an important step in controlling indiscriminate dumping in the sea. 
Nations are now going to take effective control not only of their territorial waters, but of the
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21 Stephen D. Krasner 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables', in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, 11. Similarly, Keohane 'regards regimes as largely 
based on self-interest'. After Hegemony, 57.
22 Nigel Hawkes 'Sea Dumping Talks Clear Snags', The Observer, November 12, 1972. 'Compromise 
Pact on Waste-Dumping at Sea Likely', The Daily Telegraph, November 13, 1972.
whole sea' 33. The international press, including the New York Times, quoted the American 
delegation leader in London, Russell Train, who declared that the convention represented 'a 
historic step toward the control of global pollution' 2A. He further said that the conference 
had met the goal set by the Stockholm Conference and that the agreement provided 'practical 
evidence of the increasing priority the nations of the world are giving to environmental 
problems' 25.
Chapters 3 and 4 showed that Realists and Rationalistic Realists would have to 
examine the domestic level in order to understand how the initiative to establish the 
international dumping regime grew out of domestic regulation in the United States. 
However, this body of theory has not developed a theory of domestic politics which can be 
tested against this case. It is a further complicating factor that while preserving territorial 
and political integrity are core objectives of a hegemonic state, and, for Realists, serve the 
national interest, protection of the oceans against dumping can hardly be seen as closely 
associated with such objectives. This complicates the Realist analysis although scholars 
sympathetic to Realism have suggested how policies that are not closely associated with 
preserving territorial and political integrity sometimes should be looked upon as examples 
of the national interest 26. Chapters 3 and 4 showed that Realists following such an
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23 Robert Bedlow '57 Nations Sign Pollution Treaty to Control Dumping at Sea', The Daily Telegraph, 
November 11, 1972. That the British government joined the international dumping regime in the hope 
that it would strengthen existing marine pollution control is only a theoretical possibility since British 
politics did not begin to 'green' before the late 1980s. See Chapter 9, footnote (83). With respect to 
consequences for regulation of ocean dumping the British Under-Secretary of State for the Environment 
pointed out after the London Conference: 'I do not think that the convention of itself will place on British 
industrialists any obligation which we do not already expect them to cany'. 'International Treaty Drawn 
up to Control Dumping in the Sea', The Guardian, November 14, 1972.
14 'Policing the Dumpers', Newsweek, November 27, 1972.
25 Jules Aibose 91 Nations Agree on Convention to Control Dumping in Oceans', New York Times, 
November 14, 1972. For full text of statement by Russell E. Train, then Chairman of CEQ, see 'London 
Conference Agrees on Ocean Dumping Convention', Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1972, 
710-11.
26 Stephen D. Krasner describes 'an inductive approach' to the definition of the national interest as 
follows: The statements and preferences of central decision-makers can nevertheless be used to define 
the national interest if two conditions are met: these preferences do not consistently benefit a particular 
class or group, and they last over an extended period of time. A public act of the state is one that affects
approach would still have to explain that the ocean dumping problem was perceived as an 
essentially international problem which necessarily demanded cooperation among states in 
order to be dealt with in an effective way. Perhaps Realists would discard some of the 
views held by Congress committees as extremist and examples of a temporary ecology fad. 
One such example, from the Congress committee report, is quoted earlier: The Committee 
wishes to emphasize its awareness that the types of problems with which [the ocean dumping 
bill] deals are global in nature. We are not so blind as to assume that in dealing with the 
problems created by our own ocean dumping activities, we are thereby assuring the 
protection of the world's oceans for all mankind. Other nations, already moving to grapple 
with these troublesome issues, also will and must play vital roles in this regard' 21. 
However, understanding some policy proposals supported by Congressional committees as 
defending national interest while other views are not defending national interest would be 
theoretically unsatisfactory. Furthermore, Realist theory does not indicate how to distinguish 
between policies which should be seen as genuinely defending national interest and those 
policies which should not be seen as genuinely defending national interest. Moreover, such 
methodological and theoretical problems are significantly worsened in this case where a new 
policy is emerging next to existing ones.
Similar to the epistemic community model, the Realist model thus has difficulties in 
explaining that the United States and other Western countries saw ocean dumping as an 
international problem of some significance. More generally, this model faces significant 
problems since policy development in this case cannot be explained by pointing to states' 
interests; the way states defined their interests was changing. In this case, policy 
development can only be explained satisfactorily when it is realized that the view of the 
health of the oceans changed significantly in the beginning of the 1970s as compared to
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the whole community. This is not to say that all citizens will be affected in precisely the same way. 
However, if there are gains from a policy, these must not always accrue only to a particular group or 
class. If there are losses, these must not always fall on a particular group or class. Furthermore, the 
preferences of central decision-makers must not be directed solely to their own personal interests, if they 
are to be termed the national interest1. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials 
Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 43.
27 House report no. 92-361, July 17, 1971, 14.
earlier, especially in the Western world 28. A British scientist and former editor of Nature 
wrote in 1972 that incidents of pollution, he mentioned recent discoveries of large amounts 
of mercury in Pacific tuna fish, had helped to create 'the impression that the oceans of the 
world are in some general sense polluted and that the pollution stems from industrial activity 
of a kind which is characteristic of the twentieth century' Prominent economist and 
ecologist Barbara Ward, one of the authors of the 'conceptual framework' of the Stockholm 
Conference published under the title Only One Earth, vividly described the same change in 
ideas at a series of distinguished lectures held in Stockholm concurrent with the United 
Nations conference there There are ideas and concepts which, when I wrote them in our 
preliminary draft last year, made me wonder how far out I could be. Yet today Ministers 
of the Crown are saying them and that is surely as far in as you can get...In today's debate, 
as you no doubt noticed, delegates talked above all of the vulnerability of the oceans. Yet 
only a year ago, this was an entirely new idea. Now it is a lieu commun, a near- 
platitude...The progress toward truism means that the new ideas are penetrating human 
consciousness with incredible rapidity'31.
In particular the ocean dumping problem was seen as essentially an indivisible 
international public bad since ocean currents were thought to mix wastes and transport them 
to even far corners of the seas. As an U.S. marine scientific community insider noted, a new
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“  For a sophisticated tteatment of the role of ideas in policy development, see Giandomenico Majone 
'Ideas, Interests and Policy Change', to appear in Harry Redner, ed., A Sceptical Child of the 
Enlightenment: Studies in the Thought of C.ELindblom (Westview Press). See also Majone, Evidence, 
Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process, 145-66. Insightful observations on the role of ideas are 
made in John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 131-34. For the role of ideas in 
regulation, see James Q. Wilson The Politics of Regulation', 357-94. See also Mark H. Moore 'What 
Makes Public Ideas Powerful?', 55-83. Sec also John S. Odell, US. International Monetary Policy: 
Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change, 58-78.
29 John Maddox, The Doomsday Syndrome, 117.
30 Speakers included Thor Heyerdahl, Sir Solly Zuckcnnan, Aurelio Peccei (cofounder of the Club 
of Rome), Georges Bananescu, Gunnar Myrdal, Lady Barbara Ward Jackson and Rene Dubos. Sec Wade 
Rowland, The Plot to Save the World, 38.
11 Barbara Ward 'Speech for Stockholm', in Maurice F. Strong, ed., Who Speaks for Earth? (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1973), 21-22.
international view on this issue emerged sfrout 1970: There unfolded an awareness that 
waste of national origin dumped at sea may be distributed globally. While such threats were 
not regarded as immediate or of crisis proportions, the pervasiveness of the fluid media 
potentially exposed all nations to the same risk and uncertainty. So whatever the geopolitical 
and geoeconomic considerations in debate, no matter how parochial the arguments, 
participants came to recognize that all questions shared a central core of scientific, technical, 
and economic facts not constrained by political or institutional boundaries or ideology' 32. 
This international idea joined states together and no nation alone could solve the problem. 
In such a situation, Realism’s egoistic self-interests, as opposed to common or shared 
interests, do not explain policy change 33.
On the other hand, it is by no means evident that Realism, except in its most 
orthodox formulations, necessarily must ignore the power of ideas There is,
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32 Edward Wenk, Jr., The Politics o f the Ocean (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 425. 
For example, one Congressman said immediately before the Senate passed the ocean dumping bill: 'I think 
we also have to understand that the European nations, in particular, have been using the oceans as a 
dumping ground, as an easy economical way of getting rid of industrial and human waste, and the oceans 
have currents, just like the rivers, as we know, so the debris and waste going into the oceans from 
Western European countries, Japan, and any industrialized nations, finds its way to the shores of this land, 
just as the debris and waste which we put in the oceans along our coast finds its way to London, 
Stockholm, and other parts of the world’. The Congressional Record, November 24, 1971, 43071. At a 
1972 meeting of the U.N. Seabed Committee one U.S. delegate similarly said that 'marine pollution knew 
no national boundaries'. Sonja A. Boehmer-Christiansen, Limits to the International Control of Marine 
Pollution. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sussex, 1981, 30. See also TJ.S. and UN Debate 
Man's Uses and Abuses of the Sea', the Congressional Quarterly. Weekly Report, May 15,1970, 1303-04.
33 Robert Keohane points out that egoism does not necessarily exclude concern for others' welfare. 
After Hegemony, 120-25. For a discussion of egoistic interests versus altruism, see Steven Kelman Why 
Public Ideas Matter1, in Robert B. Reich, ed., The Power of Public Ideas, 31-53. In my view of self- 
interest, I disagree with the one Oran Young recently has argued. He writes that 'self-interest is a broad 
concept; it includes a devotion to intangible values, such as the achievement of a peaceful world* and that 
some (entrepreneurial) leaders are often willing to take their compensation in intangible currencies such 
as...the achievement of some larger personal goal (for example, the uniting of Europe or the preservation 
of species). 'Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in 
International Society', 296-97.
34 The literature which stresses perception and knowledge often claims, implicitly or explicitly, that 
states make ’mistakes', that states are incompletely rational, and so forth, and that Realism by ignoring 
perception and knowledge is an imperfect theory. These theorists also claim that cognitive heuristics 
make states employ their power with less efficiency than if they had not been under the influence of such 
heuristics. This literature has not shown, however, that psychological and ideological factors necessarily
furthermore, good reasons to assume that political leaders are fully aware that ideas might 
play an important role in furthering national interests. As Senator Warren G. Magnuson, for 
example, declared when he submitted a resolution to the Senate in 1970 to create a world 
environmental institute: 'Surely the time has come for the United States to take the lead and 
propose creation of the Institute to the nations of the world. The time has come for us to 
realize that world leadership and prestige are based on the power of ideas, not on the power 
of weapons'35.
Realists and Rationalistic Realists would have difficulties explaining how international 
agreement on the dumping regime was reached. Realists claim that regime formation would 
be very unlikely in a situation of significantly opposed interests among developed and 
developing countries and they would expect that the hegemon, perhaps together with other 
powerful states, necessarily would have to use side-payments, force or manipulation of 
incentives in order to build the regime. Rationalistic Realists predict that large groups only 
with severe difficulties can reach agreement and they expect that the hegemon, perhaps 
assisted by other powerful states, would transform a large group of states negotiating the 
international dumping regime into smaller, more manageable groups of states. Neither of 
these predictions are confirmed by this case. Chapter 2 mentioned that collective action 
theorists predict that a large group of governments encourages governments to free-ride, 
since the group will provide the collective good despite free-riders who therefore are not 
strongly motivated to join the group. However, a very different pattern of behavior is 
observed in this case. A large group of governments increases the pressure on governments 
to join, especially when public opinion, national and international, encourages collective 
action 36.
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make states behave 'sub-optimally' in all situations. In other words, it is not clear that perception and 
heuristics are not a help to states in solving problems and realizing their interests. For an example, see 
Nancy Kanwisher ’Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy', Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 
(December 1989), 652-75.
35 International Environmental Science, 131.
36 Discussing how voluntary movements succeed to provide public goods when Olson's theory would 
predict their failure, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky note that 'sometimes the mass media help to
Importantly, the series of events examined in this study show that all states do not 
have the same ability to define the scope and purpose of international regimes for 
environmental protection. A hegemon, or a group of powerful states, probably assisted by 
an international organization, is much more able to put their imprint on international 
institutions for environmental protection than are less powerful states. Put differently, 
environmental problems causing concern to a hegemon, or groups of powerful states, are 
likely to set the international environmental agenda. Chapter 9 will add supporting evidence 
to this conclusion.
The remaining part of this chapter will show that the Stockholm secretariat played 
an essential role in the negotiations on the international dumping regime. Realists' 
preferences for systemic explanations leave little attention to the constructive role an 
international organization can play in the regime-building process. It will also become clear 
that the United States leadership most likely was a necessary condition, but not a sufficient 
one, for the construction of the international dumping regime.
Complex interdependence theory
These theorists predict that the structure of ecological interdependence issues make 
cooperation among states more likely. The complex interdependence model correctly 
predicts that the United States took the lead and attempted to initiate cooperation by 
demonstrating to other nations the advantages of cooperation. In order to do so, as political 
and administration leaders recognized, the problem had to be dealt with effectively at home 
37. As described in Chapter 4, one Congress-sponsored international conference dealt
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build up the equivalent of small-group, face-to-face social pressures'. Risk and Culture, 116.
37 As a Senator declared just a few weeks before government representatives met in the London 
Conference: I f  the United States does not take the affirmative action to secure authority to control ocean 
dumping from its own shores, we cannot expect to be persuasive or to maintain the credibility of our 
leadership on this issue at the international meeting in London'. Senator Buckley, the Congressional 
Record, October 3, 1972, 33311. A representative from the CEQ, Dr. Gordon J.F. MacDonald, said 
before a Congressional hearing: 'If the United States is in fact to exercise leadership in this critical area,
specifically with the issue of ocean dumping while other conferences and international 
meetings brought foreign decision-makers, scientists, representatives from international 
organizations and the Stockholm secretariat together as part of United States' preparations 
for the conference 38. This fits well with the model since it gives considerable attention 
to international organizations and transnational coalitions. It also introduces more actors into 
the process through which states' interests are defined than do the epistemic community 
model and Realist model.
But although the complex interdependence model best explains the construction of 
the international dumping regime, it cannot explain why the way states defined their interests 
changed, the emergence of a new perception of the health of the ocean in the early 1970s, 
and how domestic and international factors were interacting in this process since it ignores 
domestic politics 39. For the same reason, it cannot explain why the United States took the 
initiative to establish an international regime. Neither does it predict that the Stockholm 
secretariat was deeply involved in essential steps in the regime-building process.
Chapter 5 showed that the Stockholm secretariat took the initiative to establish first 
the Preparatory Committee and later the IWGMP. However, the secretariat did much more 
to move governments toward agreement <0. To help negotiations on the international 
dumping convention, the secretariat introduced the notion, innovated by lawyers and 
scientists within the United Nations, that substances could be classified into so-called black
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if it is to persuade other nations to control their ocean disposal of wastes, then it is essential that the 
United States first put its own house in order. Im my opinion, prompt and favorable action by Congres 
to establish effective regulation of ocean dumping is a prerequisite to action by other nations'. Ocean 
Waste Disposal, 153.
M Among others the International Conference on Ocean Pollution, International Environmental 
Science, U.N. Conference on Human Environment: Preparations and Prospects
39 No single theory of domestic politics exists today to explain international cooperation. For a recent 
overview of the dominant approaches, sec Helen Milner 'International Theories of Cooperation Among 
Nations', 494-95.
40 See Appendix B.
and grey lists by an international convention 41. It should be prohibited to dump blacklisted 
substances, while special care should be taken and permission should be given before 
greylisted substances were dumped 42. The secretariat recognized that categorizing 
substances on the basis of available knowledge of their environmental impact in separate lists 
annexed to the convention had several advantages. By using this approach the contents of 
the lists could be updated and adjusted as new knowledge of pollutants developed without 
it being necessary to negotiate the entire convention text. In itself this would mean a major 
innovation of the standard treaty form 43. Recent experiences showed that lack of 
knowledge about pollutants was a significant barrier to international agreement 44. The 
black and grey lists system also offered a solution to this problem as scientific uncertainties,
139
41 Interview with Sachiko Kuwabara, August 26, 1991, New York. Telephone interview August 27, 
1991. Member of the Stockholm secretariat and U.N. representative at negotiations on the London 
Dumping Convention.
42 The so-called Oslo Convention, which regulates dumping in the North Sea, pioneered the use of 
black and grey lists. As in the negotiations on the international dumping regime, the negotiators followed 
the advice of GESAMP, an expert group established in 1969 by the United Nations. For the Oslo 
Convention, see F. Bjerre and PA. Hayward The Role and Activities of the Oslo and Pahs Commissions*, 
in TJ. Lack, ed., Environmental Protection: Standards, Compliance and Costs (Chichester: Ellis 
Horwood, 1984), 142-57.
43 For the study requested by Maurice Strong and presented to the preparatory committee suggesting 
the separation of the adjustable technical part' from the more permanent 'diplomatic part' of an 
international treaty, see Paolo Contini and Peter H. Sand 'Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: 
International Ecostandards,' The American Journal of International Law 66 (1972), 37-59. These two 
FAO lawyers' study was originally titled 'Methods to Expedite the Adoption and implementation of 
International Rules and Standards for Environmental Protection', U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/PC(II)/Conf. Room 
Paper No. 3, 8 February, 1971.
44 For example, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Environmental Matters, Christian 
A. Herter, explained at an international meeting organized by the United States Congress in 1971 about 
a recent attempt to reach an agreement on control of oil pollution of the oceans: 'It is very difficult to 
persuade a number of countries that normal spillage -  cleaning of tanks, this kind of thing -  in the ocean 
produced a very serious threat in terms of the total ocean...a certain amount of scientific information was 
produced by experts pointing out the hazards to marine life of oil pollution. But it was perfectly clear 
that more scientific information and research on this topic was required, and the lack of it made the 
political process more difficult'. Senator George Miller, chairman of Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, then summed up: 'Isn't it true that a lack of this information and the necessity for it is one 
of the great handicaps that we have not only in getting international cooperation but getting cooperation 
within our own country on these problems, that a lot of people do not quite comprehend or understand?'. 
International Environmental Science, 45.
i.e. lack of complete knowledge, concerning the impact of pollutants on the marine 
environment could be acknowledged without jeopardizing agreement. As one U.S. delegate 
to the negotiations later described, the black and grey lists helped negotiators to overcome 
this obstacle to agreement: 'There was very little disagreement over the scientific portions 
of the Convention. All accepted the concept of an annexed list of substances banned from 
ocean dumping. Another annexed list would contain substances requiring special care before 
dumping could be permitted. The delegations recognized that present knowledge of the 
effect of substances in the marine environment was quite deficient, and accordingly, the lists 
were prepared in light of a rapid amendment procedure for the annexes' 4S. At the first 
session of the IWGMP, Maurice Strong had been at pains to stress that sufficient knowledge 
existed to act against specific pollutants 46. United Nations experts had furthermore 
recognized that it was very unlikely that governments would support the creation of an 
international agency with planning and enforcement powers. They hoped instead for 'direct 
cooperation between non-diplomatic officials in different countries' 47. They also hoped 
to separate the technical from the diplomatic part in international environmental negotiations, 
science from politics, as the black and grey lists did.
The secretariat was also aware that the black and grey lists were a moderate, stepwise 
approach which allowed even reluctant governments to join an international dumping regime 
and thereby be looked upon as pro-environment at a point where the public, especially in 
the Western world, was considerably concerned over the environment. This would make
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45 Charles F. Lettow The Control of Marine Pollution', in Erica L. Dolgin and Thomas G. P. Guilbert, 
eds. Federal Environmental Law, 665.
46 Strong told the IWGMP: It must be acknowledged that we lack sufficient knowledge today on 
which to base all future decisions... But we do know enough to begin to take some of the important 
decisions that must be made, and I hope that this group will begin now to determine what action can be 
taken and needs to be taken on the basis of existing knowledge. The recommendations of GESAMP, the 
Group of Experts on the Scientific Effects of Marine Pollution, are clear on this point; that the time for 
action is at hand'. 'Address by the Secretary-General of the Conference -  Mr. Maurice F. Strong'. 'Report 
of the First Session o f the Inter-Governmental Working Group on Marine Pollution, London, 14-18 June 
197V. U.N. doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.I/5, 21 June 1971. Annex IV, 2.
47 Oscar Schachter and Daniel Serwer 'Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies', 104. See, for 
example, Edward Cowan U.S., Canada Asked to Save the Lakes’, New York Times, September 11,1970.
good political sense also for developing countries as they feared that future 'environmental 
aid' would reduce existing funds for development aid and that public pressure in donor 
countries would channel resources away from developing countries which were looked upon 
as being 'anti-environmental'. The black and grey lists system effectively gave governments 
the option of not doing everything immediately. As the secretariat wished, it avoided a 
take-it-or-leave-it, or an all-or-nothing, dilemma48. It was also hoped that the approach 
in this way would help delegations in overcoming resistance to join a global regime back 
home in their capitals. On this particular advantage of the black and grey lists, one member 
of the Stockholm secretariat summarized: The black list allows you to have a grey list'49.
The secretariat was aware that the black and grey lists had other advantages which 
all could have a constructive influence on the negotiations. Primarily, the approach was 
instrumental in reaching agreement on banning dumping of at least some pollutants. Further, 
it demonstrated to developing countries that developed countries were serious about 
controlling ocean dumping. Finally, developing countries generally would have no reason 
to worry about the economic consequences of ocean dumping regulation since they would 
have few, if any, of their substances blacklisted. Thus, the black and grey lists in reality 
imposed heavier burdens on those governments who were more concerned over pollution, 
and lesser burdens on those who were not as concerned. Chapter 5 showed that developing 
countries actually favored stringent black and grey lists but were opposed to draft general 
provisions which they feared would impose unacceptable constraints on their economies. 
In conclusion, the Stockholm secretariat recognized that the relatively straightforward notion 
of black and grey lists had important advantages in environmental negotiations in which 
developed and developing countries participated.
Chapter 5 mentioned that the secretariat realized early on that developing countries 
indeed were very skeptical about a need for international regulations and standards. It 
therefore considered it very important that developing countries did not suspect that the
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41 See Appendix B, point 8.
49 Interview with Sachiko Kuwabara, August 26, 1991, New York. Telephone interview August 27, 
1991.
United Nations was on the side of the developed countries and it wished to demonstrate that 
a global interest existed in controlling certain pollutants. It was hoped that the 'basic papers' 
on pollutants of 'broad international significance', mentioned in Chapter 5, would help to 
accomplish this. The secretariat hoped in particular to appease the fear of some developing 
countries -  most importantly, Brazil -  towards agreeing to control at least some pollutants.
It was due to the secretariat that the international community's willingness to protect 
the environment was at stake in the negotiations since the convention would be the first 
global regime for environmental management to embody the success of the Stockholm 
Conference 50. Chapter 5 showed that governments meeting in the London Conference felt 
committed by recommendations agreed to at the conference. 'And naturally', one 
experienced negotiator said caustically earlier the same year, 'everyone wants to see at least 
one treaty result from a Conference as heralded in advance as Stockholm is '51. It is thus 
clear, although the examined models either disagree or are silent on this aspect, that 
governments can be pressured to demonstrate willingness to cooperate by a well-organized, 
highly visible international environmental conference raising domestic costs of non- 
cooperation. The case of the international dumping regime shows that an international 
environmental conference can achieve this when public policy is not enjoying strong 
domestic support, especially in times of changing public opinion. Chapter 7 will add 
supporting evidence to this conclusion.
142
50 For the success of the Stockholm Conference, see Anthony Lewis ’One Confused Earth', New York 
Times, June 17,1972; Gladwin Hill, ’Sense of Accomplishment Buoys Delegates Leaving Ecology Talks’ 
New York Times, June 18, 1972; ’Global Environment', New York Times, June 19, 1972; Nigel Hawkes 
’Stockholm: Politicking, Confusion, but Some Agreements Reached' Science 176 (23 June, 1972), 1308- 
10; 'Mr Strong's Recipe', Nature 237 (June 23), 1972.
51 Allan I. Mendelsohn 'Ocean Pollution and the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Environment' 
Journal o f Maritime Law and Commerce 3 (January 1972), 391. According to Wade Rowland: 'It was 
not until the committee (the Preparatory Committee) met for the third time in September of 1971 that it 
had become clear that the job of educating the public and their political leaders had already been partly 
accomplished through the explosion of public interest in environmental matters, and that the Stockholm 
conference would have to produce some concrete action if it were to be taken seriously by observers 
around the world'. The Plot to Save the World, 87.
The secretariat was intensely involved in enhancing the conference's visibility 52. 
Mass media and prominent international scientists and ecologists, among others several 
'visible scientists1 who earlier had participated in Congressional hearings, played an essential 
role in focusing global attention on the conference and thereby the environment, thus 
increasing domestic pressure on governments 53. Mostly Maurice Strong, but also other 
members of the secretariat, met with representatives from the international scientific 
community, governments, the business community» and environmentalists in various 
combinations and fora around the globe The Secretary-General of the Stockholm
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52 Marvin S. Soroos has concluded that the preparations for and subsequent convening of the 
Stockholm Conference in June 1972 apparently heightened environmental consciousness internationally'. 
Trends in the Perception of Ecological Problems in the United Nations General Debates/ Human Ecology 
9 (March 1981), 30. The Stockholm Conference was undoubtedly effective in galvanizing international 
expectations. 'Greater expectations will be raised than can practically be achieved'. Philip H. Abelson 
'After the Stockholm Conference', Science 175 (11 February 1972), 3. In May the Science editorial found 
it 'obvious that what is most needed now is a severe cutback in our expectations -  else the affair will go 
down as a failure'. Hans H. Landsberg 'Can Stockholm Succeed?', Science 176 (19 May 1972), 751.
53 Thor Heyerdahl spoke at the distinguished lectures series held concurrent with the Stockholm 
Conference, as well as to the IGWMP. Using more dramatic statements than at previous occasions, he 
said: 'Quiet recently, it has become more and more apparent that some of the changes Man is imposing 
on his original environment could be harmful to himself; in fact they could even lead to global 
disaster...Only in recent years have we begun to understand the interaction of the extremely complex 
ecosystem...Since life on land is so utterly dependent on life in the sea, we can safely deduce that a dead 
sea means a dead planet'. Reprinted in the Congressional Record, October 13, 1972, 35753-35756.
Maurice Strong had asked Rene Dubos and Barbara Ward to prepare the 'conceptual framework' 
for the Stockholm Conference. The study was published under the title Only One Earth: The Care and 
Maintenance o f a Small Planet -  Only One Planet was the conference slogan -  and was conveniently for 
sale at the time of the conference. This book was telling evidence of the environmental concern of the 
late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small 
Planet (New York: Norton, 1972).
54 It should be noted that many representatives of the scientific community were sceptical about the 
quality of scientific knowledge about environmental impact of pollutants. For example, at the 
distinguished lecture series held concurrent with the Stockholm Conference the Swedish economist Gunnar 
Myrdal, one of the *world's leading scientific and intellectual people' credited in Only One Earth, the 
unofficial conference report, made devastating criticism of the popular 'Club of Rome* study The Limits 
to Growth'. He criticized the 'inexcusably careless manner in which so-called futuristic research is now 
often pursued' and emphasized that the 'all estimates upon which the warnings for depletion and pollution 
arc founded are utterly uncertain'. Myrdal quoted in support Rene Dubos, who also lectured at the 
Stockholm series: The existing knowledge of the natural sciences is not sufficient to permit the 
development of effective action programs'. Gunnar Myrdal 'Economics of an Improved Environment', in 
Maurice F. Strong, ed., Who Speaks for Earth?, 70-71.
Conference and the secretariat acted as a pressure group on behalf of the global environment. 
None of the models examined predict that an international secretariat might pressure 
governments to cooperate by forming coalitions with domestic groups and by mobilizing 
public opinion and support55.
Already in November 1970 the secretariat singled out ocean dumping as a strong 
candidate for global agreement in Stockholm and advocated agreement in this area at 
meetings with the Preparatory Committee 56. The secretariat was searching for problems 
which governments collectively could start doing something about by establishing an 
international regime. Although land-based sources of marine pollution supposedly accounted 
for as much as ninety percent of marine pollution, insufficient knowledge about these sources 
and much higher economic costs associated with their control made land-based marine 
pollution a very unlikely candidate for international regulation. Scientific evidence of 
pollution from ocean dumping also made this issue easier to tackle. Since oil pollution from 
ships would be dealt with at an IMCO conference in 1973, dumping was left as the 'last key 
maritime source' of ocean pollution. The secretariat thus saw the possibility to 'close off one 
remaining source' and in this way demonstrate that governments were able and willing to act 
57. When it established the IWGMP, as one United States negotiator put it, 'the stage was set 
for the United States to table a draft ocean dumping treaty' S8. The secretariat thus 
succeeded to focus international negotiations on an area of possible global agreement and 
establish a useful negotiation forum for the hegemon, the United States.
In summary, to reach agreement on an international dumping treaty, the Stockholm 
Secretariat followed a multifaceted strategy. First, the secretariat helped governments in
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55 Other scholars have reached different conclusions. Eugene Skolnikoff writes: that the secretariats 
of international organizations may come to play an important role as mobilizers of public opinion, and 
thus as pressure groups on their own'. The International Imperatives of Technology, 96.
56 'Opening Remarks by Maurice F. Strong, Secretary-General Designate, United Nations Conference 
on Human Environment, at Informal Meeting of Preparatory Committee for the Conference', 4.
17 Interview with Peter S. Thacher, August 14, 1991. Stonington, Connecticut.
“  Robert J. McManus The New Law on Ocean Dumping. Statute and Treaty', 29.
identifying areas of common conccrn and environmental problems which could be solved 
through international cooperation. Second, the secretariat fashioned and advocated a treaty 
form which could expedite international environmental negotiations, in addition could tackle 
the problem of insufficient knowledge and, further, could accommodate the interests of both 
developed and developing countries, namely the black and grey lists system. Third, the 
secretariat galvanized world public opinion in order to pressure states to act and focused 
international expectations on an international dumping regime, i.e. an area of possible global 
agreement. The secretariat's strategy combined both sticks and carrots.
Conclusion
Chapter 2 concluded that the three models examined -  the Realist, the epistemic community, 
and the complex interdependence models -  disagree on many theoretically important issues. 
This chapter has shown that the three models all disregard essential aspects of how the 
international regime for controlling ocean dumping was built. Chapter 7 will demonstrate 
that similar aspects have been essential in the case of global termination of radwaste 
disposal.
First, and most importantly, there is widespread agreement that public opinion, hardly 
mentioned in the international regimes literature, has no effect on international cooperation 
on the protection of global commons such as the oceans 59. Even students of international 
cooperation on environmental protection minimize the role of public pressure, nationally and 
internationally, as well as the impact of public opinion. This negligence of public pressure 
stems from Realists' preoccupation with coercion and 'power' as the only available 
instruments of control and, on the other hand, Reflective scholars' preoccupation with 
knowledge and perception.
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39 Undoubtedly other cases exist. There is agreement, for example, that worldwide concern was a key 
factor behind the agreement on the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. See McGeorge Bundy, Danger and 
Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 460. See 
also Ralph E. Lapp, The Radiation Controversy (Greenwich, Conn.: Reddy Communications), 16.
Second, all three models tested here exclude the domestic level from their 
understanding of international regime-building. This chapter has repeatedly concluded that 
examination at the domestic level is necessary in order to understand the origins of the 
international dumping regime. It is also evident that scientists are only one among many 
domestic groups influencing policy development. This chapter has stressed the need to 
include the role of ideas in policy development. The observations made here mostly concern 
policy-making in the United States, and therefore do not necessarily apply to other countries. 
However, the importance of developing testable theories of domestic politics in studies of 
international regimes is repeatedly stressed.
Third, international organizations, taken in their own right, and NGOs play an 
insignificant role in the theories tested here. The epistemic community model tends to erase 
the boundaries between national and international bureaucracies and does not pay much 
attention to NGOs. Of the three models examined, this model is the one most open to the 
possibility that an international secretariat would play a catalytic role and would facilitate 
negotiations among governments. Similar to the complex interdependence model, however, 
it ignores the role of mass media, public opinion and international pressure.
Finally, Reflective theorists and Realists agree that anarchy characterizes international 
politics. They conclude that states cannot be forced to act against their self-interest however 
defined This chapter, like Chapter 7 will do, has raised some doubts about this 
assumption.
In summary, the three models examined here only focus on certain aspects of 
international regime-building but might supplement each other and in this way give a better 
understanding. This study shows that detailed examination must include, not exclude, all the 
levels at which international regime-building takes place. Existing models artificially 
separate the domestic and the international levels, and interests and power are, equally
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60 Kenneth Waltz writes: 'States are self-regarding units. State behavior varies more with differences 
of power than with differences in ideology, in internal structure of properly relations, or in governmental 
form. In self-help systems, the pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences 
or internal political pressures'. 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics', 
329.
artificially, seen as antithetical to ideas and knowledge. Better models should fit together, 
not separate, all aspects and actors that contribute to international regime-building.
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REVISING THE INTERNATIONAL DUMPING REGIME
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the international dumping regime declared a global ban on 
dumping of low-level radioactive waste in the world's oceans in 1983. This ban marked the 
most significant policy development in the history of the regime as well as in the entire 
history of control of radwaste disposal Although legally non-binding, the ban and the 
forces supporting it have effectively terminated radwaste disposal in the world's oceans, a 
practice that had been in use since 1946. Ocean dumping has been suspended since 1982 
although several major nuclear nations -  principally the United States, Britain and Japan -  
still do not have permanent land-based storage facilities for their low-level radioactive waste 
and consequently have a considerable stake in disposal at sea 2.
The ban marked the convergence of pressure from the public, trade unions, 
international environmental interest groups, and governments. Contrary to the predictions 
of the Realist model, the ban was, therefore, not established through American leadership. 
For complicated reasons, the United States in fact opposed -  and still does -  the ban. 
Neither was the ban, as epistemic community theorists would predict, a result of an 
international network of ecology-oriented marine scientists pressuring and persuading policy 
makers to terminate radwaste disposal. If anything, the authority vested in scientific 
expertise within the regime was recently seriously challenged. While small states used 
coalition-building and the regime's decision-making procedures to their advantage, as the 
complex interdependence model predicts might happen, the international environmental 
interest group Greenpeace provided international leadership by mobilizing opposition its well
1 For a review of the pollution control results reached within the regime prior to the moratorium on 
radwaste disposal, see M.G. Norton The Oslo and London Dumping Conventions', Marine Pollution 
Bulletin 12 (1981), 145-49.
2 For the present situation of those three nations, see Chap. 1, footnote 43.
as turning international public opinion against ocean dumping of radioactive materials. 
Protests against radwaste disposal
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Britain was dumping low-level radioactive waste in the Atlantic 
Ocean annually from 1949 onwards. Starting in 1967, waste delivered by Britain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland was periodically dumped in a deep part of the 
Atlantic Ocean under a voluntary system of international supervision administered by the 
NEA/OECD. While the dumping operations did comply with the international dumping 
regime when it entered into force in 1975, several non-dumping nations were opposed to 
them. In 1978, at the consultative meeting of the members of the international dumping 
regime, 'many delegations expressed the view that radioactive waste disposal in the ocean 
should be discouraged and that prohibition of dumping high-level radioactive wastes should 
be retained' 3. Similar to the 1958 United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, described 
in Chapter 1, the conflict surrounding radwaste disposal was unresolved. Pro-dumping and 
anti-dumping governments had moreover been unable to reach an agreement at a meeting 
held in Lisbon, in 1966 4.
Greenpeace, which since its founding in Canada in 1971 has become the world's 
largest, most effective international environmental pressure group, launched a campaign in 
1978 against the European dumping in the Atlantic Ocean s. Greenpeace has by staging
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s IMO document 111/12 'Report of the Third Consultative Meeting', 24 October 1978, 16.
4 A.W. van Wcers, B. Vcrkcrk and C. Koning 'Sea Disposal Experience of the Netherlands', in 
'Proceedings o f the Symposium on Waste Management at Tucson', 1982, 4S1.
5 A member of the National Audubon Society, a U.S. environmental group struggling to acquire a 
newer, tougher image, recently explained: 'We want to be Greenpeace but we don't want to parachute off 
bridges'. Anne Raver 'Old Environmental Group Seeks Tough New Image', New York Times, June 9, 
1991. Greenpeace has 'a reputation as the main green influence on public opinion', 'Green Groupies', The 
Economist, June 6,1992, 37. For Greenpeace's early history, see John McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise. 
The Global Environmental Movement (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 
143-45.
spectacular 'happenings' or series of focusing events called campaigns by Greenpeace focused 
the attention of the international public and mass media on whaling, sealing, nuclear testing 
and other 'environmental crimes'6. The nuclear industry feared that the campaign also was 
intended to mobilize public opinion to prevent a resumption of dumping by the United States 
or a start of such operations by Japan 7. Greenpeace hoped to obstruct the dumping 
operation by positioning inflatable dinghies underneath the dumping ship's platforms from 
which the containers were rolled into the sea. The dinghies were operated from the Rainbow 
Warrior, the same ship used to protest against French nuclear tests on the Polynesian island 
of Mururoa in the South Pacific 8.
Starting in 1978, Greenpeace intended to hinder the annual European dumping 
operation taking place at a site 4000 m below sea level, located approximately 700 
kilometers off Spain's north-west coast. A Greenpeace ship followed a freighter to the dump 
site. At a press conference in Britain Greenpeace showed film of their unsuccessful attempts 
to stop the dumper ship tipping more than five thousand barrels of radioactive waste into the 
sea. Greenpeace charged that the dumping violated the rules of the international dumping 
regime, a claim rejected by the British government, declaring that the material dumped only 
had insignificant amounts of radioactivity 9. In the summer of 1979, Greenpeace again set
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6 Greenpeace has since its beginning been an anti-nuclear organization working to reduce nuclear 
weapons, nuclear weapons testing, and nuclear power. Its nuclear-free seas campaign has aimed at 
'ridding the seas of nuclear weapons'. See Greenpeace 'Greenpeace..for a cleaner, safer earth'. In a 
newsletter released in relation to the campaign against radwaste disposal it explained: 'A ban on dumping 
of radioactive waste would hasten the death of the nuclear industry, particularly in the U.K.'. Quoted in 
Simon Rippon 'Ocean Disposal', Nuclear News (March 1983), 79. For how Greenpeace initially got 
involved in the dumping of nuclear waste in the Atlantic Ocean, see Fred Pearce, Green Warriors. The 
People and the Politics Behind the Environmental Revolution (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), 54.
7 Simon Rippon 'Ocean Disposal', 76-79.
* A major international scandal followed when in 1985 the Rainbow Warrior was blown up by French 
agents in Auckland harbour, New Zealand. For a pro-Greenpeace account of the explosion of Rainbow 
Warrior, sec Bengt Danielsson and Marie-Therese Danielsson, Poisoned Reign: French Nuclear 
Colonialism in the Pacific (Penguin Books 1986), ix-xv.
9 Michael Monis "Dangerous* Waste Dumped', The Guardian, July 25, 1978. For Greenpeace's 
ram paign within Britain, I draw on the recent book of Andrew Blowers, David Lowry, and Barry D. 
Solomon, The International Politics of Nuclear Waste (London: Macmillian, 1991), 74—85. A good
out to obstruct the dumping. The British press reported how the dumper ship crew's used 
powerful fire hoses to prevent the protesters from placing dinghies under the cranes dumping 
drums of radioactive waste into the sea 10.
In 1982, three Dutch ships were responsible for the annual dumping operation. The 
international press reported how dinghies launched from the Rainbow Warrior were placed 
under the ships' cranes. The population on the Spanish northwest coast, which was strongly 
protesting against the dumping, had dispatched two trawlers with local politicians on board 
to escort the Greenpeace ship to the dumping site. Dumping was suspended 24 hours after 
two drums struck a dinghy carrying Greenpeace protesters 11. Spanish politicians' appeal 
by loudspeakers to the captain in command also interrupted the operation, which however 
was resumed, but then finally cancelled n. After this incident, the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution urging the European Commission to employ 'any procedures at its 
disposal, either action within the Community framework, or through international agreements 
to stop this dumping of nuclear waste'13. At this point, 'the issue of the annual dump was 
developed into an international scandal' by Greenpeace 14.
Several European governments soon responded to the Greenpeace campaign. Within 
a month after the incident, the Dutch government officially suspended all dumping of 
radioactive waste. This ministry is convinced that ocean-dumping is a safe disposal for 
wastes,1 said a spokesman for the Dutch Ministry of Public Health and Environment, 'but it
151
source of information is the Greenpeace documentary film 'Desperate Measures', which follows the 
Greenpeace campaign from its beginning in 1978 through 1982.
10 Tony Allen Mills 'Atomic Waste Dumpers Foil Saboteurs', The Daily Telegraph, July 13, 1979.
11 No one was injured in the accident. Dutch Ship Stops Dumping Nuclear Waste', New York Times, 
August 30, 1982.
12 'A Dutch Ship Resumes Dumping Nuclear Waste Off Northern Spain', New York Times, August 31,
1982.
u Quoted by Ursula Wassermann Disposal of Radioactive Waste', Journal o f World Trade Law' 19 
(1985), 427.
14 Fred Pearce, Green Warriors, 54.
is clear that our society does not want ocean—dumping11S. Transport and loading of waste 
had in the last two years been possible only because police thwarted protests organized by 
Greenpeace 16. Considerable public protest at a time when Dutch politics was increasingly 
becoming 'green' caused the government to reverse its policy
In Spain, the Greenpeace campaign galvanized massive public protests against 
dumping in the Atlantic Ocean off the Spanish coast and the government intended as a 
consequence to end the dumping1B. In particular the population of the north-west Galician 
coast, mostly ocean-oriented communities where fishing is one of the main industries, was 
strongly protesting against dumping. In the summer of 1982, local politicians and thousands 
of people carrying anti-dumping posters welcomed the Greenpeace crew when it arrived in 
port in Vigo in Galicia after having protested against dumping. The Spanish government had 
since 1980 been increasingly under pressure to stop dumping. The Socialist government 
headed by Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez which came to power in 1982 thus intended to 
stop the dumping taking place off the Spanish coast19.
In 1980, there were also protests in Zeebrugge, Belgium, where demonstrators caused 
considerable damage to instruments on the bridge of a freighter leaving to dump in the 
Atlantic 30. In 1982, national attention was attracted to the issue when the major of Bruges’
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15 'Dutch to Stop Dumping Nuclear Wastes at Sea', New York Times, September 23, 1982.
16 'Nuclear Dumping Leads to Clash', New York Times, August 21, 1982. A.W. van Weers, B. 
Verkerk and C. Koning 'Sea Disposal Experience of the Netherlands', 461-62.
17 Personal communication, Dutch delegate to the 1991 consultative meeting of the London Dumping 
Convention, November 1991. For short history of the 'greening' of the Netherlands, see Graham Bennett 
The History of the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan', Environment 33 (1991), 7-8.
1S The Spanish government has later prepared a comprehensive study of public attitudes on the issue, 
presented to the LDC. Sec IMO. Inter-Governmental Panel of Experts on Radioactive Wastes Disposal 
at Sea. Intersessional Studies on Radioactive Waste Dumping at Sea. Political Aspects. Submitted by 
Spain'. IMO Doc. LDC/IGPRAD 2/2/6, August 1988.
19 Interview with Jose Juste Ruiz, Spanish delegate to the LDC meetings, London, (November 29, 
1991).
20 Demonstrations Against Low-Level Sea Dumping', Nuclear News (August 1980), 72-73. A.W. 
van Weers, B. Verkerk and C. Koning 'Sea Disposal Experience of the Netherlands', 461-62.
attempt to prevent shipment of waste destined for the ocean through his territory was 
overruled by the Belgium government 21. The Belgium government did not, however, 
change its dumping policy.
In 1979, Japan announced that it planned to experimentally dump radwaste at a site 
north of the Mariana Islands in the South Pacific 22. According to the Japanese 
government, the plan conformed to the regulations of the international dumping regime. 
Japan, whose geography lacks sufficient long-term geologic stability for repository sites, 
ships spent fuel to Europe for reprocessing at either Sellafield, Britain, or Le Hague, Fiance 
23. Under the Japanese plan, 5,000 to 10,000 drums of nuclear waste would be dumped in 
1981 when Japan would become member of the international dumping regime. The dumping 
would be expanded to up to 100,000 curies a year after the Japanese government had 
verified the safety of its experimental program.
A mission from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, however, soon 
presented a formal anti-dumping petition representing seventy organizations with a total 
membership of more than 12 million to the Japanese Diet 2A. The Japanese government 
was also asked to send officials to the islands for discussions. Encouraged by the United
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21 GeraJd Bourke 'Europeans Seek Answers to Nuclear Waste Buildup', Chemical Engineering 90 
(February 7, 1983), 25-26.
22 'Japan Plans to Begin Ocean Disposal', Nuclear News, November 1980, 20.
23 These shipments as well as the subsequent storage of plutonium in Japan have caused considerable 
international controversy. See Stans field Turner and Thoman Davies 'Plutonium Tenor on the High Seas', 
New York Times, May 28, 1990; David E. Sanger 'Japan Edges Close to Nuclear World', International 
Herald Tribune, November 26, 1991; Paul Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer 'Plutonium: Time for a Global 
Ban', International Herald Tribune, January 15,1992; Dangerous Cargo', The Economist, April 18,1992; 
David E. Sanger Tokyo Cautioned on Nuclear Storage', International Herald Tribune, April 4, 1992; 
'Japan May Put Off Plutonium Plans', International Herald Tribune, April 21, 1991; 'Japanese Affirm 
Plutonium Policy', International Herald Tribune, April 22, 1992; Michael Richardson 'Asia Warns Japan 
on Plutonium Shipments', International Herald Tribune, July 7, 1992; 'Japan Plutonium Cargo Ship to 
Sail', International Herald Tribune, August 19, 1992.
24 'Mariana Islanders Protest Plans by Japan to Dump Atomic Waste', New York Times, August 3, 
1980; Jon Van Dyke, Kirk R. Smith, and Suliana Siwatibau 'Nuclear Activities and the Pacific Islanders', 
Energy 9 (1984), 741; James B. Branch The Waste Bin: Nuclear Waste Dumping and Storage in the 
Pacific', AMBIO 13 (1984), 329. See also Nuclear Fears Voiced for the South Seas', New York Times, 
October 29, 1982.
States, Japanese scientists and politicians toured the region in August and September, trying 
to persuade governments that the dumping was safe. The campaign failed, however, and the 
following month the New Guinea Foreign Minister told the United Nations General 
Assembly that the long-term effects of dumping could be catastrophic 25. In October 1980, 
the Governors of Hawaii, Guam, American Somoa and the Northern Mariana Islands issued 
a statement opposing the dumping of radioactive waste planned by Japan and the United 
States -  plans by the United States will be discussed below -  and declared that their 
organization, the Pacific Basin Development Council, 'totally opposes the dumping of 
radioactive nuclear waste in any part of the Pacific Basin1 26. In February 1981, Japan 
announced that it, in response to the protests, had put off its plan to begin experimental 
dumping later the same year 21. A complex combination of governmental considerations 
and domestic opposition apparently led to that decision 28. Instead, after the Japanese
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25 Rowan Callick ’A Storm Beneath the Calm', Far Eastern Economic Review, November 7,1980, 40. 
Sec also James B. Branch The Waste Bin: Nuclear Waste Dumping and Storage in the Pacific’, AMBIO
13 (1984), 328.
26 Robert Trumbull ’Pacific Governors Oppose Dumping Atom Wastes', New York Times, October 5, 
1980.
27 Henry Kram 'Islanders Fight Japan's Plan to Dump Atom Waste', New York Times, March 18, 1981. 
'Japan. Seabed Dumping Delayed as Other Nations Object', Nuclear News (March 1981), 61-62.
28 Japan's desire to act in a responsible way internationally motivated this decision then, as well as 
later. Takao Kuramochi, first secretary, Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C. Interviewed August 30, 
91. This consideration might have been given some weight by the Japanese government as the United 
States has recently urged Japan to join, or even provide international leadership behind, efforts to protect 
the environment. Thoman L. Friedman Baker to Japan: Share the Global Burden', International Herald 
Tribune, November 12, 1991, In 1980, however, Japanese fishermen, fearing adverse effects from 
dumping on the fish stocks which constitute their livelihood, threatened to use their boats to hinder 
dumping. Robert T. Trumbull ’Pacific Governors Oppose Dumping of Atom Wastes', New York Times, 
October 5, 1980; see also John Junkcrman Deep-Sixing the Atom', The Progressive 45 (December 
1981), 32. In 1980, the government of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas reportedly threatened 
to exclude Japanese vessels from its fishing zone should dumping operations commence. Daniel P. Finn 
'Nuclear Waste Management Activities in the Pacific Basin and Regional Cooperation on the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle', Ocean Development and International Law Journal 13 (1983), 216. The following considerations 
have also been suggested to explain Japan's decision not to dump: 'Japan's forbearance appears to have 
resulted from a mix of considerations: Japan has been cultivating an image of peace and conciliation in 
an effort to live down its prewar reputation as the Pacific Basin's strong-arm bully; it has made substantial 
investments in the island nations and territories, and wants to make more; and it does not want to 
jeopardize its fishing privileges within the exclusive economic zones of existing or emerging island
government hopefully had appeased the fears of the Oceanian and Southeast Asian countries, 
it planned to dump small amounts of radioactive waste and only if proved safe, which was 
expected, would full-scale dumping begin, probably in 1987 or later 29. In August 1984, 
however, Japanese officials of the Japanese Science and Technology Agency reportedly 
admitted that they were prepared to break their 1980 assurance not to dump without the 
consent of the Pacific nations30. After an uproar in the Pacific, representatives of the same 
agency later assured that dumping would only happen ’with the understanding' of the Pacific 
nations 31.
In November 1980, Japan and the United States started a joint program to study the 
possibilities for interim storage of high-level radioactive waste on Palmyra Island, an 
isolated Pacific island located approximately 1000 miles south of Honolulu 32. In addition 
to its suitable geology and other properties, it was hoped that such a remote storage site for 
high-level radioactive waste would not arouse public protests 33. Intended to avoid
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nations. Indeed, should these privileges be jeopardized by ocean dumping, Japan's politically powerful 
fishing industry would probably put a quick stop to it'. Luther Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public 
Trust: Dealing with Radioactive Waste, 364.
29 Takehiko Ishihara 'Ocean Dumping of Low-Level Waste in Japan: Past and Future', in Proceedings 
of the Symposium on Radioactive Waste Management at Tucson', 469-70.
30 Jane Dibblin 'Paddling in the Nuclear Pool', New Statesman, 1 March 1985, 18-19. In 1980, 
officials of the Japanese Science and Technology Agency noted it was still 'not necessary to get approval 
of foreign governments'. Don Kirk Double Standards in Japan's Nuclear Policy', New Statesman, 
September 5, 1980, 4. In 1981, a leading official of the same agency reportedly said: Wc will continue 
to have a plan to dump. We did not give up the plan'. Henry Kamm 'Islanders Fight Japan's Plan to 
Dump Atom Waste', New York Times, March 18, 1981.
31 Jane Dibblin 'Britain Is In the Dock', New Statesman, September 20, 198S, 21.
32 George C. Wilson Tiny Pacific Isle of Palmyra Targeted as Nuclear Dump’, Washington Post, 
August 18, 1979. James B. Branch The Waste Bin: Nuclear Waste Dumping and Storage in the Pacific', 
AMBIO 13 (1984), 328. John Edwards The Fuel Nobody Wants', Far Eastern Economic Review, August 
8, 1980.
33 Around the same time, some experts hoped for similar solutions to problems of public acceptance 
of European high-level waste: 'While there appears to be general agreement among Europeans that low- 
and medium-level wastes will have to be disposed of on their own territories, some specialists are still 
concerned about public acceptance of high-level wastes, even in the deepest deposit of granite, salt, 
volcanic rock or clay. They would be happier if it was carried far away -  to a midocean island or a sea-
reprocessing (a process in which the valuable uranium and plutonium are recovered from 
'spent' fuel rods), which entails the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, the proposal 
envisaged that up to 10,000 tons of high-level radioactive waste, delivered by Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan, would be stored for 30 years and then moved to a permanent storage site. 
Although the plan only involved storage of high-level radioactive waste on land, it added 
momentum to Pacific protests against radwaste disposal 34. The proposal confirmed 
widespread beliefs in the region, in the words of a lawyer acting as council to the people of 
Bikini, 'that the United States continues to treat the Pacific islands as its back-yard dumping 
grounds, disregarding the interests and legitimate rights of their inhabitants' 3S. Atom 
bombs tests in the Pacific, which began in 1946, had thus caused the development of very 
strong regional resentment towards nuclear tests and disposal of radioactive materials 36. 
Regional efforts at controlling and reducing nuclear testing and radioactive waste disposal, 
which dated back to 1976, led in 1985 to signing of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone 
Treaty, the so-called Rarotonga Treaty. Signed on Hiroshima Day, 6 August 1985, this 
treaty bans, among other things, ocean dumping of radioactive wastes anywhere within the 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 37.
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bed depository'. Walter Sullivan 'Nuclear Waste Disposal: Bold Innovations Abroad Instructive for U.S.', 
New York Times, August 31, 1982. Similarly, the 'unstable nature' of most European governments made 
most experts hope for 'some dim and distant sub-seabed site' for high-level waste. Gerald Bourke 
■Europeans Seek Answers to Nuclear Waste Buildup', Chemical Engineering 90 (February 7, 1983), 25- 
26.
34 George C. Wilson 'Plan for Storing Nuclear Wastes on Pacific Atoll Strongly Protested'. 
Washington Post, August 23, 1979.
35 Jonathan M. WeisgalJ The Nuclear Nomads of Bikini', Foreign Policy 39 (1980), 97.
36 Jon Van Dyke, Kirk R. Smith, and Suliana Siwatibau 'Nuclear Activities and the Pacific Islanders', 
733-50.
37 The treaty was signed by Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu, and 
Western Samoa. Article 7 of the treaty requires each zone member to undertake: '(a) not to dump 
radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone; (b) to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in its 
territorial sea; (c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of radioactive 
wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone; (d) to 
support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the protection of the
In the United States, there existed a real possibility that some forms of radioactive 
waste again would be ocean dumped. Toward the end of the 1970's, the United States ocean 
dumping regulation -  the essentially precautionary and prohibitory Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, described in Chapters 3 and 4 -  came under some 
attack. There were indications that existent stringent ocean dumping regulation would be 
relaxed as Congress and the courts became painfully aware of the realities of strict 
regulation, namely considerable pollution-control costs and insufficient alternatives. At the 
same time it was alleged that parts of the oceans had an ability to assimilate some wastes
38
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began around the same time to 
look to the oceans as a possible disposal alternative for both low-level and high-level 
radioactive wastes. Public concern over disposal of radioactive waste made it extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to find sufficient permanent disposal facilities on land 39< In 
addition, when weighing the costs and benefits of regulation, as the Reagan administration 
urged EPA to do, ocean disposal of old nuclear submarines was clearly more attractive than
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Review 2 (1989), 320-33.
38 James P. Walsh XJ.S. Policy on Marine Pollution: Changes Ahead', Oceanus 24 (1981), 20-24. 
Allan Bakalian 'Regulation and Control of United States Ocean Dumping: A Decade of Progress, An 
Appraisal for the Future', Harvard Environmental Law Review 8 (1984), 193-256.
39 See statement by Roger J. Mattson, Office of Radiation Programs, U.S. EPA, given before 
1Radioactive Waste Disposal Oversight'. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. House of Representatives. November 20, 1980, 436-54. 
A US EPA official explained in 1981: With increasing public concern for waste management practices 
on land and the need to find permanent disposal sites, the United States is again looking towards the 
oceans as a possible alternative to land disposal for both low-level and high-level radioactive waste'. 
Robert S. Dyer 'Sea Disposal of Nuclear Waste: A Brief History', in Thomas C. Jackson, ed., Nuclear 
Waste Management: The Ocean Alternative (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 11. See also Philip 
Shabecoff 'Agency May Alter Atom Waste Policy', New York Times, January 15, 1982.
land disposal 40. There seemed also to be a growing consensus among marine scientists 
that radwaste disposal would cause no significant risks to either human health or the marine 
environment 41.
Starting in 1980, EPA was thus revising existing regulation so that thousands of tons 
of slightly contaminated soil left over from the World War II Manhattan project and more 
than 100 retired nuclear submarines, each representing more than 50,000 curies of radioactive 
waste, could be dumped at sea 42. A report sponsored by EPA noted, however, that 'the 
disposal of radioactive waste into the ocean evokes strong feelings. There are those who feel 
that radioactive materials should be completely prohibited from deep ocean disposal'. The 
report concluded that, 'it is naive to believe that all other countries will accept a position of 
not permitting the disposal of packaged low-level waste when for certain countries it is the 
only option available to them' 43. It would soon become clear, however, that the report 
underestimated the potential political impact of those 'feelings', both in the United States and 
elsewhere.
A possible change of EPA's policy on disposal of radioactive materials in the ocean 
sparked considerable alarm within the environmental community. Around the time it became 
known, public attention was attracted to radioactive waste dumped from the 1946 to 1970
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40 Land disposal was estimated to cost well over $100 million, ocean disposal less than $10 million. 
Both the U.S. Navy's cost estimates, which did not included costs of monitoring over a period of several 
hundred years, and its scientific documentation claiming that no harm would be inflicted on the marine 
environment and human health, were criticized by groups opposing the Navy's plans. See 'Joint 
Comments o f Environmental and Other Citizen Organizations in Response to the Department of Navy's 
Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the Disposal of Decommissioned, Defueled Naval Submarine 
Reactor Plants'. Submitted by the Center for Law and Social Policy and the Oceanic Society. 30 June
1983.
41 Leslie Roberts 'Ocean Dumping of Radioactive Waste', BioScience 32 (November 1982), 773-6.
42 Luther J. Carter Navy Considers Scuttling Old Nuclear Subs', Science 209 (26 September 1980), 
1495-97. Colin Norman U.S. Considers Ocean Dumping of Rad wastes', Science 215 (5 March 1982), 
1217-9.
43 Amelia Ann Hagen 'An Analysis of International Issues Associated with Ocean Disposal o f Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste' (McLean, Virginia: The MITRE Corporation, 1980), 7-1/2.
as drums were found unexpectedly and previously unknown dump sites were disclosed 44. 
EPA sent some of its researchers to examine a former site near Boston for health effects 45. 
As the EPA scientists expected, however, no evidence of harm was turned up 46. The 
public visibility of the issue was further heightened as environmental groups organized public 
policy forums and 'citizen workshops' that addressed past dumping in the United States, legal 
aspects of international regulation, and plans to bury high-level radioactive waste in the deep 
seabed 47. Hearings on the early dumping were held in, among other places, San Francisco, 
California, and Boston, Massachusetts, and a hearing on the U.S. Army's proposed dumping 
of decommissioned submarines was held in North Carolina 48. Environmental pressure 
groups, conservationist groups, private citizens, local business leaders, and commercial 
fishermen's organizations all advocated a ban on disposal of radioactive waste in the ocean. 
The Oceanic Society, a Washington-based environmental group which publishes the 
magazine Oceans -  'for people who love the sea' -  challenged the scientific basis of the 
Navy's proposal. The Oceanic Society, which, as mentioned in Chapter 4, had been involved 
in the early 1970s' hearings on the issue, was by 1980s coordinating the U.S. opposition
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44 The US navy had bound the EPA to secrecy. See Carol Polsgrove 'Second Choice. Nuclear 
Dumping on the High Seas', Oceans 14 (May-June 1981), 65.
45 'Contamination Survey Set for Boston Harbor', New York Times, September 18, 1982.
46 For the expectations of the EPA researchers, see 'Offshore Waste Study Begun', New York Times, 
September 21,1982. Compared to samples taken in areas where no dumping had occurred, the dumpings 
were not found to have caused detectable levels of radioactivity in Massachusetts Bay. See 'Radwaste 
in Massachusetts Bay', BioScience 33 (February 1983), 87. See also Alan B. Sielen 'Sea Changes? Ocean 
Dumping and International Regulation', 26.
47 The proceedings of a public policy forum held in Washington, D.C., and organized by the Oceanic 
Society, see below, are published in Thomas C. Jackson, ed., Nuclear Waste Management. The Ocean 
Alternative. This is the only existing publication which brings together relevant political, scientific, and 
regulalory issues in a comprehensive and balanced way. For these citizen workshops, see footnote 49 
below.
41 'Ocean Dumping of Radioactive Waste off the Pacific Coast'. Hearing before A Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Government Operations. House of Representatives. 96th Congress. October 7, 1980. 
Disposal of Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines'. Hearing before the Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries. House of Representatives. 96th Congress. October 19, 1982.
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against ocean dumping of radioactive wastes 49. The governor of New Jersey similarly 
called the proposal to dump off the New Jersey coast 'a very severe potential health hazard'
50
To head off the Reagan Administration's proposal, the House of Congress approved 
in September 1982 legislation imposing a two-year moratorium on any dumping of low- 
level radioactive waste 5\  Despite ocean scientists and experts assuring that the involved 
risks were minuscule, the practice was perceived as a threat to the marine environment. 'As 
a common-access resource, the ocean is not protected by the same economic and political 
forces that protect private property,' said one of the bill's sponsors, 'It is up to the members 
of Congress to provide a voice for the ocean and to insure that the ocean has sufficient 
protection. We are specifically charged with the mandate of providing our citizens and our 
future generations a healthy and unpolluted ocean environment' 52.
At the end of the moratorium, the bill required EPA to make a comprehensive 
environmental statement before a permit for ocean disposal of low-level radioactive waste
49 The Oceanic Society represented the following twenty-five environmental and public-interest 
groups in the debate on the Navy's proposal: The American Cetacean Society, Ban Ocean Nuclear 
Dumping (B.O.N.D.), CAN-Disarm, Center for Environmental Education, Clean Water Action Project, 
Committee to Bridge the Gap, Critical Mass Energy Project, Environmental Defense Fund, Farallon 
Foundation, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, U.S.A., Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., National 
Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Free Pacific, Nuclear Information Resource 
Service, Ocean Education Project, Palmetto Alliance, Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference, Sierra 
Club, Southwest Research and Information Center, Union of Concerned Scientists, United Methodist 
Church Joint Law of the Sea Project, United Methodists General Board of Church and Society, and 
Wilderness Society. The Oceanic Society and some of the above groups also organized a series of citizen 
workshops on the proposal to dump aged nuclear submarines in Boston, MA; Washington, D.C.; Winston- 
Salem, NC; Beaufort, NC; Charleston, SC; Eureka, CA; and Seattle, OR. See 'Joint Comments o f 
Environmental and Other Citizen Organizations in Response to the Department of Navy's Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement on the Disposal of Decommissioned, Defueled Naval Submarine Reactor 
Plants', 1-4. See also 'Oceanic Society Leads Opposition to Nuclear Dumping', Oceans 16 (September- 
October 1983), 70.
50 'Kean Assails Proposal On Dumping A-Waste', New York Times, March 28, 1982.
51 'House Backs Moratorium on Ocean Dumping', New York Times, September 21, 1982. Joseph A. 
Davis 'Legislation to Strengthen Rules on Ocean Dumping Approved by the House', the Congressional 
Quarterly, Weekly Report', 40 (September 25 1982), 2386.
52 Norman E. D'Amours, democrat from New Hampshire, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Oceanography, Congressional Record, September 20, 1982, H 7261.
could be issued. Congress was given 30 days to review and block issuance of each permit 
which made it very unlikely that any dumping permit would be issued within a short period 
of tim es3. The Senate approved the bill in December 1982 although powerful Senators and 
President Reagan were opposed to it M. The sponsors in the House outmaneuvered them, 
however, by attaching it to a gas-tax bill supported by the Senate and President Reagan 55. 
In 1984, the U.S. Navy made it official that it had decided to bury the defueled radioactive 
engine compartment of its retired submarines on government-owned land 56.
In summary, unlike in the early 1970s, when few European governments, i.e. Britain, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium, were dumping low-level radioactive waste, the 
United States and Japan planned to start ocean dumping in the 1980s. Since the mid-1970s, 
several nuclear nations had furthermore been examining the technical and scientific 
feasibility of high-level radioactive waste disposal into the deep ocean seabed 51. The 
regulatory situation had thus changed dramatically compared to 1972 when the international 
dumping regime had been constructed. The United States ocean regulation, i.e. the Marine 
Protection, Sanctuaries, and Research Act from 1972, strictly regulated low-level waste 
disposal. Its sponsors in Congress had, as described in Chapter 4, been strongly opposed to 
dumping 'hot' high-level radioactive waste at sea. International pressure had in 1972 forced
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in a denial of the permit. The bill's sponsors deliberately chose this procedure because they expected it 
was extremely unlikely that Congress within so brief time could consider a permit. Personal 
communication from U.S. source who has asked to remain anonymous.
54 The Congressional Quarterly. Weekly Report, 40 (December 25, 1982): 3138.
55 Personal communication from U.S. source who has asked to remain anonymous. See also footnote 
(53) above.
56 'Navy Prefers to Bury Subs', Science News 125 (May 26/June 9, 1984), 358. Philip Trupp 'Nuclear 
Subs to Settle on Dry Land', Oceans 17 (July 1984), 34-35.
57 In the period 1976-82, the following countries participated in the Seabed Working Group of the 
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD: Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Commission of the European 
Communities, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Britain, and 
the United States. See David A. Deese 'Seabed Emplacement and Political Reality', Oceanus 20 (1977), 
47-63. See also Clifton E. Curtis 'Legality of Seabed Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes under 
the London Dumping Convention', Ocean Development and International Law 14 (1985), 383-415.
the United States and Britain to include radwaste disposal under the international dumping 
regime.
At the same time, European environmentalists and the Spanish population located 
nearest to the dump site protested ever more vocally against dumping of low-level 
radioactive waste in the Atlantic Ocean. As the case of the Netherlands illustrates, public 
opinion in Europe was increasingly questioning the wisdom of existing policy. In the United 
States, the Reagan administration's plans to dump radioactive materials had been met with 
considerable public protests and legislation to halt dumping was passed by Congress. 
Japanese plans were also put on hold due to protests voiced throughout the Pacific region.
The international dumping regime 1983-85: Regime change despite resistance
A significant number of the governments attending the seventh consultative meeting of the 
international dumping regime, held in February 1983 at IMO headquarters in London, were 
unwilling to let dumping of low-level radioactive waste at sea continue. Some governments 
were in favor of stopping dumping immediately, others would rather phase out dumping. 
Banning radwaste disposal required, however, that the grey and black lists to the London 
Dumping Convention, discussed in Chapter 5, be amended. In accordance with the London 
Dumping Convention, low-level radioactive waste would have to be moved from the grey 
list to the black list. The convention stipulated, furthermore, that any amendment to the 
black and grey lists Svill be based on scientific or technical considerations' 58. Those 
governments seeking to halt radwaste disposal would consequently have to present scientific 
and technical evidence proving that such practice was harmful and should be banned under 
the convention 59.
By 1983, the two Pacific islands Kiribati and Nauru had become members of the
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58 See Appendix A , article 15 (2).
19 The convention puts the onus of proof on those wanting to halt pollution. See Appendix A, article
1.
international dumping regime in the hope that the convention could be amended to ban all 
forms of radioactive waste disposal at sea 60. Nauru, represented by an American anti- 
nuclear campaigner, biology professor Jackson Davis from the University of California, 
proposed an immediate global ban on radwaste disposal 61. Being heavily dependent on 
marine resources, fish being one of the two staple foods and an important economic resource, 
Kiribati and Nauru feared that radioactive waste endangered the marine environment and 
presented scientific evidence in support of their claim. Their report claimed that 
radioactivity had leaked from old drums into the marine environment and had entered into 
the oceanic food chain, that existing knowledge of behavior of radioactivity in the ocean was 
based on incorrect and uncertain theoretical models, and finally that experts disagreed on 
low-level radiation hazards a .
The Nordic states -  Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden -  proposed a 
ban on dumping to start 1990. They agreed in principle with the proposal of Kiribati and 
Nauru but wished to give dumper nations some time to develop land-based alternatives. In 
the intermediate period, dumping should be more strictly controlled and the amount of waste 
should not exceed the present level. Furthermore, only existing dump sites should be used, 
and no new dumpers should be allowed. The Marine Pollution Division of the Danish 
National Agency of Environmental Protection (NAEP) formulated the Danish policy but 
failed to win Nordic support for the Nauru and Kiribati proposal. Danish scientists, who like 
their international peers considered the risks of dumping low-level radioactive waste to be
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60 Jon Van Dyke et.al. 'Nuclear Activities and the Pacific Islanders', 743. Other Pacific Basin nations, 
like Fiji, have chosen not to do so because they have considered the Convention too lenient as 
demonstrated by Japan's claim that its proposed dumping was in accord with the convention. Kiribati -  
formerly the Gilbert islands, which gained independence from Britain in 1979 -  became a member of the 
London Dumping Convention in June 11, 1982; Nauru -  a former United Nations trust territory that 
became independent in 1968 -  became a member in August 25, 1982.
61 For the meeting discussion, see LDC document 7/12 'Report of the Seventh Consultative Meeting', 
9 March 1983, 19-30.
62IMO document LDC7/INF.2 'Evaluation o f Oceanic Radioactive Dumping Programmes. Submitted 
jointly by Kiribati and Nauru', 23 September 1982.
very low, were not conferred with 63. Two of the Danish government officials later joined 
Greenpeace M.
The Spanish delegation told the consultative meeting that dumping in the North 
Atlantic Ocean was a cause of great domestic public concern. Spain considered that the 
effects on human health and long-term consequences of dumping were the subject of 
scientific controversy and proposed suspension of dumping operations until the necessary 
research and evaluation were completed.
The delegation from Ireland, one of the countries nearest the dump site then in use, 
was opposed, in principle, to the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea and supported the 
Nordic proposal. The Irish government was 'coming under increasing domestic pressure 
from a public opinion which was not convinced that dumping did not constitute a hazard'6S. 
Ireland maintained that governments wishing to dump had the responsibility to demonstrate 
that dumping was safe.
The British delegation replied that the documents submitted by Kiribati and Nauru 
did not provide the scientific and technical basis required for amendment of the convention. 
The convention should consequently not be amended. The delegation was of the opinion that 
the onus of proof that dumping was unsafe rested with those proposing to change the 
convention. Britain failed, however, to get support for this view Switzerland fully 
supported the British position.
Also the United States supported the British position, stressing that a change of the 
convention to ban radwaste disposal should be based on sound scientific evidence of adverse 
health effects and damages to the marine environment. Dr. Charles D. Hollister from Woods 
Hole Oceanographic Institute, Massachusetts, one of America's most respected marine
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63 Interview with Asker Aarkrog, Head of Ecology Section, Environmental Science and Technology 
Department, Ris<t> National Laboratorium, Denmark (March 20, 1992).
64 Interview with Kirsten F. Hansen, The National Agency of Environmental Protection (NAEP), 
H^rsholm, Denmark (January 17, 1990).
65 LDC document 7/12 'Report o f the Seventh Consultative Meeting', 22-23.
66 Rob Edwards 'Wasting the Ocean1, New Statesman, 1 July 1983, 6.
research centers, concluded that 'the Davis paper is clearly not the balanced scientific 
evaluation claimed by the authors and thus it is my recommendation that no amendments to 
the London Dumping Convention be considered until such an evaluation is completed' 67.
The Netherlands delegation explained to the meeting that it was looking for 
possibilities to avoid dumping from 1983 and intended to store waste on land. Due to 
difficulties in finding suitable disposal alternatives, dumping in 1983 could perhaps not be 
avoided. Japan believed that sea disposal of radioactive wastes would not adversely affect 
the marine environment when international regulations, which presently rested on firm 
scientific basis, were followed. The Japanese government therefore strongly opposed 
proposals for prohibiting sea disposal.
During informal negotiations among the various delegations it became clear that the 
proposal to amend the convention would not receive support by a sufficient number of 
governments. Agreement was reached, however, that the scientific basis of the proposal by 
Nauru and Kiribati should be reviewed by an expert group. The results of such a study 
should be discussed in 1985, at which time further action should be taken.
Spain then proposed a moratorium resolution -  according to LDC, resolutions require 
a simple majority -  which meant a suspension of all dumping at sea pending completion of 
such an expert group study of effects of dumping of low-level radioactive waste on the 
marine environment and human health In a subsequent roll call vote, which the United
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Disposal o f Radioactive Wastes. Critical Studies and Comments to the Report 'Evaluation o f Oceanic 
Radioactive Dumping Programmes. Submitted by F ra n ce9 December 1983, Annex 1. Dr. Hollister 
claimed that his scientific work on the geological effects of deep sea currents was misinterpreted by Davis 
et al. Dr. Hollister is one of the chief U.S. spokespersons of sub-seabed disposal of high-level 
radioactive wastes. For one of Hollister's many publications, see K.R. Hinga, G. Ross Heath, D. Richard 
Anderson, and Charles D. Hollister Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes by Burial in the Sea 
Floor', Environmental Science Technology 16 (1982), 28A-37A. For Hollister's involvement in this issue, 
see Edward L. Miles, Kai N. Lee and Elaine M. Carlin, Nuclear Waste Disposal under the Seabed: 
Assessing the Policy Issues (California: University of California, 1985).
“  For this moratorium resolution, see Appendix C.
States and Britain failed to block 69, 19 countries -  Spain, Portugal, the Nordic countries, 
Ireland, Canada and almost all developing countries -  voted in favor of the Spanish proposal 
10. The sponsors of the moratorium resolution easily persuaded developing countries -  
none of the few developing countries producing radioactive waste conduct ocean dumping -  
to support the moratorium 71. The group of countries considering or involved in dumping
-  Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, Britain and the United States -  voted 
against the resolution. Five countries -  Brazil, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece 
and the Soviet Union -  abstained. While the moratorium resolution was not legally binding 
on governments, several delegations indicated that it was morally binding. The nuclear 
industry, among others, thus expected that continued ocean dumping would 'result in a 
substantial political storm' 12.
Very significantly, Britain immediately indicated it would not be bound by the 
decision Britain planned to dump 3500 tonnes low-level radioactive waste, representing 
more than 1500 curies of alpha radiation and some 150,000 curies of beta and gamma 
radiation in the Atlantic Ocean 74. The Swiss delegation also expressed the view that 
Switzerland did not feel bound by the resolution. Switzerland intended to dispose of 
relatively small amounts, but would stop dumping in 1984 75. Netherlands explained it had
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See also Clifton E. Curtis 'Radwaste Dumping Delayed. An International Moratorium Keeps Nuclear 
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70 Countries voting in favor of the Spanish resolution were Argentina, Canada, Chile, Denmark, 
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71 Interview with Jose Juste Ruiz, Spanish delegate to the LDC meetings, London, (November 29, 
1991).
72 'A Call for a Two-Year Halt on Ocean Disposal', Nuclear News, March 1983, 120.
73 Pearce Wright 'Britain Defies Ban on Dumping Waste', The Tunes, February 18, 1983.
74 Fred Pearce 'Seamen Pull the Plug on Radioactive Dumping', New Scientist, June 30, 1983.
75 Rob Edwards 'Wasting the Ocean’, New Statesman 1 July 1983, 6.
difficulties disposing of low-level radioactive waste on land and therefore might have to 
carry out dumping in the summer 1983. It became clear later that the French government 
intended to participate in the 1984 dumping operation 76.
The United States explained that its vote reflected its concern that decisions whether 
to dump should be taken on the basis of scientific and technical evidence. Because of its 
attempt to keep the resolution from coming to a vote, however, many delegations and NGOs 
doubted whether that was the true reason 77.
As often happens in international negotiations, the United States delegation did not 
reveal its real concerns. Importantly, the administration did not welcome the legislation on 
radwaste disposal passed by Congress in 1982. The U.S. Navy was still faced with the 
problem of disposing of its retired nuclear submarines and preferred to keep open the option 
of ocean disposal. Moreover, the U.S. marine scientific community generally did not support 
an unqualified ban on ocean dumping of waste, radioactive wastes included; U.S. legislators 
and the public, it was felt, misperceived the risks involved in ocean dumping. A report 
released in 1984 by the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere 
(NACOA), co-written with NOAA, recommended that Congress and the administration 
revise the policy of excluding the use of the ocean for low-level radioactive waste disposal. 
Ocean disposal should not, however, start before the needed research efforts and monitoring 
of the fate and effects of disposal were established n . In the view of the U.S. marine
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77 For governments and NGOs' doubts about the U.S. reasoning, see Gifton Curtis 'Radwaste 
Dumping Delayed. An Internationa] Moratorium Keeps Nuclear Wastes at Bay', Oceans 16 (1983), 22- 
23.
71 National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere 'Nuclear Waste Management and the Use 
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oceanography, University of Rhode Island; since August 1989, Under Secretary for Occans and 
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Andrea Corell 'Surprises from Ocean Conference' Oceans 19 (1986), 9. Knauss has recently addressed 
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scientific community, an international ban on ocean dumping would instead be similar to 
'doing the same mistake twice' 19. To the surprise of members of the international dumping 
regime, the United States' foreign policy on radwaste disposal, which is the domain of the 
executive branch of government, consequently was -  and still is -  not identical to domestic 
policy.
To prevent the scheduled dumping, Greenpeace at this point set out to broaden 
opposition against nuclear ocean dumping. Greenpeace took contact with the National Union 
of Seamen (NUS), the British seamen's organization, hoping that the union would boycott 
the dumping planned for summer 1983 80. The initiative was successful. In March 1983, 
the British seamen, concerned primarily about their safety when handling the waste, passed 
a resolution in favor of halting ocean dumping of radioactive materials81. One month later, 
the opposition was further strengthened when the Transport and General Workers' Union 
(TWGU), the train drivers' union (ASLEF), and the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), 
at a meeting organized by Greenpeace, agreed on an attempt to halt ocean dumping of 
radioactive waste 82. In June of the same year, the British seamen announced a ban on 
handling the waste. The seamen refused to crew a 'Greenpeace-proof ship -  the ship had 
been fitted with a hole in the hull through which drums of waste could be dropped without 
being interfered with by Greenpeace -  which had been chartered by Britain, Belgium and 
Switzerland to carry out dumping 83. The TWGU and the ASLEF similarly called on their 
members not to handle or transport the waste. Transport union boycotts were also adopted
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79 Bryan C. Wood-Thomas, environmental scientist, Marine Policy Programs, Office of International 
Activities, U.S. EPA. Interviewed August 29,1991, Washington, D.C., and London, November 27,1991. 
Confirmed by U.S. source who has asked to remain anonymous.
*° Fred Pearce, Green Warriors, 55. Herb Short 'Sea Burial of Radwaste: Still Drowned in Debate', 
Chemical Engineering, March 5, 1984, 14-18.
81 'Four Unions Back Ban on A-Waste Dumping', The Guardian, April 7, 1983.
a  Ibid. and Tony Samstag Unions Act to Black Nuclear Dumping', The Times, April 7, 1983.
13 Fred Pearce 'Seamen Pull The Plug on Radioactive Dumping', New Scientist 30 June 1983, 924.
Many described the ship as 'Grcenpeace-proof. Sec, for example, Tony Samstag Unions Act to Block
Nuclear Dumping', The Times, April 7, 1983.
in Switzerland and Belgium M.
Furthermore, if the British government, as the unions expected, let the armed forces 
carry out the dumping, an armada of protest vessels was expected to sail from Spain to 
converge on the dumping site. 'We understand there are already plans for quite a lot of 
vessels to leave Spain', explained an executive officer of TGWU, 'and we would hopefully 
form part of that amarda' 85. In February and July 1983, Spanish 'Friends of the Earth', 
ecologists and left-wing protestors demonstrated before the British Embassy in Madrid in 
protest against the plan to dump. In July, more than 150 British flags were burnt in several 
towns and cities in Galicia, and in one city Mrs. Thatcher was burnt in effigy 86.
In September, the British opposition was significantly strengthened when the seamen's 
union won backing from the Trade Unions Congress (TUQ for a motion condemning the 
use of the world's oceans as a dumping ground for nuclear waste and demanding that 
development of land-based disposal facilities be accelerated 87. The Union Congress 
furthermore urged the British government to comply with the decision made at the February 
meeting of the international dumping regime w. At the end of August 1983, the British 
government announced that it had given up its dumping plans, together with the Belgian and 
the Swiss governments 89. On the eve of the 1985 meeting of the members of the 
international dumping regime, the general secretary of TUC and the British seamen reiterated
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their opposition to any British plans to resume dumping ®°. The International Transport 
Unions Federation, in addition, was 'putting its full weight behind a ban and could force 
dumping nations to toe the line'91.
The eighth consultative meeting of the international dumping regime, taking place in 
February 1984, agreed on a more precise structuring of the review of effects of dumping of 
low-level radioactive waste on the marine environment and human health 92. It was 
decided that a panel of twenty-two international experts nominated by the International 
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), an UN-based advisory scientific body, and the IAEA 
should prepare a basic document which later would be examined by an expanded panel 
including experts from governments, international organizations and NGOs. This decision 
was a compromise between a group led by Britain, wanting the IAEA and the ICSU to select 
the experts to review the evidence and make recommendations for consideration at the next 
consultative meeting, and another group of governments, led by Canada and Nauru, which 
felt that experts reflecting different interests and regions should review the evidence and 
make recommendations 93. The United States in particular insisted that the representatives 
from NGOs were indeed experts in the relevant fields 9A. Experts should be knowledgeable 
in fields such as marine ecology, oceanography, radiological protection, marine geochemistry 
and marine mathematical modelling 95.
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The experts did not recommend whether to amend the international dumping regime. 
Perhaps surprisingly, they judged that the question was not a wholly scientific-technical one 
96. As the expert report said: The report does not endorse the dumping of radioactive 
waste at sea nor does it condemn it. In the view of the panel, such a decision could involve 
value judgements which go beyond consideration of the technical and scientific evidence*97. 
However, as to the risks of dumping, the expert concluded that 'the calculations show that 
any risk to individuals from the use of the [Atlantic] dump site is very low, both in relation 
to other common radiation risks such as that from natural background radiation and to the 
risk that corresponds to any of the dose limits or upper bounds that would apply following 
current international radiation protection recommendations'
Within the expanded group of experts, with representatives from governments and 
NGO Greenpeace, some proposed to make a clear statement which could be used by the 
consultative meeting in reaching a final decision They suggested that 'no scientific or 
technical grounds could be found to prohibit the dumping at sea of all radioactive wastes,
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discussion of the concept, especially its political ramifications, see Shelia S. Jasanoff 'Contested 
Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Sciences', Social Studies of Science (May 1987), 1-51.
97 IMO. Expanded Panel on the Review of Scientific and Technical Considerations Relevant to the 
Proposal for the Amendment of the Annexes to the London Dumping Convention Related to the Dumping 
of Radioactive Wastes. Introduction of Report Prepared by the Panel of Experts. The Disposal o f Low- 
Level Radioactive Waste at Sea. (Review o f Scientific and Technical Considerations). Note by the 
Secretaria tIMO Doc. LDC/PRAD.l/2/Add.2, 1 May 1985, 17.
98 IMO. Expanded Panel on the Review of Scientific and Technical Considerations Relevant to the 
Proposal for the Amendment of the Annexes to the London Dumping Convention Related to the Dumping 
of Radioactive Wastes. 'Introduction of Report Prepared by the Panel o f Experts. Note by the 
Secretariat'. IMO Doc. LDC/PRAD.1/2, 12 April 1985, 136. On the question of deep sea fauna, ’the 
results so far indicate that there is no risk of significant damage to local populations ... at or near the 
North-East Atlantic dump site*. Ibid, 137. Upper bound signifies the maximum amount of total human 
irradiation permitted from a certain source.
99 Since 1981 Greenpeace International has bad status as observer at consultative meetings of the 
international dumping regime. The organization is allowed to make oral statements and submit written 
material. LDC document 6/12 'Report of the Sixth Consultative Meeting, 3-4.
provided that dumping is carried out in accordance with internationally agreed procedures 
and controls' 10°. But a number of representatives opposed any such categorical statement. 
There was agreement on a compromise stating 'no scientific or technical grounds could be 
found to treat the option of sea dumping differently from other available options when 
applying internationally accepted principles of radioprotection to radioactive waste disposal' 
101. The British press, however, reported that 'all the parties who attended seem to come 
away with a different version of the result' 102. The coming consultative meeting would 
consequently have to reconsider the moratorium without clear recommendations from its 
scientific advisers.
The report of the expanded panel was the focus of the ninth consultative meeting of 
the international dumping regime, held in September 1985 1<n. Governments reached very 
different conclusions from the findings of the report. Nauru, Spain, Denmark, Norway, 
Australia, New Zealand, Saint Lucia, Iceland, and Brazil found the report supported their 
fears about radioactive dumping. Several of them stressed that land disposal was safer, more 
controllable and reversible than ocean disposal. Governments which were in the process of 
developing land-based alternatives, i.e. Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, also opposed ocean dumping. Spain and Ireland explained that factors 
other than scientific and technical ones, for example availability of land-based disposal 
alternatives, also should be taken into account. Several of the governments opposing 
dumping as well as international environmental organizations stressed that available 
knowledge was insufficient for it to be modelled adequately and with a sufficient margin of 
safety. A representative of the scientific panel, however, criticized that the scientific findings
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100 IMO 'Report of Intersessional Activities Relating to the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes at Sea, 
Including the Final Report o f the Scientific Review'. IMO Doc. LDC 9/4, 24 June 1985, 25-27.
101 Ibid.
102 Paul Brown 'Britain Seeks Allies to Lift Nuclear Dumping Trucc’, The Guardian, September 21, 
1985.
103 For the meeting discussion, see IMO document 'Report of the Ninth Consultative Meeting', LDC 
9/12, 18 October 1985, 16-41.
seemed to have been 'ignored, distorted or misinterpreted by some parties in unprofessional 
attempts to exaggerate the uncertainties'104.
Japan explained that although it presently did not intent to dump without the consent 
of the Pacific region it needed to dispose of radioactive waste and, as a small country, it had 
to consider ocean disposal. Provided that scientific and technical studies showed disposal 
would be safe, the option should remain open. France concluded that no scientific grounds 
for suspension of ocean dumping had been found and that the option should be reopened. 
Britain and the United States also argued that the available scientific evidence did not 
support a change of the convention. The United States suggested to end the suspension of 
dumping. Belgium and Switzerland supported the position of the United States. Thus, the 
panel report did not help to resolve the conflict. As a U.S. delegation member caustically 
remarked later, 'both those for and those against sea disposal have pointed to the panel's 
conclusion as vindication of their own positions' I0S. 'Scientifically', he noted, 'you seem 
to be able to argue either w ay'106.
Intense negotiations followed but did not result in agreement. Although Britain had 
hoped to avoid a vote altogether, a resolution co-sponsored by Spain and fifteen other states 
for an indefinite moratorium pending further considerations of the issues involved was then 
brought to a vote 107. The group of governments supporting a moratorium had grown, 
mostly because several developing countries had joined, to 25 governments; 6 governments, 
almost the same that had been against the 1983 moratorium, opposed it; and 7 abstained >os.
I0* IMO 'Report o f Intersessional Activities Relating to the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes at Sea, 
Including the Final Report o f the Scientific Review', 22.
105 Alan B. Sielen 'Sea Changes? Ocean Dumping and International Regulation', 10.
106 Interview with Alan B. Sielen, August 29, 1991, Washington, D.C.
107 Paul Brown 'Open-Ended Nuclear Dumping Ban: Britain Loses Strong Rearguard as Vote Switches 
Burden of Proof, 7Tie Guardian, September 27, 1985.
101 For the ban were Australia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, West 
Germany, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Kiribati, Mexico, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, St. Lucas, Spain, Sweden. Against the ban were Canada, 
France, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. Abstentions: Argentina, 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal and the Soviet Union. A few months later, Canada changed its
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Governments opposing the moratorium resolution protested fiercely against the vote 
109. The British press reported that TJK threatens to withdraw from convention on nuclear 
dumping' and 'the big nuclear nations, including the United States, had pointed out that they 
would have to reconsider their position if dumping was banned' uo. The United States 
cautioned governments that 'similar action in the future on other important issues will not 
only undermine the fabric and regulatory framework of the London Dumping Convention, 
but also tend toward its politicization' ni. The Canadian chairman of the consultative 
meeting again appealed for a compromise at a subsequent press conference saying that it was 
'better for all countries to take one step forward than some to take five steps back and others 
none at a ll 'm .
The resolution called for suspension of all ocean dumping of radioactive wastes 
pending studies of wider legal, social, economic and political aspects of resuming radwaste 
disposal. The resolution was thus intended to broaden the dumping regime's decision­
making principle to include considerations other than scientific and technical ones. While 
the exact nature of such considerations were not clearly spelled out, future proposals to dump 
should be examined in the light of what international law said about liability, duty to
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negative vote to a yes.
109 For this resolution, see Appendix D.
110 Paul Brown UK Threatens to Withdraw from Convention on Nuclear Dumping', The Guardian, 
September 25, 1985.
111 According to the meeting report -  members of the international dumping regime adopt the meeting 
report at the end of their meeting, and it might therefore not be an entirely accurate account of what was 
said -  Britain told the meeting that 'such tactics bad brought the Ninth Consultative Meeting very close 
to the point at which some Contracting Parties might have to reconsider the terms of their participation 
in the Convention'. For the British and American statements, see IMO Document 'Report o f the Ninth 
Consultative Meeting', annex 5, 10-11.
112 Paul Brown UK Threatens to Withdraw from Convention on Nuclear Dumping'. The chairman 
later circulated a letter to all members in which he pointed out that the integrity of the Convention could 
suffer if a sequence of amendments were adopted that were unacceptable to some Contracting Parties'. 
He also noted that decisions on the annexes should be based on scientific and technical considerations. 
See Edward L. Miles, Science, Politics, and International Ocean Management: The Use o f Scientific 
Knowledge in International Negotiations, 49.
cooperate, the oceans status as 'common heritage of mankind', and so on 113. Economic 
considerations would, or could, include for example losses to the fishing industry. Dumping 
in the Atlantic Ocean, for example, has repeatedly resulted in reduced sales of fish in Spain 
m . In 1980, the Japanese market for sablefish collapsed after a photograph of a sablefish 
swimming near drums dumped in the Pacific Ocean off San Francisco was published in 
newspapers around the world. All orders for sablefish, not just ones from the U.S. West 
Coast, were cancelled ns.
Risks and costs of land disposal also had to be examined. It would, in addition, be 
examined whether it could be proven that radwaste disposal would not harm human health 
or cause significant damage to the marine environment. Significantly, the resolution thus 
shifted the onus of proof to those interested in dumping who in the future would have to 
demonstrate that no harm would be inflicted on the marine environment or humans n6. 
This decision, in particular, was a significant victory for those opposing radwaste disposal 
and delegations considered that such a proof could not be made 11?.
At the tenth consultative meeting of the international dumping regime, held in 
October 1986, a few governments restated their position on radioactive dumping u8. The 
debate from the previous year was not reopened. The supporters of the moratorium stressed
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113 For the oceans' legal status as common heritage of mankind, see Stephen D. Krasner, Structural 
Conflict, 245 ff.
114 Judith Spiller and Cynthia Hayden 'Radwaste at Sea: A New Era of Polarization or a New Basis 
for Consensus', in Ocean Development and International Law 19 (1988), 352.
115 Katherine Bishop U.S. to Determine if Radioactive Waste in Pacific Presents Danger', New York 
Times, January 20, 1991.
116 Compare with Appendix A, article 1.
117 Paul Brown 'Open-ended Nuclear Dumping Ban: Britain Loses Strong Rearguard Action as Vote 
Switches Burden of Proof, The Guardian, September 27, 1985. For an environmental NGO's view on 
the importance of this decision, see Clifton Curtis 'Radioactive Wastes: Reflections on International Policy 
Developments under the London Dumping Convention', 14.
u* For the meeting discussion, see IMO document 'Report o f the Tenth Consultative Meeting', LDC 
10/15, 5 November 1986. For statements made by contracting parties during the discussion on radwaste 
disposal, see Annex 10.
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that especially economic and social factors of ocean dumping should be examined. No clear 
terms of reference for the coming studies were established, and governments could contribute 
studies on the various aspects on a voluntary basis. The studies are expected to be 
completed in 1992 or 1993.
In 1988, the British government formally announced that radwaste disposal would not 
resume 119. In 1989, a proposal to dump decommissioned nuclear submarines by the 
British Ministry of Defence was rejected by ministers 120. While domestic regulation in 
the United States practically prohibits ocean dumping of low-level radioactive wastes, the 
administration has not definitively cancelled plans to dump low-level radiative wastes 121. 
However, resuming dumping would need the approval of Congress which is unlikely given 
public sentiment on this issue 122. Japan has presently no plans to dump although the 
option is not ruled out by domestic law 123.
An attempt to amend the London Dumping Convention to finally prohibit dumping 
of low-level radioactive waste surfaced at the fourteenth consultative meeting of the
119 R.H. Flowers 'Radioactive Waste Management in the United Kingdom', Proceedings of the 1989 
Joint International Waste Management Conference'. Vol. 1. Law and Intermediate Level Radioactive 
Waste Management, 108.
120 David Fairhall 'MoD Favours Scuttling Old Nuclear Subs', The Guardian, April 13, 1989. John 
Pienaar 'Nuclear Subs May Be Scuttled', The Independent, April 13, 1989.
121 In 1989, EPA considered regulations for ocean disposal of low-level radioactive wastes. See F.L. 
Galpin, W.F. Holcomb, J.M. Gruhlke and DJ. Egan, Jr. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's 
Radioactive Waste Disposal Regulatory Activities', in S.C. Slate, R. Kohout, and A. Suzuki, eds., 
'Proceedings of the 1989 Joint International Waste Management Conference. Vol. 2: High Level 
Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management' (New York: The American Society of Mechanical 
Engineering, 1989), 177-80.
122 Interview with Robert S. Dyer (Office of Radiation Programs, Chief of Environmental Studies 
Branch, U.S. EPA.), September 27, 1991, Washington, D.C. For recent concern in Massachusetts, see 
Dianne Dumanoski and Jeff McLaughlin Probe of Ocean Waste Site Urged', The Boston Globe, 
September 17, 1991. For recent concern in California, see 'Atomic Waste Reported Leaking in Ocean 
Sanctuary Off California', New York Times, May 7, 1990; TJS Sees Threat in Nuclear Dump', The Boston 
Globe, May 6, 1990; 'Radioactive Waste Threatens Sanctuary', The Washington Post, May 6, 1990. See 
also Katherine Bishop XJ.S. to Determine if Radioactive Waste in Pacific Presents Danger', New York 
Tunes, January 20, 1991.
123 Takao Kuramochi, first secretary, Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C. Interviewed August 30,
91.
international dumping regime, held in November 1991 124. A group of countries, let by 
Nauru and the Scandinavian states, suggested the inclusion of a ban on ocean dumping of 
radioactive wastes in a so-called amendment conference planned to take place in 1992 or 
1993 12s. But the consultative meeting wished to postpone the decision on such a 
conference until after the so-called Rio Conference, officially the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED), in June 1992. The proposal for an amendment 
conference will therefore be considered at the consultative meeting in fall 1992.
Summary
This chapter has described the establishment in 1983 of the global ban on radwaste disposal 
within the international dumping regime. Since then, for the first time since World War n, 
no radioactive materials have been ocean dumped. This ban has thus effectively terminated 
ocean dumping of low-level radioactive waste.
This significant policy development does not conform well to the models suggested 
by Realists, epistemic community theorists and complex interdependence theorists. 
Obviously, neither hegemonic leadership nor an international network of ecology-oriented 
marine scientists have caused the ban. Although the complex interdependence model stresses 
the importance of voting power, coalition-building and control over elite networks within 
international regimes, it cannot fully explain this policy development. As described in this 
chapter, the public, trade unions, international environmental interest groups and governments 
have effectively pressured large nuclear nations to cease ocean dumping. Chapter 8 will 
discuss the implications for our understanding of policy change within international 
environmental regimes and in particular emphasize the need to improve present
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124 The author attended the meeting as an observer.
135 The proposal for an amendment conference of the London Dumping Convention was made by 
Denmark, Norway, Nauru and Sweden. Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, and the Solomon Islands 
appeared in brackets on the proposal distributed to the consultative meeting, i.e. these countries were not 
yet official sponsors of the proposal.
understanding of the influence of international public opinion.
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CHAPTER 8
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EXPLAINING REGIME CHANGE: LESSONS FROM GLOBAL TERMINATION OF 
RADWASTE DISPOSAL
This chapter examines the three models of international regimes presented in Chapter 2, 
especially their predictions about regime change, in the light of the policy development 
described in the previous chapter \  Not surprisingly, the conclusion will be that none of 
the models are able to fully explain this policy development within the international dumping 
regime. Instead, this chapter will emphasize that social pressure on a global scale has caused 
the ban on radwaste disposal. This case thus inspires hope in those who believe that social 
pressure might beneficially be applied to solve international environmental problems. It will 
further be emphasized that international public opinion's denunciation of radwaste disposal 
is an essential element of this global social pressure. Thus, the global ban cannot be 
separated from a development, or change, in international public opinion on radwaste
1 In the international regimes literature, regime change refers to changes in principles and norms of 
regimes, while changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes. Thus, 
regime change is a fundamental, more dramatic change, while changes within regimes are less dramatic, 
supposedly happening more gradually. The change of policy on ocean dumping of low-level radioactive 
waste could therefore be considered a change within the international dumping regime: the moratorium 
on ocean dumping changed the previous rules governing this activity and the existing decision-making 
principle based on scientific and technical knowledge was changed to include broader social, economic, 
political and legal aspects. Although in accord with Krasner's definitions, characterizing the global ban 
on radwaste disposal as a change within the international dumping regime underplays that a substantia] 
change of policy took place in the period 1983-85. As described in the previous chapter, the change in 
the rules and decision-making principles was indeed so dramatic that some governments decided to ignore 
them and considered leaving the regime.
The conceptual problem whether this policy development should be considered a regime change 
or a change within the regime results from the rather imprecise definitions used by regime theorists. On 
the other hand, perhaps this case is unique in the sense that a change of the rules with respect to radwaste 
disposal was decided in direct opposition to the interests of powerful governments who therefore furiously 
resisted the change but then, because of domestic support, eventually had to accept the change. To 
improve on this conceptual problem, I will suggest that a regime change has taken place but that the 
regime has proved itself to be robust. For a brief definition of robustness, see Chap. 1, footnote 48. For 
the widely accepted definition of regime change and changes within regimes, see Stephan D. Krasner 
'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', 2-5.
disposal. The consequences for international regime theory are finally discussed and an 
entrepreneurial politics model, stressing mobilization of public opinion, the use of slogans, 
and determined policy entrepreneurs, is suggested as an alternative model of regime change.
Realism, epistemic communities, and complex interdependence
The three models of international cooperation examined in Chapter 2 made very different 
predictions about how international regimes, once they are constructed, are maintained and 
how and why they change. Realists expect the international dumping regime would be 
highly dependent on continued hegemonic leadership. Declining American leadership would, 
in their view, lead to regime collapse because states would follow their own individual 
interests.
As described in Chapter 7, however, a momentous international policy change with 
respect to radwaste disposal occurred despite the lack of support by the United States. 
Realists might argue that the lack of American leadership explains why the international 
dumping regime did not resolutely adopt the new international policy on radwaste disposal. 
Clearly, it is possible that American support of a change to the annexes could have 
influenced the position taken by other pro-dumping governments, and that a change to the 
annexes perhaps would have been supported by a sufficient number of governments. 
Moreover, if the United States had determinedly supported the ban, it might, as it has done 
in similar international environmental conflicts, have used sanctions of various sorts to 
pressure pro-dumping governments to follow suit2.
In this case, however, that lack of American leadership did not lead to non­
cooperation and regime collapse. From the point of view of this theory, the global 
termination of radwaste disposal is completely unexpected since nearly all the world's
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2 In the case of drift net fishing, for example, the United States has backed pressure with threats of 
banning import of Japanese marine products, perhaps including pearls, a major import product. Steven 
R. Weisman 'Japan Yields to U.S. on Drift Net Fishing: Government, Citing Pressure, Says It Will Halt 
Practice in North Pacific', International Herald Tribune, November 27, 1991.
economic and military superpowers opposed the ban. This case thus does not support the 
Realist claim that powerful states can always ignore international regimes and even 
restructure regimes if they should wish to do so. The reason why this did not happen is, as 
described in Chapter 7, that powerful states lacked the necessary domestic support to rule, 
or alternatively ignore, the international dumping regime on the issue of radwaste disposal. 
Because Realists ignore the domestic level they cannot tell which foreign environmental 
policies governments can pursue within international environmental regimes.
Rationalistic Realists suggest a more benign version of the hegemonic stability theory. 
They stress that declining hegemonic support would not necessarily result in immediate 
regime collapse. By facilitating international cooperation -  providing information, 
lengthening 'the shadow of the future', and facilitating linkages among issues -  international 
regimes might, this group of scholars claim, even persist beyond hegemonic support. But 
Rationalistic Realists would not expect policy development to happen as it did. Chapter 7 
showed that small states used their control over the forum of an international regime to 
establish international rules which large pro-dumping states, due to development of domestic 
policies and protests against radwaste disposal, could not go against.
It follows from Realism's assumption of anarchy in the international system, meaning 
no central authority exists above states, that compliance with and monitoring of international 
agreements is left to the states themselves, i.e. reliance on self-enforcement. But this was 
clearly not the case. Greenpeace patrolled the oceans on the look-out for dumper ships and, 
in the case of Britain, successfully forged an alliance with domestic actors in order to 
pressure a recalcitrant government to comply with international rules. The British seamen, 
conversely, had 'regime interests' and urged the British government to comply with the 
rulings of the international dumping regime. Thus Greenpeace and other representatives of 
the international environmental community might under some circumstances compensate for 
the lack of an international authority to perform monitoring and enforce compliance with 
international environmental regimes 3.
3 According to several interviewees, it is relatively easy to detect ships violating the moratorium on 
radwaste disposal. The release of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which deplete the ozone layer, from 
multiple sources in wide use into the atmosphere is for obvious reasons intrinsically more complex to
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Furthermore, and very much in line with the thinking of United Nations experts 
involved in the regime-building process, the international dumping regime served as a global 
institution before which private citizen groups as well as governments could bring their 
protests concerning perceived hazardous dumping practices entailing transboundary risks 4. 
By providing a permanent international forum where the issue could be addressed, the 
regime served as the global focal point for environmental groups and governments protesting 
against radwaste disposal and in this way dramatically increased the international visibility 
of the issue. Furthermore, by transforming protests against radwaste disposal into a 
moratorium the regime had, as is further illustrated below, a significant political-normative 
impact which, in a dialectic way, further strengthened the opposition against radwaste 
disposal. Governments, especially the United States, recognized the importance of peer 
pressure and public opinion when they equipped the regime with a compliance mechanism 
in 1972. They agreed that an amendment of the annexes decided by two-thirds of those 
members present at a consultative meeting would apply to all members except those who 
made an official declaration rejecting it within 100 days after the decision had been taken 
5. The reason for this was, in the words of one U.S. negotiator, that 'it was felt that the
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monitor. Greenpeace has for example also served as 'unofficial monitor* in the case of the Convention 
on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities. See David Laws The Antarctic Minerals 
Regime Negotiations', in Lawrence E. Susskind, Esther Siskind, and J. William Breslin, eds., Nine Case 
Studies in International Environmental Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Harvard Public Disputes 
Program, 1990), 139.
4 Oscar Schachter and Daniel Serwer wrote in their UNITAR report concerned with marine pollution: 
’Action in the area of marine dumping need not, however, come only through the initiative of international 
organizations and governments. In a number of countries, action on pollution problems of the 'dangerous 
practices' type has been stimulated largely through the initiatives of private citizens and concerned 
organizations who have taken pollution problems to court. The effectiveness of such private actions varies 
with the situation, but they must be considered an important mode of action where governments which 
are responsible for controlling pollution are participants in practices which may cause pollution. An 
international mechanism for handling complaints and grievances from private groups as well as 
governments might contribute to the control not only of marine dumping of wastes but to the control of 
other dangerous practices as well. Moreover, such a mechanism might be one form in which problems 
of international concern could be adequately discussed from both the technical and legal points of view'. 
'Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies', 110. Sec also Chap. 5, footnote 12.
5 The United States delegation had suggested these rules for changes in the annexes. Archival 
material (j.no 82, B.89. December 6, 1972), 18. For the rules, see Appendix A, article 15 (2).
procedure adopted would be useful, in that it requires a positive act of refusal, theoretically 
made more difficult by publicity and peer pressure to accept the proposed amendment1 6. 
But publicity backfired in the radwaste disposal controversy. In summary, hegemonic 
leadership is eroded when lacking domestic support, when forcefully challenged by a 
transnational nongovernmental coalition, and when environmental regimes focus public 
attention on contested environmental policies.
Epistemic community theorists' view of international policy development differs 
markedly from the Realist view. They predict that the strength of the international dumping 
regime would vary with an ecological epistemic community's influence on domestic policy­
making. Countries with strong representation of the ecological epistemic community would 
be the most active supporters of international commitments and the most successful in 
national compliance. Countries with weak representation of the ecological epistemic 
community would be less supportive of international commitments and would adopt weaker 
domestic ocean dumping controls.
The ban on radwaste disposal confirms that essential aspects of international 
environmental politics are ignored by the epistemic community model. Similar to the 
discussion in Chapter 6, a significant difference between the case of ocean dumping of low- 
level radioactive waste and the cases examined by epistemic community theorists -  
protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution, protection of the ozone layer, and 
protection of whales -  concerns scientists' perception of the risk involved in radwaste 
disposal vis-à-vis the public's risk perception7. In the case of radwaste disposal, modelling 
and studies convinced scientists that the risk involved was very low8. As Chapter 7 quoted,
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6 Terry L. Leitzell The Ocean Dumping Convention -  A Hopeful Beginning', 513.
0
7 International regulation of CFCs has been analyzed from an epistemic community perspective in 
Peter M. Haas 'Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric 
Ozone', International Organization (Winter 1992), 187-224.
8 Divergence between the view of experts and that of the public and policy-makers is by no means 
restricted to the case of radwaste disposal. For examples, see several of the contributions in Daedalus 119 
(Fall 1990) Special Issue Risk. See also Edith Efron, The Apocalyptics. For some of the problems of 
using science to legitimize environmental regulation, see Sheila S. Jasanoff 'Contested Boundaries in 
Policy-Relevant Sciences', Social Studies of Science, May 1987, 1-51.
the expert group advising the international dumping regime concluded that 'the calculations 
show that any risk to individuals from the use of the [Atlantic] dump site is very low1 9. 
Thus the scientific community was, and still is, convinced that the risk from past dumping 
was 'exceedingly small' 10. Therefore it is not simply the case that this international policy 
is based on rather limited scientific knowledge; instead it largely ignores expert opinion u. 
Experts were therefore on the wrong side, so to speak, of the international environmental 
movement and public opinion in this case but were on the right side in those cases epistemic 
community theorists have examined. Although their model claims the opposite, policy 
development may therefore primarily, or to considerable extent, be attributed to public 
opinion and the international environmental movement and much less to expert opinion in 
those cases 12. It is therefore necessary that this model incorporates public opinion or, even
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9 IMO. Expanded Panel on the Review of Scientific and Technical Considerations Relevant to the 
Proposal for the Amendment of the Annexes to the London Dumping Convention Related to the Dumping 
of Radioactive Wastes. Introduction of Report Prepared by the Panel of Experts. Note by the 
Secretariat\ 136.
10 See Chap. 9, footnote 69.
11 Relevant to the policy development of the radwaste disposal issue within the international dumping 
regime, a recent growing tendency in U.S courts has been noted to pass decision on questions concerning 
health impacts of substances, chemicals and various kinds of rays which scientists only can detect by 
using the most advanced measurement techniques but seldom can assure will cause no risk whatsoever. 
It is concluded, among other things, that the effect has been to downgrade the importance of professional 
standards, peer review -  the industry norms, so to speak, of the scientific community. Authority has thus 
been taken away from scientific and professional communities, and given instead to individual scientists 
and professionals. Thus, science's traditional demands for replication, reinforcement, and consensus within 
the scientific community have gradually come to be ignored in court. Instead, litigation amplifies the 
poles and gives prominence to the eccentric. It downgrades science, medicine, engineering as professional 
disciplines. Their consensus standards count for less and less'. It is also stressed that too many resources 
are spent on such issues: 'Sooner or later courts, like other institutions, must find ways to move beyond 
the trivia] or imaginary problems to more serious things'. Peter W. Huber 'Pathological Science in Court', 
Dcedalus 119 (Fall 1990) Risk (Special issue), 103 and 115.
12 Note the conclusion of an epistemic community-oriented case study in international regulation of 
commercial whaling: Tet the epistemic community of conservation-minded cetologists only briefly 
enjoyed predominant influence over policy. Most of the time, the influence of cetologists was outweighed 
by that of other groups, the industry managers until the mid-1960s and the environmentalists after the 
mid-1970s'. M.J. Peterson 'Whaling, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management 
of Whaling', International Organization 46 (1992), 182.
better, that epistemic community theorists develop a theory of domestic politics 13. Judging 
from this case, the ecological epistemic community model tends to exaggerate the influence 
of experts on policy generally, while it minimizes the influence of public opinion and 
environmental NGOs 14.
The epistemic community model's contribution to our understanding of international 
cooperation is its emphasis on the role of knowledge and ideas both when the content of a 
policy is defined and when it changes. Ironically, however, by stressing so-called theoretical 
knowledge, the model ignores the work of those social theorists who have inspired epistemic 
community theorists 15. According to two social and cultural theorists: 'If the integration 
of an institutional order can be understood only in terms of the 'knowledge' that its members 
have of it, it follows that the analysis of such 'knowledge' will be essential for an analysis 
of the institutional order in question. It is important to stress that this does not exclusively 
or even primarily involve a preoccupation with complex theoretical systems serving as 
legitimations for the institutional order. Theories have also to be taken into account, of 
course. But theoretical knowledge is only a small and by no means the most important part 
of what passes for knowledge in a society. Theoretically sophisticated legitimations appear 
at particular moments of an institutional history. The primary knowledge about institutional 
order is knowledge on the pretheoretical level. It is the sum total of 'what everybody knows' 
about a social world, an assemblage of maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, 
values and beliefs, myths, and so forth' I6. Therefore, the epistemic community model 
should broaden its view of knowledge when analyzing knowledge creation, communication 
and consensus formation. Presently, the model gives too much attention to policy-making
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u For similar criticism, see Helen Milner 'International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations', 489.
14 The influence of public opinion, also in the case of the Mediterranean, has been noted by others. 
See R.B. Clark The Mediterranean, the Media, and the Public Interest', 369-7. See also Baruch Boxer 
'Mediterranean Pollution: Problem and Response' Ocean Development and International Law 10 (April
1982), 318-19.
15 See Peter Haas 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internationa] Policy Coordination', 20-26.
16 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction o f Reality (Garden City: 
Doubleday Anchor, 1967), 65.
within national and international bureaucracies 17.
The complex interdependence model predicts that the international dumping regime 
largely would be dependent on continued legitimacy, while powerful states would have no 
means for forcing regime decisions upon other states. This model predicts that less powerful 
states through transnational coalition-formation and control of elite networks to some extent 
might use the international dumping regime to their advantage. However, in case the regime 
becomes too adverse to the interests of major powerful states, the model claims, they would 
destroy the regime.
The complex interdependence model best explains the development within the 
international dumping regime. Military force is inapplicable, small states have successfully 
used coalition-building to challenge big states. Issue-specific voting rules and decision­
making principles also strengthen the influence of small states, and transnational actors are 
important players. But the model does not predict that a NGO, in this case an international 
pressure group, would forge a coalition with domestic interest groups and in this way 
effectively pressure a government to comply with international regulations. Similar to the 
Realist and the epistemic community model, the complex interdependence model ignores 
domestic politics.
Keohane and Nye suggest, as discussed in Chapter 2, that governments might chose 
not to destroy a regime in some cases since 'the costs of destroying a regime will be high 
when well-integrated elite networks exist on many levels among countries' 18. This claim 
poses some difficulties since it is unclear what precisely should be understood by 'well- 
integrated elite networks on many levels among countries'. This case shows that 
governments which ignore international environmental protection rules might be 'pilloried'
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17 Reflective scholar Ernst B. Haas might point out that this criticism is not relevant to the problem 
he analyses in his recent book: “the change in the definition of the problem to be solved by a given 
[international] organization'. Haas, When Knowledge is Power, 3.
11 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 57.
at home 19. While scholars have mostly paid attention to the costs non-cooperative 
governments suffer abroad, for example loss of reputation for cooperation, the domestic costs 
of non-cooperation, in the form of protests against and even boycotts of policy supported 
by government, are in this case significantly higher 20.
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that the annual meeting of the international dumping 
regime agreed in 1984, i.e. one year after the moratorium on radwaste disposal was 
introduced, that the international dumping regime was 'the appropriate forum' to examine the 
issue of seabed emplacement of high-level radioactive waste. In 1985, moreover, the 
expanded panel of experts concluded that 'present and any future dumping can only take 
place within the still-developing framework of international regulations'. As described in 
Chapter 7, however, the United Kingdom and the United States threatened in 1985 to 
abandon the regime despite the decisions to cooperate made earlier. It is not clear whether 
these threats were sincere. If they were, it throws doubt on the claim that governments will 
choose not to destroy regimes that are adverse to their interests 'when well-integrated elite 
networks exist on many levels among countries'. Instead, if the threats were only empty 
ones, nothing can be concluded. Large nuclear nations, however, would not be paying 
significant costs in case the international dumping regime was destroyed. Most probably, 
governments cooperating in nuclear waste management would simply continue to cooperate 
within the NEA/OECD and the IAEA, both forums being much more homogeneous in terms 
of membership and interests than the international dumping regime. But the domestic costs 
of destroying a regime might, as mentioned, outweigh the benefits.
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19 Depending on the intensity of domestic pressure, the following generalization therefore seems valid. 
'As green issues become international, it will become harder for any country to reconcile greenery and 
sovereignty. There will be international pressure for agreements to reduce the emission of 'greenhouse' 
gases, to stop polluting the sea, to transfer cash and technology to the third world and Eastern Europe to 
help them clean up. Governments that are reluctant to sign will be pilloried at home'. The Greening of 
British Politics', The Economist, March 3, 1990.
20 Robert Keohane, for example, writes: 'As the Prisoners' Dilemma example suggests, social pressure, 
exercised through linkages among issues, provides the most compelling set of reasons for governments 
to comply with their commitments. That is, egoistic governments may comply with rules because if they 
fail to do so, other governments will observe their behavior, evaluate it negatively, and perhaps take 
retaliatory action'. After Hegemony, 103.
Judith Spiller and Cynthia Hayden have suggested that a declining trust in the ability 
of science to make predictions about the state of the environment and human health 
combined with an increase in member countries opposed to radwaste disposal caused the ban 
on radwaste disposal 21. While this explanation is somewhat satisfactory it overlooks that 
the London Dumping Convention determined the way the radwaste disposal conflict played 
out within the international dumping regime. Since a science-based decision-making 
principle was laid down in the London Dumping Convention, governments opposing 
radwaste disposal had no other choice than to stress scientific uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge when they wished to halt radwaste disposal. Also, most governments responded 
to public concerns about ocean dumping of radioactive waste and simply wanted to protect 
their fishing and environmental interests against the risk of radiation, however small. As a 
British regulator noted recently: '1 think everybody who objects to sea dumping accepts that 
the risks that are present look as if they are very low, and it is not really an argument on that 
basis at all. It is simply that, for example, people who get their living from the sea do not 
like anything put into the sea, they see it as a threat to their livelihood, and it becomes much 
more that kind of argument than anything at all to do with radiation' 22. Thus, although 
scientific uncertainty recently moved to the center of this international controversy, an 
international trend towards elimination of perceived threats to the health of the ocean rather 
than 'a new awareness of uncertainty's role in predictions about the environmental and human 
health' was the reason why this happened 23. Neither do Spiller and Hayden explain why 
the pro-dumping governments apparently were unaware of such uncertainty.
Surprisingly enough, Spiller and Hayden ignore that public and governmental protests 
against ocean dumping of radioactive materials took place several years prior to the 
construction of the international dumping regime, the first regime to establish international
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21 Judith Spiller and Cynthia Hayden 'Radwaste at Sea: A New Era of Polarization or a New Basis 
for Consensus', 345-66.
22 M.D. Hill, Head, Assessments Department, U.K. National Radiological Protection Board, witness 
quoted in U.K. House of Lords Nineteenth Report, 1987-88, 34.
23 Judith Spiller and Cynthia Hayden 'Radwaste at Sea: A New Era of Polarization or a New Basis 
for Consensus', 349.
policy. As described in Chapters 1 and 4, protests had in 1960 obstructed French plans to 
dump radioactive waste in the Mediterranean Sea. The same year, after public uproar, the 
AEC stopped issuing licenses for sea disposal of radioactive wastes. International concerns 
persisted after the 1958 United Nations Law of the Sea Conference's failed attempt to agree 
on a common policy. 'Internationally', said a 1964 report sponsored by the AEC, 'there is 
considerable concern about utilizing the sea for the disposition of radioactive-waste 
materials' 7A.
However Spiller and Hayden correctly imply that the issue of scientific uncertainty 
did not loom large in the early 1970s. A belief that science could provide irrefutable, 
objective answers to questions about environmental damage prevailed at that time. The 
discovery of PCB, for example, raised expectations that measurement techniques existed that 
were able to accurately detect minute concentrations of pollutants 25. United Nations 
officials involved in the regime-building phase and the preparations for the Stockholm 
Conference similarly hoped that: 'International environment protection on a wider scale may 
and should indeed be a highly technical matter once it has cleared some of its present 
political-emotional hurdles' 26. Chapter 7 showed that reliance on science to provide 
unambiguous scientific evidence of environmental damage has turned out to be much more 
difficult than the public and advocates of regulation imagined 27.
Since marine scientists in the early 1970s assumed that the oceans have a capacity 
to safely assimilate certain wastes, although the precise nature was not known, one of the
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24 Conrad P. Straub, Lmv-Level Radioactive Wastes, 99.
25 See Sören Jensen The PCB Story,' AMBIO 1 (August 1972), 123-31.
26 Paolo Contini and Peter H. Sand 'Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: International; 
Ecostandards', 56.
27 Similar observation made in Harold K. Jacobson and David A. Kay 'Conclusions and Policy', in 
Kay and Jacobson, eds., Environmental Protection: The International Dimension, 310-11. More 
generally, see Giandomenico Majone 'Process and Outcome in Regulatory Decision-Making', American 
Behavioral Scientist 22 (1979), 561-83; see also Giandomenico Majone 'Science and Trans-Science in 
Standard Setting', Science, Technology and Human Values 9 (1984), 15-22. See also Sheila S. Jasanoff 
'Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science'.
preambles of the London Dumping Convention refers to this capacity 28. But as Chapter 
5 showed, this did not imply that scientific knowledge about this capacity should guide 
policy-making 79. If future cooperation should have a scientific foundation, it was just a 
matter of course that the convention assumed the existence of such an assimilative capacity 
30. Other concerns also played a role. Governments that worried about the economic costs 
of pollution control and lack of sufficient disposal alternatives supported that the convention 
made a reference to the concept of assimilative capacity. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce, for example, strongly supported that the convention recognized the existence of 
the assimilative capacity of the ocean 31. It should also be noted that since the developed 
countries, especially the United States, possessed most of the world's marine science 
expertise, science-based decision-making was in their interest 32.
It is evident from the test of the Realist, the epistemic community, and the complex 
interdependence models of regime change that they do not explain the policy change with 
respect to radwaste disposal. Clearly, policy change was not caused by changes in relative 
power capabilities among states, or an international network of ecology-oriented marine 
scientists persuading or pressuring policy makers. Neither was it caused by small states' 
control of policy-making within an international organization. Instead, any explanation of 
the observed regime change should reflect that public concern for the health of the marine
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28 See Appendix A.
29 Dolores Maria Wesson claims that the international dumping regime is 'unequivocally founded on 
the concept of assimilative capacity. It implicitly recognizes the value of this capacity as a natural 
resource in need of protection'. Science and Policy in International Ocean Regimes: MARPOL 73/78, 
Annexes II and III, and the London Dumping Convention, 63.
30 Ole Vagn Olsen, Danish oceanographer and participant in the negotiations on the international 
dumping regime. Interviewed March 19, 1992, Charlottenlund, Denmark.
31 Robert J. McManus, U.S. delegate to the negotiations. Interviewed August 29, 1991, Washington, 
D.C.
32 Within GESAMP (the UN-appointed Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine 
Pollution), the United States supplied twenty-three percent of GESAMP members, and 30 percent of 
members of GESAMP working groups, while EEC states supplied thirty-three percent of GESAMP 
members, and thirty percent of the members of GESAMP working groups in the period 1969-1981. V. 
Pravdic 'GESAMP: The First Dozen Years', 21-25.
environment has been increasing since the 1970s. This concern, which spread from the 
United States and parts of Western Europe to the rest of the world, is increasingly shared 
by developing countries, especially those dependent on the ocean for their livelihood 33.
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Regime change and international public opinion
International public opinion is one of the most effective political resources available to those 
seeking to shape and influence international environmental policy. Chapter 4 described how 
U.S. Senators used Congressional hearings to mobilize international public opinion and focus 
the attention of politicians on the need for international cooperation on protection of the 
oceans against pollution. Chapter 5 described how the Stockholm secretariat, in the 
secretariat's own words, through a 'promotion campaign1 involving, among other things, 
world mass media and the Stockholm Conference, sought to 'sell the product’ environmental 
protection policies to the citizenries and governments of the world 34. Similarly,
33 For development of public concern about the marine environment, see Michael Waldichuk 'An 
International Perspective on Global Marine Pollution' in Virginia K. Tippie and Dana R. Kester, eds., 
Impact o f Marine Pollution on Society (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 37-75.
34 The first global modeling exercise titled The Limits to Growth1 by Dennis L. Meadows and others 
-  the book that introduced supposedly scientific, computer-based predictions of global ecological collapse 
to the public -  offers another example of the role of the mass media in communicating new ideas. The 
highly respected journal Science wrote: 'Fully cognizant that, to borrow from a press release, an 
'intellectual bombshell' had fallen into its lap, to say nothing of a potential best-seller, Potomac Associates 
[a Washington, D.C., think tank which acquired the rights to The Limits to Growth’] president William 
Watts passed a copy of it [Hie Limits to Growth'] along to Benjamin H. Read, director of the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. Read quickly agreed to organize a symposium 
on the book ...Then came the publicity. To spread the word, Potomac Associates hired Calvin Kytle 
Associates, an energetic local public relations firm. Kytle churned out some zingy press releases and 
background material, embargoed it all for Sunday 27 February, and promptly struck a PR man's idea of 
gold. The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and others picked up the story and 
splashed it in their Sunday editions. Most reported some criticism of the Meadows' work, but not all did. 
Later in the week for instance, syndicated columnist Claire Sterling wrote from Rome that the study, soon 
to be available to the eyes of Everyman, contained 'shattering insights' into catastrophe waiting in the 
wings, no question about it. A flood of phone calls Monday morning made it plain to the Woodrow 
Wilson people that their sedate invitation-only affair was now an Event of major proportions. After all, 
who could turn away ambassadors, industrialists, high government officials, congressmen, and a flock of 
distinguished scientists practically pounding on the door?1. The Limits to Growth: Hard Sell for a
mobilization of international public opinion is essential for international environmental 
pressure groups like Greenpeace, i.e. those with a more activist bent. 'We want to draw 
attention to something', explained a founder and chairman of Greenpeace in 1984. 'We use 
action and, once there's attention, we move into lobbying'3S. Characteristically, movement 
opponents will often claim, maybe correctly, that the movement leaders act as mobilizers 
raising concerns. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the nuclear industry saw the Greenpeace 
campaign as an attempt to mobilize public opinion. Similarly, an advocate of storage of 
nuclear waste in the Pacific Basin charged that Jackson Davis, the American scientific 
advisor to Nauru and Kiribati, 'has been successful in raising [Pacific] regional concerns 
about the proposed operations' 36.
The Greenpeace campaign against dumping in the North Atlantic Ocean focused 
public attention on tin activity that previously had gone rather unnoticed. Though never 
conducted in secrecy, dumping had until then never attracted sustained attention. In 1959, 
after more than a decade of dumping of radioactive waste about twelve miles off Boston's 
coast and thirty miles northwest of Cape Cod's tip, 'neither the people of Boston nor of Cape 
Cod knew anything, officially, of this' 37. From the outset of Greenpeace's campaign, 
dumping of radioactive waste in the Atlantic Ocean was seen as a dangerous activity. For 
example, although British officials in 1978 rejected Greenpeace's claim that high-level 
radioactive waste was dumped in the Atlantic Ocean, The Guardian headlined its article 
"Dangerous' waste dumped'
Similar to American Senators and the Stockholm secretariat, Greenpeace intended to
Computer View of Doomsday', Science 175 (10 Marts 1972), 1089-90.
35 Jo Thomas 'Greenpeace Aims at Headlines First', International Herald Tribune, September 4, 1984,
2.
36 Daniel P. Finn 'Nuclear Waste Management Activities in the Pacific Basin and Regional 
Cooperation on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle', 222.
37 Grace DesChamps Hot Dumping Off Boston: Atomic-Waste Case No. II', The Nation, September 
1959, 144. See also E.J. Kahn, Jr. 'Our Far-Flung Correspondents: The Government and the People', The 
New Yorker, October 15, 1960, 106.
38 Michael Morris "Dangerous1 Waste Dumped', The Guardian, July 25, 1978.
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influence public opinion in several countries simultaneously. This strategy, in the words of 
one of its leading members, stems from 'a recognition that the traditional ways of changing 
things don't work. You won't end whaling just by education or by research or by lobbying 
or by direct action or by scientific proof. You have to think globally and combine all of 
them. That's what Greenpeace is about' 39. While the Greenpeace campaign initially 
attracted attention only in Britain, it soon attracted international attention. Intended or not, 
the emotional appeal of the campaign was significantly strengthened when waste drums hit 
Greenpeace dinghies and protestors were knocked overboard. In 1982, as quoted already, 
'the issue of the annual dump was developed into an international scandal' by Greenpeace
40
In this atmosphere of changing public opinion, governments increasingly felt 
pressured to cancel dumping, as it first happened in the Netherlands in 1982. As illustrated 
by a leading article appearing in The Times on the eve of that year's consultative meeting, 
public opinion in Britain clearly disapproved continuing radwaste disposal in 1983: 'In the 
long run, sea dumping is not a desirable practice. It is in principle a bad idea to put things 
that may be dangerous where you cannot keep an eye on them. Too little is known of the 
sea bed, underwater currents and the food-chains of marine life for the sea to be suitable for 
use as an oubliette on an indefinitely expanding scale' 41. Radwaste disposal was by the 
public seen as a dangerous activity and scientific knowledge was perceived as being too 
uncertain to guide policy.
As described in Chapter 7, the Greenpeace campaign triggered Spanish protests 
against dumping. In 1982, Spanish trawlers with politicians on board joined the Greenpeace 
ship at the dumping site. The next year, the Spanish government responded to the protests 
against the dumping. While the Greenpeace campaign increased the public pressure on the
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39 Alan Rusbridger 'Where Greenpeace Draws up its Blueprint for Battle’, The Guardian, September 
25, 1985.
40 Fred Pearce, Green Warriors. The People and the Politics Behind the Environmental Revolution,
54.
41 Deep-Sea Dumping', The Times, February 16, 1983.
British government to halt the dumping, it increased the public pressure on the Spanish 
government to protest against the dumping 42. Although Spain has not yet developed 
permanent land-based disposal facilities, the Spanish government has ever since been leading 
the European opposition against radwaste disposal 43.
While British seamen were primarily concerned over the risks of handling nuclear 
waste -  in 1984, a French cargo vessel carrying nuclear waste sank in the British Channel -  
their protests and policy advocacy should also be understood in the context of changing 
international public opinion 44. Supporters and opponents alike thus were in agreement that 
the 1980s' protests against dumping should properly be seen as manifestations of 
international public opinion. 'Public opinion can find expression in policy not only through 
appeals to government, but also through direct intervention', said a commentary in Nuclear 
Engineering International, 'The seamen can be condemned for taking the law into their own 
hands, but their action is only a symptom of an underlying public concern which is apparent 
world-wide and which stochastic assurances of safety have done little to assuage' 4S. 
Similarly, the pro-environment journal AMBIO, in almost identical words, observed: 'Even 
though the moratorium was legally non-binding, trade unions in Britain and throughout the 
world heeded the message of international opinion'46. According to the British press, the 
Spanish protests and demonstrations against the dumping planned for the summer 1983 had
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42 As mentioned earlier, few scholars of international regimes have attributed any importance to the 
impact of public opinion on foreign policy. See, however, Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The International 
Imperatives o f Technology: Technological Development and the International System, 176.
43 Against this historical background, we can understand that the Spanish government protests against 
Humping at sea although it has not solved its disposal problem on land. For general discussion of such 
'policy paradoxes', see Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason' (Harper Collins, 1988). 
For the most recent proposals by Spain to ban radwaste disposal, see Chap. 9, footnote 85.
44 Ursula Wassennann Uncontrolled Transport of Nuclear Materials', Journal o f World Trade Law 
19 (1985),178-81.
45 Andrew Cruickshank 'Dumping in Deep WaterT, Nuclear Engineering International 28 (September
1983), 13-14.
44 James B. Branch The Waste Bin: Nuclear Waste Dumping and Storage in the Pacific', 330.
'strong British and international support' 47. And, as the Secretary General of the British 
seamen explained to the readers of The Times, the seamen had international, if not global, 
support on their side: The NUS has been inundated with messages of support from 
individuals and organizations around the world, including Jacques Cousteau, the mayors of 
towns and cities along the French and Spanish Atlantic seaboard, scientific groups, 
environmentalists and seafarers' unions. Given the attitude of our Government towards trade 
unionism, it is ironic that it has taken a successful act of defiance against Government policy 
by three unions to protect Britain's good name in the international maritime community' 48. 
With the 1983 moratorium resolution signaling the turning point, international public opinion 
no longer accepted ocean dumping of radioactive materials. In the eyes of the public, the 
previous policy had lost its legitimacy.
Public policy's loss of legitimacy resulted in widespread protests when the British 
government intended to dump despite the moratorium. Previous policy was not changed 
simply because public opinion condemned it. British 'illegitimate' plans to dump were 
cancelled when boycotted by trade unions which Greenpeace had involved in the conflict. 
However, after the moratorium, as the Secretary General of the British seamen pointed out, 
it was now the British government who was the protestor.
Conclusion
The explanation of regime change suggested here can be summarized in the following way. 
First, public opinion matters. Second, policy advocates try to influence public opinion in 
order to shape the principles and values on which policy is based. Third, Greenpeace's 
campaign against dumping in the Atlantic Ocean significantly influenced international public 
opinion. Fourth, after initial resistance to regime change, the international dumping regime 
was adjusted in line with international public opinion. This explanation suggests that change
47 'Protest at Nuclear Waste Plan', The Guardian, July 13, 1983.
** Jim Slater 'Radioactive Waste Dumping at Sea', letter to The Tunes, August 4, 1983.
195
of international public opinion was the primary cause of policy change. While evidently a 
complex phenomenon, an explanation of why international public opinion changed is also 
given above. Not surprisingly, the implications for understanding regime change are far- 
reaching.
As discussed already, Realists claim that international cooperation necessarily is 
limited and depends on hegemonic leadership. But Chapter 7 showed that a strong, globally 
shared idea or public concern evidently makes international cooperation more likely also 
when the hegemon opposes cooperation. Landlocked states excluded, states share an interest 
in 'radiation-free1 oceans 49. As discussed in Chapter 6, Realists ignore that new ideas may 
influence how states define their interests in ways that enhance cooperation. Realists would 
doubt that a change of international public opinion, which governments of powerful states 
ignored, can have an essential impact on an international regime and international policy 
development. Governments were clearly not motivated by concern for protecting themselves 
as sovereign political entities, or a need to maximize power or maintain economic growth 
when they adopted the moratorium on radwaste disposal. Realists therefore cannot explain 
the international policy development with respect to radwaste disposal in the 1980s.
This significant weakness of Realism was discussed earlier in Chapter 6. It is 
moreover evident that Rationalistic Realism leaves out a good part of what regimes and 
cooperation are about by focusing on self-interest and ignoring common interest. For 
Rationalistic Realists, regimes coordinate interactions among states pursuing their self- 
interest. Cooperation does not, in their understanding, imply that states may share a common 
goal although others stress that cooperation is directed towards a common goal 50. Oddly 
enough, Keohane's widely accepted definition of cooperation instead stresses voluntarism and
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491 write 'radiation-free' oceans since several radionuclides (e.g. potassium-40 and uranium) naturally 
exist in the oceans. I thank Asker Aarkrog for pointing this out to me. See also Chap. 1, footnote 10.
30 According to Robert A. Nisbet: 'Cooperation is joint or collaborative behavior that is directed 
toward some goal and in which there is common interest or hope of reward'. 'Cooperation' in David L. 
Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Library of Congress, 1968), vol. 3, 385.
gains: states cooperate because it provides them with individual gains or rewards 51. In 
short, regimes define the rules of the game, but states individually define why they play the 
game.
The conflict in 1983-85 would have been avoided had pro-dumping governments 
responded to public protests and cancelled future radwaste dumping. This happened 
domestically in the United States, but American delegations did not advocate domestic policy 
at the meetings of the international dumping regime. The British and Japanese governments 
refused to change domestic policy in response to domestic and international protests. But 
had these governments instead responded to public protests, no international conflict would 
have occurred. Far from an act motivated by self-interest worldwide concern over radwaste 
disposal would have resulted in permanent termination of this practice. But because pro­
dumping governments did not change their policy -  and still refuse to do so -  international 
conflict erupted on this issue. The weakness of Keohane's definition of cooperation becomes 
obvious in the light of this policy development. Since it emphasizes self-interest, it ignores 
that a policy widely supported by the public in many countries may become international 
policy and that governments may have to adjust their policy in accordance with international 
policy. Significantly, Rationalistic Realism has not demonstrated why the concept of 
cooperation should exclude the possibility that states might have common interest although 
self-interest plays the dominant role in theories of international politics, especially in 
Realism and Rationalistic Realism 52.
Especially the policy development in 1983-85 shows that international regimes and
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51 According to Keohane: 'intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually 
followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization o f their own objectives, 
as the result o f a process of policy coordination'. After Hegemony, 51-52. (Emphasis in the original). 
See also Chap.l, footnote 3. For a recent discussion of this definition, see Helen Milner 'International 
Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', 467-68.
52 Keohane, for example, gives only little attention to this question: Harmony is rare in world politics. 
Rousseau sought to account for this rarity when he declared that even two countries guided by the General 
Will [Rousseau's phrase for public opinion] in their internal affairs would come into conflict if they had 
extensive contact with one another, since the General Will o f each would not be general for both. Each 
would have a partial, self-interested perspective on their mutual interactions'. After Hegemony, 52. 
(Emphasis added).
cooperation should not be confused. Although these two concepts often are used as 
synonyms, this policy development illustrates that an international regime can play an 
important role in pressuring governments to cooperate 53. Two such ways were pointed out 
earlier in this chapter: first, as an international forum, environmental regimes enhance the 
public visibility of contested environmental policies; second, by adopting resolutions, 
principles and similar, they build legal and regulatory machinery with de facto significance 
even when resolutions and principles are not agreed upon unanimously. And, third, 
environmental regimes establish internationally agreed upon norms and standards for 
behavior against which governments are evaluated by other governments and the public. But 
perhaps international regimes and cooperation will not be confused after all since the concept 
of international regimes, against the intentions of those using the concept, conveys the image 
of a rather permanent international arrangement imposing uniform rules and policies on 
governments, an image that conforms well with the general meaning and use of the term 
regime 54.
The epistemic community model's emphasis on the role of knowledge and perception 
when states identify their interests is a substantial contribution to our understanding of 
international cooperation. This body of literature stresses that knowledge and perception 
varies over time with consequence for perception of the 'goods' provided through 
international cooperation. But, as it has been noted: 'In fact, much of the politics of 
controversial policy issues is about the definition of the 'good' S5. James Q. Wilson 
similarly points out that 'much, if not most, of politics consists of efforts to change wants 
by arguments, persuasion, threats, bluffs, and education. What people want -  or believe they
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53 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons make this distinction without discussing the possibility that 
regimes might pressure governments to adjust their policies to the preferences of other governments. See 
Theories of International Regimes,' 495.
54 See Susan Strange: 'Cave! hie dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis', 344. See also James N. 
Rosenau 'Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics', 880.
55 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith 'Alternative Theories of the Policy Process: Reflections on Research 
Strategy for the Study of Nuclear Waste Policy', P.S Political Science and Politics, 14 (June 1991), 159.
want -  is the essence of politics' 56.
This study demonstrates that scientists do not necessarily influence the public's 
perception of the good, even in the case of science-intensive policies such as environmental 
protection. As a Greenpeace member has explained by pointing to whaling, another case 
where the organization has been successful, scientific arguments alone seldom have strong 
mobilizing effect 57: The scientific debate about whether whales really are in danger of 
extinction is not one we want to get reduced to1, says he. The general public is not going 
to understand the science of ecology, so to get them to save the whale you have to get them 
to believe that whales are good' 58. Similarly it can be concluded from this study, as 
elaborated below, that the primary audience to be persuaded and mobilized is the public, in 
other words the voters. Discussing the refusal of the United States to sign a global treaty 
protecting biological diversity made ready for signature at the 1992 Rio Conference, Mostafa 
Tolba, director of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), recently made the 
same point. Tolba had been contacted early on about creating such a global treaty, but was 
reluctant about the idea: 'My own reluctance came from experience in dealing with the ozone 
layer. Countries simply will not give up any of their sovereignty unless they are faced with 
catastrophe. The reason -  the only reason -  that an ozone treaty was signed was that 
scientists could point to catastrophe, and explain the consequences in words that every voter 
could understand. And still countries did nothing. Only after the predicted ozone depletion 
began, only after a hole started to open, did nations finally come to the table and began to 
eliminate some of the harmful chemicals responsible' s9. The challenge for epistemic 
community theory is therefore to examine under what conditions epistemic communities can
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56 James Q. Wilson The Politics of Regulation', 363.
37 See Bruce J. Stedman The International Whaling Commission and Negotiation for a Global 
Moratorium on Whaling', in Lawrence E. Susskind, Esther Siskind, and J. William Breslin, eds., Nine 
Case Studies in International Environmental Negotiation', 171.
** Fred Pearce, Green Warriors, 27.
59 Mostafa K. Tolba The U.S. Flip-Flop Means a Grayer Planet’, International Herald Tribune, June
12, 1992.
mobilize public support for policy.
The complex interdependence model correctly assumes that a variety of actors are 
involved in building and changing international regimes. It does, however, resemble Realism 
in essential aspects and would predict that the moving force or prime dynamic behind policy 
development would be found in intergovernmental meetings of officials or scientists, i.e. 
inside the regime. Chapter 7 showed, however, that the opposition against radwaste disposal 
was increasingly transnationally organized. Nordic governments, South Pacific nations, 
Spain and Greenpeace formed a transnational coalition. Key actors such as trade unions and 
Greenpeace in particular were transnational actors who made the separation of domestic and 
international politics largely irrelevant. Environmental NGOs linked together domestic and 
international policy arenas and U.S. independent experts opposed to radwaste disposal 
collaborated with South Pacific nations.
While this chapter has stressed the impact of ideas on international policy 
development, it should also be stressed that ideas must interact with actors in order to 
influence policy. This study shows that understanding international environmental regimes 
requires looking at the whole range of actors involved: governments, firms, international 
organizations, scientists, environmental interest groups, mass media, and the public. But 
future studies of international environmental regimes should especially examine the role of 
policy entrepreneurs and public opinion, national and international, when regimes are built 
as well as when they change. Since students of international regimes either disregard public 
opinion, or claim that it has no significant impact, this concept, as well as how public 
opinion influences policy development, should finally be defined more precisely.
In the case of the international dumping regime all key actors attributed crucial 
importance to public opinion. American Senators, for example, hoped to get 'the attention 
of the American public' and a marine scientist described 'the general public's mind' and 'the 
present era of aroused public interest in the environment' in 1971. Later, a Greenpeace 
member saw the beliefs of 'the general public' as crucial and, according to Irish officials, the 
Irish government was in 1983 'coming under increasing domestic pressure from a public 
opinion' to protest against radwaste disposal within the international dumping regime. 
Carefully examined and compared observations of public opinion by key actors thus are one
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valuable source of information on public opinion. Newspapers and opinion polls are other 
primary sources. The importance which decision-makers, politicians, industries and others 
attribute to public opinion should therefore not be an issue for theoretical debate but instead 
an issue for empirical observation. Despite sceptics' doubts about the impact of public 
opinion, recent empirical evidence suggests that public opinion may be both stable and exert 
considerable influence on policy ®. The notion of public opinion is sometimes ill-defined, 
however, and should not be used as a catch-all notion or include all those perceptions and 
interests that are ignored by the models tested in this study 61.
While public opinion in various ways can be measured, as just indicated, the concept 
of public opinion is closely associated with the concept of public interests, a concept denied 
by some while others claim that only private interests have significant influence on policy 
a . Public interests are interests shared by a large segment of society a . Public interests 
are therefore not identical to interests of private interest groups or particular classes although 
private interest groups, such as the nuclear industry, fishing interests, and tourism often
60 See Thomas Risse-Kappen 'Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal 
Democracies', World Politics 43 (July 1991), 479-512; see also Lawrence R. Jacobs 'Institutions and 
Culture: Health Policy and Public Opinion in the U.S. and Britain', World Politics 44 (January 1991), 
179-209. For how public opinion is appealed to and used in order to influence policy, see L. Marvin 
Overby and Sarah J. Ritchie 'Mobilized Masses and Strategic Opponents: A Resource Mobilization 
Analysis of the Clean Air and Nuclear Freeze Movements', The Western Political Quarterly 44 (June 
1991), 329-51.
61 For a study of the historic origins and development of the concept, see Jürgen Habermas, 
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft 
(Neuwied am Rhein-Berlin: Politica, 1965). See also Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society, trans. 
and ed. by Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 218-31.
62 The distinction between public and private interests cuts right to the core of perennial debates 
among social scientists and philosophers, as well as economic historians, about the respective meaning 
of private and public, class and society, methodological individualism, and other, sometimes contentious 
issues. For a brief discussion, see Steven Lukes 'Methodological Individualism Reconsidered', in Alan 
Ryan, ed., The Philosophy o f Social Explanation (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 119-29. 
Economic historian Karl Polanyi, for example, was struggling with the distinction between class and 
society in The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins o f Our Time (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1957), 151-62.
63 For a discussion of various definitions of the public interest, see Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox 
and Political Reason (Harper and Collins, 1988). See also Mark Sagoff, The Economy o f the Earth 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 10-11.
couch their interests as public interests and appeal to values shared by broader constituencies 
and society. Neither should the interests of environmental interest groups be considered 
public interests. Only interests that are shared by a large segment of society should rightly 
be seen as public interests. Similarly, only opinions shared by a large segment of society 
should rightly be seen as expressions of public opinion although public opinion may change 
considerably over a short period of time M. It further should be noted that public opinion 
may be divided on and even inattentive to particular issues 65. As the campaign slogans 
'the oceans are dying' and 'save the whale' illustrate, a distinction should also be drawn 
between broad issues, and more specific issues 66.
As regards the international dumping regime, the process of regime change, and to 
some extent also the regime-building process, can best be understood as examples of 
entrepreneurial politics, a form of politics for which forceful mobilization of public opinion 
is essential. Entrepreneurial politics has previously been observed at the domestic level but, 
this study suggests, also occurs at the international level. According to James Q. Wilson's 
definition of entrepreneurial politics, which he developed in his analysis of regulation, 
forceful mobilization of public opinion is essential when the costs of a regulatory policy are 
concentrated narrowly on, for example, one industry, while the benefits are widely 
distributed 67. Food and drug regulation and environmental regulation are typical examples 
of such policies.
It is widely assumed among political scientists that a small group will be able to
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64 For a discussion of the concept of public opinion, see W. Philipps Davidson 'Public Opinion', in 
David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Library of Congress, 1968), vol.
13, 188-96.
65 For examples and discussion, see William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani 'Media Discourse and 
Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach', American Journal o f Sociology 95 (July 
1989), 1-37.
66 This distinction can be seen as being parallel to the one between policy-makers’ specific beliefs 
and general beliefs. For a discussion of this distinction, see John S. Odell, U.S. International Monetary 
Policy, 62-64.
67 For a discussion of this model, see Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason (Harper 
and Collins, 1988), 176-80.
avoid a substantial cost increase being imposed on it by such policies because incentives to 
organize are substantial, while a large group with diffuse interests is not motivated to 
organize since benefits are small. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is basically the same 
reasoning that makes scholars of international regimes who are inspired by collective action 
theory doubt that such policies will be established unless big members of groups choose do 
so, or when small groups are able to discourage free-riding. But, according to Wilson, such 
policies may be established when a skilled entrepreneur 'can mobilize latent public sentiment 
(by revealing a scandal or capitalizing on a crisis), put the opponents of the plan publicly 
on the defensive (by accusing them of deforming babies or killing motorists), and associate 
the legislation with widely shared values (clean air, pure water, health, and s a f e t y ) ' A n  
entrepreneur may be able to capitalize on a crisis but, according to Wilson, it is extremely 
important how third parties -  'the media, influential writers, congressional committee staff 
members, the heads of voluntary associations, and political activists' -  respond to the 
entrepreneur's campaign 69. As students of environmental politics, as well as others, have 
stressed, the first essential step in politics is issue creation: 'the transformation o f a fact of 
life into a political issue' 10. It is by constructing a political issue where no issue 
previously existed and by mobilizing other stakeholders that entrepreneurs and policy 
advocates influence policy development.
The moratorium on radwaste disposal neatly fits the entrepreneurial politics model. 
Following Greenpeace's campaign, radwaste disposal was looked upon as an international 
scandal. Not surprisingly, the nuclear industry and pro-dumping governments rejected the 
charges made by the campaign organizer but were defeated internationally at the meetings 
of the international dumping regime and domestically by Greenpeace and British trade unions 
backed by sympathetic public opinion. The fact that Greenpeace and the seamen played an 
important role after the moratorium on radwaste disposal was declared only shows that
“  James Q. Wilson The Politics of Regulation', 370.
69 Ibid., 371.
70 Cynthia H. Enloe, The Politics o f Pollution in a Comparative Perspective: Ecology and Power in 
Four Nations (New York, London: Longman, 1975), 11. (Emphasis in the original).
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private interest groups pursue their interests vigorously when they are backed by public 
opinion. Moreover, public opinion in many countries at the same time responded in a 
similar way to radwaste dumping then being conducted or planned for the future. Thus 
public opinion formation may be a system level phenomenon, not exclusively a domestic 
level phenomenon. It is likely that we in the future will increasingly witness other examples 
of international public opinion with significant effect on international policy, particularly on 
issues seen as threats to environmental protection and collective human welfare.
While some regime theorists think differently, this study has demonstrated that 
international environmental regimes -  because of the essential role of public opinion, 
international organizations, and NGOs -  should be distinguished from other kinds of 
international regimes 71. It may become evident that public opinion and the channels 
expressing as well as molding public opinion should play a bigger role in the regime analysis 
than has been the case until now. At the very least, this study cautions one to be sceptical 
about approaches to regime analysis emphasizing self-interest, power, rationality, state 
sovereignty, and knowledge at the expense of everything else.
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71 According to Oran R. Young: 'regimes for natural resources and the environment presumably do 
not differ from other international regimes in any fundamental way'. The Politics of International Regime 
Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment, 349.
CHAPTER 9
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
This final chapter provides a model of global environmental regime-building based on the 
above findings on the construction of the international dumping regime. These findings 
show a need for a different, and hopefully better, model than one exclusively focusing on 
either states or networks of scientists 1.
This case study shows that the United States and the Stockholm secretariat both 
performed very important, but also very different, functions when the ocean dumping regime 
was built. A model of global environmental regime-building should accordingly take that 
into account. It is in addition clear that the Stockholm Conference, i.e. a highly publicized 
international environmental conference, also played an essential role. That should therefore 
also be part of a model of global environmental regime-building.
The model proposed here is, as was mentioned in Chapter 1, termed a transnational 
coalition model and it stipulates that three conditions, at a minimum, must be satisfied before 
global environmental regime-building will take place: first, the United States must provide 
international leadership; second, an international secretariat must play a catalytic and 
facilitating role; and third, an international convention obliging countries to cooperate must
1 For the ecological epistemic community model of regime formation, see Peter M. Haas 'Obtaining 
International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus'. For a brief overview of existing 
explanations of regime formation and their relevance for environmental issues, see Oran R. Young 'Global 
Environmental Change and Internationa] Governance', in Millennium 19 (Winter 1990), 337-46. For a 
more comprehensive discussion, see Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for 
Natural Resources and the Environment. See also Oran Young The Politics of International Regime 
Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment'. International regimes for environmental 
protection as well as other issues are discussed in Oran R. Young 'Political Leadership and Regime 
Formation: On the Development of Institutions in Internationa] Society'. For international environmental 
negotiations in a more narrow sense, see The International Environmental Negotiation Network 'Long 
Term Capacity Building for Global Environmental Negotiations' (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Harvard Public 
Disputes Program, 1991). See also Winfred Lang 'Negotiations on the Environment', in Victor A. 
Kremenyuk, ed., International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
1991), 343-56.
be signed by high-level government officials or government leaders meeting in an 
international environmental conference. While these three conditions only are necessary 
conditions in themselves, together they may constitute a sufficient condition for global 
environmental regime-building. Furthermore, global regime-building will not take place in 
cases where public opinion, national and international, disapproves or ignores the 
environmental problem to be solved. The ocean dumping case supports such a strong claim.
To test the transnational coalition model, two recent examples of global regime- 
building -  the regime controlling chlorofluorocarbons depleting the ozone layer and the 
regime for stabilizing greenhouse gases, especially C02 emissions -  are briefly analyzed. 
The interplay of a hegemon, an international secretariat and an international environmental 
conference are also discussed, and some observations on future international environmental 
leaders are made.
The chapter also discusses the future policy development with regard to ocean 
dumping of low-level radioactive waste. Finally, suggestions are given for how to deal with 
similar issues.
Building global regimes for environmental protection
The Unites States is best able and willing to participate actively in the construction of a 
global environmental regime when an environmental problem exists in the United States. 
In case no environmental problem clearly exists, it will be exceedingly difficult to attract and 
sustain public and political support necessary for international action. The strongest 
candidates for international cooperation are American environmental problems which have 
obvious international consequences and environmental problems which are seen as 
threatening U.S. environmental interests. Environmental problems in the oceans and the 
atmosphere, in relation to migratory species, or caused by international trade and transport 
clearly cannot be solved by any one state. Such cases, in which an environmental problem 
clearly exists in the United States and U.S. environmental policy obviously has an significant 
impact on other states and vice versa, offers the necessary opportunity to illustrate the
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benefits of international policy coordination to the American public and policy-makers.
Simple, powerful slogans and symbols of the environmental problem will be an 
essential part of any successful attempt to mobilize the American public and policy-makers. 
The oceans are dying' and 'Spaceship Earth' are examples of slogans and symbols of 
environmental damage or environmental interconnectedness or both 2. Distinguished 
scientists, respected ecologists and environmentalists, as well as eminent public speakers may 
be used to focus the attention of the public and policy-makers on particular environmental 
problems.
Economic aspects are also important. U.S. industries are at a comparative 
disadvantage when environmental regulation is introduced in the United States but not in 
other countries. Harmonization of costs of environmental protection across countries, 
especially industrialized countries, offers in such cases a significant incentive for the United 
States to build or join a global regime. Those building U.S. support will, therefore, attempt 
to capitalize on potential economic benefits to the United States that global regulations will 
bring.
To build international support for a global regime for environmental protection, the 
United States will demonstrate to other states the benefits of environmental protection.
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2 Note the following insightful observation from a review of Dr James Lovelock Gaia: a New Look 
at Life on Earth from 1979, a recent contribution to ecological thinking and philosophy: 'When the Apollo 
programme took men far enough form the earth for it to be revealed as an oasis in space, white clouds 
wrapped around blue, green and brown, the visions those men saw and brought back had an enormous 
effect. The fact that the earth somehow looks alive proves absolutely nothing. But ideas do not live by 
proof alone. The earth adrift in the lifeless void is an image that quickly become a cliché, but only 
because it strung such a strong chord in so many people. It played some role in shaping Dr Lovelock's 
ideas. It probably played a bigger one in preparing the ground for their acceptance, at least among the 
lay audience'. 'GAIA: The Veiled Goddess', The Economist, December 22, 1990. (Emphasis added). The 
metaphor of the earth as a spaceship on which humanity travels, dependent on its vulnerable supplies of 
air and soil appeared for the first time in a speech drafted by Barbara Ward which was given by the 
United States ambassador to the United Nations before the U.N. Economic and Social Council in 1965. 
Spaceship Earth was the title of Barbara Ward's book from 1966 describing how rapid changes, as a result 
of science and technology in a world of 'unbalanced power, disproportionate wealth and ideological abyss' 
increasingly necessitated international cooperation through the United Nations in charge of 'rules for 
survival'. Spaceship Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 22. While the notion 
Spaceship Earth today brings environmental associations to mind, this book is not concerned with the 
environment. In the book Ward further developed some of the themes from an earlier book of hers, 
namely The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, 1962).
United States-sponsored international scientific conferences will attempt to identify and 
reach agreement on the environmental problem to be corrected and thus demonstrate the need 
for global cooperation. United States-sponsored international policy conferences attended 
by foreign politicians and high-level government officials will attempt to demonstrate the 
need for and benefits of environmental protection. Mass media coverage of both 
international scientific conferences and international policy conferences will be an essential 
element of the United States' strategy to build international public and governmental support. 
Successful conferences will convince foreign scientists and government representatives that 
a global regime will benefit not just the United States but all countries.
The secretariat of an international organization -  most likely UNEP or other 
specialized agencies of the United Nations -  will be essential in solving technical and 
scientific issues as well as issues more related to inter-governmental tensions in the regime- 
building process. Lack of trust among governments, especially between the developed and 
the developing countries, is a severe obstacle to all attempts to build global regimes for 
environmental protection. Developing countries are often mistrustful of the intentions of 
developed countries, the United States in particular. Developed countries, on the other hand, 
are equally mistrustful when developing countries point to the fact that in order to participate 
successfully, developing countries are dependent on some measure of scientific and perhaps 
financial assistance, as well as transfer of technology, from developed countries.
It is important that the international secretariat involved in global regime-building 
is autonomous, and perceived so. In order to establish trust between the developed and the 
developing countries, too close ties to either part will be detrimental. Developing countries 
might otherwise see pollution control as simply an attempt by developed countries to control 
developing countries' economies and impose their environmental policies. On the other hand, 
an international secretariat which is too responsive to developing countries' demands will 
alienate the developed countries to which it instead might look like another attempt by the 
developing countries to squeeze money out of the developed countries.
In order to overcome mistrust among governments, the international secretariat will 
try to convince governments and scientists from governments, industry, and international 
agencies that a need for global cooperation exists. The international secretariat will follow
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a careful planned strategy to produce a consensus on the nature of the problem 3. The 
secretariat will bring together scientists from various countries in scientific conferences 
intended to reach agreement on the environmental problem to be corrected. Scientists will 
need to examine and validate the evidence of environmental damage and the pollutant or 
pollutants causing damage as well as other relevant scientific data and theoretical models 
used to estimate and predict environmental damage. While concerned with scientific and 
technical issues, successful conferences might also facilitate international trust-building. 
International scientific conferences might also support regulations and policies, which will 
further increase pressure on governments to establish new policies.
An international secretariat with a reputation for scientific, technical and legal 
expertise and experience might participate in drafting the accord that will induce 
governments to cooperate. Governments might welcome this especially when their treaty 
proposals, due to lack of resources or knowledge of constraints on other governments, do not 
suit all governments and thus need improvement. An international secretariat will propose 
regulatory techniques which both can accommodate the inevitable scientific uncertainties and 
ambiguities of estimations of environmental impact of pollutants and can be revised as new 
knowledge develops. Black and grey lists annexed to a formal agreement text exemplify an 
international secretariat's attempt to create a flexible regulatory technique. An international 
secretariat will also suggest flexible or multiple standards and regulations that permit 
developed countries to start tackling the environmental problem but do not impose 
unreasonable or unacceptable burdens on developed countries. Within such an arrangement, 
developed countries will be able to demonstrate their commitment to environmental 
protection to developing countries which will strengthen the global regime. At the same 
time, concern for the special needs of developing countries will not slow down developing 
countries.
An international secretariat will, finally, start a carefully planned public education
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3 In their review of a number of international environmental issues, David A. Kay and Harold K. 
Jacobson found several examples of international organizations contributing significantly in the problem 
identification and the problem recognition phases. See Jacobson and Kay 'Conclusions and Policy', in Kay 
and Jacobson, eds., Environmental Protection: The International Dimension, 321-22.
campaign aimed at both governments and citizenries. This effort will stimulate public 
interest and thus increase the pressure on governments. World mass media, particularly 
television and press, will be the essential elements of such a strategy to educate the public 
and governments.
The third essential component of a successful global regime-building process is an 
international environmental conference at which high-level government representatives or 
government leaders sign an international agreement obliging countries to cooperate. An 
international environmental conference will offer an important opportunity to educate 
governments and citizenries about the reasons for instigating new policies and regulations. 
The need for environmental protection might not at all be straightforward but instead a result 
of complex interactions between natural systems and human systems. Successful 
implementation of new policies and regulations, furthermore, may ultimately depend more 
on individuals complying out of insight than out of fear of punishment.
An international environmental conference will significantly increase the pressure on 
governments opposing international cooperation. While solutions to the environmental 
problem seldom will be available at the point when international agreement is reached and 
international cooperation also may impose some, maybe considerable costs on countries, the 
need to respond to an international high-level environmental conference may cause even 
reluctant governments to take the first steps to control pollution. At the same time, 
governments will score a significant foreign policy and environmental success when they 
respond to what is widely seen as a significant environmental problem. Mass media, 
environmental NGOs and parts of the private sector supporting environmental protection will 
be essential in raising expectations and pressure at domestic levels for concrete action. To 
illustrate the transnational coalition model, two recent examples of global regime-building -  
namely the Montreal Protocol, formally known as the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the regime for stabilizing greenhouse gases -  are briefly 
analyzed.
Essentially, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are synthetical chemicals that have become 
important in the production of refrigerators, electronics cleaning products and plastic foams. 
They are released into the atmosphere during manufacturing processes, or during use, or later
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disposal. Chlorine, which is released when CFCs interact with sunlight in the atmosphere, 
is under the right meteorological conditions a potent catalyst for the decomposition of ozone. 
The ozone layer screens out much of the sun's harmful ultraviolet radiation. High doses of 
ultraviolet radiation causes cataracts and skin cancer. Two American scientists discovered 
chlorine's destructive effect on ozone in 1973. In 1974, two other American scientists 
discovered that CFCs were exceptionally stable gases able to migrate slowly up to the 
stratosphere and remain intact in the atmosphere for decades or even centuries.
It was in the United States that concern over depletion of the ozone layer first became 
a public issue. Already in 1977 was ozone protection legislation passed by Congress. 
However, scientific uncertainty together with the antiregulatory Reagan administration soon 
diminished the sense of urgency for new regulatory action. While the issue did more or less 
stay prominent in the mind of the American public, it became an international issue only in 
the mid-1980s 4.
UNEP gave ozone depletion top priority in 1976, and was since then actively 
involved in the issue 5. According to the chief U.S. negotiator to the negotiations on the 
Montreal Protocol, as well as many others, this organization acted as a catalyst in the process 
leading to international agreement in Montreal: 'UNEP was indispensable in mobilizing data 
and informing world public opinion, as well as during the negotiating and implementing 
phases. It was UNEP -  inviting, cajoling, and pressuring governments to the bargaining 
table -  that broadened the protocol to a global dimension'6. UNEP also introduced the idea 
of an 'interim protocol' into governments' deliberations on the design of the future 
international regulatory regime. This protocol, modelled in part on the London Dumping 
Convention, formed a framework that could define the problem as well as the overall goal 
of cooperation, while specific undertakings could be covered in separate protocols requiring
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4 Peter M. Morrisette The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion', Natural 
Resources Journal 29 (Summer 1989), 819.
s Thomas B. Stohl, Jr. 'Fluorocarbons: Mobilizing Concern and Action', in David A. Kay and Harold 
K. Jacobson, eds., Environmental Protection: The International Dimension, 45-74.
6 Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet, 6.
periodical scientific reassessments 7 According to the chief U.S. negotiator in Montreal, 
as well as others: This idea facilitated future negotiations and proved to be a critical element 
of the eventual agreement'8.
After initial policy meetings of governments and international organizations in 1977 
and 1978 organized by UNEP, and the decision by its Governing Council in 1981 to support 
and finally approve that it began work toward an international agreement on protecting the 
ozone layer, UNEP invited in 1982 representatives of 24 governments to consider a global 
framework convention. In 1985, the Vienna convention was signed by 20 countries, plus the 
EC Commission. While a considerable accomplishment, the convention provided only for 
monitoring and research, but did not nothing to limit production of CFCs. The so-called 
Toronto Group, composed of governments supporting reduction of CFCs, namely Canada, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States, had been unable to reach an 
agreement with western European governments protecting their chemical industries, in 
particular Britain and France, and the EC Commission. Negotiations on a protocol, however, 
soon resumed in Montreal.
The discovery of a seasonally depleted ozone layer over the Antarctica -  the so- 
called ozone hole -  was disclosed in May 1985, only two months after the Vienna 
Convention had been signed, and refocused public attention on the ozone depletion issue. 
The Antarctic ozone hole greatly reduced lingering uncertainties about CFCs' effect on
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7 For UNEP's contribution to the Montreal Protocol, and the similarities between the London Dumping 
Convention and the Montreal Protocol, see Peter S. Hiacher 'Alternative Legal and Institutional 
Approaches to Global Change', Colorado Journal o f International Environmental Law and Policy 1 
(Summer 1990), 103-5. Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol specifies as follows: 'Beginning in 1990, and 
at least every four years thereafter, the Parties shall assess the control measures...on the basis of available 
scientific, environmental, technical and economic information. At least one year before each assessment, 
the Parties shall convene appropriate panels of experts qualified in the fields mentioned and determine 
the composition and terms of reference of any such panels. Within one year of being convened, the 
panels will report their conclusions, through the secretariat, to the Parties'. Richard Elliot Benedick, 
Chone Diplomacy, 236.
* Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, 50. Also the leader of the British delegation has praised 
the Montreal Protocol's creation of a 'review process designed to enable stronger measures to be taken 
later'. See Fiona McConnell 'Review of Richard E. Benedick 'Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in 
Safeguarding of the Planet', International Environmental Affairs 3 (Fall 1991), 319.
stratospheric ozone and served in addition as a simple, powerful symbol of environmental 
damage increasing pressure on governments as well as industry to correct the problem. To 
quote again Mostafa Tolba, director of UNEP: 'Only after the predicted ozone depletion 
began, only after a hole started to open, did nations finally come to the table and began to 
eliminate some of the harmful chemicals responsible'9.
The United States employed intense mass media coverage of the scientific theories 
and warnings over use of CFCs in order to build public and governmental support for the 
Montreal Protocol. According to the chief U.S. negotiator in Montreal, the U.S. strategy to 
reach an international agreement was as follows: The Department of State now designed and 
managed a multifaceted strategy to gain acceptance of the U.S. position by as many countries 
as possible. Over the next months about 60 U.S. embassies were regularly provided with 
talking points explaining the rationale behind the U.S. proposals, as well as with scientific 
and policy updates. Embassies were instructed to engage their host governments in 
continuous dialogue to inform, influence, and demonstrate flexibility...The U.S. negotiators 
coordinated these diplomatic initiatives closely with like-minded governments. ..The chief 
U.S. negotiator led several missions to Western European capitals for consultations on both 
policy and science... The State Department's interim objective was to move the international 
political community gradually toward a consensus on the science and the risks...The media 
were an integral element of the diplomatic strategy. The U.S. government undertook major 
efforts to reach out to foreign public opinion, especially in Europe and Japan, to counteract 
the previously unopposed influence of commercial interests. Senior U.S. officials and 
scientists gave speeches, press conferences, and radio and television interviews in numerous 
foreign capitals' 10. The U.S. State Department also encouraged U.S. environmental
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9 Mostafa K. Tolba The U.S. Flip-Flop Means a Grayer Planet', International Herald Tribune, June 
12, 1992. Peter M. Morrisette writes: 'As a powerful symbol of the potential impacts from stratospheric 
ozone depletion, the ozone hole galvanized world opinion, and thus influenced the outcome in Montreal1. 
The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion', 815. The crucial role an ozone 
hole over the Antarctic played in reaching an agreement is also stressed in Chris Grand a The Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer', in Lawrence E. Susskind, Esther Siskind, and J. 
William Breslin, eds., Nine Case Studies in International Environmental Negotiation, 44.
10 Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, 56.
organizations to motivate European environmental organizations to challenge publicly the 
European chemical industry's claim that ozone depletion was an insignificant problem and 
available substitutes were too expensive u.
In December 1986, international negotiations under the Vienna Convention were 
resumed and in September 1987 the Montreal Protocol was signed by 24 countries, most of 
the major producers and consumers of CFCs included. The United States, the world's 
biggest market for CFCs, had finally pressured the EC to accept a 50 percent reduction on 
consumption and production of CFCs by 1998 12. For the first time since concern over the 
impact of CFCs on stratospheric ozone evolved in the mid-1970s, international agreement 
was reached on specific measures and timetables for reducing production and consumption 
of CFCs and halons. Negotiations later resumed as new scientific evidence showed that the 
targets of the Montreal Protocol were inadequate. In a 'landmark agreement' reached in 
London in June 1990, governments agreed to a total phaseout of CFCs by the year 2000 13. 
Importantly, governments also agreed to establish a Funding Mechanism for assistance to 
developing countries and, as it was anticipated that developing countries would increasingly 
play an crucial role in global protection of the ozone layer, strived toward including 
especially India and China as parties to the Montreal Protocol u.
Chemical companies which at first were fiercely opposed to international regulation 
later halted production of at least some ozone-depleting chemicals. In October 1988, almost 
two years before governments agreed to do so, DuPont and ICI -  CFCs are manufactured 
primarily by DuPont in the United States and Britain's Imperial Chemical Industries -
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announced that they supported a ban on CFCs by the year 2000. The reason for that was 
twofold: a global ban would prevent competitors from continuing to produce and sell CFCs 
and, at the same time, would open the door to introducing the more expensive CFC 
substitutes, an area in which DuPont was leading 15. In July 1992, ICI announced that it, 
as part of its intention 'of getting out of potentially ozone-harming chemicals', would close 
the last of its plants producing the ozone-destroying chemical halon by the end of 1993 16. 
Importantly, some economical and environmentally safe alternatives to CFCs have been 
developed rather quickly despite earlier doubts voiced by the chemical industry 11.
Responding to new evidence of damage to the ozone layer President Bush announced 
in February 1992 that United States would halt production of CFCs by the end of 1995 18. 
In March 1992, EC Environmental Ministers responded to the U.S. initiative and public 
concerns in Europe by adopting proposals to halt production and consumption of ozone- 
depleting chemicals by 1995 and to reduce their countries' use by 85 percent by the end of 
1993 19. In April 1992, Japan announced that it planned to end all production of chemicals 
that threaten the ozone layer at the end of 1995, five years earlier than mandated by the
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Montreal Protocol 20.
Clearly, the process which produced agreement on the Montreal Protocol confirms 
the propositions about global regime-building for the environment set out above. First, the 
United States provided international leadership. Second, United Nations Environmental 
Program played a catalytic role in the process. Third, the case of atmospheric ozone 
depletion clearly illustrates that international public opinion and public pressure are essential 
elements of successful global environmental regime-building. As the public was well- 
informed about this problem, especially after the discovery of the ozone hole, an 
international environmental conference did not in this case significantly galvanize 
international attention on and expectations for establishment of a global regime.
An international treaty to control global warming was signed by 154 nations attending 
the Rio Conference in June 1992, officially the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), marking the twentieth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference 
21. Scientists have long been concerned that accumulation of various gases in the
atmosphere is causing a global temperature rise. The theory behind the so-called greenhouse 
effect says that various gases and water vapor present in the atmosphere trap heat from the 
sun which would otherwise escape back into space and that the trapped solar radiation heats 
up the earth's atmosphere. An accumulation of greenhouse gases, it is assumed, will produce 
a global temperature rise. The chief greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide (CO2), a gas produced 
by the burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil and gas, as well as by deforestation. Climate 
changes and sea-level rises, due to portions of the polar ice caps melting, are some of the 
expected effects of a global temperature rise.
There is general agreement that the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has
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increased by about 25 percent in the past century 22. There is also agreement that the world 
has already warmed by about one degree C since the industrial age began. It is debated 
among scientists, however, whether the accumulation of carbon dioxide has caused the 
observed global temperature rise and whether a continuous accumulation, or buildup, of 
carbon dioxide in the future will result in a temperature rise and the speed at which it will 
happen. Some scientists claim that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the 
global temperature rise and the buildup of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping 
atmospheric gases 33. Other scientists claim that no such cause-and-effect relationship 
exists. Further complicating policy-making, scientists are warning that a significant global 
temperature rise may cause non-linear responses as, for example, sudden jumps in global 
temperature rather than gradual increases. Based on model results, the scientists advising 
the international negotiations on the global warming treaty predicted the global mean 
temperature would increase by approximately 3 degrees C by the end of the next century if 
nothing was done to limit emissions of greenhouse gases 24.
Importantly, however, unlike the ozone layer case, the global wanning issue had not 
moved from a growing scientific consensus that a problem existed to clear evidence of 
environmental damage. Mainly because of U.S. resistance, this lack of evidence significantly 
slowed down the pace of international negotiations on the global warming treaty and led a 
negotiator to say: 'Pray for another hot summer in America' 2S. Thus, global warming 
emerged as a political issue in the United States when American scientist Jim Hansen in the 
unusually hot summer of 1988 testified that the world was getting hotter probably as a result
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of increasing atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 26. The high 
uncertainties characterizing the global warming phenomenon did not, however, severely 
reduce its political significance. As it was noted on the eve of the Rio Conference: 'Seldom, 
in fact, has an issue risen to the top of the international political agenda while the facts of 
the matter remained so uncertain' 27.
Due to its truly global scope, numerous specialized agencies of the United Nations 
had been involved in the issue. A number of countries, especially the United States, had 
also been involved in the scientific aspects of atmospheric carbon dioxide and climate change 
28. UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), another United Nations 
organization, created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. This 
advisory group, consisting of 1000 of the world's leading climate experts, examined the 
scientific knowledge about global warming and suggested policy action. That group 
produced a report in 1990 that was the scientific basis for the global climate treaty.
The EC had hoped to play a leading role in the negotiations on the global warming 
treaty. In October 1990, the EC agreed to stabilize emissions of carbon dioxide to the 1990 
level by year 2000. But less than one month before the Rio Conference EC environment 
ministers from Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands rejected an EC 
Commission plan for a carbon dioxide tax within the EC Community. They rejected the EC 
environment commissioner's decision, which was influenced by hectic lobbying by European 
industry, to make the plan conditional on similar steps being taken by the United States and
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Japan 29. On the other hand, poor EC countries, Spain being the most vocal protestor, 
opposed the EC Commission's plan which they feared would burden their economies 30. 
The decision left Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands as the only EC member countries 
with plans for how to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and the EC Community without a 
common policy on the issue which could be presented to the Rio Conference 31. The EC 
environment commissioner refused to go Rio in protest32. There is a feeling that it is each 
country for itself out there', said an EC official later in Rio, referring to the lack of a 
coordinated EC policy on controlling carbon dioxide emissions 33.
The Bush administration persistently sought a 'no regrets' policy approach -  'a 
balanced policy of adopting those environmental measures that reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions while providing concrete environmental benefits' -  in the negotiations on the 
global warming treaty 34. Apart from protests from the environmental community, some 
scientists and members of Congress, this policy had domestic support 35. Quoting high 
scientific uncertainties and massive economic costs of regulation, the Bush administration 
persistently opposed any attempt during the negotiations to set targets and deadlines for
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control of carbon dioxide 36. A U.S. National Academy of Sciences report recommending 
the United States should take modest steps to mitigate global warming did not cause the 
administration to change its policy 31. It seemed certain that the U.S. policy was being 
formulated by the White House chief of staff, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, and the head of the Council of Economic Advisers, all known to fear that limits 
would damage the U.S. economy 38. Administration officials doubted whether the EC was 
able and willing to live up to its intentions of controlling global warming 39.
Despite early indications to the contrary, Japan did not play a leadership role in the 
negotiations on the global warming treaty, nor later at Rio 40. Japan's position changed, 
however, over the negotiations. While Japan at first supported the United States position, 
it later sided with the EC and other industrialized countries.
As at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the interests of the rich, developed countries 
from the North and the poor, developing countries form the South clashed in the negotiations 
on the global warming treaty. Developing countries saw in the preparations for the Rio 
Conference an opportunity to attract money, technology, know-how and other forms of
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assistance from developed countries. According to an official from a Caribbean nation: 'For 
the first time in more than a decade the developing countries have an issue where they have 
some real leverage. They had none during the debt negotiations. But they are part of the 
environment, so they have leverage now. And they are using it. It's their negotiating 
strategy' 41. Objecting to 'environmental colonialism', developing countries stressed that the 
global warming problem should be solved by those countries which had created it, namely 
the developed countries 42. OPEC countries led by Saudi Arabia, fearing the effects on oil 
export, were vehemently opposed to taxes on fossil fuels 43. But the developing countries 
played a rather insignificant role in the negotiations which mostly were dominated by 
disagreements between the EC and the United States.
The United States organized international policy conferences bringing together foreign 
delegates 44. President Bush and the administration told delegations and scientists meeting 
in the April 1990 White House conference that more scientific studies were needed and that 
the uncertainties involved warranted a cautious approach towards control of greenhouse 
gases. Especially northern European countries strongly disagreed, however, and favored 
instead strong action to curb global warming 4S.
Japan and the United States refused to endorse commitments to control carbon 
dioxide emissions to an agreed level by the year 2000 as supported by most Scandinavian 
and western European governments at an international meeting of environmental ministers 
in the Netherlands in November 1989. The United States wanted more studies before 
binding control should be considered. The United States acknowledged for the first time,
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however, that stabilizing carbon dioxide emissions in industrialized countries would have to 
be enforced at some point. The Soviet Union and Poland also opposed specific targets, 
fearing that they would be too costly to their economies 46.
The report of the IPCC was presented to the Second World Climate Conference in 
Geneva in November 1990, jointly sponsored by UNEP and WMO 47. The director of 
UNEP, Mostafa Tolba, concluded that 'what we know now is more than enough to act, and 
to act fast' 48. However, the IPCC report's conclusion -  'countries are urged to take 
immediate actions to control the risks of climate change with initial emphasis on action that 
would be economically and socially beneficial for other reasons as well' -  seemed to suggest 
that the scientific evidence in itself did not warrant implementing major policy changes 49. 
The United States, at that point the only industrialized country not committed to a national 
carbon dioxide control policy, still resisted concrete goals for cutting emissions 50. Similar 
to the EC, Japan had in October 1990 committed itself to stabilizing its emissions at 1990 
levels by the year 2000.
The first United Nations-sponsored negotiations on a global warming treaty in 
Chantilly, Virginia in February 1991, did not result in agreement among the delegates from 
130 countries. Although admitting that global wanning was a problem, the United States 
resisted specific targets and deadlines as suggested by the EC, Brazil and a number of small 
low-lying island nations. The EC found a convention that did not require detailed
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commitments unacceptably weak 51. The United States also wished to include greenhouse 
gases other than carbon dioxide and believed that measures already taken would reduce its 
amount of greenhouse gases 52. The United States stuck to its decision to refuse mandatory 
cuts in emissions of carbon dioxide at a meeting session in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 
1991, while the EC and Japan supported reducing carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels 
by the year 2000 53.
The United States again refused to accept a treaty setting a strict timetable for curbing 
emissions of carbon dioxide that bound governments at the final negotiations in New York, 
in May 1992. The fact that the United States necessarily had to be part of any global 
solution to global warming, as it accounts for almost one-quarter of total global emissions, 
provided the United States with powerful bargaining leverage: 'Faced with the U.S. refusal, 
the other delegates gave in, knowing that a treaty would be worthless unless the United 
States signed it' 54. It seemed clear, furthermore, that President Bush would not participate 
in the Rio Conference, where it was planned government leaders would sign the global 
warming treaty, unless other industrialized countries accepted a treaty without specific targets 
and deadlines. In fact President Bush announced that he would attend the conference only 
after agreement on the draft treaty had been reached 55. European governments and others 
thus feared that the Rio Conference would have little political impact in case President Bush 
stayed away.
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Governments' reactions to the draft treaty illustrated how widely attitudes toward 
uncertain scientific proof of environmental damage differed between the United States and 
the EC. The administrator of the EPA, William K. Reilly, characterized it as a 'historical 
achievement. The measured approach taken in the treaty is a reasonable response to the 
current state of scientific knowledge' 56. However, the German environment minister 
conceded: 'Naturally we would like to have achieved a better climate agreement than the 
United States and those who are hiding behind the United States' 51. Thus, western 
European governments felt that Washington exaggerated the amount of uncertainty in 
existent knowledge about global warming in order to protect the U.S. economy. In Rio, 
President Bush urged other countries to present specific plans to put into effect the global 
warming treaty at a meeting to be held before the end of 1992 58. U.S. officials pointed 
out that only the United States and a small number of other countries had specific plans, and 
repeated doubt about the scientific consensus on global warming 59. After some initial 
confusion, however, the EC adopted a declaration setting targets and timetables for reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 60.
Clearly, the case of the global wanning regime differs from both the ocean dumping 
case and the atmospheric ozone depletion case. Most conspicuously, the United States did 
not attempt to build international support for a global regime. Quite the opposite, by 
splitting ranks with the EC and other industrialized countries the United States in fact
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delayed the regime-building process. But UNEP did also in this case play a catalytic role 
by organizing scientific meetings and marshalling scientific knowledge as well as by 
increasing the visibility of the issue and advocating international action. The Rio 
Conference, furthermore, the largest meeting ever of state leaders, dramatically raised 
international expectations for environmental protection. Rio significantly increased the 
pressure on governments to demonstrate that they were environmentally responsible.
While still in its initial phase, the case of the global wanning treaty does confirm the 
above propositions about the conditions under which the United States plays a leadership role 
in the construction of global environmental regimes. With no evidence of environmental 
damage and environmentalists, scientists and others being unable to significantly mobilize 
public opinion, global warming was not a significant environmental issue in the United 
States. Compared to the cases of atmospheric ozone depletion and ocean dumping, that is 
a significant difference. While other explanations could be suggested, the lack of 
international leadership by the United States can therefore quite simple be explained by 
pointing to insufficient U.S. domestic pressure for national and international steps to tackle 
global warming. In a case where no domestic environmental problem clearly existed, as the 
above model predicts, the United States did not provide international leadership. 
Furthermore, U.S. environmental regulation either preceded or was introduced parallel to 
global regulation in the cases of atmospheric ozone depletion and ocean dumping which 
created pressure in the United States for global regulation harmonizing economic costs across 
countries 61. But in the case of carbon dioxide emissions control U.S. regulation 
comparable to a European 'carbon tax' neither existed nor was expected. Nor was there such 
pressure for moving the United States to constructively undertake such global regime- 
building.
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The case of the global warming treaty also confirms that several actors interact when 
global environmental regimes are built. Despite its resistance, the United States did join an 
international process which will mean increasing attention to the issue in the future. There 
is no doubt that the negotiations on the global warming treaty as well as the Rio Conference 
increased the pressure on the Bush administration to join multilateral efforts to deal with the 
problem. It should also be noted that, despite huge dissimilarities, international cooperation 
to control global warming presently resembles the Vienna Convention and the London 
Dumping Convention; it establishes a framework for global action and provides for more 
research.
Some observations on the interplay of a hegemon, an international secretariat and an 
international environmental conference can also be made. Undoubtedly, United States' 
support of the Stockholm Conference contributed greatly to its success 62. To support and 
strengthen the conference, the United States proposed and contributed significantly to a new 
U.N. Environment Fund Conversely, there is every reason to believe that the lack of 
support by the Bush administration of the Rio conference made it less successful than if the
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United States had been an eager supporter By withholding financial support and making 
little personnel available to an international secretariat, as the Stockholm secretariat was fully 
aware, a hegemon can severely reduce an international secretariat's ability to catalyze 
international action 65. But a hegemon's 'power' or ability to exert influence over an 
international secretariat is largely of a defensive kind as it might succeed to slow down but 
apparently cannot stop an international secretariat's efforts to catalyze action and global 
environmental regime-building. The single most important explanation for this anomaly, 
as compared to other international issues, is that environmental protection so far has been 
driven by public opinion and domestic pressure which even hegemons must respect and 
respond to. And again, an examination of U.S. domestic politics tells us why United States' 
foreign environmental policy in 1992 has differed markedly from that pursued twenty years 
earlier.
The global warming case also demonstrates that other nations than the United States 
might in the future act as international environmental leaders. The model proposed here 
assumes that the existing international system with the United States being the prominent 
leading nation will not undergo major changes in the foreseeable future. But in case that 
happens, it is conceivable that the European Communities or Japan, perhaps jointly, will 
provide leadership. As shown above, several developments in the global wanning case 
pointed to that fact. But it is also evident that in cases where the United States does not 
play its proper leadership role it can, due to its economic as well as its technical-scientific 
capabilities, significantly hamper other attempts at leadership.
It is evident, however, that international environmental leadership involves more than 
a willingness to contribute financially to international environmental funds and the like. As 
environmental protection has increasingly become lucrative business, governments might be
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advocates and even eager financiers of international environmental policies preparing the way 
for the export of pollution control equipment and environmentally friendly products. But 
such attempts at influencing international environmental policy will hardly be successful. 
In order to be credible, international environmental leadership must be based on a firm 
commitment to solving environmental problems at home before solving them abroad 66.
In summary, the case of the Montreal Protocol confirms the propositions of the 
transnational coalition model and the case of the global warming regime, although it has not 
yet moved beyond the initial phase, also supports the model. Again, at least three 
conditions must be met for global environmental regime-building to happen: international 
leadership provided by the United States, an international secretariat to play a catalytic role, 
and an international environmental conference to focus public opinion and public pressure 
on governments. Furthermore, the global warming case supports the strong claim about 
public opinion as the United States did not provide international leadership in a situation 
where no significant U.S. domestic pressure and support for international leadership existed.
The future of international regulation of radwaste disposal
It is uncertain whether or not ocean dumping of low-level radioactive waste will be resumed 
in the future. Perhaps ironically, while U.S. delegates to the recent consultative meetings 
within the international dumping regime do not expect so, Spanish, Danish and Greenpeace 
delegates are less certain 61. Various forces seem to be pulling in almost opposite 
directions. The opinion of ocean scientists, the development of international regulatory 
machinery, the strength of the transnational opposition against radwaste disposal, and 
international public opinion will all play a role.
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66 The case of Japan seems to illustrate this point well. See Andrew Pollack 'Ecological Savior 
Abroad, Japan Lags at Home', International Herald Tribune, August 1-2, 1992.
67 Based on author's interviews with delegation members attending the 1991 Consultative Meeting in 
November 1991, in London.
Ocean scientists have in professional journals criticized the policy development within 
the international dumping regime. In a commentary entitled 'Science -  A Time of Change?', 
one British scientist has criticized the 1985 decision that "in the final analysis, social and 
related factors may outweigh those of a purely scientific and technical nature'. However the 
terms of reference of the convention were to decide issues on the basis of science; the 
scientists have done a commendable job, but the unscientific demand of the resolution cannot 
be answered by scientists. There is no scientific evidence to indicate that the discharge of 
low level radioactive wastes to the sea, land or air is harmful to man'. While undermining 
his own rejection of non-scientific factors, he concludes that these social matters are more 
destructive to the nuclear power programme than any of a scientific nature. The resolution 
is not binding and matters should be clarified when the UK government identifies what is 
the best practical option for disposal' 68. As far as the risks concerned, a recent peer- 
reviewed study concluded that the risks from past radioactive ocean dumping in the north­
east Atlantic 'are very low indeed', and that 'even if dumping rates over the next few years 
were ten times those in the recent past, the effects on humans and marine fauna would still 
be extremely small'. Thus, as the study also concluded, making a barely concealed reference 
to the moratorium on radwaste disposal, 'it is clear that there are no scientific or technical 
grounds for excluding sea dumping from consideration alongside other viable disposal 
options for radioactive wastes' 69. Although present knowledge admittedly is imperfect and
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“  E.I. Hamilton 'Science -  A Time of Change', in Marine Pollution Bulletin 17 (1986), 296-97. See 
also E.I. Hamilton 'Radiation Dose -  The Marine Environment, A Cause for Concern?', Marine Pollution 
Bulletin 16 (1985), 305-09.
69 The conclusion of the study, in which a leading international expert in the field participated, says: 
'Over the last five years, our understanding of modelling biological, oceanographic and geochemical 
processes in the oceans has increased significantly. New models and data bases, which have been 
subjected to peer review by experts in dumping and non-dumping countries alike, have been used to show 
that the effects on man and marine animals from past radioactive waste dumping in the north-east Atlantic 
are very low indeed. It has also been shown that, even if dumping rates over the next few years were ten 
times those in the recent past, the effects on humans and marine fauna would still be extremely small. 
On the basis of these results, and other evidence presented to them, the experts involved in the NEA 
review concluded that the north-east Atlantic site could continue to be used for the dumping of packaged 
wastes during the next five years. It is recognized that before any country issues a permit for further 
dumping, other aspects of this disposal method will need to be considered. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
there are no scientific or technical grounds for excluding sea dumping from consideration alongside other
uncertain, the marine scientific community is in agreement that the risk from past dumping 
is 'exceedingly small' TO.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a few marine scientists opposed to the trend towards 
all-out protection of the oceans have occasionally tried, as Jacques Cousteau, Thor 
Heyerdahl and others did in the 1970s, to reach out to public opinion through the New York 
Times and other publications with a wide circulation 71. One scientist advocating the 
concept of assimilative capacity has pointed out that regulation presently, by forcing wastes 
to go on land, overprotects the oceans at the cost of a concentration of wastes, and thereby 
risks, on land: The reasons for change in philosophy are compelling. The ocean is a large 
part of the planet. Land makes up only 30 percent of the earth's surface and we are land 
animals. On this small bit of land we must find sustenance, and, nature has decreed, 
generate wastes. Not all of the land is readily available to us. We must subtract the polar 
regions, deserts and huge mountain ranges. What is left is both the domain of man and, 
unfortunately, the repository of nearly all of his more toxic wastes. With this being the case, 
does it make sense to keep the vast ocean, with 97 percent of the world's water in its basins, 
inviolate? Is it right to protect all of this salt water while endangering the piddling fresh 
water resources we absolutely must have for drinking and agriculture?' n . Making the
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viable disposal options for radioactive wastes'. W.C. Camplin and M.D. Hill 'Sea Dumping of Solid 
Radioactive Waste: A New Assessment', Radioactive Waste Management and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 7 
(August 1986), 250-51.
70 On the question of the scientific accuracy of existing oceanographic and radiological models, two 
marine scientists have recently pointed out: The consensus of the scientific community (as represented 
by the LDC Expert Panel) is that, while there are uncertainties and inaccuracies, these are not so great 
as to invalidate the conclusion that the individual risk from past dumping is exceedingly small and that 
the collective dose commitment cannot have been underestimated by more than an order of magnitude 
or so [i.e. a factor of ten]'. J. Mike Bewers and Chris J.R. Garrett 'Analysis of the Issues Related to Sea 
Dumping of Radioactive Wastes', 118.
71 For another populist advocacy of radwaste disposal by an American marine biologist and former 
member of the AEC, see Dixy Lee Ray with Lou Guzzo, Trashing the Planet. How Science Can Help 
Us Deal with Acid Rain, Depletion of the Ozone, and Nuclear Waste (Among Other Things), 153 ff.
72 Charles Osterberg, a former American director of the International Laboratory of Marine 
Radioactivity in Monaco, 'Seas: To Waste or Not', New York Times, August 9, 1981. Osterberg has also 
presented his view in The Ocean -  Nature’s Trash Basket1, in Roy G. Post, ed., 'Waste Management '82.
same point, another American scientist has challenged 'Planet Earth', one of the key symbols 
of the late 1960s' environmental movement: 'Several leading U.S. scientists have voiced the 
opinion that 'Planet Water' is a better name than 'Planet Earth', since 71 percent of the earth's 
surface is covered with seawater. Over 99 percent of all liquid water on earth is polluted 
with salt, leaving less than 1 percent fresh or drinkable. This small amount of fresh water 
and land supports some 5 billion people. The laws protecting the oceans are forcing the 
most toxic wastes to go on land, placing humans in jeopardy by contaminating the limited 
volume of drinkable water. Also, the land produces some 99 percent of the food consumed 
by mankind. The key question then becomes 'What is more critical to mankind -  the 99.4 
percent of the water contaminated with salt which provides so few of our needs, or the tiny 
0.6 percent of the fresh liquid water that contributes to nearly all of our food, fiber, and 
shelter?"73.
Those attempts to influence public thinking have not had any effect so far. 
Supporters of the concept of assimilative capacity find that they are being seen as advocates 
of unrestricted pollution by parts of the marine scientific community as well as the public 
7A. Given the public sentiment on the issue of ocean protection it thus seems most unlikely 
that the public in the foreseeable future will accept a reversal of the trend towards all-out 
protection of the oceans.
United States EPA officials have recently suggested that the assimilative capacity 
concept or some variation thereof should complement, or perhaps replace, the international
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Proceedings o f the Symposium on Waste Management at Tucson, Arizona, March 8-11, 1982'. For 
another scientist advocating opening up the oceans to more waste disposal, see Edward D. Goldberg The 
Oceans as Waste Space: The Argument', Oceanus 24 (1981), 4-9. By same author, see aJso The Oceans 
as Waste Space', in Virginia K. Tippie and Dana R. Kester, eds., Impact o f Marine Pollution on Society, 
26-33.
73 Michael A. Champ The Ocean and Waste Disposal', in The World and I  5 (April 1990), 328.
74 J.E. Portmann 'ACMP's Approach to Environmental Management and Protection'. Internationa] 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 1991. J.E. Portmann, U.K. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, Fisheries Laboratory, is member of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea's (ICES) 
Advisory Committee on Marine Pollution (ACMP). ICES is an international organization providing 
scientific advice on marine affairs. J.E. Portmann is also member of the GESAMP. For GESAMP and 
ACMP, see also footnote 96 below.
dumping regime's black and grey lists regulatory system. While there are several ways in 
which the black and grey lists system could incorporate the notion of assimilative capacity, 
the oceans would as a result be opened up to greater use as a waste disposal medium as long 
as unreasonable degradation would not occur 7S. Also, although an unpopular proposal 
among environmental groups, marine scientists from Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution 
plan to study use of the deep-sea floor for dumping sewage sludge, the end product of the 
sewage treatment process 76. On the other hand, U.S. federal law passed by Congress in 
1988 prohibits ocean dumping of sewage sludge and industrial wastes after 1991 77. After 
New Jersey stopped dumping sewage sludge in March 1991 the only dumpers left in the 
United States were three authorities in the New York City who were to stop dumping July 
1992 78.
European states are increasingly phasing out ocean dumping and are adopting the so- 
called precautionary approach, an approach to environmental regulation that at the 
international level can be traced back to the Stockholm secretariat in the early 1970s 79.
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75 Alan B. Sielen 'Sea Changes? Ocean Dumping and International Regulation', 1-32. The author 
is Director of Multilateral Staff in the Office of International Activities, U.S. EPA. The article is written 
in his private capacity.
76 Charles D. Hollister explains: The idea isn't to make it easier for industries or cities to be sloppy 
with their wastes. But at the same time, no matter how much we recycle and conserve and reduce waste, 
we're still going to have some. Does it make sense to close off 70 percent of the earth's surface without 
at least studying the idea of using it for waste disposal?'. Keith Schneider "U.S. Scientists Plumb Depths 
For Dump Sites', International Herald Tribune, December 3, 1991. For Charles D. Hollister, see Chap. 
7 footnote 67.
77 For the law, which amends the 1972 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, see 'End 
of Ocean Dumping' Marine Pollution Bulletin (April 1989), 156-57. The law thus brought an end to the 
more permissive attitude towards ocean dumping which, as mentioned in Chapter 7, had developed since 
1977. For the U.S. policy development up to 1988, see R.H. Burroughs 'Ocean Dumping: Information 
and Policy Development in the USA', Marine Policy (April 1988), 96-104.
78 Allan R. Gold 'Millions in Bills are Coming Due for Region's Ocean Dumping', New York Times, 
December 24, 1990; Allan R. Gold "New Jersey Ends Practice of Dumping Sludge in Sea', New York 
Times, March 18, 1991.
79 Maurice Strong spoke at the first meeting of the IWGMP. He said, among other things, that: 'It 
is not only the lawyers amongst us who will be aware that the law cannot always wait until science can 
provide all the answers. Time is often against us: even if we were able tomorrow totally to prohibit the 
production or use of the most damaging pollutants it would be some time before the effects of our actions
The Second North Sea Conference in November 1987 -  attended by Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the then Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Britain 
-  agreed 'that, in order to protect the North Sea from possible damaging effects of the most 
dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to 
control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by 
absolutely clear scientific evidence1 80. The Nordic states, in particular, are arguing that 
disposal of wastes at sea is an unacceptable way of getting rid of wastes, that waste 
generation must be limited at source, and that safe methods of land disposal must be used 
for the remaining waste 81. In September 1992, Nordic environmental ministers agreed to 
propose a permanent ban on dumping of medium-level and low-level radioactive waste to
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would be felt in the oceans. We need urgently to clarify the law with respect to marine pollution....We 
would need to weigh the price of doing nothing as opposed to doing something...but such [economic] 
figures would represent only the tip of the iceberg of ultimate costs. Just as the law must anticipate 
science to a certain extent, I think that we will agree that the law cannot wait either on a fully detailed 
cost-benefit balance sheet'. 'Report o f the First Session of the Inter-Governmental Working Group on 
Marine Pollution, London. 14-18 June 1971\ UN doc. A/CONF.48/IWGMP.I/5, 21 June, 1971, Annex
4, 4-6. Strong also stressed this approach at the opening session in Stockholm: There is much difference 
of opinion in the scientific community over the severity of the environmental problem and whether doom 
is imminent or, indeed, inevitable. But one does not have to accept the inevitability of catastrophe. We 
need subscribe to no doomsday threat to be convinced that we cannot -  we dare not -  wait for all the 
evidence to be in. Time is no ally here unless we make it one*. Walter Sullivan 'World Conference: 
Struggling Against the Doomsday Timetable', New York Times, June 11, 1972. For a discussion of this 
regulatory principle, see Daniel Bodansky 'Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle' 
Environment 33 (September 1991), 4 ff. See also discussion in Environment 34 (April 1992), 2-4.
80 Ministerial Declaration Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea' 
(London: 24-25 November 1987), 7.
81 An official of the Norwegian Ministry of Environment suggests five main arguments for this policy: 
First, all dumping of wastes at sea may result in harm to marine life, and should therefore be avoided. 
Little is yet known about possible long-term effects on marine ecology. Second, dumping of wastes at 
sea may, directly or indirectly, harm the interests of third countries and their legitimate uses of the sea. 
In this respect, ocean disposal does not share the costs and benefits equally between states. Third, 
acceptable land-based options do exist. The use of such options, including the use of recycling and new 
industrial processes, will be encouraged and further improved if dumping is no longer allowed. Fourth, 
the problems of effective control over dumping activities, and over their effects on the marine 
environment. Fifth, the problem of 'no return', once the materials have been dumped. Atle Fretheim 
Dumping at Sea' Marine Policy (May 1990), 247-50.
the consultative meeting of the international dumping regime in November, 1992 82. 
Britain, once called 'the dirty man of Europe', thus is increasingly 'greening' in response to 
international pressure canalized through specialized fora such as the international dumping 
regime and, more importantly, the EC On the EC's influence on British environmental 
policy, a member of Britain's House of Lords recently noted: 'I cannot help feeling it is 
impossible to avoid the Community as a forum and as a pressure group working on us, and 
working on our public'84.
In summary, a strong international trend presently exists towards stopping dumping 
at sea within the international dumping regime. In the early 1990s, the United States is 
isolated internationally on this issue. In addition to the rulings of the international dumping 
convention, a regional agreement to ban radwaste disposal has recently been reached in the 
Pacific. An African agreement from 1990 prohibits dumping of radioactive waste at sea, as 
well as disposal into the seabed, and a ban on radwaste disposal is presently being 
considered within two European marine pollution control arrangements 85.
The strength of the nongovernmental opposition against radwaste disposal is not
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12 Vi] stoppe for dumpning', Berlingske Tidende, September 4, 1992. Ellen Andersen 'Globalt stop 
for havsvineri. Dansk forslag mod dumpning af affald', Politiken, August 1, 1992.
83 There is agreement that Britain's environmental policy increasingly has been shaped by the EC. 
See Timothy O'Riordan The Politics of Environmental Regulation in Great Britain' Environment 30 
(October 1988), 5ff. See also The Greening of British Politics’ The Economist, March 3, 1990, 49-50.
14 E. Cranbrook quoted in U.K. House of Lords Nineteenth Report, 1987-88, 34.
85 The official title of this convention from 1990 is the African Convention on the Ban of Import of 
All Forms of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements of such Wastes 
Generated in Africa. For its relation to the so-called Basel Convention (The Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal), see Winfred Lang The 
International Waste Regime', in W. Lang, H. Neuhold and K. Zemanek, ed., Environmental Protection 
and International Law (London: Graham and Trotman, 1991), 159-60.
The Helsinki Convention of 1973 prohibits all dumping in the Baltic Sea; the Barcelona Protocol 
of 1976 prohibits the dumping of all forms of radioactive waste. Spain suggested recently that the Oslo 
Convention and the Paris Convention -  a North Sea arrangement regulating land-based marine pollution 
sources -  be revised to ban radwaste disposal. Information taken from 'Proposal for an Express 
Prohibition on the Dumping of Radioactive Waste to be Included in the New OSPAR Convention' 
submitted by Spain to the Third Joint Meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Oslo 
Convention and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Paris Convention meeting in Lisbon, 
9-13 September 1991.
entirely clear. Greenpeace has grown considerably since its protests against radwaste 
disposal started around 1978. By 1990, Greenpeace had over 4 million supporting members 
worldwide, employed approximately a thousand people in 23 offices located on four 
continents, including Asia and Latin America, and owned seven vessels 86. Although 
Greenpeace recognizes that radwaste disposal perhaps is not so prominent in the public mind 
at this point in time it expects that a resumption of radwaste disposal would be met with 
considerable public opposition S7. The trade unions which effectively brought radwaste 
disposal to a halt in 1983 have reiterated their position in the late 1980s. Most recently, in 
August 1990, the Congress of the International Transport Federation (ITF) -  with worldwide 
affíliate-members -  adopted a resolution on toxic wastes which 'calls on developed nations 
and others involved in the dumping of toxic waste to cease their nefarious activities forthwith 
and to find alternative safe means of disposing of such wastes...Transport workers throughout 
the world should be mobilized to take action against any person or persons continuing to 
engage in the reckless dumping of toxic and radioactive waste in any part of the world' 88. 
Pacific islands have also repeated their call for a stop for 'all ocean dumping of any kind of 
radioactive waste' at the 1991 consultative meeting of the international dumping regime 99. 
Importantly, recently disclosed Soviet dumping of radioactive waste over the last three 
decades in the Arctic has caused considerable concern in Norway and has once again focused
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M Information on Greenpeace is taken from 'Political and Social Impact o f a Resumption o f 
Radioactive Waste Dumping at Sea'. Statement submitted by Greenpeace Internationa] to the Third 
Meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Radioactive Wastes (IGPRAD) of the London 
Dumping Convention (LDC). October 1990.
17 See 'Political and Social Impact o f a Resumption o f Radioactive Waste Dumping at Sea’. Statement 
submitted by Greenpeace Internationa] to the Third Meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel of Experts 
on Radioactive Wastes (IGPRAD) of the London Dumping Convention (LDC). October 1990.
m Quoted from ibid.
19 Matthias Y. Kuor, Yap State Legislature, Federated States of Micronesia, at the 1991 consultative 
meeting of the LDC.
international attention on this issue 90.
In summary, the interplay of several factors will influence the future of radwaste 
disposal. The opinion of marine scientists, the strength of the transnational coalition against 
radwaste disposal, the development of international regulatory machinery, and international 
public opinion will all play a role. But the international dumping regime is steadily moving 
towards phasing out dumping activities which are perceived as hazardous -  for example, the 
1990 consultative meeting decided to phase out industrial dumpings by the end of 1995 91. 
Significant policy changes in the future will be contingent upon a change in public opinion.
Looking back -  looking ahead
The international dumping regime marks a significant step forward in nations' efforts to 
protect the oceans of the world. Twenty years ago some parts of the oceans were seriously 
damaged. It was increasingly realized that they cannot absorb unlimited amounts of wastes. 
Competent national agencies, monitoring, keeping records, and licensing dumping permits, 
should together formulate policy needed for protection of the marine environment against 
dumping.
The ban on radwaste disposal has been a stumbling block within the international 
dumping regime. While some countries claimed victory, others reconsidered their 
membership. But it has also been a revelation. To all, this experience has illustrated that
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90 'Masser Af A-Affald I Havet', Politiken, February 26, 1992; see also Einar Hagvaag 'Norsk Frygt 
for Atomkirkegârd', Politiken, May 3, 1992; see also Patrick E. Tyler 'Soviets Dumped Nuclear Waste in 
Arctic Waters', International Herald Tribune, May 5, 1992; Alfred Friendly, Jr. We Ignore Chernobyl's 
Cousins at the World's Risk', International Herald Tribune, May 15, 1992. The Soviet Union has always 
maintained that it did not dump. Furthermore, Soviet scientists have been criticizing Western scientists 
for being too permissive in their attitude towards regulation of radwaste disposal. Typical of the Soviet 
position is the following statement: The Soviet Union always has been and will be a supporter of the 
strictest measures for the prevention of radioactive contamination of the ocean'. Quoted in F.L. Parker 
Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Wastes into the Oceans', Nuclear Safety 8 (Summer 1967), 377.
91 'Overraskende Globalt Stop for Industridumpninger’. Press release from the Danish Ministry of the 
Environment, November 2, 1990.
the world of science and technology is not one of safety, absolutes and hard facts, but rather 
one of risks, probabilities, and uncertainty 92. Despite initial protests, the resolution calling 
for studies of scientific and technical issues, as well as wider legal, social, economic and 
political aspects, may lead to an improvement of the existing way of making decisions. 
While the process seems rather unstructured at the present, this may change in the future.
The international dumping regime's scientific advisory group GESAMP -  the Joint 
Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, established under the United 
Nations in 1969 -  is concerned over the ban on radwaste disposal 93. The most recent 
GESAMP report, the policy manifesto Global Strategies for Marine Environmental 
Protection, sees the ban as an expression of 'lack of confidence in the regulatory process' and 
as a forerunner of the recent trend within international environmental forums, for example 
the North Sea Conference, to adopt the precautionary principle 94. A former editor of 
Marine Pollution Bulletin has written that this principle, in the worst case, means 'that 
marine science no longer has an effective contribution to make to decision-making about 
waste disposal options' 95. But GESAMP, and ACMP, which is another international
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92 Mary Douglas writes with respect to the cultural meaning of risk today: However, the risk that is 
a central concept for our policy debates has not got much to do with probability calculations. The original 
connection is only indicated by aim waving in the direction of possible science: the word risk now means 
danger; high risk means a lot of danger'. Mary Douglas 'Risk as a Forensic Resource', Daedalus 119 (Fall
1990) Risk (Special issue), 3.
93 For GESAMP, see Michael Waldichuk 'An International Perspective on Global Marine Pollution' 
in Virginia K. Tippie and Dana R. Kester, eds., Impact o f Marine Pollution on Society, 37-73.
94 GESAMP report no. 45 'Global Strategies for Marine Environmental Protection' (London: IMO,
1991), 10. This report has been heavily criticized by Greenpeace. See IMO document LDC14/Inf.29 
'Critical Review o f GESAMP Report No. 45 on ’Global Strategies for Marine Environmental Protection' 
(1991). Submitted by Greenpeace International to the Fourteenth Consultative Meeting of the London 
Dumping Convention (LDC). IMO, London, 25-29 November 1991.
95 Dr. R.B. Clark, also quoted in Chap. 3, writes: 'In Europe there is a strong trend towards the 
elimination of disposing of wastes to the sea. It is perhaps best exemplified in the German 
Versorgeprindp, or 'precautionary principle'. In other words a decision has already been taken that the 
sea must be exempt, so far as possible, from receiving waste discharges. In that case, marine science no 
longer has an effective contribution to make to decision-making about waste disposal options'. R.B. 
Clark 'Ocean Dumping', Marine Pollution Bulletin 20 (June 1989), 295. When the goal is to reduce waste 
discharges as much as possible, regulatory decisions will then be concerned with choosing technologies 
that best meet this goal. Marine science, however, cannot contribute to the realization of such a goal.
marine science advisory group, are proposing new ways to make decisions for all kinds of 
wastes, low-level radioactive waste included Some recent proposals are encouraging
97
Comprehensiveness was one of the key concepts of the strategy to protect the global 
environment laid out by the Stockholm secretariat in 1972. The secretariat was aware that 
decisions and institutions may be shifting problems into other sectors of the environment 
rather than coming to grips with them. As an international management arrangement for a 
single waste management activity, the international dumping regime could be shifting 
problems around rather than 'solving' them. Wastes that are not disposed of at sea must 
ultimately be disposed of on land, or in the air (incineration). In order to avoid transferring 
harm to other environmental sectors, the decision whether or not to dispose of at sea should, 
therefore, include a comparison with harm from using other disposal options.
The London Dumping Convention says, in its Annex 3, that the competent national 
agency should compare the risks from ocean disposal with the risks from land-based 
methods of disposal before issuing a dumping permit. But such comparative risk 
assessments have never been carried out in a systematic fashion. As Chapter 7 showed, the 
risks from land-based methods of disposal of low-level radioactive waste were not 
systematically taken into account when the decision to ban radwaste disposal was made. The 
ban was based only on the risks to humans and the marine environment from dumping. The 
London Dumping Convention's Annex 3 should therefore be strengthened. But without 
comprehensive knowledge of the behavior of contaminants in the marine environment and 
effects on humans it obviously will be impossible to make comparative risk assessments.
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96 The Advisory Committee on Marine Pollution (ACMP) is set up by the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), a Copenhagen-based scientific advisory organization founded at the 
beginning of the century. While ACMP does not give scientific advise to the international dumping 
regime, some of ACMP's members are also members of GESAMP and the two advisory groups have the 
same view on what is the best approach to management of marine pollution. For a brief description of 
ICES, see Gunnar Alexandersson, The Baltic Straits (Hague: Mart in us Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), 95-%.
97 For ACMP's approach to environmental management and protection, see Report of the ICES 
Advisory Committee on Marine Pollution 'Cooperative Research Report No. 167 (ICES: Copenhagen, 
August 1989), 124-45.
Marine scientists agree that the ocean in principle has an assimilative capacity. But 
a consensus definition -  'the amount of material that could be contained within a body of 
seawater without producing an unacceptable biological impact' -  was reached only in 1979 
at a workshop held in the United States 98. It follows from this definition that pollution is 
an unacceptable change to the environment and that change in itself does not constitute 
pollution It presently seems evident that much research is needed before marine 
scientists will know which contaminants can be assimilated, and in which quantities. Marine 
scientific research should consequently be supported 10°. There will otherwise be no 
foundation for a more informed ocean dumping policy and improvement of the black and 
grey lists system. More knowledge will also have important implications for public 
legitimacy of policy. Since the debate on the concept of assimilative capacity presently is 
still evolving within the marine scientific community the scientific basis of ocean protection 
policies is vulnerable to criticism 101. A more permissive ocean dumping policy that
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98 A brief account of the history and conceptual development of the assimilative capacity concept and 
associated concepts is given by A.R.D. Stebbing The Environmental Capacity Concept and the 
Precautionary Principle' (ICES. C. Af. 1991/E24).
99 See M. Tomczak, Jr Defining Marine Pollution: A Comparison of Definitions Used by International 
Conventions’, Marine Policy, October 1984, 311-22. For brief discussion of GESAMP's definition, see 
also Virginia 1C Tippie and Dana R. Kester, eds., Impact o f Marine Pollution on Society, 76. More 
generally, see Allen L. Springer Towards A Meaningful Concept of Pollution in International Law,' 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 26 (July 1977), 531-57.
100 Although made in the context of land-based sources of marine pollution, for a proposal for policy 
relevant marine science research which includes acquisition of a baseline data base, identification of key 
pollutants, agreement on the acceptable levels of the identified key pollutants, and monitoring, see Robert 
J. McManus 'Legal Aspects of Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution' in Jonathan I. Chamey, ed., The 
New Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces, 90-111.
101 For an argument stressing that knowledge of the marine environment is too limited for opening 
up the oceans to more waste disposal, see biologist Kenneth S. Kamlet The Oceans as Waste Space: The 
Rebuttal', in Oceanus 24 (1981), 10-17. Greenpeace's view is more radical. It is not clear whether or 
not the organization accepts the concept of assimilative capacity ['imprecise']. And with respect to the 
definition of pollution: '...for many substances, there can, in our view, be no clear distinction between 
'contamination' and 'pollution'. IMO document LDC14/Inf.29 'Critical Review o f GESAMP Report No. 
45 on 'Global Strategies for Marine Environmental Protection' (1991), 4. Greenpeace has elsewhere 
provided a definition of pollution which, similar to GESAMP's definition, ultimately hinges on the notion 
of acceptability. Criticizing another recent GESAMP report, Greenpeace concludes: This inherent flaw 
in the GESAMP report arises from a persistence with the now outdated notion that 'pollution' is distinct
lacked a firm scientific foundation obviously would be difficult to legitimize.
GESAMP and ACMP criticize the regulatory approach taken by most international 
marine pollution arrangements because 'the occurrence or risk of pollution becomes the 
major criterion for regulatory action' 102. In their view, this is a conceptually flawed 
approach and leads to haphazardous regulation. Instead, they stress the need to distinguish 
between contamination and pollution and the importance of agreeing on a definition of 
'acceptability' with respect to environmental change. They also stress that overall regulatory 
priorities are in need of improvement and, on the administrative and regulatory level, the aim 
must be to spend financial resources available for marine environmental protection in the 
most rational and cost-effective way. They suggest the principle of justification, which is 
applied by ICRP 103. While this principle really concerns decision-making at an earlier, 
more general stage, regulatory decisions concerning for example ocean dumping should 
attempt to maximize net benefit to society: 'A justified practice will be one for which the 
combined benefits to the whole of society are considered to outweigh the combined deficits
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from 'contamination'. There is an implicit assumption that pollution, defined as 'harm' in the marine 
environment, can be readily identified whenever it occurs. However, as we shall argue, 'harm' has to be 
defined as some anthropogenic change in (usually) marine biota or risk to man as measured against the 
natural background and its fluctuations, together with a subjective judgement on the degree of change that 
is acceptable'. IMO document LDC/Inf. 30 'Critical Review of GESAMP's ’State of the Marine 
Environment' Report No. 39 (1990)'. Submitted by Greenpeace International to the Fourteenth 
Consultative Meeting of the London Dumping Convention (LDC), IMO, London, 25-29 November 1991,
5. Although referring only to toxic wastes, the scientific advisor to Nauru apparently rejects the concept 
of assimilative capacity: The oceans have always been used as a waste repository by human societies. 
In pre-industrial times, total toxic waste generation was small in comparison with global limits, and 
wastes were managed under the permissive 'dilute and disperse' philosophy. Corollary concepts included 
the idea that the oceans have an 'assimilative capacity' for toxic wastes'. W. Jackson Davis 'Global 
Aspects of Marine Pollution Policy: The Need for a New International Convention', 193.
102 GESAMP report no. 45 'Global Strategies for Marine Environmental Protection', 25.
103 ICRP expresses the principle of justification in the following form: Wo practice shall be adopted 
unless its introduction produces a positive new benefit'. Report of the ICES Advisory Committee on 
Marine Pollution 'Cooperative Research Report No. 167, 129. The concept of justification has, together 
with the concept of optimization ['all exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic 
and social factors being taken into account'] and compliance with dose limits ['the dose equivalent to 
individuals shall not exceed the limits recommended for the appropriate circumstances...'] has also been 
advocated as an approach to regulation of radwaste disposal. See, for example, IAEA Safety Series No. 
65 'Environmental Assessment Methodologies for Sea Dumping of Radioactive Wastes' (Vienna: IAEA, 
1984).
or detriment, environmental effects being only part of the latter1 104. When selecting the 
best option, therefore, many broad issues need to be addressed, including economic, social, 
political, and scientific considerations as well as the nature and extent of damage.
GESAMP and ACMP endorse the concept of assimilative capacity and distinguish 
between acceptable and unacceptable change to the marine environment. In accordance with 
the Stockholm strategy, they stress that so-called holistic considerations should be made in 
all cases, radwaste disposal included 10s. This, furthermore, will also minimize the total 
harm inflicted on the environment. The GESAMP and ACMP proposal could form the basis 
of how decisions with respect to marine environmental protection, and especially the role of 
science herein, could be made in the future. A need for developing ways to include aspects 
other than scientific and technical ones in decision-making with significant economic, 
employment, social, and energy consequences for society clearly exists. The present process 
of making decisions encourages manipulation of scientific and technical issues. But lack of 
information on various 'practices" potential for environmental damage and effects on humans, 
difficulties involved in setting a price on environmental quality, and other issues, will make 
use of the proposal difficult. However, the proposal addresses several of the shortcomings 
of the existing approach within the international dumping regime.
The black and grey lists system, in essence the international dumping regime's 
regulatory approach, illustrates such shortcomings. It relies heavily on the categorization of 
harmful substances as either safe or unsafe. But marine scientists do not categorize 
substances in that way. Put simply, their view is instead that 'it all depends on the dose' 
106. The black and grey lists system does not take into consideration the aggregate amount 
or concentration of wastes, the assimilative capacity of the receiving body of ocean water, 
various uses of the oceans (e.g. recreation, fishing, or exploitation of mineral resources), or
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104 Ibid., 124.
105 J. Mike Bewers and Chris J.R. Garrett 'Analysis of the Issues Related to Sea Dumping of 
Radioactive Waste', 119.
106 A.R.D. Stebbing The Environmental Capacity Concept and the Precautionary Principle' (ICES. C. 
M. 1991/E.24), 5.
dumping periods 107. Furthermore, the convention, as one participant of early scientific 
working groups has noted, ’give[s] no specific criteria for the inclusion of materials in each 
Annex [i.e. the black and grey lists] and there can be little doubt that some of the substances 
were included on the basis of very little scientific evidence'108. This regulatory approach, 
categorizing substances as either safe or unsafe for regulatory purposes, is widespread and 
must necessarily be changed if the international dumping regime is to become a more 
efficient and rational regulatory regime in the future 109.
Finally, it is essential to consider the power of public opinion when examining the 
possibility that the international dumping regime will become a more efficient, rational and 
holistic regime in the future. It should be recalled that the ban on radwaste disposal 
reflected international public opinion on this issue. International public opinion thus will set 
the boundaries within which policy will develop in the future. But international public 
opinion might gradually change. It should be recalled that dumping of low-level radioactive 
waste was being carried out for almost four decades before this practice was banned. But 
environmentalism is a fact today.
A more rational and holistic strategy towards protection of the marine environment 
will be very difficult to develop. The crucial point will be education of the public, 
politicians and other decision-makers about the health of the marine environment and risks 
to the marine environment and humans n0. Mass media should be used to educate the
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107 Annex 3 of the London Dumping Convention does list such considerations. But, as a former EPA 
official has noted: 'Annex 3, however, is totally lacking in prescriptive content'. Robert J. McManus 
'Ocean Dumping: Standards in Action' in David A. Kay and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., Environmental 
Protection. The International Dimension, 124. For Annex 3, see Appendix A.
10* M.G. Norton The Oslo and London Dumping Conventions', 147.
109 For another example of this regulatory approach and a presentation of the decision process 
approach as an alternative way to make complex decisions, see Oliver E. Williamson 'Saccharin: An 
Economist's View' in Robert W. Crandall and Lester B. Lave, eds., The Scientific Basis o f Health and 
Safety Regulation (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 131-51.
110 On the domestic level, changing public opinion through education is often seen as essential to 
resolving waste facility siting disputes. For a pessimistic account of such attempts, see Herbert Inhaber 
'Of LULUs, NIMBYs, and NIMTOOs,' The Public Interest no. 107 (Spring 1992), 52-64. For a different 
approach, developed by a group of American siting experts, see Lawrence E. Susskind 'A Negotiation
public and politicians when substances are not as hazardous as we previously thought m . 
A major step in this direction could be taken by environmental NGOs educating the public, 
politicians and the private sector about the choices that must be made between environmental 
protection and social and economic development, about the ultimate goal of minimizing the 
total harm inflicted on the environment, and about the need for research. This would 
necessitate that environmental groups and ultimately the green public reexamined their view 
of the balance between environmental protection and social and economic development. As 
part of such a process, NGOs from the environmental community -  which the public trust 
more than they trust industry, government, and scientists -  and the private sector should be 
able to fully participate in the work of expert groups 112. Such groups might provide a 
context within which the participants can get acquainted with the environmental and health 
sciences' advances as well as difficulties in detecting the impact of minute concentrations of 
substances and the economic and social concerns that regulation must and should take into
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Credo for Controversial Siting Disputes,' Negotiation Journal, October 1990, 309-14.
111 Although ecological disaster and human health threats make good copy, new knowledge giving 
a more complete picture has been reported on in the mass media. See, for example, Keith Schneider TJ.S. 
Officials Say Dangers of Dioxin Were Exaggerated', New York Times, August 15, 1991; Gina Kolata 
'Scientists Question Methods Used in Animal Cancer Tests', New York Times, August 31, 1991; Jane E. 
Brody 'Some Scientists Say Concern Over Radon Is Overblown by E.PA.', New York Times, January 8, 
1991; Philip Shabecoff 'Acid Rain Report Confirms Concern: But Study Group's Final Draft Concludes 
Problem Is Not of Crisis Proportions', New York Tunes, September 6, 1990; Gina Kolata 'Researchers 
Now See a Danger In Very Low Levels of Cholesterol', International Herald Tribune, August 12, 1992.
112 A survey from the mid-1980s asking the British public who they would trust to supervise nuclear 
waste found that 'MPs of any party, managers from the nuclear industry, and anyone in the government, 
police, or armed forces were the last people' that interviewees would trust. Public trust was limited to 
groups like Greenpeace, 'independent scientists', 'women', and 'investigative journalists'. There was 'deep 
public scepticism about the feasibility of properly monitoring (any radioactive waste disposal) system. 
Most people felt that bribery, corruption or hit squads might be employed to shut up dissenters". Duncan 
Campbell and Patrick Forbes '£100 Million To Be Made As Nuclear Waste Dumpers Scramble To Get 
Rich,’ New Statesman, 18 October, 1985, 5. For recent studies of public risk perception, see Paul Slovic, 
Mark Layman, and James H. Flynn 'Risk Perception, Trust, and Nuclear Waste: Lessons from Yucca 
Mountain' Environment 33 (April 1991), 6 ff. More generally, see Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A 
History o f Images. Public fear is not confined to nuclear waste; bio-technology, chemicals, and pesticides 
cause similar reactions. This phenomenon which often is, somewhat imprecisely, referred to as a decline 
in public trust in science and technology first became visible in Western democracies in the early 1960s. 
For a brief, perceptive discussion, see National Science Foundation 'Assessment o f Future National and 
International Problem Areas. Vol. V (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1977), 51-61.
account. Also, since the nuclear industry can hardly be said to have an impressive record 
of public trust, environmental NGOs can play an important role as nuclear watchdogs 113. 
This is certainly in the interest of the public and might also be in the self-interest of the 
industry. Holistic alternatives to present regulation might also be developed more easily in 
a context that is less dominated by the traditions and protocol of international diplomacy. 
After several years' debate it thus is encouraging that the 1991 consultative meeting, partly 
because of their sometimes comprehensive knowledge of scientific and technical issues as 
well as practices of regulatory agencies and private industries and partly because of their 
'right' to participate, unanimously agreed that NGOs such as Greenpeace International in the 
future can participate in the work of the inter-govemmental scientific working groups 
established under the international dumping regime m.
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113 By bringing in nongovernment scientists environmental NGOs might counterbalance the special 
interests of government scientists. It has thus been argued that to be most effective, peer review of these 
government-sponsored studies should include nongovernment scientists. To argue to cancel or cut back 
a study is a difficult task for any scientist, governmental or nongovernmental. Nevertheless, 
nongovernmental scientists are less concerned about agency turf,' role, and budget and probably find it 
easier to say that a study, no matter how well dome, cannot answer the important questions'. Michael 
Gough ’Environmental Epidemiology: Separating Politics and Science’ Issues in Science and Technology 
3 (Summer 1987), 30.
114 Most importantly, the Scientific Group on Dumping and the Intergovernmental Panel of Experts 
on Radioactive Wastes (IGPRAD).
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Appendix A
The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and other Matter
Preamble
The Contracting Parties to this Convention
Recognizing that the marine environment and the living organisms which it supports are of vital importance to 
humanity, and all people have an interest in assuring that it is so managed that its quality and resources are not 
impaired;
Recognizing that the capacity of the sea to assimilate wastes and render them harmless, and its ability to 
regenerate natural resources, is not unlimited;
Recognizing that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
Recalling Resolution 2749 (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the principles governing 
the sea bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
Noting that marine pollution originates in many sources, such as dumping and discharges through the 
atmosphere, rivers, estuaries, outfalls and pipelines, and that it is important that States use the best practicable 
means to prevent such pollution and develop products and processes which will reduce the amount of harmful 
wastes to be disposed of;
Being convinced that international action to control the pollution of the sea by dumping can and must be taken 
without delay but that this action should not preclude discussion of measures to control other sources of marine 
pollution as soon as possible and;
Wishing to improve protection of the marine environment by encouraging States with a common interest in 
particular geographical areas to enter into appropriate agreements supplementary to this Convention:
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the effective control of all sources of pollution 
of the marine environment, and pledge themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the 
pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, 
to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the 
sea:
Article 2
Contracting Parties shall, as provided for in the following Articles, take effective measures individually, 
according to their scientific, technical and economic capabilities, and collectively, to prevent marine pollution
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caused by dumping and shall harmonize their policies in this regard.
Article 3
For the purpose of this Convention:
1 (a) "Dumping” means:
(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or 
other man-made structures at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures 
at sea;
(b) "Dumping" does not include:
(i) the disposal at sea of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the normal 
operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their 
equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms 
or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter 
or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft 
platforms or structures
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided 
that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention.
(c) The disposal of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to the exploration, 
exploitation and associated off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources will not be 
covered by the provisions of this Convention.
2. "Vessels and aircraft" means waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever. This 
expression includes air cushioned craft and floating craft, whether self-propelled or not.
3. "Sea" means all marine waters other than the internal waters of States.
4. "Wastes or other matter" means material and substances of any kind, form or description.
5. "Special permit" means permission granted specifically on application in advance and in accordance 
with Annex II and Annex III.
6. "General permit" means permission granted in advance and in accordance with Annex III.
7. "The Organisation" means the organization designated by the Contracting Parties in accordance 
with Article 14(2).
Article 4
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention Contracting Parties shall prohibit the dumping of any 
wastes or other matter in whatever form or condition except as otherwise specified below:-
a. The dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex I is prohibited;
b. The dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex II requires a prior special permit;
c. The dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior general permit.
2. Any permit shall be issued after careful consideration of all the factors set forth in Annex III, including prior
studies of the characteristics of the dumping site, as set forth in Sections B and C of that Annex.
3. No provision of this Convention is to be interpreted as preventing a Contracting Party from prohibiting, 
insofar as that Party is concerned, the dumping of wastes or other matter not mentioned in Annex I. That Party 
shall notify such measures to the Organisation.
Article 5
1. The Provisions of Article 4 shall not apply when it is necessary to secure the safety of human life or of 
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea in cases of force majeure caused by stress of 
weather, or in any case which constitutes a danger to human life or a real threat to vessels, aircraft, platforms 
or other man-made structures at sea, if dumping appears to be the only way of averting the threat and if there
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is every probability that the damage consequent upon such dumping will be less than would otherwise occur. 
Such dumping shall be so conducted as to minimize the likelihood of damage to human or marine life and shall 
be reported forthwith to the Organisation.
2. A Contracting Party may issue a special permit as an exception to Article 4(la), in emergencies, posing 
unacceptable risk relating to human health and admitting no other feasible solution. Before doing so the Party 
shall consult any other country or countries that are likely to be affected and the Organisation which, after 
consulting other Parties, and international organisations as appropriate, shall, in accordance with Article 14 
promptly recommend to the Party the most appropriate procedures to adopt. The Party shall follow there 
recommendations to the maximum extent feasible consistent with the time within which action must be taken 
and with the general obligation to avoid damage to the marine environment and shall inform the Organisation 
of the action it takes. The Parties pledge themselves to assist one another in such situations.
3. Any Contracting Party may waive its rights under paragraph 2 at the time of, or subsequent to ratification 
of, or accession to this Convention.
Article 6
1. Each Contracting Party shall designate an appropriate authority or authorities to:
a. issue special permits which shall be required prior to, and for, the dumping of matter listed in 
Annex II and in the circumstances provided for in Article 5(2);
b. issue general permits which shall be required prior to and for the dumping of all other matter;
c. keep records of the nature and quantities of all matter permitted to be dumped and the location, 
time and method of dumping;
d. monitor individually, or in collaboration with other Parties and competent international 
organisations, the condition of the seas for the purposes of this Convention;
2. The appropriate authority or authorities of a Contracting Party shall issue prior special or general permits 
in accordance with paragraph 1 in respect of matter intended for dumping:
a. loaded in its territory;
b. loaded by a vessel or aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag, when loading occurs in 
the territory of a State not party to this Convention
3. In issuing permits under sub-paragraph la and b above, the appropriate authority or authorities shall comply 
with Annex HI, together with such additional criteria, measures and requirements as they may consider relevant.
4. Each Contracting Party, directly or through a Secretariat established under a regional agreement, shall report 
to the Organisation, and where appropriate to other Parties, the information specified in sub-paragraphs c and 
d of paragraph 1 above, and the criteria, measures and requirements it adopts in accordance with paragraph 3 
above. The procedure to be followed and the nature of such reports shall be agreed by the Parties in 
consultation.
Article 7
1. Each Contracting Party shall apply the measures required to implement the present Convention 
to all:
a. vessels and aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag;
b. vessels and aircraft loading in its territory or territorial seas matter which is to be dumped;
c. vessels and aircraft and fixed or floating platforms under its jurisdiction believed to be engaged 
in dumping.
2. Each party shall take in its territory appropriate measures to prevent and punish conduct in contravention 
of the provisions of this Convention.
3. The Parties agree to co-operate in the development of procedures for the effective application of this 
Convention particularly on the high seas, including procedures for the reporting of vessels and aircraft observed 
dumping in contravention of the Convention.
4. This Convention shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under 
international law. However each Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures that such vessels 
and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention,
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and shall inform the Organisation accordingly.
5. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of each Party to adopt other measures, in accordance with 
the principles of international law, to prevent dumping at sea.
Article 8
In order to further the objectives of this Convention, the Contracting Parties with common interests to protect 
in the marine environment in a given geographical area shall endeavour, taking into account characteristic 
regional features, to enter into regional agreements, consistent with this Convention for the prevention of 
pollution, especially by dumping. The Contracting Parties to the present Convention shall endeavour to act 
consistently with the objectives and provisions of such regional agreements, which shall be notified to them 
by the Organisation. Contracting Parties shall seek to co-operate with the Parties to regional agreements in 
order to develop harmonized procedures to be followed by Contracting Parties to the different conventions 
concerned. Special attention shall be given to co-operation in the field of monitoring and scientific research.
Article 9
The Contracting Parties shall promote, through collaboration within the Organisation and other international 
bodies, support for those Parties which request it for:
a. the training of scientific and technical personnel;
b. the supply of necessary equipment and facilities for research and monitoring;
c. the disposal and treatment of waste and other measures to prevent or mitigate pollution caused 
by dumping;
preferably within the countries concerned, so furthering the aims and purposes of this Convention.
Article 10
In accordance with the principles of international law regarding state responsibility for damage to the 
environment of other States or to any other area of the environment, caused by dumping of wastes and other 
matter of all kinds, the Contracting Parties undertake to develop procedures for the assessment of liability and 
the settlement of disputes regarding dumping.
Article 11
The Contracting Parties shall at their first consultative meeting consider procedures for the settlement of 
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this Convention.
Article 12
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to promote, within the competent specialized agencies and other 
international bodies, measures to protect the marine environment against pollution caused by:-
(a) hydrocarbons, including oil, and their wastes;
(b) other noxious or hazardous matter transported by vessels for purposed other than dumping;
(c) wastes generated in the course of operation of vessels, aircraft, platforms and other man-made 
structures at sea;
(d) radioactive pollutants from all sources, including vessels;
(e) agents of chemical and biological warfare;
(f) wastes or other matter directly arising form, or related to the exploration, exploitation and 
associated off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources.
The Parties will also promote, within the appropriate international organisation, the codification of signals to 
be used by vessels engaged in dumping.
Article 13
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the codification and development of the law of the sea by the United 
Nations conference on the Law of the Sea convened pursuant to Resolution 2750C (25) of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations nor the present of future claims and legal views of any State concerning the
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law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag state jurisdiction. The Contracting Parties agree 
to consult at a meeting to be convened by the Organisation after the Law of the Sea Conference, and in any 
case not later than 1976, with a view to defining the nature and extent of the right and the responsibility of a 
coastal state to apply the Convention in a zone adjacent to its coast.
Article 14
1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as a depository shall call 
a meeting of the Contracting Parties not later than three months after the entry into force of this Convention 
to decide on organisational matters.
2. The Contracting Parties shall designate a competent Organisation existing at the time of that meeting to be 
responsible for secretariat duties in relation to this Convention. Any Party to this Convention not being a 
member of this Organisation shall make an appropriate contribution to the expenses incurred by the 
Organisation in performing these duties.
3. The Secretariat duties of the Organisation shall include :-
a. the convening of consultative meetings of the Contracting Parties not less frequently than once 
every two years and of special meetings of the Parties at any time on the request of two-thirds 
of the Parties;
b. preparing and assisting, in consultation with the Contracting Parties and appropriate International 
Organisations, in the development and implementation of procedures referred to in sub- 
paragraph 4e of this Article;
c. considering inquiries by, and information from the Contracting Parties, consulting with them and 
with the appropriate International Organisations, and providing recommendations to the Parties 
on questions related to, but not specifically covered by the Convention.
d. conveying to the Parties concerned all notifications received by the Organisations in accordance 
with Articles 4(3), 5(1) and (2), 6(4), 13, 20 and 21.
Prior to the designation of the Organisation these functions shall, as necessary, be performed by the depository, 
who for this purpose shall be the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
4. Consultative or special meetings of the Contracting Parties shall keep under continuing review the 
implementation of this Convention and may, inter alia:
a. review and adopt amendments to this Convention and its Annexes in accordance with Article 15;
b. invite the appropriate body or bodies to collaborate with and advise the Parties or the 
Organisation on any scientific or technical aspect relevant to this Convention, including 
particularly the content of the Annexes;
c. receive and consider reports made pursuant to Article 6(4);
d. promote co-operation with and between regional organisations concerned with the prevention of 
marine pollution;
e. develop or adopt, in consultation with appropriate International Organisations, procedures 
referred to in Article 5(2), including basic criteria for determining exceptional and emergency 
situations, and procedures for consultative advice and the safe disposal of matter in such 
circumstances, including the designation of appropriate dumping areas, and recommend 
accordingly;
f. consider any additional action that may be required;
5. The Contracting Parties at their first consultative meeting shall establish rules of procedure as necessary.
Article 15
l.a. At meetings of the Contracting Parties called in accordance with Article 14 amendments to this convention 
may be adopted by a two-thirds majority of those present. An amendment shall enter into force for the Parties 
which have accepted it on the sixtieth day after two-thirds of the Parties shall have deposited an instrument 
of acceptance of the amendment with the Organisation. Thereafter the amendment shall enter into force for 
any other Party 30 days after that Party deposits its instrument of acceptance of the amendment,
l.b. The Organisation shall inform all Contracting Parties of any requests made for a special meeting under
250
Article 14 and of any amendments adopted at meetings of the Paities and of the date on which each such 
amendment enters into force for each Party.
2. Amendments to the Annexes will be based on scientific and technical considerations. Amendments to the 
Annexes approved by a two-thirds majority of those present at a meeting called in accordance with Article 14 
shall enter into force for each Contracting Party immediately on notification of its acceptance to the 
Organisation and 100 days after approval by the meeting for all other Parties except for those which before the 
end of the 100 days make a declaration that they are not able to accept the amendment at that time. Parties 
should endeavour to signify their acceptance of an amendment to the Organisation as soon as possible after 
approval at a meeting. A Party may at any time substitute an acceptance for a previous declaration of objection 
and the amendment previously objected to shall thereupon enter into force for that Party.
3. An acceptance or declaration of objection under this Article shall be made by the deposit of an instrument 
with the Organisation. The Organisation shall notify all Contracting Parties of the receipt of such instrument.
4. Prior to the designation of the Organisation, the Secretarial functions herein attributed to it, shall be 
performed temporarily by the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, as one of the 
depositaries of this Convention.
Article 16
This Convention shall be open for signature by any State at London, Mexico City, Moscow and Washington 
from 29 December 1972 until 31 December 1973.
Article 17
This Convention shall be subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Governments of Mexico, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America.
Article 18
After 31 December 1973, this Convention shall be open for accession by any State. The instruments of 
accession shall be deposited with the Governments of Mexico, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
Article 19
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the fifteenth 
instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each Contracting Party ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the fifteenth
instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit
by such Party of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 20
The depositaries shall inform Contracting Parties:
a. of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of ratification, accession or
withdrawal, in accordance with Articles 16, 17, 18 and 21 and
b. of the date on which this Convention will enter into force, in accordance with Article 19. 
Article 21
Any Contracting Party may withdraw from this Convention by giving six months' notice in writing to a 
depositary, which shall promptly inform all Parties of such notice.
Article 22
The original of this Convention of which the English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, 
shall be deposited with the Governments of Mexico, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the United States of America who shall send certified copies thereof to all 
States.
Annex I
1. Organohalogen compounds.
2. Mercury and mercury compounds.
3. Cadmium and cadmium compounds.
4. Persistent plastics and other persistent synthetic materials, for example, netting and ropes, which may 
float or may remain in suspension in the sea in such a manner as to interfere materially with fishing, 
navigation or other legitimate uses of the sea.
5. Crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, and lubricating oils, hydraulic fluids, and any mixtures containing 
any of these, taken on board for the purpose of dumping.
6. High-level radioactive wastes or other high-level radioactive matter, defined on public health, biological 
or other grounds, by the competent international body in this field, at present the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, as unsuitable for dumping at sea.
7. Materials in whatever form (e.g. solids, liquids, semi-liquids, gases or in a living state) produced for 
biological and chemical warfare.
8. The preceding paragraphs of this Annex do not apply to substances which are rapidly rendered harmless 
by physical, chemical or biological processes in the sea provided they do not:
(i) make edible marine organisms unpalatable, or
(ii) endanger human health or that of domestic animals.
The consultative procedure provided for under Article 14 should be followed by a Party if there is doubt about 
the harmlessness of the substance.
9. This Annex does not apply to wastes or other materials (e.g. sewage sludges and dredged spoils) 
containing the matters referred to in paragraphs 1-5 above as trace contaminants. Such wastes shall be 
subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III as appropriate.
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Annex II
The following substances and materials requiring special care are listed for the purposes of Article 6(la). A  
Wastes containing significant amounts of the matters listed below: 
arsenic )
lead ) and their compounds 
copper ) 
zinc )
organosilicon compounds
cyanides
fluorides
pesticides and their by-products not covered in Annex I.
B. In the issue of permits for the dumping of large quantities of acids and alkalis, consideration shall be given 
to the possible presence in such wastes of the substances listed in paragraph A and to the following additional 
substances:
beryllium )
chromium ) and their compounds
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nickel ) 
vanadium )
C. Containers, scrap metal and other bulky wastes liable to sink to the sea bottom which may present a serious 
obstacle to fishing or navigation.
D. Radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter not included in Annex I. In the issue of permits for the 
dumping of this matter, the Contracting Parties should take full account of the recommendations of the 
competent international body in this field, at present the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Annex III
Provisions to be considered in establishing criteria governing the issue of permits for the dumping of matter 
at sea, taking into account Article 4(2) include:- »
A  CHARACTERISTICS AND COMPOSITION OF THE MATTER
1. Total amount and average composition of matter dumped (e.g. per year).
2. Form, e.g. solid, sludge, liquid, or gaseous.
3. Properties: physical (e.g. solubility and density), chemical and biochemical (e.g. oxygen demand, 
nutrients) and biological (e.g. presence of viruses, bacteria, yeasts, parasites).
4. Toxicity.
5. Persistence: physical, chemical and biological.
6. Accumulation and biotransformation in biological materials or sediments.
7. Susceptibility to physical, chemical and biochemical changes and interaction in the aquatic 
environment with other dissolved organic and inorganic materials.
8. Probability of production of taints or other changes reducing marketability of resources (fish, 
shellfish, etc).
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DUMPING SITE AND METHOD OF DEPOSIT
1. Location (e.g. co-ordinates of the dumping area, depth and distance from the coast), location in 
relation to other areas (e.g. amenity areas, spawning, nursery and fishing areas and exploitable 
resources).
2. Rate of disposal per specific period (e.g. quantity per day, per week, per month).
3. Methods of packaging and containment, if any.
4. Initial dilution achieved by proposed method of release.
5. Dispersal characteristics (e.g. effects of currents, tides and wind on horizontal transport and 
vertical mixing).
6. Water characteristics (e.g. temperature, pH, salinity, stratification, oxygen indices of pollution -  
dissolved oxygen (DO), chemical oxygen demand (COD), biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) -  
nitrogen present in organic and mineral form including ammonia, suspended matter, other 
nutrients and productivity).
7. Bottom characteristics (e.g. topography, geochemical and geological characteristics and biological 
productivity).
8. Existence and effects of other dumpings which have been made in the dumping area (e.g. heavy 
metal background reading and organic carbon content).
9. In issuing a permit for dumping, Contracting Parties should consider whether an adequate 
scientific basis exists for assessing the consequences of such dumping, as outlined in this Annex, 
taking into account seasonal variations.
C. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONDITIONS
1. Possible effects on amenities (e.g. presence of floating or stranded material, turbidity, 
objectionable odour, discoloration and foaming).
2. Possible effects on marine life, fish and shellfish culture, fish stocks and fisheries, seaweed 
harvesting and culture.
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3. Possible effects on other uses of the sea (e.g. impairment of water quality for industrial use, 
underwater corrosion of structures, interference with ship operations from floating materials, 
interference with fishing or navigation through deposit of waste or solid objects on the sea floor 
and protection of areas of special importance for scientific or conservation purposes).
4. The practical availability or alternative land based methods of treatment, disposal or elimination, 
or of treatment to render the matter less harmful for dumping at sea.
Done at London on the 13th day of November 1972.
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Appendix B 
Stockholm Secretariat Memo
Secretariat memo from Peter Thacher to Maurice Strong, dated 20 December, 1971.:
’1. The primary task between now and June is to refine and sell the product; get negotiations started leading 
to favourable action by Governments at Stockholm. The Prepcom session in March should be used to start a 
planned promotion campaign.
2. By the time you return to Geneva in late January all but a few of the action proposals will be in final form 
but not yet ready for presentation to Governments in February. The analytical process which underlies all 
subsequent promotion activities should be completed.
This will allow the secretariat to display information showing how proposals respond to areas of 
concern as well as the authentication of both needs and actions i.e. the source of the concerns 
(mostly in the basic inputs) and the sources of the proposals (in the basic inputs plus the 
preparatory process, IWG’s etc. [international working groups] and relating both of these to 
particular countries and regions.
3. By the end of February information should be in hand as to the financial and organizational steps needed
to get the post-Stockholm process started. Pre-Prepcom promotion work will be needed with a few
governments.
4. In order to plan the campaign that is it to get underway at the Prepcom we need to identify major target 
governments, i.e. those from whom support is critical, and draw up a plan for each government identifying the 
points of influence, both official and private (including mass media) which should be approached, as well as 
all assets, "friends", available to assist. This should be completed in February.
Chief among constraints will be availability of personnel and funds to support travel and reproduction 
of promotional material.
5. The plan should also take into account various international meetings at which the promotional material can 
usefully be presented.
With regard to specific subjects such as marine pollution, there may be regional and other meetings 
of importance at which our participation will be useful. We need to consider whether further work 
along the lines of our proposals can be advanced before Stockholm. The same may be true of other 
areas such as soils.
6. The Prepcom in March will attract considerable attention from a large number of states (many more than 
the 27 members of the Committee) and will be the first real occasion to present the actions proposed and the 
promotion material to world governments and press.
7. Immediately after a final review of experience gained at the Prepcom the planned promotional activity by 
staff, consultants, and "friends” should be launched.
8. Essential to the above promotion campaign is the dynamic quality of the actions proposed; they are not 
being presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, they are subject to modification both before and, if necessary, 
at Stockholm.
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9. In summary:
January: 1.
2.
3.
February: 1.
2.
3.
4.
March: 1.
Z
April- 1.
June\
Completion of analysis relating the recommended actions to inputs.
Work on costing and organizational proposals.
Developing a general plan for promotion based on available resources.
Completing of costing and organizational proposals.
Refinement of promotion plan including identification of specific targets and assets. 
Refinement of analysis in relation to targets.
Pre-Prepcom work with key governments.
Kick-off promotion campaign at Prepcom
Review of this experience and alteration of plans as necessary.
Carry out plan.
Kindly made available by Peter S. Thacher, presently Senior Counselor at World Resources Institute, 
Washington, D.C.
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Appendix C
Resolution LDC.14(7) 
Disposal of Radio-active Wastes and 
other Radio-active Matter at Sea
The Seventh Consultative Meeting,
Recognizing that the marine environment and the living resources of the sea are of vital importance to all 
nations,
Recognizing that the London Dumping Convention plays a decisive role as a means of protecting the marine 
environment,
Considering that the Convention should continue to be an effective global forum for the Contracting Parties 
in which to pool the advances of science and technology in their efforts to combat marine pollution,
Observing the increasing concern of a growing body of public opinion with regard to the dumping of radio­
active substances,
Recognizing that the practice of dumping radio-active substances at sea is limited to a small number of 
countries and that some of them have suspended such dumping,
Noting that, given the present state of research on the matter within international bodies, is considered necessary 
to carry out programmes to extend current knowledge of dumping zones,
Considering that the Seventh Consultative Meeting had decided to refer proposals for the amendment of 
Annexes I and II of the London Dumping Convention regarding the dumping of radio-active wastes and other 
radio-active matter at sea to an expert meeting on radio-active matters related to the London Dumping 
Convention,
Calls for the suspension of all dumping at sea of radio-active materials pending the presentation to the 
Contracting Parties of the final report of the expert meeting on radio-active matters related to the London 
Dumping Convention.
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Appendix D
Resolution LDC.21(9) 
Dumping of Radioactive Wastes at Sea
The Ninth Consultative Meeting,
Recognizing that the marine environment and the living resources of the sea are of vital importance to all 
nations and that the objective of the London Dumping Convention is to prevent the pollution of the seas by 
dumping,
Considering that the Convention should continue to be an effective global forum for the Contracting Parties 
in which to pool the advances of science and technology in their efforts to combat marine pollution,
Taking note of the increasing concern of a growing body of public opinion, and in particular among the 
populations living near present or potential dumping sites, with regard to the dumping of radioactive wastes 
at sea,
Recognizing that dumping of radioactive wastes at sea may adversely affect the environment of other nations 
and of regions beyond the limits of national jurisdiction in contravention with Principle sa of the UN 
Declaration on the Human Environment adopted in Stockholm in June 1972,
Recognizing that, under Article 1 od the Convention, Contracting Parties have pledged themselves specially to 
take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of wastes and other matter that is 
liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to 
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea,
Recalling that the Seventh Consultative Meeting in February 1983 adopted resolution LDC.14(7) which called 
for the suspension of all dumping at sea of radioactive materials pending the presentation to the Contracting 
Parties of the final report of an expert meeting in radioactive matters related to the London Dumping 
Convention,
Noting that, given the present state of research on the matter within international bodies, is considered necessary 
to carry out programmes to extend current knowledge of dumping zones,
Recognizing that the practice of dumping radioactive wastes at sea has been limited to a few States which have 
halted such dumping since the adoption of resolution LDC.14)7) of February 1983,
Noting the findings of the Expert Panel on the Disposal at Sea of Radioactive Wastes contained in document 
LDC 9/4, Annex 2, and expressing its appreciation to the experts involved in the preparation of this report,
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Noting that the Expanded Panel of Experts recognizes deficiencies in scientific information that need to be 
resolved for a rigorous and precise assessment of the consequences of sea dumping of radioactive wastes,
Accepting that, as noted by the Expert Panel, in the comparison between options, social, economic, scientific 
and technological factors are difficult to quantify on a common basis, especially where the social factors have 
international dimensions; and that, as also noted by the Expert Panel, in the final analysis social and related 
factors may outweigh those of a purely scientific and technical nature.
Noting also the absence of comparison between land-based and sea dumping options,
1. Agrees to a suspension of all dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter to 
permit time for the further consideration of issues which would provide a broader basis for an 
informed judgement on proposals for the amendment of the Annexes of the Convention. This 
suspension will continue pending the completion of the studies and assessments referred to in 
paragraph 2 to 5 hereunder;
2. Requests that additional studies and assessments of the wider political, legal, economic and social 
aspects of radioactive waste dumping at sea be undertaken by a panel of experts to complement 
the existing Expanded Panel Report;
3. Request that further assessments examine the issue of comparative land-based options and the 
costs and risks associated with these options;
4. Requests that studies and assessments examine the question of whether it can be proven that any 
dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea will not harm human life and/or 
cause significant damage to the marine environment;
5. Requests the IAEA to advise Contracting Parties with respect to certain outstanding scientific and 
technical issues relating to the sea dumping of radioactive wastes; specifically:
(a) To determine whether additional risks to those considered in the revised IAEA Definition and 
Recommendations justify re-examination of the definition of radioactive wastes and other 
radioactive matter unsuitable for dumping at sea for certain individual radionuclides;
(b) To establish source (dose) upper bounds appropriate to the practice of radioactive waste 
dumping under the Convention;
(c) To define quantitatively the exempt levels of radionuclides for the purposes of the Convention
6. Requests the Organization to approach appropriate international agencies to establish and maintain 
an inventory of radioactive wastes from all sources entering the marine environment;
7. Calls upon Contracting Parties to develop, as envisaged in Article 10, procedures for the assessment 
of liability on accordance with the principles of international law regarding State responsibility for 
damage to the environment of other States or to any other area of the environment resulting from 
dumping.
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